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 Resumo 
 
 
 
Nas últimas duas décadas do século XX, a questão ambiental assumiu o status de um 
problema global. Os efeitos colaterais da produção industrial são caracterizados como resultado 
de uma profunda crise institucional da sociedade industrial como um todo. Por outro lado, a 
capacidade de um país de suportar impactos relacionados às mudanças climáticas depende 
sistematicamente do nível de renda do mesmo país. Nesse cenário, o dilema de priorizar as 
preocupações ambientais ou o desenvolvimento econômico é o maior desafio dos países 
emergentes. Com a urbanização, o governo local desempenha um papel maior na resposta aos 
riscos das mudanças climáticas. Um dos riscos que mais afetam megacidades como Pequim é 
a poluição atmosférica. 
Tomando como exemplo a metrópole de Pequim, esta pesquisa analisará seus problemas 
de poluição atmosférica e as políticas adotadas. Mais importante, concentrando-se nos cientistas 
locais, com a identidade social de “especialistas” em Pequim, eles serão analisados e divididos 
em diferentes grupos em termos de percepção do risco de poluição atmosférica e de reação a 
ele em sua vida cotidiana e em suas pesquisas. 
 
 
 
Palavras-chave: Percepção de risco, Mudanças climáticas, Cientistas. Política ambiental – 
Pequim, Poluição 
 
  
 Abstract 
 
 
 
From the last two decades of the twentieth century, the environmental issue assumed the 
status of a global problem. The side effects of industrial production are characterized as the 
result of a profound institutional crisis of industrial society as a whole. On the other hand, a 
country’s ability to withstand impacts related to climate change is systematically dependent on 
the level of income of the same country. In this scenario, the dilemma of prioritizing 
environmental concerns or economic development is the biggest challenge of emerging 
countries. With urbanization, local government plays a greater role in responding to the risks 
of climate change. One of the risks that most affect megacities like Beijing is air pollution. 
Taking as example the metropolis of Beijing, this research will analyze its air pollution 
issues and the policies adopted. Most importantly, focusing on the local scientists, with the 
social identity of “experts” in Beijing, they will be analyzed and divided into different groups 
in terms of their recognition of the risk of air pollution and of their willingness to react to it in 
their daily lives and in their researches. 
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Preface 
My first contact with Brazil was no more than the basic information of Samba, football 
and Amazon Rainforest, until when I began to work as a researcher of Brazilian policies of 
science, technology and innovation in 2012. Before that, my major was Portuguese Language 
in Beijing Foreign Studies University (BFSU), the best university to learn foreign languages in 
China. And I spent one year in University of Coimbra (UC), Portugal, to take the course of 
Portuguese Language and Culture. Like all my classmates, our destiny after university is to 
work in a Portuguese-speaking country. There are many opportunities, as many Chinese 
companies are having construction projects in African countries and having more commercial 
affairs with Brazil. Eventually I got an offer from a company, that will send me to Brazil for 
three years. As soon as my mother heard this news, her tears came out, and she said: “You have 
no idea how much I suffered during the year you were in Portugal. I don’t want you to leave 
home any more...” So instead, I chose a job in a public institution, that will never send me out. 
And my daily work was reading Brazilian news about their recent policies on science, 
technology and innovation, as a reference to our policy makers. One day in 2014, a Brazilian 
strategy aiming at sustainable development and environmental protection of Amazon by 
improvement of the allocation of science and technology resources drew my attention. The 
same as many Chinese young people, I always hold a positive assessment of Brazil’s role 
regarding the environment (DWYER et al. 2016). So, this idea of “why not going to Brazil to 
study how does science and technology benefit to environment” came to my mind. This time, 
my mother didn’t stop me. That’s how my adventure to Brazil began. 
The reason why environmental problem can always draw my attention is because of my 
early experience when I was a child. As a local born Beijinger, in the memories of my entire 
life, there has never been a Spring without sandstorms, because of the geographic conditions, 
and in winter, only in a few days that we can see the blue sky. From a very young age, I was 
aware of the air pollution in Beijing as a serious problem. Maybe to many people, Beijing is 
just a temporary stay, somewhere to achieve their dreams or to capture wealth and resources. 
But to me, Beijing is my home, my last escape. I love it so much, that I hate to see it being 
polluted like this. So I decided to concentrate my research on air pollution in Beijing.  
Air pollution and climate change are strongly linked in China as the major GHGs and 
major air pollutants come from the same source, i.e. fossil fuels (Jiang et al., 2013; see also 
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Barbi 2016). This is firmly related to the coal-based energy structure and the industry-based 
economic growth model of China during a long history. And the governmental resolutions to 
the problem of air pollution and the response to climate change are aiming at the same purpose 
- transformation of energy structure and optimize the economic growth model. What’s more, 
the perception of the risk of air pollution also shows the similar unique characteristics to the 
perception of the risk of climate changes, such as the breadth of risk awareness, the differences 
in risk perception subjects and the conflict between risk perception and action. So as to the 
present research, to the case of Beijing, China, it is hard to extract “air pollution” from the topic 
of “climate change”. And in the following chapters, “air pollution” and “climate change” are 
always arisen together, unless when it is necessary to point out the particularity of “air pollution” 
from “climate change”. 
As mentioned before, my first attempt was to study “how does science and technology 
benefit to environment”, then after years of theoretical study, I found something more 
interesting to me - the interaction between the policy, the scientists and the environment. As the 
scientists have the double dual identity in the interaction - face to the environmental policies, 
they are both part of the policy makers and the people who the policy is applied to, at the same 
time, they are both the “experts” and the “lay people” face to the environment risks. If we can 
understand how this interaction works and the motivation mechanism behind it, we could make 
better policies to solve the problem of air pollution. 
To collect the data, questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, direct observation and 
documentary review are the main methodology used in this research. During the research, I 
have flown four times to Beijing, to get the official documents, send and collect the 
questionnaires and conduct interviews. The field research was conducted in my working entity 
in Beijing - Institutes of Science and Development of Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS/ISD). 
116 questionnaires were sent out and collected back 104 pieces. And interviews with  9 experts 
in the area of “climate change” was conducted. During the three years comes and goes to Beijing, 
I clearly noticed big improvement on the situation of air pollution. At least I saw more blue sky 
than the past years. And I also experienced government’s effort to the problem, the more 
convenient and more intelligent public transportation, for example. Of which, people are easy 
to ignore when living in and getting used to it. In this perspective, traveling between China and 
Brazil every now and then keeps me sensitive to see the surprising detailed improvement. 
Apart from the introduction and final comments, this research is divided into four chapters. 
The chapter of “introduction” is a theory and methodology chapter, with the arise of questions. 
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Then comes the first chapter, with a brief review of the national and local policies in connection 
with the problem of air pollution; chapter 2 describes the current air pollution situation in China 
and in Beijing; chapter 3 shows the result of the research; chapter 4 attempt to analyze the result 
and search for the reasons.  The final answers to the questions raised in the initial of the research 
will be listed in the chapter of “final comments”. 
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Introduction 
With the continual occurrence of man-made disasters caused by the development of post-
industrial society, potential risks – nuclear leaks, epidemics, war and terrorist incidents, etc. – 
are felt in all fields of people’s lives. The lack of control which many of us feel about some of 
the circumstances of our lives is real (Giddens, 1990:146). The public becomes more and more 
sensitive and vulnerable, people’s sense of fear increases day by day, and the risk problem has 
become the theme of today’s social debate. Due to the rapid development of science and 
technology and the expansion of globalization, human society began to enter a “risk society” 
era (Beck, 1992; 2009). 
The world in which we live today is a fraught and dangerous one. Different from the pre-
modern society, we are living in a world structured mainly by humanly created risks (Giddens, 
1990). Modernity is a double-edged phenomenon (Giddens, 1990:7). Three dominant sources 
of the dynamism of modernity, each connected with the other, are the separation of time and 
space; the development of disembedding mechanisms; and the reflexive appropriation of 
knowledge (Giddens, 1990:53). As Giddens (1990:110) justified, in conditions of modernity, 
the dangers we face no longer derive primarily from the world of nature. At first glance, the 
ecological dangers that we confront today might seem similar to the hazards of nature 
encountered in the pre-modern era. But deeply observed, ecological threats are the outcome of 
socially organized knowledge, mediated by the impact of industrialism upon the material 
environment. They are part of what Giddens called a new risk profile introduced by the advent 
of modernity. By a risk profile he means the particular portmanteau of threats or dangers 
characteristic of modern social life. As a result, living in the modern world is more like being 
aboard a careering juggernaut rather than being in a carefully controlled and well-driven motor 
car (Giddens, 1990). This “runaway world” (Giddens, 1990), because of the design faults, the 
operator failure, the complexity of systems and actions, and most importantly, the reflexivity 
or circularity of social knowledge, is driven by its persisting unintended consequences, which 
are out of our control. 
To begin the discussion of the risk society, we should firstly clarify that danger and risk 
are closely related but are not the same. As Giddens (1990: 34-35) explained, what risk 
presumes is precisely danger (not necessarily awareness of danger). A person who risks 
something courts danger, where danger is understood as a threat to desired outcomes. Anyone 
who takes a “calculated risk” is aware of the threat or threats which a specific course of action 
21 
 
 
brings into play. But it is certainly possible to undertake actions or to be subject to situations 
which are inherently risky without the individuals involved being aware how risky they are. In 
other words, they are unaware of the dangers they run. In addition, risk is not just a matter of 
individual action. There are “environments of risk” that collectively affect large masses of 
individuals – in some instances, potentially everyone on the face of the earth, as in the case of 
the risk of ecological disaster or nuclear war. 
The specific risk profile of modernity may be outlined in the following way: globalization 
of risk in the sense of intensity; globalization of risk in the sense of the expanding number of 
contingent events which affect everyone or at least large numbers of people on the planet; risk 
stemming from the built environment, or socialized nature: the infusion of human knowledge 
into the material environment; the development of institutionalized risk environments affecting 
the life chances of millions; awareness of risk as risk; the well-distributed awareness of risk; 
awareness of the limitations of expertise: no expert system can be wholly expert in terms of the 
consequences of the adoption of expert principles (Giddens, 1990:124-125). 
According to Giddens (1990:146-147), the possibility of global calamity, whether by 
nuclear war or other means, prevents us from reassuring ourselves with the assumption that the 
life of the species inevitably surpasses that of the individual, but no one knows how remote that 
possibility is. Interestingly, as Giddens (1990:146-147) observed, balanced against the deep 
anxieties which such circumstances must produce in virtually everyone, is the psychological 
prop of the feeling that “there’s nothing that I as an individual can do,” and that at any rate the 
risk must be very slight. Business-as-usual is a prime element in the stabilizing of trust and 
ontological security, and this no doubt applies in respect of high-consequence risks just as it 
does in other areas of trust relations.  
Yet, obviously even high-consequence risks are not only remote contingencies, which can 
be ignored in daily life, albeit at some probable psychological cost. Some such risks, and many 
others which are potentially life threatening for individuals or otherwise significantly affect 
them, intrude right into the core of day-to-day activities. This is true, for example, of any 
pollution damage which affects the health of adults or children. 
This interesting observation of Giddens, with a related survey of Public Attitudes and 
Behaviors in relation to the Environment (Ministry of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs-
DEFRA, the UK, 2007), initially inspired this study about the risk perception and the 
environmental behavior of the Chinese society. The results of the 2007 survey were produced 
from data collected from a representative sample of about 3,600 individuals in the UK during 
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the spring of 2007. The data were collected on behalf of DEFRA by the British Market Research 
Bureau (BMRB). The research itself was divided into several sections: Attitudes and 
Knowledge in Relation to the Environment, Transportation, Energy and Water Efficiency, 
Recycling, Ecological Purchases. Each section follows the following format: attitudes, 
behaviors, and barriers. In the result, it divided the audience into seven groups in terms of their 
recognition of the risk of climate change and their willingness to react to it at the level of their 
daily lives: “Positive greens”; “Waste-watchers”; “Concerned consumers”; “Sideline 
supporters”; “Cautious participants”; “Stalled starters”; “Honestly disengaged”. 
One group, the ‘positive greens’, accept that they should do as much as they 
can to limit their impact on the environment… A second group, the ‘waste-
watchers’, follow a ‘waste not want not’ philosophy, relevant to environmental 
goals, but not especially inspired by them. Thrift is part of their lives, presumably 
most often simply because of lack of resources[…] The third cluster, the 
‘concerned consumers’, […], say they ‘already do more than a lot of people’ and 
are not willing at the moment to do much more. A fourth cluster, the ‘sideline 
supporters’, accept that climate change is a major problem. Yet they are not 
contemplating any particular changes to their lifestyles. They say, for example, 
‘I don’t think much about how much water or electricity I use, and I forget to turn 
things off’, yet do seem to feel minor pangs of guilt about their attitudes[…] A 
fifth group, the ‘cautious participants’, do little to help the environment, but 
would do more if others did[…] The sixth cluster, labelled the ‘stalled starters’, 
say they don’t know much about climate change, and, in any case, lack the means 
to take any steps to help with the issue- they are mostly from non-affluent 
backgrounds. Most can’t afford a car, but would like to buy one if they could. 
Finally, the ‘honestly disengaged’ are either skeptical about, or indifferent 
towards, climate change (Giddens, 2009.Changing lives. In: The politics of 
Climate Change:100-110). 
 
The research in UK inspired me to investigate its Chinese version because Chinese society 
is facing the same risk and its reaction could be more interesting as Chinese society is heading 
to a totally different road of modernization. The development of Chinese society is embedded 
in the process of globalization and is part of the global risk society. There is no doubt about 
considering the cases of risk events that occurred in China in recent years.  In addition to the 
global crisis of SARS and bird flu, the H1N1 flu and the financial crisis, there have also been 
quite a number of food crisis and natural disaster incidents in China (Wang 2010). Going 
through a “compressed modernization”, China is currently experiencing the predicament of a 
synchronic coercion from the first and the second modernity, to which risk society might 
possibly provide a solution of “alternative social imaginary” (Deng, 2010). So, it is interesting 
to insert the Chinese society, specifically the local Beijing people in this study, into these seven 
groups, and adjust the groups according to the reality of the Beijing’s society. 
Due to its synchronicity of first and second modernity, China’s risk problems have shown 
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greater complexity than in the West. The paradox of risk conflict is that in China, risk can 
promote rationalization and institutional transformation. However, risk also eliminates the basis 
of industrialization and first modernization. China is moving toward an industrialized, risk-
based society that is in the process of transforming itself into a modern state that has been 
traditionalized by reflexive modernity (Deng, 2006). The “compressed modernization” (Chang, 
2009) of Chinese society strengthens the production of risks without leaving time for the 
systematic anticipation and management of risks. 
According to the theories of risk perception, such as the cultural theory, social 
amplification of risk and social institutional structural theory, Wang (2010) develops four 
hypotheses, in order to find the experience evidence in China for these theories. The data is 
from the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) collected in 2006. The results show that, in 
general, Chinese residents have a very strong risk perception to the problems challenged to 
Chinese development, especially for the energy and environment problems. Besides, residents’ 
risk perception is mainly determined by individual cognitive ability, media-contacts, urban and 
rural segmentation, and social status. Specifically, those who have higher education, more 
frequently media contacts, and higher social status, will have stronger risk perception. The 
urban residents have stronger risk perception than the rural residents. Also, based on this result, 
the present research will make a more specific analysis of risk perception focusing on the urban 
residents with higher education. 
According to Beck (1992, 1995, 2010a), climate change can be considered a component 
of a new set of contemporary environmental risks produced by the scientific and technological 
development process, which is qualitatively different from the typical risks of pre-industrial 
and industrial societies. These new postindustrial risks would be characterized thus by their 
global scope, by the incomplete understanding of their causes and consequences, by being 
immeasurable and impossible to be compensated, and most often invisible (i.e., phenomena that 
require expertise in relation to their recognition and their measurement). Therefore, they would 
be uncontrollable and difficult to have responsibilities assigned, often irreversible (Ferreira; 
Barbi, 2016). 
According to the debates around the risk theory presented by Beck (1992, 2009), the risks 
given by climate change are characterized by escaping from the sense perception, that is, they 
are phenomena located in the abstract of physical equations and chemical formulas, remaining 
thus invisible to the daily perceptions. They can be changed, expanded, dramatized or 
minimized within the knowledge and thus are open to definition and social construction. 
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Moreover, these risks are closely related to the future and to the misfortunes evaluated in 
probabilistic projections regarding different future possibilities. 
In the risk society, the technical and industrial development causes are unpredictable, 
invisible and incalculable risks that require self-reflection and self-confrontation of society with 
respect to the base of social cohesion and the examination of the grounds of their rationality. 
The boundaries between nature and culture are pulverized against a historical setting permeated 
by multiple porosities between natural and artificial, between nature and culture. The risk that 
characterizes contemporary industrial society is closely involved with future projections, with 
the misfortunes actively assessed in relation to the possibilities and the probable situations with 
which our society has only limited experience (Beck 1992, 2000b, 2009; Giddens 2005, 2009). 
These characteristics are closely related to the risks of climate change and are influenced by the 
increasing globalization (Young et al., 2006), which is one of the fundamental consequences of 
modernity (Giddens, 1990). 
 Globalization – which is a process of uneven development that fragments as it 
coordinates – introduces new forms of world interdependence, in which, once 
again, there are no “others”. These create novel forms of risk and danger at the 
same time as they promote far-reaching possibilities of global security. […] 
Modernity is universalizing not only in terms of its global impact, but in terms of 
the reflexive knowledge fundamental to its dynamic character” (Giddens 
1990:175). 
At the same time, with globalization, to reduce the competition among states in the global 
market, the strategy of “state specialization” is taken. As Beck explained (2005: 190-191), the 
division of labor between states can never be comprehended in a rigidly functional, technical 
way, but only in terms of a comprehensive profile in which technical, economic and functional 
aspects are embedded in cultural and political traditions and fictions. Focusing on this last factor, 
Beck identified four specialization strategies, available to states, which are: (a) the social 
democratic strategy of the protective state, (b) the downwardly mobile strategy of low-wage 
states, (c) the parasitic strategy of tax haven states, and (d) the Anglo-American strategy of neo-
liberal depoliticization, of divesting the state of its functions qua state. China was one of the 
states who took the downwardly mobile strategy during a long period, which is one of the main 
historical reasons of the environmental problems of China. 
The same as the other states of so-called Third World, China attempted to acquire a 
distinctive profile in the global market and to attract of low costs and few controls, which means 
they either relax or abolish laws to do with health and safety, the environment and state taxes. 
Beck (2005:197) pointed out that there is a dual meaning contained in the notion of strategies 
of “downward mobility”. Firstly, downward mobility becomes a specialization profile in inter-
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state relations, a proprietary brand used by these states to open themselves up to foreign capital 
in the global market. Secondly, this strategy can also be used to force downwardly mobile states 
into competition with one another so that they undercut one another, making downward 
mobility turn into exclusion. As Beck (2005:197) explained, this specialization in downward 
mobility poses a risk to itself insofar as it makes a gap in the inter-state system the basis of the 
state’s economic survival. In other words, the strategy of downward mobility not only stirs up 
competition among states themselves, it is also in open conflict with the interests of rich nation-
states, whose economic and cultural existence and political values are called into question by 
the creation of unlegislated zones for capital investment. If governments, too, were to become 
“global players”, these conflicts between rich and poor would intensify on a global scale. If 
norms of social justice, dignified forms of work and the peaceful use of natural resources are to 
become more widespread, the first prerequisite is an international consensus. Only if such 
consensus exists can effective sanctions be applied against those who violate the rules. 
Although the “downward mobility” was only limited temporally and locally in China, it caused 
serious harmful consequences to the environment until now. 
Recently, China, especially its famous capital and international big city Beijing, has been 
marked with a new label of “air pollution”. In fact, this is not a new problem. But the problem 
of air pollution is getting worse in recent years. We can see this problem from two points of 
view: Firstly, the air pollution is truly getting worse. Besides the geographic conditions and the 
energy matrix based on coal burning, with the high speed of industrial development and the 
following improvement of people’s living standards, there are much more energy consume and 
emissions during the production and the daily life than earlier. A good example is the rapidly 
increasing quantity of the ownership of private cars in the big cities as Beijing. Secondly, the 
problem of air pollution is getting much more attention. Once again, because of the industrial 
development and the following improvement of people’s living standards, the higher request of 
living conditions and the high speed spreading of information, people are getting aware of the 
problem and feel it threaten to their lives. At the same time, as China is getting more and more 
influential and having more and more attention of the world, along with its achievements, the 
problems are also exposed to the world. From the cosmopolitan vision (Beck 2004), in respect 
of the balance of security and danger which modernity introduces into our lives, there are no 
longer “others” – no one can be completely outside (Giddens 1990:149). In addition, air 
pollution and climate change are strongly linked in China as the major GHGs and major air 
pollutants come from the same source, i.e. fossil fuels (Jiang et al., 2013; see also Barbi 2016). 
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Then, a local problem is no longer a local problem, everyone is feeling part of it. As a result, 
the problem of air pollution in Beijing is becoming an important international problem of which 
is talking by the entire world. 
Just as Beck (2002:167) observed, two epochal processes, individualization and 
globalization, are changing the foundations of living together in all spheres of social action. 
Both only superficially appear to be threats; they force but they also permit society to prepare 
and reshape itself for a second modernity. It is essential to recognize that cultural 
individualization and globalization create precisely that historical orientation and those 
preconditions for an adaptation of institutions to a coming second modernity that are obstructed 
by the institutions (or those controlling them). The problem is that there are obstacles in 
perception. To cross the obstacles of perception, Beck gave rise to a methodologically 
cosmopolitan vision (Beck, 2006). 
But first of all, by taking the cosmopolitan outlook, we should distinguish between 
“globalization” (or “globalism”) and “cosmopolitanization”. In public discourse the fashionable 
political term “globalization” is understood primarily in a one-dimensional sense as economic 
globalization, and is closely connected with what can be called “globalism” (Beck, 2005). 
Globalism promotes the idea of the global market, defends the virtues of neoliberal economic 
growth and the utility of allowing capital, commodities and labor to move freely across borders. 
Cosmopolitanization, by contrast, must be interpreted as a multidimensional process which has 
irreversibly changed the historical “nature” of social worlds and the standing of states in these 
worlds. Cosmopolitanization comprises the development of multiple loyalties as well as the 
increase in diverse transnational forms of life, the emergence of non-state political actors (from 
Amnesty International to the World Trade Organization), the development of global protest 
movements against (neoliberal) globalism and in support of a different kind of (cosmopolitan) 
globalization (Beck 2006:9). 
Globalization is being fashioned by the powerful against the interests of the poor. There is 
no advancement of cross-cultural interaction among different societies; instead, the interests of 
one particular society are being pursued in opposition to those of all the others. By contrast, the 
cosmopolitan imagination represents the universal interests of humanity itself. It is an attempt 
to rethink interdependency and reciprocity beyond the limits of national axioms and national 
arrogance, in the sense of a cosmopolitan realism capable of stimulating and sharpening our 
faculties of perception to take in the unfamiliar, ‘glocally’ networked societies in which we live 
and act (Beck 2005: xvi). 
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To Beck (2006), the cosmopolitan outlook is both the presupposition and the result of a 
conceptual reconfiguration of our modes of perception. Cosmopolitanism which has taken up 
residence in reality is a vital theme of European civilization and European consciousness and 
beyond that of global experience. For in the cosmopolitan outlook, methodologically 
understood, there resides the latent potential to break out of the self-centered narcissism of the 
national outlook and the dull incomprehension with which it infects thought and action, and 
thereby enlighten human beings concerning the real, internal cosmopolitanization of their life-
worlds and institutions. 
What do we mean by the ‘cosmopolitan outlook’? Global sense, a sense of 
boundarylessness. An everyday, historically alert, reflexive awareness of 
ambivalences in a milieu of blurring differentiations and cultural contradictions. 
It reveals not just the ‘anguish’ but also the possibility of shaping one’s life and 
social relations under conditions of cultural mixture. It is simultaneously a 
skeptical, disillusioned, self-critical outlook  (Beck 2006:2-3). 
Cosmopolitan vision has to do with the way in which basic nation-state institutions can be 
opened up in the long term, from below as well as from within, to the challenges of the global 
age. It has to do with the way minorities, foreigners and the socially excluded are treated. Above 
all, it has to do with the role of the state and of governments in these contexts, a role that is 
fundamentally changing and whose contours still need to be defined. It has to do with the 
problems thrown up in the process of consolidating and reconstituting democratic societies in 
the global age, and the role of different groups’ and parties’ human rights in this. It has to do 
with the question of what functional equivalents there might be to the state, and in particular 
with the question of how outbreaks of violence stemming from people’s disappointments and 
humiliations can be countered preventively (Beck 2005:xvi). 
The local air pollution in Beijing is becoming a global problem, both for its hazard and for 
its influence, and global risks have the power to mix a variety of irresponsible organized 
mechanisms and open these mechanisms for global (political) action. In order to answer the 
difficult problem, China needs to work closely with other countries. Which means, the 
cosmopolitan vision could be taken as a method to analyze and to resolve the problem. In my 
research, cosmopolitan vision will be used when it comes to the analysis of the consequences 
of air pollution, the public environmental policies and most importantly, the local people’s 
reactions. 
As mentioned above, together with the globalization, individualization is another epochal 
process we are experiencing. Faced with the uncertainty of the globalized world, individuals 
have to make their own decisions. This new form of individualization is the result of the failure 
of experts in the management of risks (Beck 2009:54). People are thrown back upon themselves: 
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disembedding without embedding is the ironic-tragic formula for this dimension of 
individualization in world risk society. The technological and social revolutions, which either 
still lie ahead or are already in full swing, will unleash a profound individualization of lifestyles 
(Beck 2005:39).  
As early as the mid-1980s, Ulrich Beck proclaimed that the developed West had entered a 
new era of second modernity, characterized by the rise of modernization risks and the 
individualization of society. Individualization, according to Beck, indicates a categorical shift 
in the relation between the individual and society (1992: 127), meaning the self-radicalization 
of modernity has set the individual free from most previous all-encompassing social categories 
in industrial society, such as family, kinship, gender, and class, and has emerged as the 
reproduction unit for the social in a risk society (1992: 90). Responding to both the challenges 
and misunderstandings from the new scholarship on individualization, Beck and Elisabeth 
Beck-Gernsheim fine-tuned their positions with more theoretical elaborations and empirical 
research (2002), emphasizing especially the institutional aspect of individualization that 
contrasts sharply with the neoliberal theory of the individual-society relationship. The key to 
understanding the individualization theorem, in my opinion, still lies in Beck’s original 
explanation of a triple individualization resulting from modernity’s dissolving impact on the 
foundation of industrial society: 
Disembedding, removal from historically prescribed social forms and 
commitments in the sense of traditional contexts of dominance and support (the 
‘liberating dimension’); the loss of traditional security with respect to practical 
knowledge, faith and guiding norms (the ‘disenchantment dimension’); and – 
here the meaning of the word is virtually turned into its opposite – re-embedding, 
a new type of social commitment (the ‘control’ or ‘reintegration dimension’) 
(Beck 1992: 128; italics in original). 
 The individualization thesis highlights the following four basic features of this 
individualization process: (1) Detraditionalization or “losing the traditional”; (2) 
Institutionalized disembedding and re-embedding; (3) Compulsory pursuit of a “life of one’s 
own” and the lack of genuine individuality; (4) The internalization or psychologicalization of 
risks due to the precarious freedoms and uncertainties that the individual is facing. In addition, 
the individualization thesis also rests on two premises. Theoretically, it claims to be an 
antithesis to neoliberalism and additionally to liberalism and classic individualism. Socially, it 
defines the individualization process under conditions of cultural democracy, the welfare state, 
and classic individualism (Yan 2010; see also Bauman 2001; Beck 1992; Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim 2002; and Giddens 1991).  
Three key arguments in the individualization thesis are particularly noteworthy (Yan 
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2009:273-291; see also Howard 2007). The first is what Giddens calls “detraditionalization”, 
or what Beck refers to as “disembedment.” The second feature is a paradoxical phenomenon 
referred to by Bauman as “compulsive and obligatory self-determination” (Bauman 2000:32). 
The third feature is characterized as a “life of one’s own through conformity” (Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim 2002:151), meaning that the promotion of choice, freedom and individuality does 
not necessarily make every individual unique. The individualization thesis as a theoretical 
construction captures the particular changes in the nature of social relations in Western 
European societies which, in a number of ways, differ from those of a developing country such 
as China. Most noticeably, in Western European societies individual rights and freedom are 
regarded as a given and they have long been protected by political democracy; the inequality 
gap is under the control of the welfare state; and individual identity is increasingly defined by 
lifestyle and an individual biography instead of by social groups, such as the family or social 
class. Consequently, the increasingly institutionally defined individual must rely on the security 
and wealth provided by the welfare state to maintain “ontological security” (Giddens 1991), a 
paradoxical development referred to as institutional individualism by Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim (2002). This emphasis on the protective and supportive role of the welfare state also 
sets the individualization thesis apart from scholarly accounts of the individual-society 
relationship in the United States (see, for example, Bellah et al. 1996; Putnam 2000; Riesman 
1989), which regard the community instead of the state as a provider of security and moral 
support for the individual. 
When it comes to the problem of air pollution, one of the obstacles that we meet combined 
with the individualization is the absence of legal norms or, more precisely, the limits of the 
validity of legal norms. Because pollution always has multi-polluters, which makes it 
impossible to prove guilt, since this requires a proof of individual responsibility. At the same 
time, by the other side, there is no good way to protect the individuals from the pollution. As 
Beck (2009: 29) justified, with the increase in “unseen and unwanted side effects”, it is 
becoming impossible to ascribe harms suffered by many people – and at the extreme by 
everyone – to an author in conformity with valid legal norms and to assign responsibility. The 
institutional contradiction which follows from the interplay between industrialization and law 
and between industrialization and science is: the more people who are poisoned, the less 
poisoning takes place, at least on the social – in this case, legal – construction. It is even (here, 
in the national context) normal everyday visible injury and visible responsibility that are being 
transformed into an “invisible side effect” by the prevailing legal norms and the social relations 
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of definition they reflect. The legal and scientific relations of definition – hence the resources 
at the disposal of the protagonists in the struggle for the recognition of the risks and threats as 
well as the associated costs – boil down to the absurdity that the more generously the limits are 
fixed, the greater the number of smoke stacks, sewerage pipes, etc., through which pollutants 
and poisons are emitted, the smaller becomes the ‘residual probability’ of calling a perpetrator 
to account for the collective sniffling and wheezing, hence the less poisoning that takes place.  
And while the general level of contamination and poisoning increases – the one thing does 
not preclude the other. In summary, faced the unsecure world, individuals have to make their 
own choices to protect themselves, and for some one, even to utilize the opportunities that come 
along with the risks. So, the individuals’ decisions are important to the effect of the public 
environmental policies and to the trend of the severity of the air pollution. That’s why 
individualization is also an important consideration in my research about the environmental 
behavior of the local people regarding the air pollution in Beijing. 
The rise of the individual and the consequential individualization of society should be 
viewed as a reflexive part of China’s state-sponsored quest for modernity since 1949  (Yan 
2010).  
As Yan (2009) indicated, Chinese society is undergoing an individualization 
transformation. Detraditionalization, disembedment, the creation of a life of one’s own by 
DIY(Do-it-yourself) biographic work, and the irresistible pressure to be more independent and 
individualistic are all indicators of individualization in Western Europe that have also occurred 
to Chinese individuals. Identity politics and institutional changes play a key role in promoting 
the process of individualization in both cases. Finally, the impact of globalization on 
individualization is equally important in Western Europe and China, albeit in different ways. 
There are important differences. First, in Western Europe, disembedment mainly refers to 
the change whereby social groups no longer define the identity of the individual, who, by 
breaking away from the previously encompassing social categories, remakes herself or himself 
through institutional mechanisms, such as an education, career or life-style (Yan 2009). Both 
disembedment and re-embedment take place at the level of life politics, the everyday politics 
of lifestyle and personal identity (Giddens 1991). In contrast, disembedment in the Chinese case 
manifests itself mainly in the domain of emancipatory politics, i.e. the everyday politics of life 
chances and social status. The individual effort of DIY biography is first and foremost about 
the improvement of living standards and social status. Personal identity does matter, but it 
matters mainly because it affects one’s life chances. As a result, mobility, which seems to be 
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merely one of many factors in the Western European case, plays a pivotal role in the Chinese 
case of individualization. Identity, the core of the politics of recognition, relates more to the 
claim of individual rights and the redefinition of the individual-group-institution relationship 
than to the search of the self (Yan 2009). Combined with the globalization and wide-spread of 
consumerism, since the 1990s, people have become even more conscious of that differences in 
consumption capabilities and styles have become a major way of measuring people and of 
distinguishing them from one another both socially and spatially (Yan 2002). Which lead to the 
irrational pursuing to high energy consumption products, like private cars of large displacement, 
as a sign of identity. 
Another big difference on the process of individualization that related to people’s 
environmental behaviors is that, the current wave of individualization in Western Europe is 
characteristic of the second or reflexive modernity, meaning that it has developed from and 
reacted to the early trend of individualization associated with industrialization, urbanization and 
liberalization – i.e. the first modernity. Several kinds of individualism, such as religious, 
political, economic, expressive and utilitarian, arose during the early stages of modernization 
and became an undercurrent yet a solid basis for the second wave of individualization. In 
contrast, individualism was introduced into Chinese society at the end of the twentieth century 
and has been understood only as utilitarian individualism or simply selfishness. This incomplete 
or unbalanced understanding of individualism not only makes the individual egotistic and 
uncivil, but also amplifies the negative aspects of individualization, such as the relentless 
individual competition and the decline of social trust. The underdevelopment of individualism 
in the Chinese process of individualization also means that the individual must face the tensions 
between the indivisible and isolated self, on the one hand, and the all-encompassing social 
categories, on the other hand, at the level of identity construction and psychological 
development. The individual has gained an opportunity for mobility to physically leave the 
family, for example, yet , at the same time, the family remains the most important reference 
point for the individual’s self-identity. It is therefore plausible that individualization in China 
may not necessarily lead to the isolation of the individual (Yan 2009). 
Finally, the individualization process in China is managed to a great extent by the party-
state, differentiating the Chinese case from its counterparts in Europe. By state-managed 
individualization, it doesn’t mean merely the state’s role in promoting institutional changes, 
which can also be found in Western Europe. More importantly, the party-state in China also 
directs the flow of individualization by soft management (as opposed to control) of the interplay 
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among the players: the individual, the market, social groups, institutions and global capitalism. 
One of the key strategies is what Yan refers to as “railroading with self-interest”(Yan 2002:40-
41), meaning that the party-state uses attractive economic or political rewards to allow the 
individuals freely choose the way favored by the party-state and to exert self-control or self-
management while staying within the boundaries that have been drawn by the party-state(Yan 
2009). In this perspective, Chinese government also played an important role for the 
environmental damages along with the irrational immature rise of consumerism among Chinese 
individuais. Since the graduated encouragement of mass consumption by the state played an 
important role in reducing social discontent and restoring political stability in post-1989 
Chinese society. To expand the domestic market and speed up the sluggish Chinese economy 
in the late 1990s, the state went one step further to promote consumerism as an engine of 
economic growth, and the official media were filled with commentaries and reports that 
encouraged people to take personal loans – then a new social invention in China – for their 
consumer needs (Yan 2000). But seeing it positively, in contrast, the government also make 
efforts to lead the mass to rational consumption and paying for the environmental benefits later 
on when it realized the severity of environmental problems. 
In short, the individualization of Chinese society appears to be an ongoing process 
characterized by the management of the party-state and the absence of cultural democracy, a 
welfare state regime and classic individualism. Moreover, whereas the notion of a “second 
modernity” refers to a new era of post-democracy and a post-welfare state (Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim 2002), the Chinese individuals examined in this volume are still working to achieve 
goals that belong to the first modernity of Western Europe, such as comfortable material lives, 
secure employment, welfare benefits, and freedom to travel, speak and engage in public 
activities. Yet, Chinese individuals are also living in an environment where a fluid labor market, 
flexible employment, increasing personal risks, a culture of intimacy and self-expression, and 
a greater emphasis on individuality and self-reliance have been created by the market economy 
and global capitalism in the context of the political authoritarianism of the party-state (Yan 
2008). In other words, the Chinese case simultaneously demonstrates pre-modern, modern and 
postmodern conditions, and Chinese individuals must deal with all of these conditions at the 
same time. This multilayered and multi-temporal mix characterizes the complex process of 
individualization in China; the corresponding ways by which Chinese individuals, social groups 
and the party-state cope with this great social transformation may well establish a different 
model of individualization. (Yan 2009) 
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One of the most important problems that come along with the individualization closely 
related to the environmental behavior of the individuals is the conflict of values in the Second 
Modernity. The much demonized decline of values actually produces the orientations and 
prerequisites which will put the society in a position to master the future (Beck 2002:161). The 
old pattern of “more income, more consumption, more career, more conspicuous consumption” 
is breaking up and being replaced by a new weighting of priorities, which may often be difficult 
to decipher, but in which immaterial factors of the quality of life play an outstanding part. For 
example, control over a person’s “own time” is valued higher than more income and more 
career success, because time is the key that opens the door to the treasures promised by the age 
of self-determined life: dialogue, friendship, being on one’s own, compassion, fun and so on 
(Beck 2002:161). This means that the struggle over the distribution of material goods has been 
undermined by a struggle over the distribution of scarce immaterial goods that can hardly be 
offset by (expressed in) money. The endangered ways of life of our highly civilized world, these 
are gaining urgency and attractiveness. And this change of mind is giving the society an 
opportunity to change the growth-oriented society: 
In the age of the self-determined life, the social perception of what constitutes 
“wealth” and “poverty” is changing so radically that, under certain conditions, 
less income and status, if they go hand in hand with the opportunity for more self-
development and more ability to arrange things personally, may be perceived as 
an advance and not a setback. This should not be celebrated without reservation, 
since it is certainly the underlying cultural perception explaining why the 
dramatic exacerbation of material social inequality has (so far!) been accepted 
without a political outcry. Conversely, however, this shows an unexpected 
opportunity to turn less into more: material sacrifices are tolerable if they go 
hand in hand with a guaranteed increase of self-developed society. A freedom 
society, not a leisure society, could perhaps allow us to say goodbye to growth-
oriented labour society (Beck 2002:162). 
At the same time, Beck (2002:162) argued that while in the old values system the ego 
always had to be subordinated to patterns of the collective (also always designed by individuals), 
these new orientations towards the “we” create something like a cooperative or altruistic 
individualism. Thinking of oneself and living for others at the same time, once considered a 
contradiction in terms, is revealed as an internal, substantive connection. Living alone means 
living socially. The age of the self-determined life is not populated entirely by people 
demanding benefits, people quarrelling, making trouble, shirking. Quite the contrary, personal 
responsibility, self-organization and personal politics are getting an enlightened and realistic 
chance to redistribute responsibility and power in society (Beck 2002:163). 
Beck drew a promising blueprint to our future, to the environmental problems, especially 
to the air pollution problem in the big cities, where the industrializing process is deteriorating 
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the problem. This may be true in industrialized societies, but the situation may not be that 
optimistic in the developing countries. As mentioned before, the Chinese case of 
individualization simultaneously demonstrates pre-modern, modern and postmodern conditions, 
China is still on its way. 
As Yan argued, the Chinese society is confront with an individualization without 
individualism (Yan,2009:xxxii). State-managed individualization has also led to the rise of 
what Yan refer to as the “uncivil individual” (Yan 2003:226), an important phenomenon in 
relation to the Chinese understanding of Western individualism. Yan (2003:162-189,220-226) 
in his research discovered that “individual villagers also often avoid fulfilling their 
responsibilities in the public life of village society while pursuing individual interests at the 
expense of others.” A close look at the introduction and dissemination of individualism from 
the West to China, however, reveals that individualism has always been understood, among 
both the elite and the populace, as a form of egotism, involving selfish, anti-sociable and 
utilitarian interests, without any consideration of other individuals’ rights and interests. Other 
elements in Western individualism, such as liberty, equality, freedom and self-reliance, have 
largely been overlooked (Yan 2009:xxxiii). Once again, individualization in China is 
characterized by the management of the party-state and the absence of cultural democracy, the 
absence of a welfare state regime, and the absence of classic individualism and political 
liberalism. In this sense, the Chinese individualization process remains at the stage of 
emancipation politics of first modernity. Yet individuals in China also live in an environment 
where a fluid labor market, flexible employment, increasing risks, a culture of intimacy and 
self-expression, and a greater emphasis on individual responsibility and self-reliance have been 
created by the globalization of the market economy and an ideology of consumerism. If we 
confine ourselves within the Western European perspective, we will not be able to understand 
the complexity of the Chinese case (Yan 2010). We should be aware of the difference, actually 
the distance, of Chinese society from the western society when considering the process of 
individualization on the environmental behaviors of Chinese individuals. 
Yan’s field research was mainly concentrated in the rural area, and only his late researches 
involve some cases of big cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai, for example (Yan 1999, 2003, 
2010, 2011). But as laying on the front end of modernity, big cities should be playing a more 
important role in the process of modernization and the following second modernization. For 
this reason, my research will be concentrated in the big city, analyzing the individuals living in 
it, especially their own decisions facing the risk society. Beijing would be a good case for this 
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research, because of its complexity. Beijing is one of the birthplaces of ancient people in the 
world. From about twenty to seven hundred thousand years ago, there has been humanity 
working and living here. Beijing area as a city, its history can be traced back to more than 4,000 
years ago, when it was called You du (du in Chinese language means city). And later it became 
the capital of Kingdom Yan from 770 to 476 B.C. until 226 B.C. Since 1276 D.C, Beijing for 
the first time was constructed as the capital of Empire Yuan, it has been the capital of three 
dynasties and until now the capital of China (Beijing University 1999). It is one of the oldest 
cities and capitals in the world, and it carries the long history and abundant traditions; at the 
same time, it is also one of the most modern, industrial and international cities in the world, as 
apart from its skyscrapers, it is always the first place to arrive in China of the latest information, 
the most sophisticated technology, the most talented people all over the world, and so on. In 
addition, Beijing, as most of the big cities, with its rapid development, attracts all walks of life 
and all kinds of people all over the country, or even all over the world. In 2010, the city’s 
permanent resident population has increased to 19,612,000, with an increasement of 44.5% 
compared to 10 years ago. And from the whole number of permanent resident population, 35.9% 
were immigrants from other provinces (National Bureau of Statistics of PRC, 2011). Moreover, 
rapid, inadequate and poorly planned expansion of cities make them vulnerable to the risks, and 
Beijing is no exception regarding its huge and rapidly increasing population. In summary, the 
richness, complexity and vulnerability of the society of Beijing make it a worthy case of social 
studies. 
Here we need to clarify that “city” and “citizenship” have more than just an etymological 
kinship (Beck 2002). Civil society and political freedom have their social origin and their locus 
in a tangible local area. Strengthening civil society therefore implies strengthening local politics 
and identity, strengthening cities against the national centers. Large cities can no longer be just 
destinations in a shunting yard of the great problems. Everyone shifts everything imaginable 
and unimaginable on to cities, that’s what Beck (2002:167) called “mature citizen”. The 
revaluation of the local as a response to globalization will therefore not be possible without 
reform of municipal finances and a revised distribution of power and problems between national 
and local politics. For this reason, in the research of the public policies about the air pollution 
in Beijing, it will consider integrating policies of the local and the national, environmental and 
all related policies and reforms. In addition, when analyze the environmental behavior of the 
local individuals against the air pollution and their reactions to the public policies, it would be 
interesting to consider the reactionary force of the individuals back onto the city. 
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Just as mentioned above, all of the characteristics of modernity, such as globalization, 
individualization, the urbanization and the rapid expansion of big cities, are all related with the 
development of science and technology. As Giddens (1990:153) justified, one of the most 
important reasons for the persisting unintended consequences of modern society is the 
circularity of social knowledge, which affects in the first instance the social world. In conditions 
of modernity, the social world can never form a stable environment in terms of the input of new 
knowledge about its character and functioning. New knowledge (concepts, theories, findings) 
does not simply render the social world more transparent, but alters its nature, spinning it off in 
novel directions. The impact of this phenomenon is fundamental to the juggernaut-like quality 
of modernity and affects socialized nature as well as social institutions themselves. For although 
knowledge about the natural world does not affect the world in a direct way, the circularity of 
social knowledge incorporates elements of nature via the technological components of abstract 
systems. In other words, science and technology was the power source of the modernization. 
And it is continue being the origin of the second modernization, or the reflexive modernization, 
of which different conditions and processes, different media and agents are characteristic than 
were typical of error management processes in the phase of primary scientization (Beck 
1992:158). 
The historically novel quality of today’s risks derives from internal decision. 
They depend on a simultaneously scientific and social construction. Science is 
one of the causes, the medium of definition and the source of solutions of risks, 
and by virtue of that very fact it opens new markets of scientization for itself. In 
the reciprocal interplay between risks it has helped to cause and define, and the 
public critique of those same risks, techno-scientific development becomes 
contradictory (Beck 1992:155). 
Here, the contradiction of techno-scientific development can be understood in two levels: 
first, it is contradictory because itself is at the same time the cause, the definition and the 
solution of risks; second, it is contradictory and has its limits as the cause, the definition and 
the solution of risks. 
To Beck (1992, 2009), risks evolve from deliberative calculations made in the use of 
science and technology to produce wealth. The constant revolutionizing of technology gains 
some of its impetus from the imperatives of capitalist accumulation and from military 
considerations, but once under-way has a dynamism of its own. The drive to expand scientific 
knowledge and to demonstrate the effectiveness of such advances in technological change is 
one influential factor. As Jacques Ellul points out, technological innovation, once routinely 
established, has a strong inertial quality. Process of technological innovation, and of industrial 
development more generally, for the moment are still accelerating rather than slowing down. 
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But it is not seemingly to continue unchecked on for the indefinite future. Firstly, whatever new 
technological developments occur, there must be finite limits to global capitalist accumulation. 
Secondly, debates over the scientific and technological development has been arisen. Concern 
over environmental damage is now widespread, and a focus of attention by governments 
worldwide. Not just the external impact, but also the logic of unfettered scientific and 
technological development will have to be confronted if serious and irreversible harm is to be 
avoided (Giddens, 1990:169-173). 
According to Beck (1992:155-168), scientific civilization has entered a stage in which it 
no longer merely scientizes nature, people and society, but increasingly itself, its own products, 
effects and mistakes. Science is no longer concerned with ‘liberation’ from pre-existing 
dependencies, but with the definition and distribution of errors and risks which are produced 
by itself. The scientific discovery and research on modernization risks means that techno-
scientific development becomes a problem for itself, in other words, scientization is scientized 
as a problem. With reflexive modernization, public risk consciousness and risk conflicts will 
lead to forms of scientization of the protest against science. In addition, the scientization, more 
precisely with the increasing differentiation of the sciences, made the actual external 
consequences incalculable, but this decreasing “calculability” is accompanied by increasing 
“estimability”, which might be a breakthrough to overcome the fatalism in techno-scientific 
civilization. Another momentous consequence of the scientization is the demonopolization of 
scientific knowledge, which means that science becomes more and more necessary, but at the 
same time, less and less sufficient for the socially binding definition of truth. The differentiation 
of the sciences also created the conditions for the raised importance of external agencies. And 
the more unforeseeable the risks of techno-scientific production become and the more 
emphatically they determine public consciousness, the more intense becomes the pressure for 
action on political and economic agencies, and the more important it becomes for social agents 
to ensure access to ‘science as a definition-making power’, whether for minimization, 
distraction, redefinition, or for the dramatization or blocking of “external interference in 
definition-making” through critique of methodology. 
Science and technology, or knowledge more generally, can be used to change the political 
agenda, stimulate new needs, create markets, redefine goals, convince, persuade, indeed, even 
transform enemies into allies. ‘Knowledge is power’ (Francis Bacon) – to the extent that time 
is money, this principle not only acquires greater acceleration and becomes a maxim of 
capitalism, it also acquires greater significance, because knowledge, in the form of investment 
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in research and technology, both undermines and accelerates knowledge production (Beck 
2005:55). But knowledge is not that almighty as a solution of risks. The greater the threat, the 
greater the gap in knowledge, the more urgent and more impossible is the decision (decision 
paradox) (Beck 2009:117). Besides, although scientific knowledge entered into the political 
process, it did not provide a clear-cut guide to action. The ultimate decision to take the threat 
of the thinning out of the ozone layer seriously was made not by the scientists but by the 
politicians responding to a change in the public perception of risk (Beck 2009:184). And more 
important, the orientation to knowledge binds not only scientist more strongly into transnational 
political processes but also other actors. For the knowledge in question is not exclusively 
scientific (Beck 2009:185). 
Along with the contradiction of techno-scientific development in the process of 
scientization, the identity of experts is also becoming contradictory. 
On one hand, experts are no longer being completely trusted as before, experts went down 
the altar and began to be doubted by the lay people. Firstly, because people’s attitudes of trust, 
or lack of trust, toward specific abstract systems (such as expert system) are strongly influenced 
by experiences at access points and updates of knowledge via the communications media and 
other sources (Giddens 1990:88-92). Secondly, because the scientific skepticism reaches to the 
lay people along with the complete scientization of the reflexive modernity. According to Beck 
(1992:155-168), the dynamism of primary scientization is the contrast of tradition and 
modernity, of lay people and experts. The second phase is based on a complete scientization, 
which also extends scientific skepticism to the inherent foundations and external consequences 
of science itself. In that way both its claim to truth and its claim to enlightenment are 
demystified. People are freed from the “patronizing” cognitive dictates of the experts (Illich 
1979). More and more people are able to play the role of assessors of science. 
The difference between […] lay people and experts, shrivels and transforms 
itself into competition between different experts. In practically all social 
subsystems the internalization of norms and values is replaced by reflection in 
the light of competing components of systematic knowledge (Wolfgang Bonβ and 
Heinz Hartmann, 1985:16; see also Weingart 1983:328; Beck 1992:168). 
On the other hand, nobody can any longer claim to be an expert in conditions of modernity. 
In other words, all of us are lay persons in respect of the vast majority of expert systems 
(Giddens 1990:146). To be more specific, as Giddens (1990:130-131) explained: 
widespread lay knowledge of modern risk environments leads to 
awareness of the limits of expertise and forms one of the “public relations” 
problems that has to be faced by those who seek to sustain lay trust in 
expert systems. The faith that supports trust in expert systems involves a 
blocking off of the ignorance of the lay person when faced with the claims 
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of expertise; but realization of the areas of ignorance which confront the 
experts themselves, as individual practitioners and in terms of overall 
fields of knowledge, may weaken or undermine that faith on the part of lay 
individuals. Experts often take risks “on behalf” of lay clients while 
concealing, or fudging over, the true nature of those risks or even the fact 
that there are risks at all. More damaging than the lay discovery of this 
kind of concealment is the circumstance where the full extent of a 
particular set of dangers and the risks associated with them is not realized 
by the experts. For in this case what is in question is not only the limits of, 
or the gaps in, expert knowledge, but an inadequacy which compromises 
the very idea of expertise. 
Moreover, the contradiction of the identity of experts also can be explained from the 
viewpoint of the logic of the power structure of risk. Risk is based on a decision (and then a 
decision maker), and creates an extreme asymmetry between two people: those who take risks, 
define risks, and those whom take risks from, who have to go directly to the “invisible side 
effects” of others’ decisions without being able to participate in the decision-making process 
and even pay for their own lives. The relationship between risk and power, that is, the 
relationship between risk and inequality, lies in this division. The potential benefits are all to 
the “we” of the decision-maker, and it is the fact that they have the ability to make such 
decisions based on their social power status. In contrast, “we” as “living side effects” comes 
and shows a double exclusion: these people are excluded from the potential benefits of such 
decisions and from making such decisions (Beck 2009, 2011). 
At the same time, social vulnerability has become a key aspect of social inequality in the 
world’s risk society: social processes and conditions allow people to tackle inequalities 
unevenly. It is difficult to define risk and the resulting inequality, it must be seen in large part 
by the expression of power relations in the state and in the global context. “Social vulnerability” 
has changed the “class” and made it more radical: it is a general concept, it transcends the 
individuals, societies or the whole human being to cope with or escape the threat of climate 
change can feel free from making use of any means and tools (Beck 2009, 2011). The more 
marginalized people have economic and political opportunities, the more vulnerable that 
particular group or population will be. Global environmental risks combine what formerly 
seemed to be mutually exclusive, namely, non-knowledge and a pronounced tendency towards 
reflexivity and explosiveness within the global public sphere. They are widening the gap 
between risk experts and public perceptions (Beck 2009). 
But as well as the climate change increases the inequality between the poor and the rich, 
the center and the edge, it also eliminates it. The greater the threat, the less likely the richer and 
the more powerful people to escape from it. Climate change is hierarchical and democratic 
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(Beck 2009, 2011). From this point of view, experts as part of “we” of the decision-maker, no 
matter how much information do they have more than the lay people, and no matter how many 
benefits do they get from the decisions, when the risks are big enough, no one will escape from 
it. 
For these reasons above, a research of the risk perception of the individuals with the social 
identity of “experts” and their environmental behaviors in the face of air pollution will gain 
importance not only for the social analysis of the consequences of modernity in the Chinese 
society in the case of environmental risks, but also to preview the tendency of public politics 
and its results on the environmental problems. But just as justified above, in condition of 
modernity, the identity of “experts” is becoming contradictory and vague, so here below, I 
would rather name them as “scientists” than “experts”. 
In summary, as justified all above, this research concentrates on the risk perception and 
environmental behaviors face the air pollution of the individuals with the social identity of 
“experts” or “scientists” in Beijing. It mainly includes the individual choice of their daily life, 
the attitude and reaction to the public environmental policies, their future expectations about 
the air pollution and their probable plans, with an aim and effort to answer the central questions: 
Do these scientists have strong risk perception to the air pollution problem? How does the 
risk perception influence their individual choices in their daily life, in their research work, and 
in their advice to the public environmental policies as well as to the S&T policies? 
The researchers in the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) can be seen as good 
representatives of the “scientists” individuals. CAS has always been key to China’s S&T 
planning since its foundation in 1949. And it has fulfilled multiple roles — as a national team 
and a locomotive driving national technological innovation, a pioneer in supporting nationwide 
S&T development, a think tank delivering S&T advice and a community for training young 
S&T talent. CAS membership is the highest academic accolade in the field of science and 
technology in China. Besides, CAS attaches much importance to international cooperation and 
considers international cooperation as a recipe for its success and an effective means to 
maximize potentials and resources worldwide to advance science and to address global 
challenges. It has extensive and diversified forms of cooperation and partnership with scientists 
all over the world. As a result, the researchers in CAS meet all the requirements of this research: 
they are experts in different academic areas, they are closely related to public policies and fully 
integrated to the globalization. 
The time frame of this research begins from 2007. Because the year 2007 was a very 
41 
 
 
important year for the environmental actions in China, and for Beijing city. Or we can say, it 
was the year when the government began to make real actions to the environmental problem 
and kept continuing its effort until now. In 2007, the first National Climate Change Program 
was launched. From then on, Chinese environmental governance was marked by the 
establishment of structures, including government agencies, by building accountability systems 
for reducing carbon intensity, conducting climate change studies, by promoting specific 
legislation, in order to strengthen governance of systems and mechanisms in connection with 
the problem (Barbi & Ferreira 2016). 
In order to achieve the purpose of study, it is necessary to use various methodologies. Here 
below I will make a special introduction of the methodological aspects of the research, 
especially the analysis aspects of risk perception, which is the focus of the present research. 
 
■ Methodological aspects of the research: Analysis of risk perception 
A. Risk Perception 
As Beck justified, studies on risk perception are very important for caution or avoidance 
of risk aggravation. As he spoke in more general terms (2009:47): 
the more emphatically world risk society is denied, the more it becomes 
a reality. The disregard for the globalizing risks aggravates the 
globalization of risk. 
Perception of risk refers to the individual’s feelings and perceptions of various objective 
risks that exist in the outside world, and it emphasizes the influence on the individual’s 
cognition from the experience gained through intuitive judgment and subjective feelings. 
The public’s perception of objective things inevitably affects the public’s attitude towards 
them. Many of the country’s decisions which involve the general public must strive for public’s 
understanding and support. The attitude of the people is also one of the bases for the decisions 
of decision-makers. The problem of risk may often be a sensitive issue for the general public. 
Therefore, people’s “perception of risks” cannot be ignored by the policy-makers. This is also 
the significance of the research on risk perception. 
Moreover, in the global age, the research on risk perception multiples its importance as it 
creates a public sphere across all boundaries, in other words, it is the reflexivity of the world 
risk society that creates a reciprocal relationship between the public sphere and globality. As to 
Beck (2005:38-39), regardless of all the borders and rifts that separate nations, the constructed 
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and accepted definition of planetary threat and its global mass-media-projected omnipresence 
create a common arena of values, responsibility and action which, analogously to the national 
arena, can (though need not necessarily) give rise to political action among strangers. This is 
the case when the accepted definition of threat leads to global norms, agreements and common 
action. At the same time, to its reverse, risk definitions are always controversial. If they do 
create commonality, this presupposes the presence of a shared set of values. Thus, culturally 
shared (socially constructed) risk definitions also produce at transnational level a proximity and 
normativity that imply social obligations. This is because reflexivity about risk opens up the 
issue of reciprocal obligations in a transnational way. Thus, the public sphere, in the sense of a 
reflexivity restricted to dialogue, becomes political only when it creates and organizes practical 
action in order to make some sort of impact. 
The problem of risk must be based on “risk”. But just as Beck (2005:38-39) points out, the 
meaning of the term “risk” is still in complicated discussions. 
According to Navarro and Cardoso (2005), risks are generated without the production of 
new knowledge being able to guarantee certainty of its control, generating a climate of 
permanent doubt, thus increasing the domain of uncertainty. In this perspective, the complexity 
of the problem of risk requires that individuals in society are constantly making choices, since 
“uncertainties” generate increasingly sophisticated cognitive processes, involving objectivity 
and subjectivity, motivated by the perspective of risk in a personal dimension, so it is 
understood that for Queface (2009), risk must be perceived as the combination of three elements: 
threat, exposure and social vulnerability. 
According to Wiedemann (1993:3), risk perception can be defined as the ability to interpret 
a situation of potential harm to the life of the person or of a third person, based on previous 
experiences and its extrapolation to a future moment. This ability varies from a vague opinion 
to a firm conviction. For Wiedemann, risk perception is based mainly on images and beliefs 
and has roots, to a lesser extent, in some previous experience, such as the knowledge of previous 
catastrophes and the relation with information about the probability of a scourge occurring. 
Various definitions of “risk” have their own rationality due to differences in the 
perspectives, contents, and methods of research. However, the term “risk” has its own core 
meaning that does not change with its appearance. Scholars believe that “risk” from the most 
general meaning can be expressed as a function of the probability of the event and its 
consequence: 
R=F(P,C) 
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In which, R= Degree of risk 
        P=The probability of an unfortunate event 
        C=The consequences of the event 
This definition emphasizes the probability of an unfortunate event, that is, “risk” is the 
possibility of the unwanted consequences of an event. Therefore, the analysis of risks must 
include both the possibility of unfortunate events and the magnitude of the consequences. Risk 
is always associated with loss. Therefore, taking “loss” as the starting point of research is also 
a routine practice that many studies take. The composition of risk has two basic elements: (1) 
the occurrence of adverse events or losses, that is, the negative characteristics of risks; (2) the 
possibility of adverse events or losses, that is, the probability of occurrence of an event. The 
first element of risk emphasizes the existence of adverse events or losses. The second element 
of risk emphasizes the magnitude of the probability of loss, that is, using the concept of quantity 
to define risk. The probability of loss is the probability or chance that the loss will occur within 
a certain period of time. In a more general sense, “risk” represents an uncertainty, and this 
uncertainty is always related to potential losses. 
The risk of climate change has been long overdue, and it has received unprecedented 
attention from the world at the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference. Over the past 20 years, 
researchers have invested considerable effort in exploring how the public understands the risks 
of climate change (Vignola, Klinsky, Tam, & McDaniels, 2013). Climate risk-based cognition 
refers to the individual’s objective and subjective perceptions of climate change risks that exist 
in life, including perception of climate change risk events and sources of risk, perception of risk 
outcomes and risk responsibilities (Zhang et al. 2013).  
Climate change risks have the same characteristics of uncertainty and unfavorable results 
as other risks, but the perception of climate change risks has its own uniqueness compared to 
other risk perceptions. First, the particularity of risk perception objects. Climate change has 
both of the characteristics of natural and man-made risks: In the sense of meteorology, climate 
change is a gradual system of long-term changes in the climate state, usually involving a series 
of related phenomena such as climate warming, rising sea levels, icebergs melting, Ocean 
acidification, etc. At the same time, climate change is also caused by humans’ activities. For 
example, the fourth climate change assessment report released by the UN’s Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2007 pointed out that since the industrialization, humans 
have burned fossil fuels and released large amounts of carbon dioxide. Greenhouse gases are 
the main cause of climate warming. Second, the breadth of risk awareness. Climate change 
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takes place on a global scale, spanning time and space. In terms of time, the perception of 
climate change risks involves the past, present and future. And spatially it covers all regions of 
the world and even everyone on earth. Compared to many other types of risk perception, its 
research has the characteristics of wide scope and long duration. Third, the differences in risk 
perception subjects. In the perception of climate change risk, researchers usually classify 
subjects into masses of lay-people and experts based on whether the subject has relevant 
professional knowledge on climate change or not. They have differences in the perceptions of 
causes of climate change, results, and actions (Swim, Stern, et al., 2011). Fourth, the conflict 
between risk perception and action. This contradiction prevails, as people are concerned about 
climate change but have not taken corresponding measures (Gifford, 2011). 
 
● A.a.Evolution of Studies on Risk Perception 
Starr (1969) systematically and definitively discusses the classic question “How safe is 
safe enough?” in the article “Social Benefit versus Technological Risk”, marking the beginning 
of a systematic study of risk perception in the field of psychology. From the 1970s and 1980s, 
the social studies on risk perception emerge as an important counterpoint to the utilitarian 
perspective of technical risk analysis, based on the knowledge of the economy and actuarial 
sciences, which did not include the beliefs, fears and concerns of the communities involved 
(Starr 1969). 
The earliest environmental risk studies were conducted in the United States in the early 
20th century when the US government asked its Corps of Engineers to propose measures to 
control the floods that often plagued cities and rural areas. In order to solve a specific problem, 
the first investigations focused on the technical aspect and the cost-benefit analysis 
corresponding to the occupation of areas subject to floods. In the year 1933, 308 reports were 
submitted to the US Federal Congress, containing analyzes and recommendations and 
constituting the final result of the work performed by the team (White, 1973). 
However, many issues still seemed unanswered, such as those related to risk assessment 
by the villagers themselves and the decisions they made in the face of threat situations. Faced 
with the challenge in answering these questions, professionals from other areas were invited to 
participate and in this scenario, the first work on risk perception emerged. The use of the 
perceptual approach in the study of risk became, then, mainly diffused from the 1960s under 
the responsibility of geographers such as Gilbert F. White, Ian Burton, and Robert W. Kates 
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(White, 1973; Castro, 2000; Marandola Jr. e Hogan, 2004). According to White (1974), through 
these pioneering researches, one sought to understand the reciprocal dependencies between 
human facts and the phenomena of the physical-natural environment, trying to avoid certain 
conceptions a priori, beyond the typical exaggerations of geographic determinism. 
Among the pioneering works in the field of risk perception, we highlight the study by 
Kates (1962), whose objective is to compare the view of ordinary citizens to that of technicians 
and researchers regarding the risk of flooding in different US cities. The time of return of the 
floods was calculated, based on conventional techniques employed by hydrology, which served 
as a parameter to evaluate the perception of the probability of accidents by the subjects surveyed. 
In addition to this aspect, linked to the knowledge and experience of individuals, their attitudes 
and their responses to danger situations were also studied. 
Still in the 1960s, Kates (1967) carried out another major study of investigating the 
perception of risks associated with tropical storms that often hit the US East Coast. Research 
has shown that a very small portion of coastal residents interviewed took minimal risk 
mitigation measures while most seemed to passively accept the situation. Some residents even 
opposed preventive measures, such as building barriers to dissipate wave energy, possibly 
because they thought it would be detrimental to the fishing activity from which they got their 
livelihood. 
The first carried-out studies, among which the examples of Kates (1962 and 1967), were 
extremely revealing and were able to indicate that the image that the inhabitants of dangerous 
places have about their risk situation and the possible combat measures may be quite different 
from that of technicians and politicians (Castro, 2000). It has also been proven that risk 
perception is a decisive component in structuring responses to danger, influencing various 
aspects of individual and collective life. 
The pioneering practice of North American geographers in the study of risk perception 
culminated in the 1970s with the launching of important books on the subject, outlining the 
guidelines that would guide other investigations in different parts of the world. Among these 
works of reference, Hewitt and Burton (1971), White (1974), Kates (1978) and Burton, Kates 
and White (1978), the latter reissued in the 1990s. 
In Brazil, despite a significant demand for studies on the perception of risk, few studies 
have been done so far. Regarding the perception of landslide risks, it is worth mentioning the 
contribution of Xavier (1996), in a study carried out in risk areas of the city of Belo Horizonte 
(MG). Contrary to American colleagues, Xavier (1996) observed a strong rapprochement 
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between the popular view and the technical view on possible solutions to the issue of risk. 
However, several investigated subjects have the idea that rain is the main factor responsible for 
accidents. In the face of the risk situation, many residents remain waiting for government 
assistance or even God's help. Such information proved to be very useful for the development 
of strategies by the public power in order to combat risk situations on the slopes studied. 
Another contribution was offered by Souza (1999), who tried to evaluate in a public school 
in Juiz de Fora (MG) how much the students perceived the risks in the neighborhood (landslides 
and floods). Among the main points found, the fact that accidents and environmental risks were 
never addressed by the teachers, although the students presented some empirical knowledge on 
the subject, including valid suggestions for improving the living conditions around the school. 
In a more recent study, Moreira and Fratolillo (2004) detected a significant mismatch 
between the technical vision and the popular view on the risks of landslides in a study carried 
out on the slopes of Vitória (ES). Moreira and Fratolillo (2004) recommend the adoption of the 
perceptive approach with the aim of guiding future urban interventions and effective 
environmental education programs in the area studied as they found out the main problems in 
this area are the lack of knowledge about the risk processes, the lack of interest in the subject 
and the low participation of the residents in the decision-making processes. 
In China, the psychometric paradigm is most used on risk perception studies. This 
paradigm has been widely used by scholars in various periods of studies (Xie & Xu 1998; Xie 
& Xu 1999; Xie & Xu 2000; Shi et al. 2003; Liu et al. 2006; Yu & Xie 2006). However, the 
psychometric paradigm has shortcomings, as it ignores the impact of individual traits on risk 
perception. This led to the majority of research findings in the area focused on the impact of 
risk event characteristics on risk perception. Few studies have examined the effects of 
individual traits on risk perception. Moreover, the psychometric paradigm cannot explore the 
psychological mechanism of risk perception (Zhang et al. 2015). 
The earliest studies in China on the cognitive structure of risk have focused on general 
social life events (Xie & Xu 1996; Xie & Xu 1998; Liu et al. 2006). However, for the subjects, 
some of the general social life events have not been experienced, and measurements based on 
imagination alone are lack of ecological validity. Meanwhile, subject to ethical requirements, 
researchers cannot make the subjects directly suffer the damages. At this time, some special 
events provided valuable information for researchers. For example, SHI and his colleagues 
examined the rational and irrational characteristics of Chinese citizens’ perception of SARS 
epidemic information (Shi et al. 2003). Some scholars have studied the characteristics of risk 
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perception in the environmental and climate issues that widely affect the public (Yu & Xie 2006; 
Zhang et al. 2013). Through these studies of relatively direct risk events, results of high 
ecological validity have been obtained, supplementing conclusions drawn from general social 
life events. 
In 1994, Xie summed up the influencing factors of risk perception, including individual 
differences, expectation level, the impact of communications, the degree of willingness to take 
risks, and the nature of risks (Xie 1994). Based on this conclusion, Xu deleted the “expectation 
level”, and added “familiarity with risk” and “impact of herd behavior” (Xu 1998). Later, Liu 
and his colleagues increased three other factors of “knowledge structure”, “achievement 
motivation” and “risk degree of the event” based on Xie’s viewpoints (Liu et al. 2006). In 
addition, studies have found that human-induced risk leads to higher risk perception than natural 
risk; the presentation of visual information increases risk perception; different sensory 
modalities of information input have no effect on risk perception; TV evoke higher risk 
perception than web pages (Xie et al. 2008). The influencing factors of risk perception proposed 
from the above researches can be divided into three categories: the nature of the individual, the 
nature of the risk, and the way of interaction between individual and risk (Zhang et al. 2015). 
In the environmental area, Yu and Xie (2006) studied the characteristics of risk perception 
of 39 environmental items among the Beijing public. After factor analysis, the six dimensions 
of study: “degree of influence”, “controllability”, “degree of understanding”, “sustainability of 
impact”, “probability of occurrence” and “seriousness of results” were summed up in two new 
dimensions: “objective understanding” and “active role”, that is, individual risk perception 
mechanism involves the objective situation of risk and the process of interaction between 
individuals and risk events. 
The applied research of risk perception is first reflected in the field of public decision-
making. In 2013, Tan and Hu taking the nuclear power stations as an example, explored the 
predictive effect of public risk perception on the stability of neighboring social avoidance (Tan 
& Hu 2013). In addition, there are researches which have investigated the cultural construction 
factors, such as cultural background and values, that influence the perception of public 
technology risks (Wang 2013). Shi and his colleagues’ findings on the SARS crisis provide 
important information for the health sector to respond to infectious diseases (Shi et al. 2003). 
Moreover, there are also a large number of researches on the application of risk perception in 
the business field (Xie & Xu 1999, 2000; Li et al. 2011). 
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● A.b.Theoretical Approach to Risk Perception: Main Categories of 
Analysis 
Research on environmental risks through the perceptual approach has been extremely 
revealing to geographers. However, above all, it is essential to pay attention to the theoretical 
basis that will always guide the argument and the elements through which the perception of 
risks will be evaluated in practical terms. Therefore, some thematic aspects outlined in the 
literature should be conveniently taken up, starting with the very idea of risk perception. 
Risk assessment is based on a strict scientific basis and it identifies, qualifies and quantifies 
risks. While scientific and technical experts use risk assessment methods to make fine and 
scientific evaluations, the public still judge risks according to their intuition, which is the typical 
“risk perception”. The perception of climate change risk not only emphasizes the objective 
existence of climate change risk, but also pays attention to subjective feelings of individuals or 
groups in the process of understanding objective risks. 
People’s understanding of risk events generates two kinds of risk perceptions. The first is 
people’s attitude and perception of risk events, and the second is people’s theoretical grasp of 
risk events (Wang 2010). 
There are two different theoretical paradigms, the individualism paradigm and 
contextualism paradigm, used to explain the risk perception of general people. In the former 
case the starting point of any analysis is the unit of cognition – the thinking, acting individual. 
Empirical data radiate from the study of individuals to generalizations about social groupings. 
The latter case emphasizes the social context (culture, affinity group, organization, lifestyle) as 
the starting point for analysis. The most articulated, mature, and influential of the social science 
theories that build on an individualist paradigm are the cognitive theory of risk and economic 
models of risk economics based on expected utility theory (Kunreuther; Camerer and 
Kunreuther 1989a; Crouch and Wilson 1982; Rowe 1977). The analysis of the contextualism 
paradigm begins with “setting”, such as social structure, institutional form, and cultural 
background. The main representative theories of the contextualism paradigm include the 
cultural theory of risk, the social amplification model, for example (Krimsky 1992). 
In the individualistic paradigm, there are two basic theoretical perspectives, the 
“knowledge theory” and the “personality theory” of risk perception (Wildavsky and Dake 1990). 
Knowledge theory believes that people respond to risk based on their knowledge and 
information. The personality theory seeks to explain the individual’s risk aversive and risk 
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tolerant choices by their personality types (which includes their propensity toward certain 
political ideologies) (Krimsky 1992). 
The cognition theory of risk perception sometimes also referred to as the psychometric 
theory of risk，and it is one of the main theories of risk perception. This theory uses a variety 
of psychological measurement scales to quantitatively analyze perceived risk, perceived 
benefits, and other aspects of perception. In the 1980s, Slovic first proposed to use psychometric 
methods to assess people’s risk perception, and to analyze the structure of perception of the 
risks already predicted and having harmful consequences. As a result, he formed a two-
dimensional structure of risk perception, with the “dread risk” dimension and the “unknown 
risk” dimension, with which he drew the “cognitive maps” to describe people’s attitudes and 
perceptions to risk (Slovic 1987). To be more specific, they use a questionnaire survey to ask 
the respondent’s perception of different risk events (establishing a ranking order), analyzing the 
principal component factors according to the different attributes of the risk, and obtain two risk 
factors - the “fear factor” and the “unknown factor”. The higher the score of people on these 
two factors, the higher people’s perception of the corresponding risk event (Slovick 1987).  
But some later studies raise criticism to the psychometric paradigm. First, the 
psychometric paradigm assumes that the public’s differential response to risk depends on the 
dimensional characteristics of the risk. However, subsequent studies have found that the risk 
feature dimensions that influence individual’s perspective structure of risks may not be the same 
(Zhang et al. 2013). Second, the psychometric paradigm ignores the fact that the questions of 
risk in the questionnaire may be unfamiliar to the individual. Such an answer cannot represent 
real judgment (Zhang et al. 2013). Third, with the psychometric paradigm, the information 
obtained from the data does not reflect the individual’s behavioral responses (Xie & Xu 1995). 
Forth, the psychometric paradigm often draws the conclusion that “the individual’s risk 
perception is determined by the nature of risk” and ignores the individual assessment as an 
analytic unit (Liu et al. 2006). Due to these deficiencies, the research based on the paradigm 
has been biased toward examining the impact of event characteristics on risk perception while 
ignoring the impact of individual traits. Although the psychometric paradigm has some 
limitations, in the research of risk perception on climate change, the theory analyzes how the 
risk perception of climate change is located on different risk dimensions, and it explores the 
risk characteristics that influence the assessment of the risk of climate change. 
Cultural theories of risk have their lineage in anthropology both in method and content 
(Krimsky 1992). The cultural theory of risk did not originate from concern with technological 
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or natural hazards, but in the anthropological study of ritual defilement with Mary Douglas’ 
Purity and Danger (1966), which concerns more about moral rather than environmental 
pollution, with its focus on the relationship between dietary restrictions and the social order. 
Cultural theory argues that risks are defined, perceived, and managed according to principles 
that inhere in particular forms of social organization. Cultural analysis of risk looks behind the 
perception of physical risks to the social norms or policies that are being attacked or defended. 
Of all the things people can worry about, they will be inclined to select for particular attention 
those risks that help to reinforce the social solidarity of their institutions. According to cultural 
theory, institutional structure is the ultimate cause of risk perception; risk management is the 
proximate stimulus rather than its outcome. In addition to being proactive, management 
strategies in cultural theory include various approaches. Finally, risk communication in cultural 
theory emphasizes creation of shared meaning and trust over the transfer of quantitative 
information (Rayner 1988a). Thus, cultural theory is fundamentally a social theory concerned 
first with relationships among human beings and second with societal relationships with nature 
(Rayner 1992). 
Meanwhile, it appears that while the principles of cultural theory have been enormously 
influential, its practical application has been very limited. Cultural theory seldom has been 
applied in risk analyses for technological decision making. Cultural theorists have made few 
systematic empirical studies of risk perception and management. The studies that do exist tend 
to be scholarly analyses of past debates and decision making about technology rather than 
contributions to the solution of current problems (Rayner 1992). 
The concept of Social Amplification of Risk is based on the thesis that events pertaining 
to hazards interact with psychological, social, institutional and cultural processes in ways that 
can heighten or attenuate perceptions of risk and shape risk behavior. In turn, the behavioral 
responses generate secondary social or economic consequences (Kasperson, Renn, et al. 1988). 
The amplification process may be caused by a physical event (such as an accident) or may 
results from a report on environmental or technical events, releases, exposures, or consequences. 
Of course, some individuals or groups also actively monitor the experiential world, searching 
for hazard events related to their agenda of concern. In both cases, individuals or groups select 
specific characteristics of these events or specific aspects of the associated depictions and 
interpret them according to their perceptions and mental schemes. They also communicate their 
interpretations with other individuals and groups and receive interpretations in return. The 
individuals or groups who collect information about risks communicate with others, and 
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through behavioral responses act, in our terminology, as amplification stations. Amplification 
stations can be individuals, groups, or institutions (Kasperson 1992). The Social Amplification 
of Risk emphasizes that the negative effects of risk events sometimes exceed direct damage to 
victims, property, and the environment, and can have significant indirect impacts. The social 
and economic impacts of hazard events are not only determined by the direct biological and 
physical consequences of the event, but also by the perceived risk factors, media coverage, and 
signal value (Kasperson 1992). 
The paradigms of individualism and contextualism have always been controversial in two 
aspects. One is related to the ontology of risk, which refers to its metaphysical status as a 
property or quality in the physical world. Is the risk of something an objective measure of that 
thing, or is it a subjective value that varies according to context? The individualist paradigm 
assumes that the risk is subjective. For example, to the Risk does not exist “out there”, 
independent of our minds and cultures, waiting to be measured. Human beings have invented 
the concept “risk” to help them understand and cope with the dangers and uncertainties of life. 
There is no such thing as “real risk” or “objective risk.” (Slovic 1992:119). However, 
contextualist paradigm advance a realist ontology of risk (Krimsky 1992). Second, a meta-
theoretical question arises in comparing individualist and contextualist approaches to risk 
selection. Does personality (including cognitive structure) precede context, or does context 
precede personality? Can one explain an organizational or political affiliation on personality 
type, or is it one’s affiliation that determines the personality? This chicken or egg problem raises 
the dilemma of the primacy of contextualism (social or cultural unit) or individualism 
(personality type or cognitive structure) (Krimsky 1992). Although individualism and 
contextualism have their own emphasis, it is most certainly the case that information processing 
(cognition), personality, social factors, economic factors, and cultural factors interact to 
determine individual and societal response to risk. The mix may be difficult, if not impossible, 
to separate-witness the endless debates about nature versus nurture (Slovic 1992). 
As Beck and other scholars (Beck 1992, 2009; Giddens 2009) justified varies times, risk is 
always related to decision. Further, one of the most important research purposes of risk 
perception is to help us making decisions. Behavioral decision research over the last 30 years 
provides a series of lessons about the importance of affect in perceptions of risk and in decisions 
to take actions that reduce or manage perceived risks. Evidence from a range of domains 
suggests that worry drives risk management decisions (Weber E.U 2006). Working on this 
thesis, the Dual-system theory has attracted the attention of many scholars. Among them, the 
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research on dual systems has mainly two perspectives: two methods of information processing 
– empirical system and analytic system, and two different types of information obtained by 
individuals – experience-based information and description-based information. The distinction 
between risky decisions made from personal experience and those made from statistical 
description has gotten a lot of recent attention because the ostensibly same information can lead 
to different choices depending on how the information is acquired (Hertwig et al., 2004, 2006). 
In the empirical system, people associate the current situation with the experience of the 
individual himself or others. The process of perception is automatic and rapid. People convert 
various experiences in the environment into emotions, such as afraid, fear and anxiety, which 
in turn affects perception and decision of the risk (Loewenstein, Weber E.U. , Hsee & Welch 
2001). Decisions from experience rely on (repeated) personal encounters with risky choice 
options, the way animals make risky foraging decisions (Weber E.U.  et al., 2004). While the 
outcomes of choice options may initially be completely unknown, repeated choices provide the 
decision maker with feedback about possible outcomes and their likelihood. On the other hand, 
decisions from description are made based on outcome and probability information provided in 
some numeric or statistical summary form (Weber E.U. 2006). The process is relatively slow 
and requires conscious control (Marx S.M. et al. 2007). This method of information acquisition 
is available only to humans, with their ability for abstract, symbolic representation (Weber E.U. 
2006). 
Weber E.U. began to compare two different systems in 2004, focusing on the differences 
in people’s understanding of uncertainties of climate change through the two systems. Weber 
E.U.(2010) believes that the different attributions of scientists and lay people to the risk of 
climate change are due to the fact that they use different systems for information processing. 
84% of scientists believe that climate change is caused by human activities. Only 49% of the 
public agree with this view. In the perception of climate change risks, scientists use more 
analytic systems, while the lay people use more empirical systems (Weber E.U & Stern 2011). 
This may because, first of all, scientists have access to more reliable data on climate change in 
research activities. Second, because of the education and professional training that scientists 
receive, they are more inclined than others to use data analysis and build models. For the general 
public, they are more susceptible to personal experience and will automatically use the 
empirical system to analyze information. When the results obtained by the two systems are 
different, the empirical system often outperforms the analysis system because it is faster and 
more vivid (E.U Weber 2010). Studies of Leiserowitz and Broad (2008) show that the British 
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people are more aware of the risks of climate change based on empirical systems, even those 
individuals whose economic sources are closely related to the climate, such as farmers and 
fishermen. When they cannot receive sufficient feedback from daily life or personal experience, 
they also tend to use empirical system to make climate change risk assessments. Similarly, in 
rain-fed agriculture in the Uganda region, whether insufficient or excessive rainfall will lead to 
agricultural damage. But the past research shows that people in the area convert rain forecasts 
into deterministic information based on personal experience, which leads to increasement of 
potential risks (Marx S.M et al., 2007). Although the empirical system can help individuals 
make decisions quickly, it can also bias individual decisions. 
When presenting experience-based information and description-based information, 
personal experience information is more likely to attract attention, and its influence is more 
trustworthy than description information (Erev & Barron, 2005). Recent personal experience 
strongly influences the evaluation of a risky option. This is because in the context of climate 
change, personal experience information can stimulate people's stronger emotional reactions 
and recall relevant events in the past (Weber E.U, 2006). Low-probability events generate less 
concern than their probability warrants on average, but more concern than they deserve in those 
rare instances when they do occur. Personal experience with noticeable and serious 
consequences of global warming is still rare in many regions of the world (Weber E.U, 2006). 
In fact, most people’s knowledge and experience about climate change are indirect. They are 
mediated by descriptions in news and movies. For example, personal experience does not 
provide strong evidence for that the melting of Greenland or Antarctica’s glaciers is attributed 
to climate change (Weber E.U, 2010). In addition, when the current situation cannot match the 
past experience, as long as it can stimulate individual strong emotions, it can also predict 
individual behavior (Weber E.U & Johnson, 2009). For example, when an individual feels a 
strong fear that the climate warming will cause melting of glaciers, even if individuals do not 
experience the melting of glaciers, they will participate more in environmental protection 
actions (Stern et al. 2011). 
However, empirical systems and analytic systems are not an absolute division. According 
to Weber E.U(2010), the two information processes involved in the two systems are parallel 
and interdependent. The analytic system can help individuals reclassify climate change 
information related to past experience, so that strong emotions can be activated in the analytic 
system. In addition, two types of information may also be processed in two corresponding 
systems. The research of Marx S.M et al. (2007) shows that specific, personally relevant 
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experience information is processed in an empirical system and generates an effective incentive 
behavior. In contrast, description information is processed in the analytic system, and unless 
the decision maker has received a certain amount of training and can consciously pay attention 
to the description information and its influence, otherwise the result has only a minor impact 
on the behavior. 
Here we must clarity that, the study that distinguish the experts from the lay people on risk 
perception is from the very beginning of this theme. 
Whyte (1985:115) explains the meaning of the term risk perception as “the process 
whereby risks are subjectively, or intuitively, understood and evaluated.” For this author, 
although the term risk is approached, at least initially, as an objective aspect of reality, some 
studies have shown that even scientists tend to estimate it based on a good deal of intuition. 
Burton, Kates and White (1993: 248) corroborate this idea and report that: 
[...]an analysis of risk needs to take account to how it is perceived by the 
people directly affected, individuals and organizations involved in responding to 
risk, as well as the perceptions of scientific and technical analysts. 
For Kates (1978), cognitive influences can reach even the most experienced scientists, who 
are able to misjudge the probability of an accident. These influences would be only more 
disguised than those acting on ordinary citizens. 
Thus, even the most informed or educated individuals can be influenced, to a greater or 
lesser degree, by subjective factors and therefore the role played by perception in both the lay 
evaluation and the technical and scientific assessment of risks should be considered. Therefore, 
there is no way to evaluate environmental risk, but rather from the interrelationship between 
the (operational) objective and the (perceived) subjective (BARBOSA et al. 2009). 
While taking into account the damage of communities affected by environmental disasters, 
variations in perceptions can be identified in differentiated socioeconomic and cultural groups. 
However, common perceptions and reactions can also be observed. According to Del Rio 
(1996:4), although perceptions are “subjetivas para cada indivíduo, admite-se que existam 
recorrências comuns, seja em relação às percepções e imagens, seja em relação às condutas 
possíveis.” 
Some characteristics or qualities peculiar to risk situations (and therefore part of their 
objective reality) are especially capable of influencing perception, attenuating or aggravating 
the assessment of reality. Among these characteristics can be highlighted the cause of the risk, 
the type of consequence, the victims involved and the possible scenario of destruction. Whyte 
(1985) presented a set of factors, related to the adverse climatic phenomena and their 
consequences, that normally interfere in the perception and the responses of the individuals. 
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Burton, Kates and White (1993) also explain the intervening factors that act on the 
different types of human responses to extreme events of nature: 
A. Magnitude: The force with which the event occurs, indicated by the flood quota, volume 
of material moved on the slopes, wind speed, rainfall values, points on the Richter scale, for 
example; 
B. Frequency: average time in return of extreme events; 
C. Duration: time of manifestation of the phenomenon - minutes, hours, days, for example; 
D. Area extension: size of the area affected by the event; 
E. Deflagration speed: how quickly the event is triggered, suddenly or gradually; 
F. Spatial dispersion: spatial pattern of the event distribution, which can be linear, punctual, 
for example; 
G. Temporal distribution: temporal pattern of the distribution of the event, being annual, 
seasonal, random, for example. 
The effective action of an individual in order to combat risk therefore demands that there 
is a previous state of sensitivity and desire for change, usually reached after some degree of 
annoyance, fear or in some cases, induced by the construction of new values. Whyte (1977) 
calls effectiveness of the ability to turn thinking into reality, that is, into attitude, behavior, or a 
true search for what is desired. The action is triggered only when a certain threshold is reached, 
which can vary considerably in each case, depending on factors such as the severity of the risk 
and the degree of exposure to its consequences, the value of the assets lossy materials, traits of 
the individual's personality (self-control, responsibility, fear, etc.). Based on the works of 
Burton, Kates and White (1993) and Park (1985), four different models of risk behavior can be 
identified: 
A. The risk is not perceived: in this case, the individuals are not aware of the threat, as 
they judge its manifestation or its effects unlikely. Generally, no losses have yet occurred or, if 
they occurred, they were insignificant and their impacts were absorbed easily. Hence, risk does 
not become a concern and the community remains at the mercy of circumstances. Typical 
behavior in areas threatened by phenomena with long intervals of recurrence (such as volcanic 
eruptions) or with slow and gradual evolution (such as air pollution); 
B. The risk is perceived, but it is accepted passively: threats are recognized and tolerated, 
as they are considered a kind of “price” for housing. The threshold of consciousness has been 
reached as a result of experience with dangerous situations, so individuals know the risk, but 
passively accept its consequences, since they cannot find solutions to the problem. The most 
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common response in these cases is the evacuation of the area and the search for help, as in some 
situations of floods or landslides involving poor communities; 
C. Risk is reduced by a positive attitude: efforts are made to reduce losses, that is, to reduce 
vulnerability to the phenomenon, since the action threshold has already been reached. The 
residents became aware of the risk and importance of the losses, adopting more effective 
adjustments for prevention and control. Typical behavior of more developed regions, whose 
economic losses are high in accidents, and the community has the necessary means to adjust 
(although such measures are not always ideal); 
D. Risk leads to change (migration) or to transformation of land-use: in this type of 
situation, the intolerance threshold has been reached and the risk implies the modification of 
land use (for example, exchange of one agricultural crop by another economic activity or 
reversal of an old residential area for leisure activities or environmental preservation), change 
of dwelling place, or a combination of both. 
For Beck (2009: 11), the perception of risk is delegated to attitude research: 
This ‘technical’ science of risk rests on a clear separation between risk and 
perception which is underscored and supported by the parallel separation 
between experts and lay people. Correspondingly, the ‘subjectivity’ of risk, and 
hence the ‘perception of risk’, is delegated to attitude research.  
And this attitude research will logically divide between experts and lay people. As Beck 
(2009: 11) explained,  the perception of risk is viewed and analysed in turn largely as an 
individual reaction and response to ‘objective’ risks as measured by various ‘heuristics’ of 
individual judgement and understanding. So it is clear that prejudices and mistakes are assumed 
to lie on the lay people and not on the experts, because the ‘subjectivity of risk’ is assumed to 
be pervasive among lay people, who are regarded as ‘poorly informed’ in comparison to the 
‘precise’ and ‘scientific’ analyses of the experts. 
Thus, the starting point of any risk perception study should be on how much the 
interpretation of a given risk by a lay person for the interpretation of the same fact by a “experts” 
differs. For the social sciences the social perception of risk by the population is generally quite 
distinct from that of the specialists, especially the scientists, and their interpretations are based 
much more on their own beliefs and convictions than on facts and empirical data, which are the 
elements that constitute the basis for constructing the risk perception of technicians and 
scientists (Slovic, 1979, and 1987). 
Peres et al. (2005), in a reference to Sjöberg & Fromm (2001), states that the population 
in general tends to perceive risks more than benefits and this trend has been found in several 
studies on perception of risks and benefits, especially those related to implementation of 
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“novelties”, such as a new strategy to prevent natural disasters, and other factors such as the 
level of schooling and the specificity of tasks are carried out, which contribute to the basis of 
sustaining the perception of risk. In this way, experience, information and cultural background 
form an inseparable triad of determinants of risk perception, though these did not deplete the 
factors related to the construction of risk perception in specific populations and/or population 
groups. 
In the study by Navarro & Cardoso (2005), the importance of the cognitive aspect that 
elaborates the perception of the risk is processed with the competition of the self-perception, 
integrated in a social context, that includes the behavioral perspective, associated to the personal 
factors, correlated with the cognitive abilities of individuals and their interaction with the 
external environment. Thus, once they are involved in these values, individuals tend to construct 
images, and based on that feeling they promote self-assessments that determine the exposure or 
not to risk. 
Thus we come to the idea that risk is perceived according to the context of social spaces, 
cultural aspects, personality, life history and personal characteristics of individuals, which from 
a certain angle can be seen as problematic, considering that this thought could lead us to 
consider the non-objective existence of risk, considering it as happening only in the perception 
of each one as a particular experience, which does not correspond to reality (Barbosa et al. 
2009). 
B. Universe of research 
With no doubt, this is an interdisciplinary research, which includes sociology, 
anthropology, psychology, public policy and socio-environmental problems. Therefore, the 
analysis methods of these disciplines mentioned contribute to the data analysis in future 
chapters. And in general, this research is a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methodology, based on the case study of Beijing, of the local scientists’ risk perception and 
pro-environmental behaviors. More specifically, to obtain the data, questionnaires, semi-
structured interviews, direct observation and documentary review are the main methodology 
used in this research. 
● B.a.Representativeness 
As justified above, in this research, the population surveyed and interviewed is of the 
scientists’ group in Beijing. Here I need to point out that, as for most of the social studies in 
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China, the scientists’ group is usually included in the intellectual class. So here below I need to 
explain the particularity and characteristics of intellectual class. The concept of intellectuals has 
always been debated by scholars in China. There is no consistent opinion so far. To sum up, 
there are mainly the following two meanings (Wang 2003, Zhang & Li 2014): First, 
“Intellectuals are people with higher educational level and engaged in mental work, such as 
scientists, teachers, doctors, reporters, engineers, etc.”. The second is that “Intellectuals are 
explorers and creators who are active in the field of ideas and concepts, and they are critics and 
representatives who care about society and the times”. In fact, any of these definitions can only 
be functional and not substantive. The concept of intellectuals is of an era. Every historical 
period has its own metrics. We can only define intellectuals in their essential sense. The 
essential difference between intellectuals and non-intellectuals lies in knowledge, in the process 
and results of their creative activities. As the main carrier of knowledge, intellectuals have their 
own special foundation. We may define intellectuals in this way: 
Intellectuals are those who create, elaborate, disseminate, and utilize mental and cultural 
achievements, engaging in mental production and innovation, and play an exemplary role in 
promoting and demonstrating social values (Li 2003). 
Chinese intellectuals, be they researchers, scholars, teachers, engineers, senior technicians, 
lawyers, doctors or artists, writers, etc., most people are in labor relations with capitalism. Many 
intellectuals have jobs in public institutions. Although they are not complete institutions of 
capitalist enterprises, but the economic situation of public institutions and working conditions 
of workers, service employees have nothing essentially difference. In the present research, the 
characteristics of the intellectual residents of Beijing are as following: 
- With a high level of education, which allows them to have good access to knowledge 
about pollution and relatively high social responsibility; 
- They have Hukou in Beijing, which means that they are permanent residents of Beijing, 
so they are more coexisting with the city. As a result, they probably take better care of the 
quality of the environment in Beijing and are more willing to make changes on the pollution 
situation; 
- They have good income, which allows them more choices of life and better adaptation to 
atmospheric pollution; 
- Relatively more respectable social status, which means that their thoughts are more 
powerful, not only up – to the level of decision, but also down - to the common people around 
them. 
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● B.b.The sample size 
The size of the sample depends basically on the equilibrium of two variables: Expected 
Sample Error, and Field Cost and Time. While the Cost and Field Time are directly proportional 
to the size of the sample, sample error is not directly proportional to the sample size. That is, 
after the inflection point of the curve, the gains usually do not compensate for the additional 
expenses and deadlines. 
The calculation of the sample size should control the Expected Proportion, Confidence 
Interval, and Error Margin. 
When talking about scientists in China, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) should be 
seen as a good representative, because it gathers lots of scientists and itself also works as a 
thinktank to the government. According to the annual report of Chinese Academy of Sciences 
in 2014, the total population of researchers in CAS is 56085 peoples, and 41400 peoples among 
the whole population of staff in the CAS are with Master or Doctor degree. 
Formula 1:   n∞ = [p(1-p) ╳ z2]/error2 
p = 0,5 
( 1-p ) = 0,5 
z = 1,96 
error = 10,0% 
Thus, n∞ = 96 
Formula 2:   n = n∞ ╳ [N/(N + n∞ - 1)] 
N = 41400 
Thus, n = 96 
In which: 
error: sampling error 
z: confidence (1,96 represents 95% of confidence) 
p: expected proportion 
N: population 
n: sample size of known population 
n∞: sample size of unknown population 
In summary, the total sample size of this research should be no less than 96 people. 
As I have been working for the Institutes of Science and Development of CAS, naturally 
I will take the sample from the Institutes of Science and Development, which is relatively easier 
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to confirm both the access and the confidence of the data. 
According to the annual report of the Institutes of Science and Development of CAS in 
2016, the total population of its staff is 194 people, among them the researchers are 162 people. 
Thus, the sample of the present research is from those people. 
● B.c.Type of sampling 
This research is probabilistic sampling with adoption of quotas. The quota controls the 
bias caused by the difficulty of doing the interviews. The quotas used would be: sex, age, job 
title, and homeland. The age quota divides in the line of 35years and 45years. Samples are 
divided into 3 groups, which are: under 35 years, between 35 and 45, over 45 years. And the 
job title quota is divided into: (1)above “Associate Professor”, with Associate Professor 
included, (2)Professor and, (3)under “Research Associate” including Research Associate and 
Research Assistant. And the birthplace quota divides the samples between native of Beijing and 
non-native from Beijing. 
C. Data collection 
Qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis should be unified and complement each 
other. Qualitative analysis is the basic premise of quantitative analysis, a quantitative research 
without qualitative is blind and useless; quantitative analysis helps qualitative analysis become 
more scientific and accurate, which promote broader and deeper conclusions. Therefore, this 
research develops both with quantitative data and qualitative data. 
● C.a.Quantitative Data 
The present research will conduct a specific questionnaire on the risk perception and pro-
environmental behavior of scientists in Beijing, with the sampling justified in sub-item before. 
In the questionnaire construction, the closed questions will be used, which produce uniform and 
easy to be coded answers. In spite of the disadvantages such as, it may induce or distort the 
response, and it requires knowledge of alternative possibilities, closed questions allow 
comparisons and are easier to be treated quantitatively. (The questionnaire is available in 
Attachment) 
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● C.b.Qualitative Data 
Qualitative measurement is a derived measure, which is not performed directly on the 
phenomenon of interest, but on the manifestations of this phenomenon (Pereira, J.C.R. 2004). 
The qualitative data is the symbolic representation attributed to the manifestations of a 
qualitative event. It is a classification strategy of a seemingly imponderable phenomenon that, 
by establishing premises of an ontological and semantic nature, instrumentalizes the recognition 
of the event, the analysis of its behavior and its relations with other events (Pereira, J.C.R. 2004). 
Different from quantitative research, which should begin with an idea (usually articulated as a 
hypothesis), and then through measurement, generates data and, by deduction, allows a 
conclusion to be drawn, qualitative research, in contrast, begins with an intention to explore a 
particular area, collects “data” (observations and interviews), and generates ideas and 
hypotheses from these data largely through what is known as inductive reasoning (Greenhalgh 
& Taylor 1983). 
As mentioned before, the methods qualitative that are used in this research include: semi-
structured interviews, direct observation and document analysis. And the qualitative data to be 
gotten through these methods are: the policies on control of air pollution, both in local and 
national level; the perception of risk and the perception of environmental policies of local 
residents in Beijing; the pro-environmental behavior of the local residents. 
The data on risk perception will address the following questions: How does air pollution 
influence their life? How does air pollution correlate with their health and the health of their 
family? What level of concern about air pollution? Which perspective on the future of air 
pollution in Beijing? If it is necessary, what level of sacrifice of benefit can they do to improve 
the situation? 
Regarding the data on the perception and attitudes of local people on environmental 
policies in Beijing, the interviewed people will be asked the following questions: In what 
aspects should local government do about air pollution? Do the local people have knowledge 
about environmental policies in Beijing? Do the local people are satisfied with environmental 
policies? In what aspects are they satisfied? In what ways are they dissatisfied? Is the air 
pollution situation improving under environmental policies? Is local people’s happiness 
influenced by environmental policies? 
In order to collect qualitative data, it is necessary to conduct semi-structured interviews 
with some representatives of the research sample. A semi-structured interview is a qualitative 
method of inquiry that combines a predetermined set of open questions (questions that prompt 
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discussion) with the opportunity for the interviewer to explore particular themes or responses 
further. The selection of interviewees will perform with the dimensions explained in sub-item 
before, combining with the results of the quantitative data. Here I need to introduce the Institute 
for Sustainable Development Strategy of the Institutes of Science and Development of CAS. It 
mainly conduct research on Ecological Civilization and Sustainable Development Strategy, 
with a focus on the major issues of the construction of an ecological civilization system, 
developing a theory system of ecological civilization, sustainable development strategies and 
policies, energy and climate change, land and space planning, regional development policies, 
geopolitics and economics, geographic process simulation, etc. The researchers of this institute 
is chosen to be the interviewees of this present research, as they are both qualified experts on 
the theme of environmental policy and the local residents that experience the air pollution in 
their daily life. 
Other than the questionnaire and the semi-structured interview, to obtain the data of pro-
environmental behaviors of the local residents, the direct observation will be conducted in this 
research as well. Direct observation is a technique that complements short-term situational 
analysis. This methodological procedure will be complemented by the establishment of 
informal and spontaneous contacts with different categories of subjects. In this way, it is 
conducted based on a list of aspects to be observed and it ensures the intersection of information 
obtained based on other techniques to make the information more reliable. 
Document analysis is a form of qualitative research in which documents are interpreted by 
the researcher to give voice and meaning around an assessment topic (Bowen, 2009). Analyzing 
documents incorporates coding content into themes similar to how focus group or interview 
transcripts are analyzed (Bowen,2009). The methodological procedure of document analysis is 
basically conducted in Chapter 1, in review of the environmental politics on the theme of air 
pollution in Beijing. Besides, in the following chapters when analyzes people’s perception on 
environmental politics, this technique will also be conducted. The documents analyzed in this 
research are mainly the governmental documents, for example including the annual reports, 
government gazettes, bulletins, both on the national level and the local level. 
In addition, I need to mention here that the literature review is very important at the first 
phase of the study. It is conducted to summarize the findings and conclusions of other 
researchers, in order to refine the questions to be addressed in this study and to avoid duplication 
and redundancy. 
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Chapter 1. A brief summary of current policies for air pollution in 
China 
Risks can be changed by modifying the activity or initial scenario or by minimizing their 
impacts (Renn, 2008). In the case of air pollution, societies can reduce pollutant emissions 
(mitigation), thereby reducing the pace and magnitude of pollution, and adapt to their impacts. 
These responses can, and should, be complementary. The political responses to air pollution 
are defined as any action taken by any governmental actor in the different levels and sectors of 
action to face climate change, being directed to both mitigation of the problem and adaptation 
to the impacts brought about by this pollution. 
Governmental action in China has constantly faced the dilemma between prioritizing 
economic growth or the protection of the environment since the introduction of Deng 
Xiaoping’s reforms in 1978. For the central government and many Chinese this attitude has 
changed since the late 1970s, when legislation and institutions to protect the environment have 
been created. It is noteworthy, for example, the presence of a Ministry dedicated exclusively to 
the promotion and compliance with environmental laws: the State Board of Environmental 
Protection. The laws on protecting the environment in China are considered the most 
progressive of any developing nation, at least on paper. Lawsuits against polluters have been 
fought in the courts, some successfully. This was due to increased awareness by the government 
to the urgent need to stop environmental degradation because of its adverse effects and also due 
to the action of civil society by pressuring governments to clean up the environment. In addition 
to the political society, the active presence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
concerned with environmental protection is verified. However, at the provincial level, in 
important sections of the political cities administration, it appears that the existence of 
conflicting objectives, as well as strong corruption in State management, ultimately weaken 
severely the effectiveness of policies and targeted legal measures for environmental protection 
in China (MacBean 2007; Oliveira 2011; Ferreira and Barbi 2013; Ferreira et al. 2016). 
Environmental management in China was largely stimulated by the 1972 United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment. Thus, the first China National Conference on 
Environmental Protection in 1973 enabled the formation of a group of experts and officials 
under the State Council whose work resulted in a published document in 1974 that 
recommended proactive policies in environmental protection. According to it, the State should 
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manage the environment rather than simply respond by trying to control pollution. In response 
to air pollution, water pollution, and solid waste disposal, the Environmental Protection Law 
was passed in 1979 and started the process of developing a legal basis for environmental 
protection. It stated the System of Environmental Impact Assessment as a requirement for every 
new project or rebuilding or expanding project. This development of environmental policies 
also coincided with and was influenced by the economic reforms of the 1980s and the increased 
openness to foreign markets. 
Furthermore, as a response to the damaged environment, changes in policy occurred in 
1984, when the State Council established the National Environmental Protection Agency 
(NEPA), responsible for the coordination of environmental activities among the relevant 
ministries. Several changes in the policy occurred after 1984. Managi and Kaneko (2010) 
highlight the approval of the Law on Air Pollution Prevention and Control of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1987. According to it, every polluting company needs to follow the rules 
for pollution control. Other policies and regulations were approved by the government and a 
set of national standards related to air quality was established. The fundamental basis for 
environmental laws rests in the 1989 Environmental Protection Law. It involved four principles: 
coordination of environmental protection, pollution prevention, polluter responsibility, and 
enhancement of environmental management. It authorized NEPA to set standards for 
environmental quality and for waste discharges and emissions. It also allowed local authorities 
to create their own standards for anything not covered by the national standards and to establish 
more strict standards than the national ones where necessary. 
Environmental protection has only really started to exert its full presence on the political 
agenda in China since the 1990s, when six environmental laws and regulations were revised 
and/or issued. It added new articles on a charge of damage to protect natural resources and the 
environment, and a charge of misconduct in environmental management. A lot of attention has 
always been paid to reducing air pollutant emissions and improving air quality in China. As 
examples, Chan and Yao (2008) name a series of laws, regulations, and standards such as the 
Law on the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution, the National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards and the Emission Standards of Air Pollutants for Thermal Power Plants. In 1998, 
NEPA was upgraded from a sub-ministry to a ministry: the State Environmental Protection 
Administration (SEPA). In 2008, SEPA was renamed to Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(MEP) and elevated to a full ministry under the State Council. This change was seen as a sign 
of the Chinese government’s willingness to make serious efforts to improve the environment. 
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MEP is a chief organ for formulating and implementing environmental policies. It 
encompasses several local Pollution Prevention Boards at provincial, city and county levels that 
would appear to meet normal requirements for implementation of laws and encouragement of 
good environmental behavior. These boards can carry out surprise inspections and central and 
local governments can impose penalties for breaches of regulations (Huang et al., 2010). 
Moreover, China has laws that deal with specific issues and specific sectors such as the marine 
environment, air, water and so on. In addition to the national laws there are many regional and 
local laws governing the environment. Chinese environmental policy has given more attention 
to water and air pollution issues; radioactive pollution has also high concern. Policy instruments 
have changed from emphasis on command-and-control regulations to economic incentives. 
Another important environmental concern in China regards energy. The coal 
thermoelectric plants prevail in the country, which is arguably the largest contributor to climate 
change in the world. Coal accounts for more than 70% of the total energy consumption, and 
emissions from coal combustion are the major anthropogenic contributors to air pollution in the 
country. From 1980 to 2001, China was able to limit energy demand growth to less than half of 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth (Zhou et al., 2010). According to Zhou et al. (2010), this 
was achieved through very aggressive energy-efficiency programs organized by the central 
government working closely with provincial and municipal authorities. However, the situation 
has turned around completely since 2002, when energy use per unit of GDP increased an 
average of 3.8% per year between 2002 and 2005. In recognition of the unsustainable pace of 
energy demand growth and its associated adverse consequences, China has created or recreated 
a policy apparatus to design and implement energy-efficiency throughout the economy since 
2006, aiming at reducing energy intensity by 20% in 5 years. China is making a significant new 
beginning in its pursuit of greater levels of energy-efficiency. Reforms have taken place at all 
levels of government, and their impact is being felt throughout the entire economy. Laws have 
been passed, regulations promulgated, new programs created and implemented in all provinces 
and many municipalities. Some of the most significant of these efforts include the creation of 
the Top-1000 enterprise program, the re-creation of a sizeable fund for energy-efficiency 
investments, strong advocacy at all levels of the Communist Party and the government for 
energy-efficiency, and increasing attention on enforcement of energy-efficiency policies in all 
sectors. 
The urban population in China is expected to grow in the next few decades. As a 
consequence, renewable sources of energy, such as wind and solar, have gained attention and 
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investments in order to sustain expected significant changes in the energy consumption pattern. 
There are relevant initiatives in the two types of energy capture across the country. For example, 
China has doubled its wind power capacity since 2005 and is about to overtake the USA as the 
world’s largest market for the corresponding turbines (Zhang, 2011). Six huge wind power 
projects are under construction in various parts of the Chinese territory, each with a capacity of 
16 coal-fired power plants. Also, the largest solar power plant in the world will be built until 
2019, in Inner Mongolia, about thirty times greater than solar power plants in Europe (Jeff 
Kearns et al. 2018). 
To cope with an increasing range of global environmental issues, the Chinese government 
has become more engaged internationally in the last two decades. In 1990, the State Council 
announced a statement on the ‘‘Problems and positions related to global environmental issues’’, 
in which principles have guided China’s position on global climate negotiations. They 
emphasized the responsibility of developed countries for environmental crisis, the harmony 
between environmental protection and economic development; the recognition of development 
right of countries; the sovereign equality of all countries and the need to create funds for 
developed countries (Oliveira 2011; Ferreira et al. 2016). 
With regard to climate change, China has engaged in the international debate, developing 
domestic institutions appropriate to the issue and collaborating with the Climate Convention in 
those international negotiations that led to the Kyoto Protocol. In addition, as a council member 
of the United Nations Environment Programme Council (UNEP), China adopted and signed 50 
international treaties, 15 are conventions and 27 bilateral agreements related to environmental 
protection during the 1990s. However, since international negotiations were set to be 
consolidated and had to be absorbed internally, the intentions of the Chinese representatives 
clashed with international aspirations. In this context, the domestic position that global policies 
could not reduce the growth rate in the country was expressed (Oliveira 2011; Ferreira et al. 
2016). 
Although the opening to the international debate is a reality, as can be seen with the largest 
participation of the Chinese government in international forums, GHG emissions in China 
continue to grow.1 In this sense, due to pressure from the international community, the country 
began to play a more proactive role with respect to the commitments made in the negotiations 
on climate change. In 2007, for example, China announced the National Climate Change 
 
1 From 1994 to 2004, the average annual growth rate for emissions of greenhouse gases was about 4 %. 
Since 2006, China overtook the USA and became the largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world 
(Huang et al. 2010). 
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Program and created the National Leadership Group on Climate Change. In 2009, China 
committed to the international community with the decision to significantly cut GHG emissions 
by 2020, by increasing the use of ‘‘clean’’ fuel sources by 15 %, as well as by increasing the 
pace of reforestation and developing a ‘‘green economy’’. However, according to the Chinese 
leadership, this structure of commitments will hardly be achieved since there is the dilemma of 
reducing emissions and decreasing economic growth, which would produce effects on the 
current pace of social development currently observed in China (Huang et al. 2010; Oliveira 
2011; Ferreira et al. 2016). 
So, in this brief overview of environmental problems in China, the country has adopted a 
series of policies and programs aimed at mitigating climate change, or to be more specific, 
mitigating air pollution, either within the civil society and the government sphere. The measures 
stood out for its diversity and coverage. 
China’s environmental policy system generally consists of broadly five series of polices, 
systematically intertwined in the departmental-regional government. They are: (1) 
environmental laws, rules and standards; (2) national plans in the Five Year Plan (FYP) 
framework; (3) ten specific regulatory measures; (4) special actions outside the FYP framework; 
and (5) environment-related state ideologies. As aforementioned, apart from environmental 
policies, energy and climate policies are also highly relevant to air pollution, but for a long time 
they were part of another relatively independent policy system in the context of climate changes 
and energy security (Jin et al. 2016). 
Here we should pay extra attention to the year of 2007. Because the year 2007 was a very 
important year for the environmental actions in China, and for Beijing city. Or we can say, it 
was the year when the government began to make real actions to the environmental problem 
and kept continuing its effort until now. In 2007, the first National Climate Change Program 
was launched. From then on, Chinese environmental governance was marked by the 
establishment of structures, including government agencies, by building accountability systems 
for reducing carbon intensity, conducting climate change studies, by promoting specific 
legislation, in order to strengthen governance of systems and mechanisms in connection with 
the problem (Barbi & Ferreira 2016). Here below is a summary of the actions taken by the 
government for 10 years, from the year 2007 until 2017. 
1.1. Legislation and plans 
On December 27, 2011, the MEP and the Ministry of Health jointly organized the second 
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national environmental and health work leading group meeting in Beijing. The meeting 
reviewed and approved the National Environmental and Health Information Notification 
Mechanism, the list of candidates for the National Environmental and Health Expert Advisory 
Committee, and the key tasks of the National 12th Five-Year National Environmental and 
Health Work Leading Group. It fully affirmed the achievements during the period of “11th 
Five-Year Plan” in areas of environment and health. The release of the National Environmental 
and Health Action Plan (2007-2015) (hereinafter referred to as the Action Plan) marks the 
beginning of the integration of environmental and health concepts into the economic and social 
development, it demonstrates the determination of all departments to address the environmental 
problems that undermine the health of the people. The meeting stressed that in order to fully 
implement the objectives and tasks of the Action Plan, during the 12th Five-Year Plan period, 
we should focus on the following tasks in the field of environment and health: First, further 
improve the national environmental and health management system and mechanism, adopting 
effective measures at the legislation, policy and implementation levels, and accelerating the 
exchange and sharing of information among departments. Second, improve national 
environmental and health risk management capabilities, focusing on heavy metals, hazardous 
wastes, persistent organic pollutants and hazardous chemicals, establishing an environmental 
and health risk assessment system. Third, plan urban and rural environmental and health work 
in a coordinated manner, and set priorities for urban and rural differences in environmental and 
health issues. Fourth, focus on achieving new breakthroughs in key areas, through the national 
investigation of environments and health situation of key regions to understand the basic 
situation of the impact of major environmental pollutants on the health of the population, and 
to complete relevant standards, monitoring, assessment, warning and other measures for 
environmental pollution problems, such as PM2.5 pollution. Fifth, increase financial support for 
environmental and health work, to support comprehensive monitoring of environment and 
health situation, and to strengthen the capacity for environmental and health risk management 
and emergency response. Sixth, improve the scientific decision-making of the national 
environmental and health work. Major decisions involving environment and health problems 
should be taken through a progress of investigation, scientific arguments and collective 
discussion. Seventh, conduct an extensive and in-depth environmental and health publicity and 
education, to promote the social participation in environmental and health work. 
In 2009, the MEP organized the revision of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law 
(Revised Draft). The draft took consideration of the current new situation of air pollution 
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prevention and control and new management requirements, and has made major adjustments in 
total control, sewage permit management, motor vehicle environmental management and 
penalties. In 2013, the Permanent Committee of the National People’s Congress revised and 
promulgated the new “Environmental Protection Law”. As well, the MEP issued a series of 
supporting documents and actions such as, “daily pollution punishment”, seizure of highly 
polluter facilities and equipment, discontinued or limited production of highly polluter factory, 
administrative detention, environmental information disclosure of enterprises and institutions, 
and investigation and handling of environmental incidents. 
In September 2012, the State Council officially approved the “Twelfth Five-Year Plan for 
Air Pollution Prevention and Control in Key Areas” (hereinafter referred to as “Planning”). The 
Planning scope is 13 key areas including Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze River Delta and the 
Pearl River Delta, involving 117 prefecture-level and above cities in the 19 provinces, clearly 
stated that “by 2015, the annual average concentrations of PM10, SO2, NO2 and PM2.5 in the air 
will decrease by 10%, 10%, 7% and 5% respectively”. Clarified the work ideas and key tasks 
of preventing and controlling PM2.5 and enhanced the joint efforts of regional atmospheric 
environment management. The Planning is China’s first comprehensive air pollution prevention 
and control plan, which indicates that China’s air pollution prevention and control work is 
gradually changed the guidance from the total amount control of pollutants to the goal of 
improving environmental quality. 
In the same year, August of 2012, the State Council officially issued the “Twelfth Five-
Year Plan for Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction” (hereinafter referred to as 
“Planning”). The Planning is one of the national key special plans for the “Twelfth Five-Year 
Plan” determined by the State Council. It is a programmatic document guiding the promotion 
of the “12th Five-Year Plan” for energy conservation and emission reduction work. It is very 
important to ensure the realization of the binding targets of energy conservation and emission 
reduction. According to the Planning, by 2015, the total amount of chemical oxygen demand 
and sulfur dioxide emissions in the country will be reduced by 8% compared with 2010, and 
the total amount of ammonia nitrogen and nitrogen oxide emissions will be reduced by 10% 
compared with 2010. The Planning has strengthened the incentive and restraint mechanism, 
built a work pattern of energy conservation and emission reduction, and set the basic principles. 
The overall target is clear, and the specific emission reduction targets such as industrial key 
industries and agriculture are refined. Besides, the main tasks are highlighted, including 
adjusting and optimizing the industrial structure, promoting the improvement of energy 
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efficiency, and strengthening the emission reduction of major pollutants. The last task, of 
strengthening the emission reduction of major pollutants, focus on five sub-tasks, which are the 
construction of urban sewage treatment facilities, the reduction of pollutant emission in key 
industries, the prevention of agricultural source pollution, the control of vehicle pollutant 
emissions, and the treatment of fine particulate matter (PM2.5) in the atmosphere. The top ten 
projects for energy conservation and emission reduction are proposed. Among them, six are 
closely related to emission reduction, namely, urban domestic sewage treatment facilities 
construction project, key river basin water pollution prevention and control project, 
desulfurization and denitrification project, large-scale livestock and poultry breeding pollution 
prevention and control project, circular economy demonstration and promotion project, energy 
saving and emission reduction capacity building project. The Planning also propose ten 
supporting aspects, including comprehensive use of law, economy, technology and necessary 
administrative means. The most important is that the implementation of the Planning further 
clarifies the division of responsibilities between the governments at all levels and the relevant 
departments. 
In 2013, the State Council issued the “Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan” 
(referred to as “Ten Articles of Atmosphere”), which proposed 35 comprehensive measures in 
10 aspects on air pollution. After the implementation of the document was issued, the following 
work was focused on: First, the responsibility was distributed. The General Office of the State 
Council issued the division plan for the key tasks of the “Ten Articles of Atmosphere”, and the 
relevant departments formulated the implementation rules for the implementation of the “Ten 
Articles of Atmosphere” in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei and surrounding areas, and signed the 
responsibility book on air pollution prevention and control targets with the provinces (and 
autonomous regions and municipalities). 25 provinces (and autonomous regions, municipalities) 
and relevant departments of the State Council promulgated the implementation plan for the 
“Ten Articles of Atmosphere”. Second, established a collaboration mechanism. Established the 
Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region and the surrounding areas and the Yangtze River Delta air 
pollution prevention and control coordination mechanism and the national air pollution 
prevention and control inter-departmental coordination mechanism to coordinate the promotion 
of regional and departmental cooperation on air pollution joint prevention and control. Third, 
strengthened comprehensive governance. Implemented measures such as rectification of key 
industries, adjustment of industrial structure, optimization of energy structure, and pollution 
control of motor vehicles. Fourth, introduced supporting policies. Six supporting policies 
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including environmental protection electricity price, special funds, new energy vehicle 
subsidies, and oil product upgrade prices were issued, and 18 pollutant emission standards, 9 
technical policies, and 19 technical specifications were issued. Fifth, improved the monitoring 
and warning system of air pollution. Policy documents to strengthen monitoring, warning and 
emergency management of heavy pollution weather were issued. Monitoring data of fine 
particles (PM2.5) and ranking of air quality status of 74 cities, municipalities and provincial 
capitals in the “three regions” of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta 
are released in real time; other 87 cities began to release the real-time monitoring data on 
January 1, 2014. The air quality forecast and warning system was initially established in Beijing, 
Shanghai and Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region. Sixth, strengthened the supporting measures. The 
central government set up a special fund for air pollution control. It also launched and 
implemented the Clean Air Research Program. 
In 2014, the General Office of the State Council issued the “2014-2015 Energy 
Conservation, Emission Reduction and Low Carbon Development Action Plan” (hereinafter 
referred to as the “Action Plan”). It specifically arranged the supervision and implementation 
of work for the energy conservation, emission reduction and carbon reduction in 2014 and 2015. 
It further clarified the specific targets for energy conservation, emission reduction and carbon 
reduction in 2014 and 2015. The Action Plan vigorously aimed at promoting industrial 
restructuring, accelerating the construction of energy-saving, emission reduction and carbon 
reduction projects, strengthening technical and policy support, actively promoting the market-
oriented energy conservation and emission reduction mechanisms, and strengthening 
monitoring and warning system. At the same time, it proposed the distribution of the targets 
and tasks of energy consumption incremental control, coal-fired boilers elimination, major air 
pollutant emission reduction, “yellow-label” vehicles（that doesn’t meet exhaust emission 
standards, i.e., higher-emission vehicle） and old vehicle elimination of 2014 and 2015 into 
various regions, and set a clear schedule. What’s more, from then on, every year the government 
will launch a similar action plan to arrange the work of energy conservation and emission 
reduction of the year. 
On August 29, 2015, the Law on the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution was 
revised and approved at the 16th meeting of the Permanent Committee of the 12th National 
People’s Congress. On the same day, President Xi Jinping signed the Presidential Decree No. 
31, officially issued it. And the law came into implementation on January 1, 2016. The new 
Law on the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution stipulates the basic principles, 
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basic systems, and prevention measures in the field of air pollution prevention and control. It 
has the following distinctive features: First, the main line is clearer. It is clearly stated that the 
prevention and control of atmospheric pollution should aim at improving the quality of the 
atmospheric environment, strengthen the responsibility of local governments, and strengthen 
assessment and supervision. Second, the focus is more prominent. Highlighting the two key 
entities of local government and enterprises, including: promoting local governments to 
effectively implement the main responsibility for improving the quality of the atmospheric 
environment in the region, stipulating that local governments are responsible for the quality of 
the atmospheric environment in the jurisdiction, and the MEP conducts assessments of 
provincial governments. The government that fails to meet the standards should prepare a 
deadline for compliance planning, and the higher-level environmental protection departments 
will implement a series of institutional measures such as administrative interviews and regional 
restrictions to ensure the full implementation of the standards. Third, the content is more 
complete. First, adhere to the governance of the pollution sources. Clearly stipulate changes in 
economic development mode, optimize industrial structure, and adjust energy structure. When 
clearly defining the quality standards for products containing volatile organic compounds such 
as coal-fired, petroleum coke, biomass fuel, paint, etc., fireworks and firecrackers, and boilers, 
the requirements for atmospheric environmental protection should be clarified. Clarified the 
fuel quality standards should meet the national air pollutant control requirements. Second, 
adhere to full control. In view of the current situation of air pollution in China with multiple 
pollutants coexisting and multiple pollution sources, the prevention and control of atmospheric 
pollution should strengthen the comprehensive prevention and control of coal, industry, motor 
vehicles, dust, agriculture, etc., with synergistic control of atmospheric pollutants such as 
particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, ammonia, and 
greenhouse gases. Third, adhere to the problem-oriented governance. Faced with the current 
problem of frequent heavy polluted weather, a special chapter was set up to make special 
provisions for joint prevention and control of air pollution in key areas and response to heavy 
pollution weather. Fourth, regulation is more stringent. Consolidate the long-term measures of 
the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan, and stipulate a series of institutional 
measures such as standards compliance deadlines, grading assessments, administrative 
interviews, regional restrictions, pollution sources management, vehicle control and coal 
reduction, regional joint prevention and control, etc. forming a more rigorous regulatory system. 
Fifth, the punishment is more powerful. In conjunction with the new “Law on the Prevention 
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and Control of Atmospheric Pollution”, the punishment for air pollution has been effectively 
increased. First, in addition to advocacy regulations, there are penalties for violations. There 
are 30 legal liability clauses, more than 20% of the provisions of the whole law, and more than 
90 types of illegal acts are listed. Second, the ceiling on fines has been raised. Third, on the 
basis of the new Law, the behavior of daily punishment is refined and increased. Fourth, the 
types of punishments have been increased. For example, in administrative penalties, it is 
ordered to suspend business, close, suspend production and rectification, stop work rectification, 
confiscation, cancellation of inspection qualifications, and public security punishment. Civil 
liability and criminal liability are also provided. The promulgation of the new “Law on the 
Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution” complies with the public’s expectations for 
improving the quality of the atmospheric environment, and clarifies the focus of air pollution 
prevention and control work in the new era. It has strong pertinence and operability to the 
outstanding problems in the field of pollution prevention and control, and provides a solid 
legislative guarantee for the comprehensive prevention and control of air pollution. 
In July of 2016, the “Intensification Measures for Air Pollution Prevention and Control in 
Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region (2016-2017)” was issued and implemented. It aims at promoting 
the optimization and adjustment of energy structure, to replace coal with gas and electricity, 
and accelerate the elimination of coal-fired boilers of 10 tons or less per hour. The national 
coal-fired units have completed a total of 440 million kilowatts of ultra-low emission 
conversion, accounting for 47% of the total installed capacity of coal-fired power (MEP 2017). 
It also formulates a plan for the reduction of volatile organic compounds and implements clean 
production technology transformation in 11 key industries such as the petrochemical industry, 
as well as the implementation of the measure of peak production for cement. It also strengthens 
the construction of heavy pollution weather monitoring and warning assessment system, 
unifying the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei regional heavy pollution weather warning grading standards, 
timely organizing air quality forecasting, consultations and supervision, and implementing 
emergency response in heavy polluted weather areas. 
On November 24, 2016, the State Council issued the “13th Five-Year Plan for Ecological 
Environmental Protection”. In order to achieve the goal of overall improvement of ecological 
environment quality, the planning put forward binding and expecting indicators, including 12 
binding indicators, which are mainly for the prevention and control of atmospheric, water and 
soil pollution. There are 2 indicators related with atmospheric quality: the ratio of days with 
good air quality at prefecture level and above, and the concentration of fine particulate matter 
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should decreases in the cities at the prefecture level and above to meet the national standard. 
1.2. Energy 
1.4.2.1 Emission reduction of coal-fired power 
The first effort of Chinese government to achieve the goal in control of air pollution is 
actively promoting the clean and efficient use of coal. 
In 2011, according to the “Notice on Conducting Pilot Work on Control of Atmospheric 
Mercury Pollution in Coal-fired Power Plants”, Chinese government actively promote the 
control of atmospheric mercury pollution in coal-fired power plants. It selected six major power 
groups, 16 pilot power plants, and 32 coal-fired units to conduct the pilot monitoring work, with 
the installation of mercury monitoring equipment. 
In 2012, the central government subsidized 1.09 billion yuan 2  to support the 
implementation of the comprehensive improvement project of coal-fired boilers in 15 key cities 
in the “Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and Control of Key Regions”. A 
total of 28,997 tons of coal-fired boilers were reformed, of which 15,406 tons of steam-
removing facilities were replaced, and 13,591 tons were replaced by clean energy (MEP 2013). 
Since the implementation of the project, the air quality of the relevant cities has improved 
significantly. 
In 2014, the “Comprehensive Management Plan for Volatile Organic Compounds in the 
Petrochemical Industry” and the “Environmental Protection Electricity Price and 
Environmental Protection Facilities Operation Supervision Measures of Coal-fired generating 
units” were issued. Later on, a series of pollutant emission standards of key industries were 
issued, such as the “Air Pollutant Emission Standards of Boilers” (GB 13271-2014), the 
“Domestic Waste Incineration Pollutant Emission Control Standards” (GB 18485-2014), the 
“Non-road mobile machinery diesel engine exhaust pollutant emission limits and measurement 
methods (The Chinese third and fourth stages)” (GB 20891-2014), the “Iron, Antimony and 
Mercury Industrial Pollutant Emission Standards” (GB 30770-2014). It also issued the 
“Implementation Plan of the Comprehensive Improvement Project for the Energy Conservation 
and Environmental Protection of Coal-fired Boilers”. In the same year of 2015, under the 
“Action Plan of Upgrade and Transformation of Coal-fired Electricity for Energy Conservation 
and Emission Reduction 2014-2020”, it arranged energy-saving transformation capacity of 180 
million kilowatts and ultra-low emission transformation capacity of 78.47 million kilowatts. 
 
2 According to the Federal Reserve System (FED), in 2012, 1USD=6.3yuan(RMB). 
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In 2014, it issued a plan for the management of air pollution in key industries in Beijing-
Tianjin-Hebei Region, the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta and the surrounding 
areas. It also promulgated the “Action Plan of the Refined-Oil Quality Upgrade for Air 
Pollution Control”, released the “Comprehensive Remediation Plan for Volatile Organic 
Compounds in Petrochemical Industry”, and proposed the action plan for the promotion of 
technology to recycle oil and gas in piers. 
In 2015, the “Guidelines for the Investigation of Pollution Sources of Volatile Organic 
Compounds (VOCs) in the Petrochemical Industry” and the “Guidelines for Leak Detection 
and Remediation of Petrochemical Enterprises” were issued, which improved the level of 
refined management of VOCs pollution prevention and control in the petrochemical industry.  
Besides the strict requirement and high standard of emission to the coal-fired industries, 
the government also took measures to promote the intensive large-scale energy bases to replace 
the small units, to improve the efficiency of coal-burning. 
In 2013, the small thermal power units were shut down with 4.47 million kilowatts; 1874 
backward coal mines were eliminated, with a production capacity of about 200 million tons. 
The number of coal mines nationwide has decreased by more than 1,200 to less than 6,300. The 
contribution rate of modernized and intensive large-scale energy bases has been significantly 
improved. The output of large-scale coal bases accounted for more than 90% of the total coal 
production in the country. The national cross-regional power transmission was about 237 billion 
kWh, an increase of about 17.5% over the previous year; the inter-provincial power 
transmission was about 779 billion kWh, an increase of about 8.7% over the previous year 
(MEP 2014). In 2014, 55,000 small coal-fired boilers were eliminated (MEP 2015). In 2017, 
the country basically completed the elimination of small coal-fired boilers in the urban areas of 
the prefecture level and above, and eliminated more than 200,000 small coal-fired boilers of 10 
steam tons below in the urban area, and completed the ultra-low emission transformation of 
coal-fired power plants by 700 million kilowatts (MEP 2018). 
What’s more, in consideration of the prevention and control of air pollution, 12 key 
transmission channels of electricity are under construction in 2015, to promote the development 
of energy resources in the west and to reduce the pressure on energy demand in the east. For 
the same purpose, the Three Gorges Power Transmission and Transformation Project was 
completed in 2015. 
1.4.2.2 Transformation of energy structure  
One of the most important and urgent tasks for China’s war on energy conservation and 
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emission reduction is actively and steadily resolving the excess capacity of industry. From 
2013-2015, more than 90 million tons of capacity of backward ironmaking and steelmaking, 
more than 1 million tons of electrolytic aluminum, 230 million tons of cement, and more than 
76 million weight boxes of flat glass were eliminated. In 2014, 31.1 million tons of steel with 
backward and overcapacity, 81 million tons of cement, and 37.6 million weight boxes of flat 
glass were eliminated (MEP 2015). In 2016, more than 65 million tons of excess capacity of 
steel production and more than 290 million tons of excess capacity of coal production were 
resolved (MEP 2017). It also takes the measure of peak production of cement in heating seasons 
in the North of China to promote energy conservation and emission reduction, to resolve the 
contradiction of overcapacity in the cement industry, and improve the air quality. Besides, from 
2017, all the ports for coal collection and drainage in Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong Bohai Sea port 
were changed to railway transportation. 
China’s efforts to cut excess industrial capacity overlap with the imperative to clean up 
the environment. Combined, those forces have had a hefty impact on commodity prices. As 
shown in figure 1, coal, steel, and aluminum prices soared last year as factories shut and mines 
closed. Under the weight of new rules on pollutant discharge, paper prices did the same. 
 
Figure 1 Commodity prices change in China in the last year 
 
The government also takes measures to ensure the key areas of air pollution, such as 
Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei, to achieve negative growth in coal consumption. The issuance of 
the “Guiding Opinions on the Adjustment of Key Industries’ Layout and Industry Transfer” in 
2015 will guide the relevant industries to gather in suitable development areas. 
The reduction of coal consumption in national scale has always been a central 
consideration of Chinese government. The government keep strengthening the clean energy 
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security in key areas, strictly controlling the new coal-consuming projects in key air pollution 
prevention and control areas such as Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl 
River Delta, and put forward the replacement of high-quality coal in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei 
region, with an expectation for replacement of 35 million tons of high-quality coal in 2017. In 
2016, the revolutionary strategy of energy production and consumption was introduced, 
according to which, the proportion of non-fossil energy consumption further increased, and the 
proportion of coal consumption continued to decline. As well as wind and solar, it’s exploring 
frontier clean energy technologies like hydrogen as an alternative to coal. 
The trend towards clean energy is poised to keep gathering steam worldwide. BNEF 
projects global investment in new power generation capacity will exceed $10 trillion between 
2017 and 2040. Of this, about 72 percent is projected to go toward renewable energy, roughly 
evenly split between wind and solar (Jeff Kearns et al. 2018). 
It is worth noticing that, worldwide, solar panel prices are plunging—allowing a faster 
shift away from carbon—thanks to the sheer scale of China’s clean-energy investment. As 
shown in figure 2, China is spending more than twice as much as the U.S. Two-thirds of solar 
panels are produced in China, BNEF estimates, and it’s home to global leaders, including 
JinkoSolar Holding Co. and Yingli Green Energy Holding Co.(Jeff Kearns et al. 2018). 
 
Figure 2 Solar installs during the last 10 years of different countries 
 
The government actively develop natural gas distributed energy, and promote the 
application of natural gas in vehicles and ships. In 2014, the natural gas supply capacity was 
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enhanced. Until 2017, the total pipeline gas receiving capacity increased to 67 billion cubic 
meters, annual import of 59.3 billion cubic meters, an increase of 12.1% (as shown in figure 3). 
Shale gas formation capacity of 1.8 billion square meters / year, annual output of 1.3 billion 
cubic meters. The gas extraction capacity is 17.1 billion cubic meters, and the utilization amount 
is 7.7 billion cubic meters. 
 
Figure 3 China’s Liquefied Natural Gas Imports  
 
In 2015, Chinese domestic natural gas production maintained steady growth and tight gas 
production increased steadily. The conventional gas field in Moxi (of Sichuan Province) was 
completed and put into operation. The policy of subsidy was issued to shale gas development 
and utilization, and the development of shale gas in Fuling, Changning, Weiyuan and Zhaotong 
blocks has reached the commercial scale. It was also implemented the “Action Plan of Coal 
Bed Methane (CBM) Exploration and Development” to promote the efficient use of natural gas, 
increasing the construction of infrastructures like natural gas pipelines, gas storage, urban 
emergency peaking management, etc. 
In 2013, according to MEP data, coal consumption accounted for 66.0% of total energy 
consumption, 0.6% off from the previous year. The new-installed capacity of hydropower was 
29.93 million kilowatts, and the total installed capacity of hydropower reached 280 million 
kilowatts. Three nuclear power generating units recently started to be constructed, 31 nuclear 
power generating units are under construction, with a total capacity of 33.85 million kilowatts; 
two new nuclear power generating units were put into operation, and 17 nuclear power 
generating units are in operation, and the total installed capacity of nuclear power reached 14.61 
million kilowatts. The installed capacity of newly installed grid-connected wind power was 
14.06 million kilowatts, and the total installed capacity of grid-connected wind power reached 
75.48 million kilowatts, with the power generation capacity of 140.1 billion kWh, an increase 
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of 36.4% over the previous year. The installed capacity of newly added solar power grid-
connected machine was 11.38 million kilowatts, and the total installed capacity of solar power 
grid-connected power reached 14.79 million kilowatts, with the power generation exceeded 8.7 
billion kWh, an increase of 143.0% over the previous year. The installed capacity of biomass 
power generation reached 8.5 million kilowatts and the power generation capacity was 32 
billion kWh. The non-fossil energy power generation installed capacity accounted for 30.9% of 
the total installed capacity of electricity, and the non-fossil energy generation capacity was 
1155.1 billion kWh. 
In 2014, the government accelerated the development of non-petroleum energy. With 
22.08 million kilowatts new installed capacity, hydropower installed capacity reached 302 
million kilowatts. 5 units of nuclear power newly put into operation, with a total number of 22 
nuclear power units in operation nationwide, and with a total installed capacity of 19.88 million 
kilowatts. With a newly installed capacity of 19.5 million kilowatts, the installed capacity of 
wind power grid-connected power reached 95.81 million kilowatts. The newly installed 
capacity of solar power generation was 10.64 million kilowatts, and the installed capacity of 
photovoltaic power generation reached 26.52 million kilowatts (MEP 2015).  
In 2015, the total installed capacity of non-fossil energy power generation reached 520 
million kilowatts, doubled from 2010 (MEP 2016). A number of major hydropower projects 
such as Wudongde and Suwalong was approved. Newly put into construction the nuclear power 
units with a total installed capacity of 8.2 million kilowatts. It arranged a series of wind power 
projects with a total installed capacity of 34 million kilowatts. At the same time, it began to 
promote the development of offshore wind power and began to promote clean heating with 
wind power. It released the construction of photovoltaic power generation with a scale of 24.1 
million kilowatts, and started the construction of solar thermal power demonstration projects. 
It keeps promoting the industrialization of bio-natural gas, and carried out the construction of 
demonstration zones and demonstration counties, resulted in an increase of utilization of bio-
natural gas by 500 million cubic meters. It also started the construction of a demonstration 
project in Inner-Mongolia of biomass-molding fuel boiler heating with an additional utilization 
of 1 million tons. 
In 2017, Chinese government launched the national carbon emissions trading system, and 
coordinated the pilot demonstration of low-carbon development. The national carbon dioxide 
emissions of 10,000 yuan3 of GDP (hereinafter referred to as carbon intensity) decreased by 
 
3 According to FED, in 2017, 1 USD=6.9 yuan(RMB). 
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5.1% year-on-year, exceeding the annual target of 4%. Clean and low-carbon energy 
development was accelerated, and the proportion of clean energy consumption such as natural 
gas and hydropower increased by 1.3% (MEP 2018). The government implemented the policy 
of clean heating price and launched the first batch of 12 northern cities, including Beijing, as 
the regional winter clean heating pilot, to replace coal with natural gas as the heating source. 
1.3. Transportation 
On January 4, 2010, the MEP issued the “China Motor Vehicle Pollution Prevention and 
Control Annual Report (2010)”, which first published the discharge of motor vehicle pollutants 
in China, and systematically introduced the progress of motor vehicle pollution prevention and 
control work. The annual report shows that China’s motor vehicle pollution is becoming more 
and more serious, and motor vehicle exhaust emissions have become one of the main sources 
of air pollution in large and medium-sized cities in China. Cars are a major contributor to the 
total amount of motor vehicle pollutants, emitting more than 70% of carbon monoxide and 
hydrocarbons, and more than 90% of nitrogen oxides and particulate matter. After nearly 30 
years of development, China’s motor vehicle environmental management has made great 
progress. In 2009, the emission of pollutants from single new light-duty vehicle fell by more 
than 90% from 2000. Through the rapid upgrade of emission standards, the total amount of 
motor vehicle emissions did not increase with the rapid growth of possession. Compared with 
1980, the number of motor vehicles in China has increased by 25 times, and the total amount 
of emissions has only increased by 12 times, effectively reducing the enormous pressure on the 
environment caused by the growing number of motor vehicles. 
In 2013, the “Guiding Opinions on Accelerating the Development of Green Recycling and 
Low-Carbon Transportation” was issued, putting forward a series of measures such as the 
construction of green recycling and low-carbon transportation infrastructure, the application of 
energy-saving and environmental protection transportation equipment, the construction of 
intensive and efficient transportation organization system, scientific and technological 
innovation and informatization of transportation, etc. to promote the transformation and green 
development of the transportation industry. It also established a cooperation mechanism of 
“interprovincial joint construction” for green transportation development. 
In the transport sector, China already has one of the largest fleets in the world of bus 
powered by compressed-natural-gas (Jeff Kearns et al. 2018). The country also invests in the 
development of electric cars, in the set of projects called Clean Development Mechanism 
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(CDM), which tries to create leading groups in the sector and the establishment of research 
institutions on the subject. The new-energy automobile industry is one of the strategic emerging 
industries that China has focused on, and it has also been included in one of the ten key 
development areas in the “Made in China 2025” strategy. In 2015, a series of documents such 
as the “Implementation Opinions of the Ministry of Transport on Accelerating the Promotion 
and Application of New Energy Vehicles”, “Notice on Improving the Urban Bus Refined Oil 
Price Subsidy Policy and Accelerating the Promotion and Application of New Energy Vehicles” 
and “Measures for the Promotion and Assessment of New Energy Buses (Trial)” were issued 
and implemented. 
The government’s war on air pollution fits neatly with another goal: domination of the 
global electric-vehicle industry. Accelerating the development of new energy automobile 
industry can not only ease the current pressures on energy and environmental protection, but 
also foster new economic growth points, and also promote the transformation of China from a 
traditional automobile power to modern automobile power. Due to the strong support of 
national policies, various domestic investment entities competed to enter the field of new energy 
vehicle manufacturing, promoting the rapid development of the new energy automobile 
industry of China. 
Elon Musk’s Tesla Inc. might be the best-known name, but China has been the global 
leader in Electric vehicle (EV) sales since 2015, with annual production of 379,000 in that year, 
and is aiming for 7 million annual sales by 2025 (as shown in figure 4). To get there, it’s 
subsidizing manufacturers and tightening regulation around traditional fossil-fuel powered cars. 
Beneficiaries include BYD Co., a Warren Buffett-backed carmaker that soared 67 percent last 
year and sold more cars than Tesla. Goldman Sachs Group Inc. has a buy rating on shares of 
Geely Automobile Holdings Ltd. (Jeff Kearns et al. 2018). According to statistics, Chinese 
production and sales of new energy vehicles in 2017 totaled 794,000 and 777,000, respectively 
growth of 53.8% and 53.3% year-on-year, 63.3 times and 60.7 times respectively to 2012, and 
have been ranked in the first place on global production and sales for three consecutive years, 
accounting for more than half of the global market of new energy vehicle (see also figure 4). 
By 2017, more than 1.8 million new energy vehicles have been promoted. 
82 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Forecast of Annual Electric Vehicle Sales in different countries 
 
In order to implement the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Prevention and 
Control of Air Pollution, to control the emission of motor vehicles, the emission standard for 
vehicles and standards for oil products are strictly prescribed. On July 1, 2008, the country 
officially implemented the third-stage of the “Light Vehicle Pollutant Emission Limits and 
Measurement Methods (China III, IV Phase)” (GB18352.3-2005) (referred to as “National III 
Standards”). According to Beijing's “Eleventh Five-Year Environmental Plan” and the 
requirements for air quality of the Olympic Games, Beijing implemented the National IV 
standards, equivalent to the Euro IV standards, in two phases starting from March 1, 2008. In 
January 2013, the implementation of the national fifth-stage gas-fueled ignition engine and 
vehicle emission standards began. Since 2015, the country has fully supplied IV standard 
vehicle gasoline and diesel products, and Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Guangdong, 
Shaanxi and some other places took the lead in supplying national V standard domestic-vehicle 
gasoline and diesel. 2016, it was released the sixth-stage emission standard for light vehicles. 
In 2017, the national V motor vehicle emission standards and oil standards were implemented. 
Since January 1, 2017, the country has fully supplied the national V standard clean oil products. 
At the same time, the government keep strengthening the supervision of environmental 
protection compliance for new vehicles production. And car management system is constantly 
improving. In July of 2009, the MEP formulated “The Regulation of Management of the Motor 
Vehicle Environmental Inspection Qualified Mark”, starting to unify and standardize the 
management of motor vehicle marks. In 2013, the “Guiding Opinions on Strengthening the 
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Prevention and Control of Motor Vehicle Pollution and Promoting the Process of Atmospheric 
PM2.5 Governance”, the “Regulations on the Administration of Environmental Protection 
Inspection of Motor Vehicles” and other normative documents were issued and implemented, 
comprehensively strengthening the weak links in the management of vehicles, such as spot-
checks on new vehicles and annual inspection on in-service vehicles, effectively guiding and 
promoting the governance of vehicles’ emission. In 2014, focusing on 20 cities in three key 
regions, a total of 1,318 models (engine type) and 109 production enterprises were inspected, 
which effectively attacked and shocked the phenomenon that new production vehicles were not 
up to standard. The government organized special campaigns for gasoline and diesel for 
vehicles in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, focusing on the special rectification to crack down 
the production and sale of counterfeit oil products. In 2015, as one of the actions to supervise 
the environmental protection compliance for new vehicles production, 21 enterprises of engines, 
light diesel vehicles, heavy-duty engines and complete vehicles were selected for emission 
testing. 
The government also actively accelerated the elimination of the yellow-labeled vehicles. 
In 2009, the MEP issued the “Notice on Implementing the Automobile Replacement Policy to 
Encourage Early Elimination of the Yellow Label Vehicle”, clarifying the procedures of 
elimination and the division of responsibilities. In 2014, more than 6 million yellow-labeled 
vehicles and old vehicles were eliminated. In 2015, the “Notice on Comprehensively Promoting 
the Elimination of Yellow Label Vehicles” and “The Notice of The Ministry of Transport of 
the People’s Republic of China on the implementation of the special supervision of the General 
Office of the State Council on the elimination of yellow label vehicles and the cooperation of 
five ministries and commissions on promoting the Elimination of Yellow Label Vehicles” were 
issued to further promote the elimination of the yellow-labeled vehicles. According to MEP, 
the whole year of 2015, a total of 1.26 million yellow-labeled vehicles were eliminated. Besides, 
an automobile inspection and maintenance (I/M) system will be established. In 2016, the 
country eliminated 4,405,800 yellow-labeled vehicles and old vehicles, exceeding the annual 
tasks. In 2017, it was basically completed the elimination of yellow-labeled vehicles in the 
country. 
Overall, it is no doubt that the top-level design of green transportation is very important 
for control of air pollution in the field of transportation. In 2014, the preliminary research and 
preparation for the “13th Five-Year Development Plan for Energy Conservation and 
Environmental Protection of Highway and Waterway Transportation” was launched, and the 
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“National Highway and Waterway Transportation Environmental Monitoring Network 
Planning” was completed. To standardize the environmental impact assessment of the 
transportation industry, the “Technical Essentials of Road Network Planning and 
Environmental Impact Assessment” was issued, and major environmental impact assessments 
such as the “Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei transportation integration plan” and the “Yangtze River 
Economic Belt comprehensive traffic three-dimensional corridor plan” were carried out. In the 
same year, pilot projects for monitoring energy consumption in transportation were launched 
in six cities including Beijing, and 19 pilot projects for hanging-transport on roads were 
organized. 
The government has been making a big effort to develop the public transportation. At the 
end of 2017, the country had 651,200 public fuel and electric vehicles, an increase of 7.0% over 
the previous year, including 8,802 Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) vehicles, an increase of 14.5%. 
According to the power type of vehicles, diesel vehicles accounted for 28.7%, natural gas 
vehicles accounted for 27.9%, gasoline vehicles accounted for 1.0%, hybrid vehicles accounted 
for 13.2%, and pure electric vehicles accounted for 26.3% (MTP 2018). 
There are 32 cities across the country that have city railway transportation, with two new 
ones opened in 2017. There are 3,040 railway transit stations, an increase of 572; and 28,125 
vehicles, an increase of 18.2%. 1,395,800 taxis were running in the country, a decrease of 0.6%. 
There were 264 passenger service ferry vessels in the cities, with 6.4% decreased (MTP 2018). 
At the end of 2017, there were 56,786 bus lines nationwide, an increase of 3,997 over the 
previous year. The total length of the operating lines was 1.069 million kilometers, an increase 
of 88,200 kilometers. Among them, the bus lane is 10914.5 kilometers, an increase of 1136.7 
kilometers; the BRT line length is 3424.5 kilometers. There are 149 railway transit lines, with 
an increase of 25 lines. The total length of the operating lines is 4484.2 kilometers, an increase 
of 756.7 kilometers; among them, 124 subway lines, of 3976.9 kilometers, and 6 light rail lines, 
of 203.0 kilometers (MTP 2018). 
In the year of 2017, 127.215 billion passengers were transported by public transportation, 
down 1.0% from the previous year. Among them, buses completed with 72.287 billion people, 
of which BRT passenger traffic was 2.196 billion passengers; railway transit completed with 
18.305 billion people; and cruise taxis completed with 36.540 billion passengers (MTP 2018). 
1.4. Regional collaboration 
As mentioned before, Chinese government has realized that the control of air pollution 
85 
 
 
must be conducted in a regionally collaborative way. On May 11, 2010, the General Office of 
the State Council forwarded the “Guiding Opinions on Promoting Air Pollution Joint 
Prevention and Joint Control Work to Improve Regional Air Quality” to the MEP and other 
eight departments, and clarified the guiding ideology and work objectives of air pollution 
prevention and control in China in the recent coming years. It is China's first comprehensive 
policy on air pollution prevention and control. On November 9, 2010, the MEP issued the 
“Notice on Compiling the Joint Work Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and Control in the Key 
Areas of the 12th Five-Year Plan”, which decided to initiate the preparation of the joint control 
plan for air pollution in three big regions of the Yangtze River Delta, the Pearl River Delta, the 
Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region and six urban agglomerations of Chengdu-Chongqing, central 
Liaoning, Shandong Peninsula, Wuhan, Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan and the west coast of the 
Strait of Taiwan (referred to as “three districts and six groups”). 
In 2015, Henan Province and the Ministry of Transport were incorporated into the joint air 
pollution prevention and control coordination mechanism of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei and 
surrounding areas. It also accelerated the implementation of the main functional area planning, 
issued and implemented the marine main function zoning, Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei coordinated 
development and ecological environmental protection plan, and published the national 
ecological function zoning. A planning and environmental assessment meeting mechanism was 
established, strengthening the linkage between environmental impact assessment of planning 
and projects, and the strategic environmental impact assessment of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, 
Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta was launched. 
In 2017, it improved the main functional area planning system and supporting policies, 
and implemented a negative list system for industrial access in key ecological functional areas. 
The regional strategic environmental assessment of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze River 
Delta and the Pearl River Delta regions was completed, and launched a pilot project of “three 
lines and one list” (green line of ecological protection, bottom line of environmental quality, 
limit line of the use of resources and the negative list of environmental access) in four cities 
surrounding Beijing, and issued the “Technical Guide for Compilation of ‘three lines and one 
list’ (Trial)”. The MEP signed a strategic cooperation agreement with the Government of Hebei 
Province to promote the ecological-environmental protection work of Xiong’an New District, 
and carried out comprehensive environmental improvement of Xiong’an New District. It also 
worth noticing that the main purpose of the construction of Xion’an New District is to distribute 
the non-capital functions of Beijing and to explore a new model of development in population-
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intensive areas, to adjust and optimize the urban layout and spatial structure of Beijing-Tianjin-
Hebei, fostering a new engine of innovation-driven development. 
1.5. Investments 
China’s leaders at the congress said they will raise spending to curb pollution by 19 percent 
over the previous year to 40.5 billion yuan ($6.4 billion) and aim to cut sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxide emissions by 3 percent (Kearns et al. 2018). 
From 2013, the central government set up a special fund for air pollution prevention and 
control. In the same year, it allocated 5 billion yuan to support the air pollution control programs 
in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei and surrounding areas. 
Also in 2013, it launched and implemented the Clean Air Research Program. It is planned 
to break through the emission list of air pollution source and comprehensive emission reduction, 
air quality monitoring and pollution source analysis, heavy pollution forecasting and early 
warning and emergency control, regional air quality management and environmental economic 
policy and other technical bottlenecks, and build a national level air pollution prevention and 
control technology system. The “State Environmental Protection Key Laboratory of Sources 
and Control of Air Pollution Complex” (SCAPC), the “State Environmental Protection Key 
Laboratory of Atmospheric Physical Modeling and Pollution Control” and the “State 
Environmental Protection Key Laboratory of Vehicle Emission Control and Simulation”. 
In January 2014, an analysis research project involving the country’s municipalities, 
provincial capital cities (excluding Lhasa) and some key cities (35 cities in total) was fully 
launched to analyze the source of atmospheric fine particulate matter. In accordance with the 
requirements of the State Council, it was established a joint working mechanism of the Ministry 
of Environmental Protection, the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of 
Engineering. At the end of 2014, the analysis and demonstration of the source of nine key cities 
in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta regions, including 
Beijing, Tianjin, Shijiazhuang and Shanghai, was successfully completed. It has been applied 
to the local air pollution prevention and control work, and the analysis of other 26 cities has 
progressed steadily.  
In 2014, the central government successively arranged a special fund of 10 billion yuan to 
support the prevention and control of air pollution in various places. The Clean Air Research 
Program and the “Twelfth Five-Year Plan” of the Blue Sky Science and Technology Project 
were implemented. And the government released the “Advanced Technical Collection of Air 
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Pollution Prevention and Control”. The government also continued to increase facilities and 
capital investment in the environmental protection of highways and waterways, including 
12.967 billion yuan for highway environmental protection (68% for ecological protection 
facilities) and 83.6 billion yuan for port environmental protection (65% for pollution prevention 
facilities). 
In 2015, the central government arranged a special fund of 10.6 billion yuan to support air 
pollution control in key areas such as Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei and surrounding areas, the Yangtze 
River Delta and the Pearl River Delta. 
In 2016, the central government allocated 11.2 billion yuan, 14 billion yuan and 9.1 billion 
yuan respectively for special funds for prevention and control of atmospheric, water and soil 
pollution. In the same year, specialized research such as “Study on Causes and Control 
Technology of Air Pollution” was implemented. 
In 2017, the central government’s special funds for prevention and control of atmospheric, 
water and soil pollution reached 49.7 billion yuan. The project of “causing and governance of 
heavy atmospheric pollution” was initiated, and the National Air Pollution Prevention and 
Control Association was established. It was printed the “Environmental Protection Equipment 
Enterprise Income Tax Preferential Catalogue (2017 Edition)” and the “Comprehensive List of 
Environmental Protection (2017 Edition)” to encourage the enterprises participating in the air 
pollution prevention and control. And it also deepened the pilot program of environmental 
pollution liability insurance. In 2017, nationwide the number of insured enterprises was 16,000, 
and insurance companies provided risk protection funds of 30.6 billion yuan. The government 
also took action to accelerate the development of environmental protection equipment 
manufacturing industry and issued the “Catalogue of Major Environmental Protection 
Technology and Equipment encouraged by the state (2017 Edition)”. 
On the other hand, in recent years, the government has increasingly noticed the importance 
of raising people's awareness of environmental protection, awareness of energy conservation 
and emission reduction, and environmental participation through publicity and education. In 
2015, the government launched a publicity campaign with the theme of “Practicing Green 
Living” to accelerate the “green” lifestyles. 
1.6. Supervision and monitoring 
1.6.1 More strict standard and clearer supervision measures 
In May 2011, the “Work Process for Administrative Approval of Ozone Depleting 
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Substances” was completed and released, so that the ODS production, use and import and 
export approval management work process was clarified and the operation was standardized, 
which effectively guaranteed the transparence, openness and fairness of the approval process. 
In 2012, the MEP further clarified the national environmental air management target and 
requirements in the new era, and issued the “Environmental Air Quality Standards” (GB 3095-
2012) and its supporting standard “Air Quality Index (AQI) Technical Regulations (Trial)” 
(HJ633-2012). According to the new “Environmental Air Quality Standards”, the PM2.5 annual 
average concentration limit and 24-hour average concentration limit, O3 8-hour average 
concentration limit, and some heavy metal reference concentration limits were added. Besides, 
PM10, NO2 and benzo[a]pyrene concentration limits were tightened. It was also improved the 
effectiveness of monitoring data statistics. The government also further strengthened the control 
requirements for air pollutants in key industries and fields, and promulgated series of steel and 
coking industrial pollutants emission standards, such as the “Emission Standards for Industrial 
Pollutants in Iron Ore Mining and Selection” (GB28661-2012), “Steel Sintering, Pellet Industry 
Air Pollutant Emission Standards” (GB28662-2012) , “Emission Standards for Air Pollutants 
in Ironmaking Industry” (GB28663-2012), “Emission Standards for Air Pollutants in 
Steelmaking Industry” (GB28664-2012), “Emission Standards for Air Pollutants in Rolling 
Steel Industry” (GB28665-2012), “Iron Alloy Industrial Pollutant Emission Standards” 
(GB28666-2012), “Emission Standards for Water Pollutants in Steel Industry” (GB13456-2012) 
and “Coking Chemical Industry Pollutant Emission Standards” (GB16171-2012), as well as a 
number of supporting environmental monitoring and management technical specifications.  
In the same year, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao put forward clear requirements for the 
implementation of the new standards in the governmental work report. The MEP attached 
great importance to it, carefully organizing and deploying it according to the requirements of 
the “three-step” implementation plan of the new air quality standard, namely, monitoring in 
key areas such as Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta, as 
well as municipalities and provincial capitals in 2012. In 2013, it carried out monitoring in 
113 key environmental protection cities and national environmental protection model cities. 
In 2015, it carried out monitoring in all cities above prefecture level of new air quality 
standards. And until the end of 2014, the monitoring implementation was successfully 
completed.  
In 2014, the “Environmental Quality Forecast and Warning Center” was established, and 
the “Monitoring and Early Warning Program for Heavy Pollution Weather in Beijing-Tianjin-
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Hebei and Surrounding Areas (Trial)” was issued, and the “Detailed Implementation Rules for 
Monitoring and Early Warning of Heavy Pollution Weather in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei and 
Surrounding Areas (Trial)” was prepared. From October 1, 2013, the daily environmental air 
quality forecast for the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region was carried out. In 2014, the air quality 
forecast and warning platform for the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze River Delta and the 
Pearl River Delta regions was basically completed. 
Further, in 2016, the MEP actively promoted the construction of big data projects of the 
ecological environment, and made positive progress in the integration and application of data 
resources. In 2017, 679 monitoring points were set up in 278 built-up domestic waste 
incineration plants nationwide, all of which completed the installation of automatic 
monitoring equipment according to law, the establishment of electronic display at the door of 
the factory, and the networking of the real-time monitoring data with environmental 
protection departments. As well, the joint supervision mechanism for environmental 
information disclosure of listed companies was established. 
As mentioned, the government proactively announces environmental information closely 
related to people’s livelihood such as air and water environment quality, and releases a list of 
key pollutant discharge enterprises and illegal sewage disposal enterprises. The “Environmental 
Impact Assessment Information Disclosure Mechanism Program” and the “Environmental 
Protection Public Participation Measures” were issued. It was established a routine press release 
system. And the MEP opened the official Weibo and WeChat public account to timely release 
and interpret the information. All the environmental protection departments at or above the city 
level have opened the official Weibo and WeChat public accounts. It was also opened the 
environmental protection WeChat reporting platform, and the country received and handled 
more than 13,000 clues of pollution by public reporting in 2015. 
 
1.6.2 Strengthen the environmental supervision and law enforcement, strict emission 
reduction responsibility assessment 
In 2014, the General Office of the State Council issued the “Notice on Strengthening 
Environmental Supervision and Enforcement” and the “Measures for the Implementation of Air 
Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan (Trial)”. Relevant departments have issued 19 
supporting policies and measures. From 2014, the environmental protection department began 
to use high-tech means such as satellite and drone to adopt cooperative-law-enforcement, 
comprehensive-law-enforcement, and regional-law-enforcement. It insisted on organizing 
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special inspections on air pollution prevention and control every month, and the results were 
reported to local governments and to the public. The MEP conducted comprehensive 
environmental supervision in 25 cities and publicly interviewed the main leaders of the six city 
governments. Various localities investigated and dealt with more than 100,000 illegal 
enterprises, and 2,177 cases were supervised, with a fine of more than 2 billion yuan. The local 
environmental protection departments have transferred 2,180 cases of suspected environmental 
crimes to the public security organs, which is twice the sum of the past 10 years. 
In 2016, the environmental protection tax law, the environmental impact assessment law, 
the marine environmental protection law and other legal amendments were revised. It was also 
revised the “Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate 
on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Laws in Handling Environmental Pollution 
Criminal Cases”. The MEP has publicly interviewed the responsible leaders of the eight 
municipal governments with obvious deterioration in environmental quality. Environmental 
law enforcement has increased significantly in this year. The environmental protection 
departments at all levels have issued more than 124,000 administrative penalties and a fine of 
6.63 billion yuan, an increase of 28% and 56% respectively compared with 2015. The 
nationwide implementation of 22,730 cases with daily penalties, seizure, limited production 
stoppages, administrative detention and transfer of suspected environmental pollution crimes, 
a year-on-year increase of 93%. It was also accelerated the establishment of a real-time online 
environmental monitoring system, and build a pollution source monitoring system, consisting 
of 352 monitoring centers and 10,257 national key monitoring enterprises. The local 
environmental protection departments issued more than 97,000 administrative penalties and 
fined 4.25 billion yuan, an increase of 34% over 2014. In 2017, the first round of central 
environmental protection inspection was fully completed. During the inspection, the inspectors 
accounted for more than 18,000 party and government leaders, accepted 135,000 environmental 
reports, and directly resolved more than 80,000 environmental problems. A total of 62,000 
polluting enterprises were rectified, and 233,000 administrative punishment cases were 
implemented nationwide, and the fine was 11.58 billion yuan, an increase of 265% over 2014, 
when before the implementation of the new environmental protection law. 
To improve the emission reduction policy system, the General Office of the State Council 
issued the “2014-2015 Action Plan for Energy Conservation, Emission Reduction and Low 
Carbon Development” and the “Guiding Opinions on Further Promoting the Pilot Work of Paid 
Use and Transaction of Emission Permits”. In 2014, the chemical oxygen demand, the total 
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emissions of ammonia nitrogen, sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides decreased by 2.47%, 2.90%, 
3.40% and 6.70%, respectively (MEP 2015). In 2017, the provincial people’s governments 
carried out the evaluation and assessment of the responsibility of controlling greenhouse gas 
emissions. The national carbon intensity decline rate was first included in the statistical bulletin 
of the national economic and social development. The rate of decline in carbon intensity in each 
province (including autonomous region and municipality) is included in the green development 
evaluation index, further strengthening the responsibility for local control of greenhouse gas 
emissions. It was established and improved the “double control” target responsibility evaluation 
system for total energy consumption and intensity, and implemented the “leadership system” 
of energy efficiency and water efficiency. More than 10 provinces have established 
environmental credit evaluation systems and implemented cross-departmental joint rewards and 
punishments. 
 
1.6.3 Heavy pollution weather emergency management 
The Chinese government focuses on special seasons with frequent heavy pollution, with 
close monitoring and is well-prepared to take emergency measures. 
For example, from May 20 to July 20, 2012, September 20 to November 20, 2012, the 
MEP kept remote sensing monitoring the situation of straw burning in the country and some 
key areas (main crop agricultural areas) through environmental satellites and meteorological 
satellites at different times. Encryption monitoring was implemented during a concentrated 
period of straw burning, and monitoring daily report was published on the government website 
of the MEP. The MEP also timely reported the situation to the provincial environmental 
protection departments and offered clear incentives and penalties. At the same time, by 
increasing the intensity of the ban on straw-burning, and by promoting the comprehensive 
utilization of straw, the air quality obtained significant improvement. In 2014, the government 
further increased the satellite remote sensing monitoring and information release of straw 
burning. Through environmental satellites and meteorological satellites, the straw burning of 
the main crops in the country was monitored by remote sensing at different times. After satellite 
remote sensing monitoring and local on-site verification, in 2014, a total of 5,034 straw burning 
points were found nationwide, a decrease of 2,949, which means 36.9% off compared with last 
year (MEP 2015). 
In 2014, 21 provinces (including autonomous regions and municipalities directly under 
the Central Government) and 194 cities of prefecture-level and above, especially the key areas 
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such as Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta, have publicized 
emergency plans for heavy pollution. In 2015, 24 provinces (including autonomous regions and 
municipalities directly under the Central Government) and 280 cities of prefecture-level and 
above were well-prepared to heavy air pollution weather. In 2014, the country issued more than 
170 warnings on heavy pollution weather, including more than 60 yellow-warnings and above 
in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region. From 2014, winter air pollution prevention and control 
work was carried out. Since October 2014, various environmental protection supervision 
centers have been organized to supervise the key areas of the country every month. Besides, 
UAVs were also used to carry out atmospheric law enforcement inspections. In 2014, a total of 
40 aircrafts were organized to participate in environmental law enforcement inspections, and a 
total range of more than 6,000 kilometers inspected by a variety of aircrafts. In 2015, a total of 
154 heavy pollution weather warnings were issued in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region. During 
the period of continued heavy pollution in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, special inspections on 
emergency response to heavy-pollution weather in key areas were carried out, with emphasis 
on over-the-counter sources, loose coal control, small enterprise group emissions, site 
construction, and VOCs emissions. In 2016, the government properly handled environmental 
emergencies of “8.12” special major fire and explosion accidents in Tianjin Port and its 
environmental impact. 
During major events, the government also took urgent measures to ensure air quality. 
In 2009, the MEP conducted a survey on the Guangzhou Asian Games and the Shanghai 
World Expo, and held a special symposium to comprehensively deploy joint prevention and 
control work in the Pearl River Delta and the Yangtze River Delta. 
In 2014, the MEP launched the Beijing Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
Meeting Air Quality Assurance Work and issued the Environmental Quality Supervision 
Program of the APEC Meeting of the Ministry of Environmental Protection. During the APEC 
meeting, the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei coordinated heavy-level pollution level I emergency 
response Measures. During the period from October 20 to November 12, 2014, 16 inspection 
teams were dispatched to supervise the air quality assurance of APEC meetings in relevant 
cities, and made positive contributions to the APEC meeting air quality assurance work. During 
the APEC meeting, Beijing’s air quality was excellent for 4 days and 7 days for good. The 
average concentration of various pollutants reached the lowest level in the same period of the 
past 5 years, and “APEC Blue” appeared, which was widely recognized by all walks of life. 
Also, in 2015, the task of air quality assurance for the commemoration of the 70th 
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anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s Anti-Japanese War and the World Anti-
Fascist War was successfully completed. 
 
Four decades of extremely fast economic growth turned China into the world’s biggest 
carbon emitter. But now the government is trying to change that without damaging the economy 
(Kearns et al. 2018). In summary, China’s air pollution control model is based on government 
governance, and flexibly integrates other governance models, such as bureaucratic governance 
model, market governance model, and network governance model. First, China learns from the 
experience of air pollution control in Western countries, breaks the traditional territorial 
jurisdiction, builds China’s “air quality cross-border management zone”, and establishes a 
cross-regional air quality management committee. It has set up departments such as governance 
funds, information, and talents to provide financial support, pollution control information 
services, and research and development of governance technologies to compensate for the 
fragmentation of administrative divisions. Second, the “Law of Air Pollution Prevention and 
Control” was amended, a series of related laws such as the “Air Cleanup Law” were formulated, 
and the legal governance mechanism was improved to enhance the legitimacy and authority of 
the “Air Quality Cross-Border Management Area”. For example, based on the air quality of the 
developed regions such as the Yangtze River Delta, the Pearl River Delta, and the Beijing-
Tianjin-Hebei region, the government promised to tentatively formulate regional air quality 
management laws and clarify the unified projects, cleaning standards, technologies systems, 
charging standards, punitive measures, etc. in accordance with the law. At the same time, it will 
ensure strict enforcement of the law, providing a fundamental legal basis for protecting the 
environment and public health and reducing air pollution. Third, it establishes a Regional Clean 
Air Incentive Market, setting up regional pollution control mechanisms, initial allocation and 
market trading rules, and regional ecological compensation system (Tao, 2012). In this way, 
regional benefit sharing can be realized, and it will promote the rational adjustment of regional 
industries and energy, and the regional economic and social and environmental harmonic 
development. Fourth, the inter-provincial air pollution control agreements were signed, which 
can clarify the governance objectives, assign the governance responsibilities, and establish new 
performance appraisal and punishment mechanisms to ensure the implementation of air quality 
standards in cross-border management areas. At the same time, enterprises and citizens are 
included in this agreement to form a network governance organization, and each governance 
force is fully mobilized and utilized (Shen et al., 2015). 
The government’s efforts turn into significant results. Heavy air pollution days in key cities 
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are down 50 percent in five years (Kearns et al. 2018). Five years ago, Beijing’s “airpocalypse” 
unleashed criticism of the government so searing that even Chinese state media joined in. In 
2017, the capital’s average daily concentration of PM2.5 particles was almost a third lower than 
in 2015, compared with declines of about a tenth for some other major cities. 
While smog was long excused as the inevitable byproduct of rising wealth, there’s no sign 
so far that the cleanup is derailing the country’s economy. Growth last year accelerated to 6.9 
percent—the first uptick in seven years—and remains a crucial prop for global expansion 
(Kearns et al. 2018). We are happy to see that this air quality improvement has been achieved 
under the rapid social and economic development in the capital city. Over the past 20 years, 
Beijing’s gross domestic product (GDP) has maintained a growth rate over 6.5% each year, 
increased by 10.8 times totally (UNEP 2019). In 2017, per capita GDP has exceeded 20 
thousand dollars. Meanwhile, energy intensity and carbon dioxide emission per unit GDP (kg 
CO2 per 10 thousand Yuan) has maintained downward tendency (UNEP 2019). What’s more, 
China sees high-tech industries like electric cars and solar panels as its chance to lead the world, 
setting standards and cornering markets as they begin to build momentum (Kearns et al. 2018). 
Clean air actions contribute to the high quality social economical sustainable development. As 
well, environmental sector is the sector encouraged to develop and are creating more job 
opportunities in Beijing. 
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Chapter 2. Risk and the atmospheric pollution in the Megacities of 
Emerging Countries 
2.1. Emergence of the risk of air pollution in the megacities of emerging 
countries 
According to Beck (1992, 1995, 2010a), climate change can be considered a component 
of a new set of contemporary environmental risks produced by the scientific and technological 
development process, which is qualitatively different from the typical risks of pre-industrial 
and industrial societies. These new postindustrial risks would be characterized thus by their 
global scope, by the incomplete understanding of their causes and consequences, by being 
immeasurable and impossible to be compensated, most often invisible (i.e., phenomena that 
require expertise in relation to their recognition and their measurement). Therefore, they would 
be uncontrollable and difficult to have responsibilities assigned, often irreversible. 
In a short period of time, the climate change issue has become one of the most important 
problems of the twenty-first century (Giddens 2009). Since 1988, the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC), jointly established by the United Nations (UN) and the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO), has been dedicated to understand the global climate 
system functioning and its governance and to propose concrete actions to face the possible 
future climate scenarios (Ferreira et al. 2016). The most significant scientific breakthroughs of 
developed activities were presented in recent IPCC reports, when the existence of a relative 
consensus on the cause of the global warming issue was reported, concluding with a significant 
level of confidence that the change is real and that the increase in the average temperature of 
the Earth’s surface is a result of human activities combined with the natural variation in the 
global climate system (IPCC 2007, 2013). 
Climate change poses not only a local place-based problem, but also cross-scale challenge 
(Wilbanks and Kates, 1999). As a multi-dimensional problem, the conventional separation 
between global and national responses is highly inappropriate. Climate change requires actions 
at different levels of governance (multilevel) and interventions that range from international 
conventions and treaties at the global scale to climate protection and adaptation measures at the 
city level (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003; Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005; Adger, 2005; Bulkeley and 
Kern, 2006; Gupta, 2007; Bulkeley and Newell, 2010). 
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The relationship between cities and climate change is usually based on a complex 
interaction between vulnerability and responsibility (Wilbanks and Kates, 1999; Robinson and 
Gore, 2005; Sanchez-Rodriguez et al., 2005; Lankao, 2007; Bicknell et al., 2009). Urban centers 
are home to a large proportion of the world’s population, economic activity, and physical 
infrastructure that are at risk from floods, storms, landslides, heat waves, droughts and other 
climate-related phenomena. Climate change is expected to exacerbate these impacts on cities 
around the world (Wilbanks et al., 2007; Satterthwaite et al., 2007; Hunt and Watkiss, 2007). 
Cities are also source of most of the world’s pollution and high consumers of non-renewable 
raw materials (Evans et al., 2005). In addition, urban centers possess substantial ecological 
footprints and require vast areas to provide the food, energy, water and natural resources that 
keep them functioning as engines of the global economy (Sanchez-Rodriguez et al., 2005; 
Evans et al., 2005). At the same time, local governments and their legal responsibility and 
jurisdiction provide opportunities to influence many of the activities that contribute to climate 
change and respond to it in terms of both mitigation and adaptation policies (Bulkeley and 
Betsill, 2003; Robinson and Gore, 2005; Satterthwaite, 2008; Puppim de Oliveira, 2009; 
Bulkeley et al., 2009; Bulkeley, 2010). 
The climate change issue for the first time was a concern for the international community 
on the agenda in 1979 at the first climate conference in Geneva. In 1988, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was created. The United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in 1992. In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was signed. 
With a number of landmark issues, the problem of climate change has already become an 
important international issue. 
Even though knowledge about climate change has already been widely disseminated 
compared to 30 years ago, and people gradually realized that climate change would be a threat 
to human existence, it is still confusion in concepts in response to climate change. One of its 
manifestations is negative behavior. Although the risk of climate change looks terrible, it is not 
as urgent as the problem of world poverty, nor is it as shocking as terrorism. Global warming 
is a cumulative process, people think they will not suffer disaster in their future, so they will 
not take any positive action. When climate change and its consequences become irreversible, 
the human being would lose the room for maneuver. What is the famous Paradox of Giddens. 
In short, when people can still deal with climate change they do nothing, and when climate 
change is really serious, people have no more possibility for any action. 
“The politics of climate change has to cope with what I call ‘Giddens’s 
paradox’. It states that, since the dangers posed by global warming aren’t 
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tangible, immediate or visible in the course of day-to-day life, however awesome 
they appear, many will sit on their hands and do nothing of a concrete nature 
about them. Yet waiting until they become visible and acute before being stirred 
to serious action will, by definition, be too late (Giddens, 2009:2).” 
Climate change policy has to deal with what is called the “Giddens’s paradox”(Giddens, 
2009): since the dangers represented by global warming are not palpable, immediate or visible 
in the course of everyday life, however frightening they may seem, a lot of people continue 
sitting down, doing nothing concrete about it. However, waiting for them to become visible and 
sharp so that only serious action is taken, by definition, too late. 
On the contrary, the other type of concept is very pessimistic. Global warming, sea level 
rise, frequency of extreme weather events, loss of biodiversity, etc. The catastrophic 
consequences of climate change are becoming step by step from the prophecies of scientists to 
realities that threaten the existence of humanity. The apocalyptic literature with the subject of 
disasters and the films like The day after Tomorrow, 2012, etc. concretized the fear. The 
emotion of End of the world began spreading in the multitude, and it is even affecting the work 
and normal life. The only choice for them is waiting for death. The measures taken are hedonism. 
The third concept is the precautionary principle advocated by environmentalists. 
Environmentalists are pioneers in dealing with climate change, but this does not mean that their 
concepts are totally correct. The precautionary principle is written in many official documents. 
We only pay attention to the danger side, i.e. the possibility of damage from climate change, 
and ignore opportunities and development in dealing with climate changes, which hinders 
innovation and adventure. “Yet risk is risk - the other side of danger is always opportunity 
(Giddens 2009:10).” Conservative concepts are unlikely to find the essential way to solve 
climate problems. 
On the contrary, Giddens expresses his optimism with respect to the fact. The fact that 
climate change is indisputable is why Giddens was pushing the problem of climate change to 
the center of the political agenda. For him, “We can anticipate, and should do our best to 
encourage, a surge of technological innovation in response to both climate change and energy 
security. Without such innovation, it is impossible to see how we can break our dependency 
upon oil, gas and coal, the major sources of environmental pollution. A turn to renewable 
sources of energy is essential, and it has to be on a very large scale (Giddens, 2009:11).” 
Risk indicates the possibility that an undesirable state of reality and/or adverse effects may 
occur as a result of natural events or human activities (Kates et al., 1985). This definition 
suggests causal connections between actions or events. Thus, risks must be perceived in the 
causal articulations between the conditions with actions and the actions with effects. 
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Megacities present intense vulnerabilities to climate change, facing environmental 
problems such as energy, water and food shortages. In addition, environmental vulnerability 
would be more pronounced in the megacities of developing countries, as they experienced 
disorganized growth, creating poor quality poverty belts in environmental services (Saldiva and 
Coelho, 2014). 
Meanwhile, we should be aware of the inequality of risks between different groups of 
people, globally and within the nation-state, which is well explained by the sociology of 
inequalities of Beck (2002: 25): 
There are at least two possible answers to the question of what it is that 
legitimizes inequality: the merit system and the nation-state principle. The first 
answer is a familiar one and has been both elaborated and criticized; it derives 
from the self-understanding of the national perspective and relates to domestic 
inequalities within the state. The second answer emerges from the frame of 
reference of the cosmopolitan perspective and relates to the ‘legitimation’ of 
global inequalities. It follows from this that it is only by systematically alternating 
between the national and the cosmopolitan perspective that the big blind spots – 
and sources of error – present in the methodological nationalism of inequality 
research can be brought to light. Only in the context of such a New Critical 
Theory of social inequalities can the fundamental asymmetry of perceptions of 
inequality that are bound up with the national outlook be revealed from both a 
social and a social scientific perspective. This illuminates the fact that the 
‘legitimatory achievement’ of the nation-state lies in turning people’s attention 
exclusively towards domestic issues, thereby banishing global inequalities from 
the field of vision of the (relatively) privileged.” 
He further make a distinguishment between large inequalities and small inequalities (Beck, 
2002:25-27). Firstly, it can be understood in purely spatial terms, that large inequalities can be 
divided into transnational, supranational, international and global inequalities, and small 
inequalities are located within the nation-state and appear to the individuals and groups affected 
by them to be large ones. However, from a cosmopolitan perspective they are small because 
they coincide with nation-state frameworks of self-description, self-ascription and self-
monitoring. The merit system allocates inequalities within the state, while at the same time 
legitimizing them. With the merit system, for example, income distribution can be both unequal 
and legitimate. In contrast, to speak of the nation-state principle as a ‘legitimation’ of social 
inequalities means that the nation-state focus on national inequalities makes global inequalities 
disappear – legitimation through erasure. Large inequalities are banished beyond the bounds of 
the national perspective. What follows from this is that they can both grow into and be 
‘legitimized’ as institutionalized irrelevance and unreality. Thus, large inequalities are 
‘legitimized’ not so much through a lack of concern and debate about global inequalities, but 
rather through concern and debate about ‘small’ national inequalities. 
To Beck (2002:25-27), the distinction between ‘large’ and ‘small’ thus relates to spaces of 
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perception and population figures. The law of the nation-state exclusion of global inequalities 
is an overstatement of the issue – the national particularity of a state does not generally rule out 
the possibility of universal principles and perceptions. And the nation-state outlook ‘frees’ 
people from having to look at the misery in the world. It works on the basis of a double 
exclusion: it excludes the excluded. The stability with which the large inequalities suffered by 
humanity are ‘legitimized’ in silent complicity between state authority and state-fixated social 
science, through organized non-perception, is astonishing. As a result, whereas the merit system 
facilitates positive legitimation of ‘small’ inequalities, the nation-state principle effects a 
negative ‘legitimation’ of large inequalities. The  “negative legitimation” means that it is non-
reflexive and non-reciprocal and therefore cannot win the consent of the underprivileged and 
excluded. Negative legitimation that is achieved through institutionalized silence and by 
looking the other way ultimately lacks legitimation, therefore, because it excludes the consent 
of those whose consent is needed the most: the poor, the degraded, the excluded. The nation-
state does not legitimize global inequalities. Rather, non-legitimized global inequalities are 
banished from the field of vision and are thereby stabilized. 
This sociology of inequalities clearly explains why and how the risks are transferred. As 
we have known, developed countries pass on highly polluting industries to China, just as China 
transfers highly polluting industries to some African countries. It happens within the country as 
well. Beijing transfers highly polluting industries to Hebei province. In 2008, the biggest steel 
company in Beijing, Shougang Group, began to be moved entirely to Tangshan of Hebei 
province. And even in the same city, the rich also could pass on pollution to the poor, 
considering that the rich people probably pollute more during their daily lives, such as the 
emission of private cars, the more frequent air travels, the more emission of heating because of 
the bigger house, etc. At the same time, the rich people have more possibility to live in the less 
polluted area and to take more efficient measures to protect themselves from the pollution. But, 
all this sense of superiority is only temporary, the risk of climate change and air pollution as 
well, have the unique characteristic, that eventually it will make everyone a victim through the 
proliferation without borders, which means no one can escape or pass it on to others. 
In addition, what is more noteworthy is the current stage of development in China. 
Undoubtedly, China’s economic leap is accompanied by the increasing degree of 
industrialization and the rapid development of technology. The industrialization and the 
development of technology deepens the degree of risk and expands its scope under the risk logic 
of the second modernity. 
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Just as Beck (2002:102) explains when he criticizes the ever-present assumption of that 
technical control of the consequences and dangers presented by new technologies is a part of 
that control, to him, the vision of completely self-monitoring, open-ended technological 
systems capable of existing independently of human intervention ultimately only reinforces the 
ambiguities of technologized civilization. Because on the one hand, such systems perfect the 
promise of security; on the other, they open up previously inconceivable dimensions of risk – 
particularly regarding the new quality of complexity and contingency which they provoke, as 
they bring about the transition from closed systems to open, self-constructing systems. And the 
latter have the capacity to adapt to conditions which are undergoing complex, turbulent and 
multidimensional change at such a speed that human intervention is out of the question. 
Therefore, the definition of the world risk society is that the very power and characteristics 
that are supposed to create a new quality of security and certainty simultaneously determine the 
extent of absolute uncontrollability that exists. The more efficiently and comprehensively the 
anticipation of consequences is integrated into technical systems, the more evidently and 
conclusively we lose control. All attempts at minimizing or eliminating risk technologically 
simply multiply the uncertainty into which we are plunging the world (Beck 2002:102) . 
In this regard, we need to distinguish between the two stages of modernity, especially to 
distinguish their different requires for the technical system. As Beck (2002:102) explained: 
The first modernity was based on a simplification: technical objects and 
worlds could be constructed without unexpected consequences, and these objects 
were capable of replacing the old, bad ones. The more science and the more 
technology were brought into use, the fewer disputes there were because the ‘one 
best solution’, optimum economic benefit, was an achievable goal on the horizon. 
In the second modernity, we find ourselves in a completely different playing 
field, inasmuch as, whatever we do, we expect unexpected consequences. 
Expectation of the unexpected, however, changes the quality of technical objects. 
Changes that are seemingly simple and minimal – those any newspaper reader 
finds confirmed every day when science and technology add their own 
uncertainties to the uncertainties that exist in general, instead of minimizing them 
– bring about a situation that is hard for many to comprehend: science and 
technology do not simplify the debates about new technological worlds. Far from 
putting out political fires, they actually add fuel to the flames by pouring on the 
oil of ethical, ecological and political controversy. 
China is now in a period of vigorous development. It is still a large developing country, 
and there are still vast underdeveloped rural areas and a large number of people in poverty. As 
the government insists, for China, “Development is the first priority”, and the overall view of 
this country is still experiencing the first modernity. However, we also should be aware of that, 
with the rapid industrialization process, and under the context of globalization, some of the 
well-developed international metropolises in China, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, 
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Shenzhen, etc. have inevitably entered the stage of second modernity. “Unexpected side-effects” 
like air pollution have becoming main concerns of people who live in it. At the same time, as I 
pointed out in the Introduction, the distrust of experts and expert systems in big cities has 
become more and more prominent in recent years. Some people even call “experts” （专家） 
as “eggspurt” or “bricklayers”（砖家）, and call “professor”（教授） as “profartssor” or 
“shouting beast”（叫兽）. People play these homophone jokes of Chinese to express their 
dissatisfaction with some irresponsible experts, or indeed the dissatisfaction with the expert 
systems. 
 Thus, the metropolis of emerging countries are inescapable embraced by the world risk 
society, which as to Beck(2002:103), is an era of civilization in which decisions that affect the 
lives of not only the current generation but also of future generations are made on the basis of 
a known lack of knowledge. 
2.2. The risk of air pollution in Beijing 
As a global actor, China can be considered a key country in the international climate policy 
(Basso and Viola 2014; Ferreira and Barbi 2014; Moreira 2015). Moreover, it is also the largest 
GHG emitter in the world since 2007, when it overtook the USA (Vidal and Adam 2007). 
One of the reasons that makes China a key actor in climate negotiations, according to the 
same author, is its status and influence in the G77, a group that brings developing countries to 
increase their bargaining power in the UN system. China’s performance in the G77 generates 
prominence in climate negotiations, since the drafting of the document that became the Climate 
Convention in 1992, going through the negotiations for the establishment of the Kyoto Protocol, 
and conquering more and more importance in the rounds of the international environmental 
order of climate change. 
China can be considered the engine of economic growth in the world due to its rapid 
development and its economic and industrial expansion. This scenario is accompanied by a 
strong growth of population density of its urban areas, a fact directly connected to the 
emergence of mega cities since the 1990s. As a result, energy consumption has grown 
significantly as well as emissions of pollutants discharged into the air, which has been 
producing negative effects on the population health. Consequently, pollution of air and water 
is one of the most serious environmental problems presented by China, but other environmental 
issues including the reduction of water resources, the accelerated deforestation and a number 
of threats to human health, arising from climate change, should also be highlighted. Thus, the 
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size of the country, the magnitude of its population and the current scenario of strong and rapid 
development cause environmental problems from spreading not only locally, but to the rest of 
the world, not only through macroeconomic policy impacts, which generate disorders to the 
financial equilibrium of different countries, but also with regard to cross-border pollution, in 
the form of acid rain and dust storms, and the strong contribution of the country to the global 
climate change scenario (MacBean 2007; Chan and Yao 2008; Huang et al. 2010; Oliveira 2011; 
Xie 2011; Ferreira et al. 2016). 
Currently in China, pollution of water and air is one of the most alarming. As shown in 
figure 5, it shows the PM2.5 concentration estimate as of January 31, 2018, a normal bad winter 
day in China. From the illustration, we can see that most part of China is in very unhealthy air 
quality on that day. According to UNEP (United Nations Environment Program), Beijing is 
among the twenty most polluted cities on the planet (UNEP, 2007). Air pollution is one of the 
most alarming risks in Beijing. The quality of the air in this megacity is a result of three factors: 
of the geography of the city - it is surrounded by mountains that do not allow the pollutants to 
disperse; population growth; and economic expansion (UNEP, 2007). 
 
Figure 5 PM2.5 concentration estimate of China in a bad winter day 
Air and water pollution pose the most serious environmental problems, but other 
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environmental issues include declining water resources, accelerated deforestation, and threats 
to human health arising from climate change. Thus, the country’s size and population together 
with its speed of development makes its environmental problems spill over to the rest of the 
world, not only through the impact of its demands on world prices but also in cross-border 
pollution in the form of acid rain and dust storms, and in contributions to climate change 
(Ferreira and Barbi, 2013; Chan and Yao, 2008; Xie, 2011). 
Chinese economic growth has been powered by a coal-dominated surging fossil fuel 
consumption resulting in the highest emission levels for such as CO2, SO2, NOx and primary 
PM in the world. Regional uneven development concentrates most of the population, economic 
activities, and emissions in eastern and central China, resulting in an overall severe air pollution 
situation in these regions, with its city clusters being most heavily affected (Jin et al. 2016).  
2.2.1. Emission sources 
In China, the major air pollution problems have been mainly attributable to coal burning 
and industry processes during the early stages of economic development. Recently vehicle 
emissions have become an increasing problem in urban areas, especially the megacities. 
A reduction of primary pollutants (primary pollutants are directly emitted from certain 
sources; secondary pollutants are formed in atmospheric chemistry reactions), e.g., SO2, in 
terms of emission and concentration has been observed, but a more complex, regional air 
pollution problem dominated by fine particulate matter (PM2.5; total suspended particulates 
(TSP) include all particulate matters (PMs) with different aerodynamic diameters) and ground 
level O3 has emerged (Jin et al. 2016). Nowadays, the main pollutants in Beijing are SO2, CO 
and NO2, and PM10 and PM2.5. 
According to Moreira (2015), China is rich in fossil energy resources, especially coal 
reserves, but he considers that, in terms of per capita possession of these resources, it is below 
the world average. The country is at the forefront in reserves of coal, iron, copper, bauxite, lead 
and zinc. China’s forest cover was, in 2008, 195.45 million hectares, and is one of the 
‘‘megadiverse’’ countries. According to the same author, in 2005 China produced about 7467 
Gt CO2 eq, 80 % of which were CO2 emissions. Of these, emissions from the energy sector 
account for 90.4 % of the total, while emissions from industrial processes account for 9.5 % of 
the total, which are the sectors that emitted more CO2 in China. The country credits the rapid 
increase in GHG emissions between 1994 and 2005 to the economic development and 
improvement of the standard of the population living. In this period, total emissions of CO2, 
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CH4 and N2O increased from 3.65 Gt CO2 eq to 6.6881 CO2 eq. 
Despite this growth, China emphasizes that its per capita emissions in 2005 arising from 
fossil fuels were 3.88 tonnes, that is, the equivalent of 34 % of the average of the Annex I 
countries of the Framework Convention on climate change, which represent 20 % of the world 
population and that produced 57 % of global GDP, based on purchasing power parity, and 
account for 46 % of global GHG emissions (IPCC 2007). It is important to note that these per 
capita data strongly support the arguments of large countries such as China, a large emitter in 
absolute terms, but with a huge population, which makes its per capita emissions to diminish 
dramatically and justify, in its view, the position of not accepting commitments regarding GHG 
emission reduction before the convention. 
In a continuity scenario of economic development and increase in energy consumption, 
CO2 emissions per capita will continue to grow in leaps and bounds until the per capita GDP 
reached 14 thousand dollars a year, which should happen after 2030, when per capita peak of 
CO2 is expected to remain around 8 tones (INDC 2015). Furthermore, it is expected that 
China’s population continues to grow steadily over the next decade, as well as urbanization 
rates, which grew on average 1.37 % per year in the 2000–2010 period. According to the 
Chinese government, these increases will require construction of urban infrastructure on a large 
scale, more iron and steel, cement and other products that require high energy consumption, 
which will lead to increased energy use and CO2 emissions (Keith et al. 2014; Moreira 2015). 
In 2013, the total energy production was 3.40 billion tons of standard coal, an increase of 
2.4% over the previous year. Among them, the output of raw coal was 3.68 billion tons, up 0.8% 
over the previous year; the output of crude oil was 209 million tons, up 1.8% over the previous 
year; the output of natural gas was 117.05 billion cubic meters, up 9.4% over the previous year; 
the power generation was 5.39 trillion kWh, increased by 7.5% over the previous year. Coal 
imports were 327 million tons, up 13.4% over the previous year; crude oil imports were 282 
million tons, up 4.0% from the previous year; refined oil imports were 39.59 million tons, down 
0.6% from the previous year (MEP 2014). According to preliminary calculations, the total 
national energy consumption in 2013 was 3.75 billion tons of standard coal, an increase of 3.7% 
over the previous year. Among them, coal consumption increased by 3.7%, crude oil 
consumption increased by 3.4%, natural gas consumption increased by 13.0%, and power 
consumption increased by 7.5%. The national energy consumption per 10,000 yuan of GDP fell 
by 3.7%. 
In 2014, China’s total primary energy production reached 3.60 billion tons of standard 
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coal. Among them, the output of raw coal was 3.87 billion tons, the output of crude oil was 210 
million tons, and the output of refined oil was 317 million tons. Natural gas production grew 
rapidly, reaching 130.16 billion cubic meters. The installed capacity of power was 1.36 billion 
kilowatts, and the annual power generation was 5.65 trillion kilowatt hours. According to 
preliminary calculations, the total energy consumption in 2014 was 4.26 billion tons of standard 
coal, an increase of 2.2% over the previous year. Coal consumption fell by 2.9%, crude oil 
consumption increased by 5.9%, natural gas consumption increased by 8.6%, and power 
consumption increased by 3.8%. The national energy consumption per 10,000 yuan of GDP fell 
by 4.8%. The national thermal power supply coal consumption was 318 grams of standard coal 
/ kWh, compared with 2010, a decrease of 15 grams of standard coal / kWh. The per capita 
energy consumption was about 3.1 tons of standard coal, the per capita electricity consumption 
was 4038 kWh, and the per capita natural gas consumption was 135 cubic meters (MEP 2015). 
In 2015, the country’s total primary energy production reached 3.62 billion tons of 
standard coal, an increase of 500 million tons of standard coal compared to 2010. Among them, 
raw coal 3.75 billion tons, crude oil 210 million tons, natural gas 134.61 billion cubic meters; 
non-fossil energy power generation installed capacity accounted for 34% of total installed 
capacity, which was a significant increase compared with the 27% in 2010. The installed 
capacity of power reached 1.51 billion kilowatts, an increase of 540 million kilowatts compared 
with 2010. The mileage of oil and gas main pipelines exceeded 100,000 kilometers, the length 
of transmission lines of 220 kV and above exceeded 600,000 kilometers, and the capacity of 
west power transmission reached 130 million kilowatts. In 2015, the total installed capacity of 
hydropower (including pumped storage), nuclear power, wind power and solar photovoltaic 
power generation reached 320 million kilowatts, 26.08 million kilowatts, 130 million kilowatts 
and 43.18 million kilowatts respectively. The average annual growth rate of the “12th Five-
Year Plan” was 8.1%, 19.2%, 34.3%, and 178.0%. In 2015, the total primary energy 
consumption in the country was 4.30 billion tons of standard coal, an increase of 0.9% over 
2014, and the average annual growth rate of “12th Five-Year Plan” was 3.6%. Among them, 
coal consumption accounted for 64.0% of total energy consumption, down 5.2 percentage 
points from 2010; oil accounted for 18.1%, up 0.7 percentage points from 2010; natural gas 
accounted for 5.9%, up 1.9 percentage points from 2010. Non-fossil energy consumption 
accounted for 12.0%, up 2.6 percentage points from 2010, and exceeded the planned target of 
11.2%. In 2015, the national energy consumption per 10,000 yuan of GDP fell by 5.6% 
compared with 2014. During the “Twelfth Five-Year Plan” period, the national energy 
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consumption per 10,000 yuan of GDP decreased by 18.2%; the standard coal consumption of 
thermal power supply decreased from 333 grams of standard coal/kWh in 2010 to 315 grams 
of standard coal per kWh in 2015 (MEP 2016). 
According to preliminary calculations, in 2016, the national total energy consumption was 
4.36 billion tons of standard coal, an increase of 1.4% over 2015. Coal consumption fell by 
4.7%, crude oil consumption increased by 5.5%, natural gas consumption increased by 8.0%, 
and electricity consumption increased by 5.0%. Coal consumption accounted for 62.0% of total 
energy consumption, and clean energy consumption such as hydropower, wind power, nuclear 
power and natural gas accounted for 19.7% of total energy consumption. The national energy 
consumption per 10,000 yuan of GDP fell by 5.0% (MEP 2017). 
According to preliminary calculations, in 2017, the national total energy consumption was 
4.49 billion tons of standard coal, an increase of 2.9% over 2016. Among them, coal 
consumption increased by 0.4%, crude oil consumption increased by 5.2%, natural gas 
consumption increased by 14.8%, and electricity consumption increased by 6.6%. Coal 
consumption accounted for 60.4% of total energy consumption, 1.6 percentage points decreased 
from 2016; clean energy consumption such as natural gas, hydropower, nuclear power and wind 
power accounted for 20.8% of total energy consumption, 1.3 percentage points increased. The 
national energy consumption per 10,000 yuan of GDP fell by 3.7% compared with 2016 (MEP 
2018). 
In addition to the fossil energy-based energy structure, the topography of the Beijing-
Hebei-Tianjin area is also a major factor in increasing air pollution. Today, Beijing is 
surrounded by plains. The west, north and east sides of the plain are surrounded by mountains, 
and the southeast is open to the Bohai Sea. Surrounded by mountains on three sides, the plain 
is in the middle, open to the southeast, like a bay. Beijing and its surroundings can be called 
“Beijing Bay” (Hou, 2000:1). And this low-lying terrain plain is prone to accumulation of 
pollutants. 
According to Zhang (2011), in 2009, China has become the world’s largest automobile 
production and sales country, and sold 13.5 million vehicles that year. According to the 
database of the Ministry of Transport of the People’s Republic of China, at the end of 2017, 
there were 14.502 million vehicles operating in the country, an increase of 1.0% over the 
previous year. It has 816,100 passenger cars, down 2.9% from the previous year. Among them, 
305,700 large passenger cars, an increase of 0.01%. And it owned 13.6862 million trucks, an 
increase of 1.2% over the previous year and the total capacity of transportation was 117,774,100 
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tons, an increase of 8.8%. As shown in figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 2013-2017 China’s Vehicle Ownership and Transporting Capacity 
Source: author (based on data of the Ministry of Transport of the PRC) 
 
As shown in figure 7, according to statistics, as of the end of 2015, the number of motor 
vehicles in Beijing was 5.619 million, an increase of 28,000 from 2014, an increase of 0.5%. 
Compared with the end of 2000, the number of motor vehicles in the past 15 years has increased 
by 4.041 million. And according to the latest data, as of September 2018, the number of motor 
vehicles in Beijing was 6.035 million and the number of drivers was 11.246 million. 
 
Figure 7 The growth trend of Beijing’s motor vehicle ownership since 2000 
Source: Beijing Traffic Management Bureau 
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2.2.2. Air Pollution Status and Social Impacts 
On December 27, 2011, the MEP and the Ministry of Health jointly organized the second 
national environmental and health work leading group meeting in Beijing. The meeting pointed 
out that the “Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the 
People’s Republic of China”, “State Council’s Opinions on Strengthening Environmental 
Protection Key Works” and “Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Environmental Protection”, 
the “National Environmental Protection and the 12th Five-Year Plan for Environmental and 
Health Works”, and the 7th National Environmental Protection Conference further strengthened 
the awareness of the overall situation, the awareness of anxiety, the awareness of risks, and the 
awareness of responsibility for environmental and health works. The government realized that 
the environmental and health issues have become a major economic and social development 
issue related to people’s livelihood and scientific development. Strengthening environmental 
and health work is a realistic and urgent task to us. 
China had become the world’s No.1 carbon dioxide emitter as it rose to dominate global 
exports, a process which began several decades ago but got its biggest lift with World Trade 
Organization entry in 2001 (figure 8). Emissions have started to fall again. (Jeff Kearns et al. 
2018) 
 
Figure 8 Carbon Dioxide Emissions from 1966 to 2016 of different countries 
 
Moreover, regional pollution problems are becoming significant, especially when weather 
conditions are not good for pollutant diffusion and degradation. Vast regions, even the whole 
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eastern and central China, can sometimes be under very high concentration of PM2.5 and O3. 
Ambient air pollution in the form of PM2.5 and O3 leads to more significant public health effects 
compared to that of primary pollutants. The Global Burden of Disease Study (GBD) estimated 
China’s annual premature deaths attributable to PM2.5 and O3 have remained high, summing 
average values of around 1 to 1.2 million deaths from 1990 to 2015 (Jin et al. 2016). 
 
Figure 9 Average concentration of pollutants in China from 2013 to 2017 
Source: author (based on data in the Chinese Environmental Status Bulletins) 
 
Although according to the Chinese Environmental Status Bulletins, the situation of air 
pollution in China, and more specifically in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region is getting much 
better during 2013-2017, as shown in figures 9 and 10, which will be detailed described in the 
further chapter, Jin et al. (2016) observed that, in China the air pollution situation is severe, 
widely distributed, and the atmospheric chemical reactions complex. These characteristics 
indicate no easy solution and that any effective control strategy has to target all the major 
pollutants from different sources, and control measures have to be jointly designed and wisely 
combined. It is evident that China therefore faces different challenges than developed countries, 
which experienced and solved different phases of air pollution for nearly a century. 
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Figure 10 Annual Air Quality Statistics in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region 
Source: author (based on data in the Chinese Environmental Status Bulletins) 
 
The air pollution in China has been estimated by the Global Burden of Disease Study 
(GBD) to lead to 1.2 million premature deaths from one year’s (2010) exposure in China, and 
in multiple studies to cause annual economic losses equivalent to between 1% and 7% of 
China’s GDP, partially or even totally offsetting China’s current annual GDP growth. 
The smog is heaviest in northern industrial provinces such as Shanxi, the dominant coal 
mining region, and steel-producing Hebei. Emissions there contribute to the planet’s largest 
mass of PM2.5 air pollution—the particles which pose the greatest health risks because they can 
become lodged in the lungs. It can stretch from Mongolia to the Yellow Sea and often as far as 
South Korea. In January 2013, PM2.5 in Beijing was basically above 100 μg/m3, most of the 
time was above 139 μg/m3, and heavy pollution exceeded 4 times. Only for 5 days that there 
was no smog (Bao et al. 2013). 
As to Beijing, being a pioneer in developing countries, it is objectively required that 
Beijing must aim at the high-end form of international cities and continuously improve the level 
of urban internationalization. However, environmental pollution has become a gap for Beijing 
to attract multinational corporations, international organizations and high-end talents around 
the world. Seriously hindered the pace of construction of the world’s cities. Beijing’s pollution 
not only brings huge economic losses, but also poses a huge threat to the health of the citizens. 
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Air pollution has an intense relationship with respiratory diseases and cardiovascular diseases. 
China’s air pollution is so extreme in 2015, independent research group Berkeley Earth 
estimated it contributed to 1.6 million deaths per year in the country. Beijing experienced 2,589 
deaths and a loss of US$328 million in 2012 because of PM2.5 pollution (Ottery 2013). 
2.3. The role of local government face to air pollution in Beijing 
In terms of responses to climate change, it has been argued that governments are important 
protagonists that play a fundamental role in defining standards, institutions and appropriate 
ways of governance to address these risks at different levels and scales (Giddens 2005, 2009; 
Alber and Kern 2008; Bulkeley and Newell 2010; Ferreira et al. 2016). 
Beck (1992, 1995, 2009), in this context, suggests the need of the nature of the current 
ecological risks to be reconsidered since the side effects of industrial production are 
characterized as a result of a deep institutional risk of industrial society. This reasoning can be 
applied to the climate change scenario, in which causes were deeply rooted in modern societies: 
seemingly innocuous and invisible substances such as methane (CH4) and carbon dioxide (CO2) 
are released into the atmosphere as ‘‘development products’’ (agricultural industrialization, 
increased energy consumption and economic growth) by changing their composition, with 
incalculable consequences (Bulkeley 2001; Ferreira et al. 2016). 
It is difficult to know the level of such risks and, in many cases it is impossible to predict 
their effects before it is too late, since we do not know what changes might happen next, or 
what are the dangers that can occur to these new modifications. Thus, the challenge is how to 
establish effective policies to address different problems, since the future is uncertain and 
assessing risks accurately until the conjectured risks materialize is not possible (Giddens 2009). 
In this scenario, political action and intervention carried out at the local, regional, national 
and international levels will have a decisive effect on the establishment of acceptable limits for 
the climate change issue, especially with regard to the scenario of adaptation to the effects and 
phenomena that are currently in progress (Giddens 2009). International agreements, for 
example, are essential attitudes, and actions of other spheres and actors such as NGOs and the 
private sector also happens to play a key role in addressing the problem. Even so, the State 
keeps providing a unique and structuring power force for social organization and, as such, 
should be convoked, especially if more serious impacts involving the climate change scenario 
indeed happen (Zehr 2014). 
Cities and regions in many other areas of the world have also come a long way toward 
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nations that are part of the search for action against climate change, and in many cases have 
done so in reciprocal collaboration. China is a good case of the reciprocal collaboration of 
different levels, as its governance model for environmental problem is that, the central 
government coordinate the national policies from different aspects(transportation, industry, 
construction civil, etc.) and coordinate the regional collaborations as well, and local 
governments execute national policies, combining with the local particularity and put forward 
local policies. For example, in 2013, China comprehensively carried out provincial-level 
climate change program work to ensure the effective implementation of the national climate 
change response plan. In addition, China’s economic stimulus package has allocated 210 billion 
yuan4 for energy conservation and ecological projects, and 370 billion yuan for structural and 
technological transformation. The people’s livelihood project is 400 billion yuan, mainly for 
the construction of affordable housing, and will actively adopt energy-saving and 
environmentally-friendly materials; the rural people’s livelihood project is 370 billion yuan, 
with the goal of improving rural living standards in a sustainable and environmentally friendly 
way (MEP 2014). Some European big cities, Milan for example, impost an air pollution tax on 
vehicles. Many Brazilian cities, such as São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Feira de Santana and Rio 
de Janeiro have proved municipal laws of Climate Changes (Barbi 2015). The reason for this 
is, to some extent, the need to deal with the directly toxic forms of air pollution faced in urban 
environments. It is relatively easy to promote air and water cleaning campaigns when their 
harmful effects are visible to everyone. However, such campaigns have created an awareness 
of the longer-term forms of pollution and, consequently, the concern to develop policies against 
them as well. In addition, in principle and often in practice, local areas and communities, 
including large cities, can often mobilize more quickly and effectively than central governments 
(Giddens, 2008). 
By mitigation, cities can substantially reduce their environmental impact and consequently 
transform their infrastructure and consumption patterns improving the global environment. By 
adaptation, cities become resilient to climatic impacts and reduce risks from climate change and 
variability (Dawson, 2007; Satterthwaite et al., 2007). Although these urban transformations 
will take decades and are probably reliant on significant developments in how cities are 
governed and planned, cities have a very direct interest in both mitigating and adapting to 
environmental and climatic change (Satterthwaite et al., 2007; Bicknell et al., 2009). 
Besides the important role in formulating and implementing climate policies, local 
 
4 According to FED, in 2013, 1 USD = 6.1 yuan(RMB) 
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governments also participate in the international arena through transnational networks of local 
(and subnational) governments. These transnational actors have been attracting increasing 
attention since the early 1990s and are commonly seen as a concrete result of the Rio Summit 
in 1992 (Martins and Ferreira, 2011). Bulkeley and Betsill (2003) have argued that such 
networks of transnational local authorities do not fall easily into existing conceptual 
frameworks for climate change responses as it is difficult to analyze whether they are 
governmental or non-governmental organizations. 
This discussion is particularly relevant for developing countries, which have no binding 
commitments for reducing greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions under the Kyoto Protocol and 
are more vulnerable to climate change impacts due to their geographical location and low 
adaptive capacity that usually result from historical development deficits (Wilbanks et al., 2007; 
Bicknell et al., 2009). It is also mostly important to focus on megacities that are the engines of 
the world’s economy, centers of innovation and important areas of population growth and 
concentration as it has been argued elsewhere (Sanchez-Rodriguez et al., 2005; De Sherbinin 
et al., 2007). 
Local governments have taken the lead in responding to climate change in diverse contexts, 
including developing, developed and countries that have been reluctant in supporting 
international action towards the mitigation of GHG emissions (e.g. USA). In this direction, 
there is a growing body of literature that provides robust arguments for the engagement of local 
governments in climate policy making (Kousky and Schneider, 2003; Bulkeley and Betsill, 
2003; Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005; Puppim de Oliveira, 2009; Bulkeley et al., 2009; Bulkeley, 
2010), although these non-state actors, as referred by constructivist approaches in international 
relations (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003), do not have direct nor binding commitments under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol 
(Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003; Betsill and Bulkeley, 2007). These arguments are usually based on 
the recognition that cities and its local authorities have the legal jurisdiction and control over 
areas and sectors that can influence many activities that are not only critical sources of GHG 
emissions such as transportation and energy use, but also key instruments for managing and 
reducing urban climate risks such as land use regulation, zoning, civil defense and disaster 
response and mitigation (Wilbanks and Kates 1999; Robinson and Gore 2005; Dawson 2007; 
Satterthwaite et al. 2007; Bulkeley et al. 2009). 
There are also many reasons for acknowledging local governments as one of the critical 
actors in climate policy, and urban centers as the fundamental arena where climate governance 
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is taking place (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003; Lankao, 2007; Bulkeley and Newell, 2010; 
Bulkeley, 2010). In the same direction, the city is also the level of governance closest to the 
people (Wilbanks and Kates, 1999; Evans et al., 2005; Adger, 2005; Satterthwaite, 2008; 
Puppim de Oliveira, 2009). This recognition builds on the assumption that local governments 
are more flexible and more accountable to their citizens than other levels of governance. In 
theory, they tend to be smaller and decisions can be taken faster than those at the national level. 
This flexibility and readiness in response and action can shape governmental structures to be 
more adaptive to new situations and agendas so that these governments become less 
bureaucratic to implement policies as local governments are closer to their constituencies and 
local officials suffer the pressure from interest groups such as civil society, community-based 
organizations and environmentalist groups on a daily basis (Puppim de Oliveira, 2009; 
Birkmann et al., 2010). 
On the other hand, local governments also face many barriers in developing climate policy 
at the city level. Some barriers are well described and analyzed by the policy and public 
administration literature such as the presence of short mandates for local authorities, the lack 
of financial and human resources available at the local and the lack of autonomy to regulate 
specific sectors and economic agents (Ligeti et al., 2007; Parzen, 2008; Puppim de Oliveira, 
2009; Martins and Ferreira, 2010). Martins and Ferreira provides a summary of key factors that 
can support or inhibit local governments to engage in climate policy making (Table 1). 
Table 1. Key factors that support or constraint climate change action at the city level 
Key factors Enabling environment Obstacles and constraints 
Resource 
and capacity 
Institutional and financial capacity to 
undertake climate change actions 
Presence of a local champion 
Allocation of financial and human 
resources 
Long-term urban planning 
Lack of financial, human and 
technological resources 
Lack of commitment from political 
leaders 
Lack of attention to environmental 
issues 
Short-term view 
Knowledge 
and 
information 
Strong communication and outreach 
Vulnerability perception and strong 
risk management approach 
Strong science-policy interface 
Business as usual approach 
Lack of vulnerability assessment and 
poor understanding in terms of 
impacts and extend of climate change 
Mismatch between policy makers and 
scientific community 
Institutions 
and 
governance 
Authority to coordinate and regulate 
climate change actions 
National programs to support local 
initiatives 
Participation in transnational city 
networks 
Lack of authority and jurisdiction 
Lack of national and international 
support 
Poor vertical and horizontal 
coordination across levels and 
policies 
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Good governance stakeholder 
involvement and participation 
strategy 
Poor governance structures and 
difficulties in getting key sectors 
involved 
Source: Martins, R.D. & Ferreira, L.C., Climate change action at the city level: tales 
from two megacities in Brazil 
 
One of the major barriers, however, is poorly approached and understood by most climate 
change governance research. It draws upon the fact that climate change is considered a “wicked 
problem” in policy circles (Brown, 2009). Climate change illustrates the dynamic complexity 
of many modern public problems as it is unstructured making the causes and effects of a 
changing climate extremely difficult to be identified and addressed by local authorities (Brown, 
2009; Giddens, 2009). Furthermore, “wicked problems”, as coined and defined by Rittel and 
Webber (1973), involve multiple and intertwined sets of public and private actors and 
challenges that cut across interconnecting policy domains and levels of government (Brown, 
2009). 
This fundamental barrier may hide the chain and scale of causes and consequences of 
climate change in all levels and thus make climate change action at the local level ineffective 
or only palliative (Puppim de Oliveira, 2009). According to Brown (2009), a network approach 
has been argued to best tackle a wicked problem where diverse actors from government and 
differing sectors and stakeholders get together to share resources and knowledge. 
Considering this fundamental barrier, Beck has a very interesting discussion when talking 
about strategies aimed at political integration within and outside the nation-state:  
A number of substantial issues are linked to the formation of transnational 
political communities. If the consequences of national decisions are 
transnational or global – as is the case with nuclear energy, climate change, and 
so forth – then duties towards others cannot be restricted merely to duties 
towards one’s national fellow citizens. In circumstances such as these, 
democracies have not only a specific obligation to include fellow citizens and 
foreigners alike as co-legislators in an extended political community; it is also in 
their national self-interest to do so. It thus becomes possible, on the basis of risk 
definitions that transcend any one nation’s borders, to create political 
communities of risk in which cosmopolitan rights of participation are 
institutionalized. To illustrate this by reference to the everyday consequences of 
climate change: humanity is increasingly plagued by weather-related disasters 
that are no longer considered ‘natural’ but are seen to be a result of human action; 
moreover, vivid images and commentaries in the mass media attribute these 
disasters to decisions emanating from the modern risk society - to ‘inappropriate 
action’. As a result of this, there is growing pressure on the various states to 
implement relevant agreements both nationally and globally in the national 
interest. Every new disaster – too much rain here, too much sun there – raises 
the question, ‘what is the rain and the heat telling us?’ thereby either contributing 
to the litany of political failures or else becoming the source of transnational 
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political renewal (Beck, 2005:220-221).  
As mentioned earlier, China strives to balance the relationship between economic 
development and the protection of resources and the environment. At the important meetings 
such as the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the National People’s 
Congress, and the Central Economic Work Conference, etc. China’s top leaders repeatedly 
proposed to pay attention to the improvement of human settlements and ecological environment 
(2008, 2009, 2010), the improvement of the sustainable development capability (2008, 2010, 
2011, 2013, 2016), saving resources and protecting the environment (2008, 2009, 2011, 2012, 
2015), and further stressing the need to thoroughly implement the basic national policy of 
saving resources and protecting the environment (2012, 2015). It also mentions to strengthen 
environmental governance (2015, 2016), build a resource-saving and environment-friendly 
society (2010, 2015), vigorously develop circular economy (2010), promote ecological 
civilization construction (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013), and it puts forward that “the ecological 
civilization construction should be placed in a prominent position and integrated into all aspects 
of economic construction, political construction, cultural construction, social construction and 
the whole process” (President Hu, 2012); also, “It is necessary to establish a systematic and 
complete ecological civilization system, use the system to protect the ecological environment. 
And it is necessary to improve the natural resource asset property rights system and use-control 
system, and to delineate the ecological protection red line, implement the system of paid-use of 
resources and the ecological compensation system, and reform the ecological environmental 
protection management system” (President Xi, 2013). The construction of disaster reduction 
and mitigation system (2010, 2011) is raised. It is also many times proposed to strengthen 
energy conservation and emission reduction work (2011, 2014), which puts forward “It is 
necessary to strict target responsibility and management, improve evaluation mechanism and 
reward and punishment system, strengthen energy conservation and emission reduction policy 
guidance, and accelerate the establishment of energy conservation and emission reduction 
market mechanism” (President Hu, 2011). The government also pays emphasis on adhering to 
green development (2015, 2016), forming a new pattern of harmonious development of human 
and nature (2015). As an international actor, the government mentions actively responding to 
global climate change (2010, 2011), insisting on constructive participation in international 
negotiations and cooperation on climate change (2011), and making new contributions to global 
ecological security (2015). 
On November 14, 2013, Premier Li Keqiang met at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing 
with foreign representatives attending the 2013 Annual Meeting of the China Council for 
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International Cooperation on Environment and Development. Premier Li said that “China is 
now at a critical stage in achieving sustainable and healthy economic development through 
transformation and upgrading. The purpose of our development is for the people. The people’s 
demands for environmental quality are getting higher and higher, and environmental protection 
has become an important issue of people’s livelihood. The Chinese government attaches great 
importance to coordinating and balancing the relationship between development and the 
environment, and better protecting the environment in promoting the continuous development 
of the economy.” 
From December 9 to 11, 2014, the Central Economic Work Conference was held in Beijing. 
The meeting held that, from the perspective of resources and environment constraints, in the 
past, the energy resources and ecological environment were relatively large. Now the 
environmental carrying capacity has reached or approached the upper limit. It must conform to 
the people’s expectations for a good ecological environment and promote the formation of a 
new way of green and low-carbon circular-development.  
On March 21, 2014, the working conference on energy conservation, emission reduction 
and climate change was held in Beijing. Premier Li Keqiang presided over the meeting, and he 
pointed out that last year’s task of energy conservation and emission reduction made new 
progress, but this year’s task is even more arduous. It is very difficult to achieve the goal of 
reducing energy consumption per unit of GDP by 3.9% while maintaining economic growth of 
about 7.5%. As Li said, “Despite the downward pressure on the economy and the challenges of 
steady growth, we must unswervingly promote energy conservation and emission reduction. 
This is to put pressure on ourselves, and we must work hard to get rid of a new way of reducing 
energy consumption and promoting economic development, which is our responsibility to the 
people and future generations.” 
Under the premise of the central government’s determination to control regional air 
pollution, how to conduct regional air pollution control is a more specific and realistic key issue. 
As mentioned above, the complexity of regional air pollution control tasks and the diversity of 
governance subjects (government, enterprises, and citizens) require some timely and specific 
environmental exploration and selection of their governance models. As Shen et al. (2015) 
summarized, there are three common governance models on conducting regional air pollution 
control, which are bureaucratic governance model, market governance model and network 
governance model. 
Since the environment is a public good, and if there is no country, people cannot coordinate 
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with each other effectively to achieve their common interests, especially not to provide certain 
specific public goods for themselves (Taylor, 1987). This can be seen as the legal basis for 
environmental bureaucratic governance. China’s environmental governance system is under the 
jurisdiction of the central government, and is governed by local governments. It is a hierarchical 
coordination mechanism that relies on top-down hierarchical control measures. It is enforced 
through mandatory administrative and legal means, as well as incentive and constraint 
economic means to achieve environmental responsibility and air pollution control. This 
inevitably determines the rational arrangement and integration of resources such as 
management institutions, relevant legal systems, and government environmental performance 
appraisal systems. 
Among these model elements, the governing institution is the platform through which 
environmental management can be implemented, and it enables government agencies to use 
this tool to combine democracy and efficiency (Mill, 1956). Environmental rule of law is the 
foundation or basis of governance. The environmental rule of law is the formal constraint. Its 
normative and disciplinary nature makes the local government condone the environmental 
pollution transfer negative external protectionism behavior, and then promote pollution 
negative external governance. The government environmental performance appraisal system is 
the key to governance. The structure of the bureaucratic elements is based on rigid power 
relations and reflects the government’s single governance. This has always been a realistic 
choice for China’s environmental management system (Shen et al., 2015). 
Meanwhile, in reality, the external authority has serious institutional defects in the 
enforcement of public resource problems, and a large number of attempts to unify the solutions 
have failed (Mcginnis, 2009) and government failures occur, thus requiring a market 
governance model to cope with environmental pollution crisis, solving the problem of pollution. 
The decision of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China that “market plays 
a decisive role in the resource allocation” has an important policy-oriented role for air pollution 
control. Unlike water pollution, the arbitrary drift of air pollution, combined with the ambiguity 
of environmental property rights, calls for making full use of market factors such as price and 
competition, to innovate the air pollution market governance model (Shen et al., 2015). 
From the experiences of air pollution control in California of the USA and the United 
Kingdom, the means of pollution control is mainly carried out through price mechanism using 
emissions trading, ecological compensation mechanism, and third-party regulation or third-
party governance. Ecological compensation refers to the adoption of administrative methods, 
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market, etc., based on comprehensive consideration of ecological protection costs, development 
opportunity costs and ecological service values, demanding the ecological protection 
beneficiaries or ecological damage injurers to compensate the injured ones or the protectors for 
its cost and other related losses by paying money, material or other non-material benefits (Wang 
2014). Emissions trading is based on the “polluter pays” principle, and the amount of pollution 
rights determined by the government according to the national environmental objectives is 
given to the microeconomic individual through auction or unpaid distribution. In essence, it is 
to make full use of market mechanisms to manage and control environmental pollutants at the 
lowest total social cost. The third-party regulation market is a market-based organization 
established by the government as a platform, and an open market system in which transactions 
of “pollution rights” are independently carried out by enterprises. The third-party governance 
is to introduce the direct responsibility of the polluters into indirect economic responsibility 
through the introduction of the market mechanism, to concentrate the capital investment by the 
intermediary agency that undertakes the specific task of governance, to establish a governance 
entity, and to implement socialized paid services, management and function. 
Network governance is based on the trading framework of Williamson, O.E. (1979)’s 
triple dimension (uncertainty demand, asset specificity and transaction frequency). Transaction 
cost economics is an important theoretical tool for analyzing network governance. Later, 
Cadence Jones and others increased the dimension of “the complexity of tasks under time 
constraints”, with structural embedding as the social mechanism of network governance, and 
the theoretical framework of network governance as the goal of governance through 
coordination and maintenance. Network governance is the result of the micro-enterprise main 
strategic alliance. It builds a network organization platform through relationship, cooperation 
and interaction, and integrates the relationships among networks, capital, information and other 
resources to minimize transaction costs (Peng 2002). 
In response to government failures and market failures, American scholars Stephen 
Goldsmith and William D. Eggers pointed out that the government’s management of society 
can no longer use the old government-regulated model, but must be more Multi-use of market 
economy means. The government must empower the public and non-governmental 
organizations to mobilize their enthusiasm for self-management and assist the government’s 
social management. The government must strengthen cooperation with citizens and non-
governmental organizations. The role of the government in social management should mainly 
be decision-making and guidance, coordination and mobilization of various social forces to 
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serve the healthy development of society (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004). Network governance is 
to achieve and enhance the public interest of the society, and to improve government agencies 
and non-governmental organizations (private sector, third sector or citizens) and other actors to 
interact with each other, to share public power in an interdependent environment and jointly 
manage social public affairs (Chen, 2003). In essence it is a collective action. 
At the dawn of the regional air pollution crisis, “the best solution is not to redesign the 
charter, but to melt the rigid boundaries between organizations” (Gore, 1993). The network 
governance model is a new public governance paradigm (NPG) that is well suited to address 
this crisis. Different from the voluntary individual behavior system in the market and the 
command obedience system of bureaucracy, the governance structure of the network 
governance model is a self-organizing system with common value appeals, and its realization 
lies in the cultivation of trust mechanism, coordination mechanism and maintenance 
mechanism (Yin, 2007). By integrating the resources of each node in the network, the interests 
of governments, enterprises, and citizens of each governance body are coordinated, mutual 
benefit and cooperation are realized, and collective actions are optimized to achieve the goal of 
air pollution control. 
In the bureaucratic governance model, the government is the single subject of governance. 
Under the leadership of the central government, it is the spokesperson for the interests of a 
certain jurisdiction, to implement the relevant central environmental policies, build an 
institutional environment for regional development, coordinate the interests of relevant 
stakeholders, solve air pollution problems, and achieve regional environmental protection goals. 
In this model, the operating mechanism mainly relies on the power mechanism (administrative 
authority), relying on regional industrial planning, fiscal means, intergovernmental agreements 
to solve environmental pollution problems. This kind of coercive power can enhance the 
visibility of local government behavior, increase intergovernmental trust, and make up for 
“market failure”. However, because the bureaucratic structure itself has shortcomings such as 
slow information transmission, large loss, and lack of effective incentives, it will lag behind the 
rapidly changing environment and provide fewer selective channels. In addition, local 
governments are rational economic people. In pursuit of maximizing self-interest, the 
environment will be sacrificed in order to achieve local economic growth under the GDP-
oriented promotion championship rules. The localism replaces cooperation and even has a 
captured crisis, resulting in “government failure” in environmental pollution. 
In the market governance model, enterprises are the main subject of governance (the role 
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of consumers has not yet fully played out from the system construction, for example: the design 
of the trading system for consumption emission rights has not been carried out). The market 
mainly allocates regional resources through price and competition mechanism, promotes the 
free flow of production factors, and improves the environmental property rights system. 
However, due to the blind pursuit of profits by enterprises, the industry is over-competitive and 
the production capacity is relatively surplus, which intensifies the air pollution across regions. 
Under the network governance model, the main body of air pollution control presents 
diversity, including the government (third sector), enterprises and citizens, emphasizing 
polycentrism. It is networked through organizational forms, building trust, reputation 
mechanisms, and interest coordination mechanisms to integrate government, market, and 
society. This network organization is conducive to information communication, resource 
utilization and sharing, mutual learning and trust, thus reducing transaction costs and 
coordination costs, and ultimately achieving reciprocal air pollution joint prevention and 
control. However, there are also opportunism, individual rationality and collective rational 
contradiction in the network, which leads to the differentiation and alienation of interests and 
deviates from public health and value. The stability is weak because trust is difficult to maintain 
for a long time. Moreover, such multi-centers will have problems such as power attribution, 
responsibility identification and sharing, thus affecting the overall performance of network 
governance. 
From the above analysis, each governance model has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. They have their own background and institutional space, as well as adaptable 
environments and conditions (including politics, economy and culture), which have been 
verified in the experience of air pollution control in Western countries. Judging from China’s 
national conditions, politically, the central government enjoys the power to control resource 
allocation, the economic market mechanism is not functioning well, and civil society is 
immature (Wang, 2012). These factors determine the choice path of China’s air pollution 
control mode, that is, the government governance-led and flexible integration of these three 
governance models (Shen et al., 2015). 
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Chapter 3. Pro-environmental behavior in relation to local 
environmental policies 
The field research was conducted in the summer of 2018. 104 employees of the Institutes 
of Science and Development of Chinese Academy of Sciences (ISD/CAS) were volunteer to 
answer the questionnaire. Here below is the basic information of the respondents. 
    
Graph 1                                                       Graph 2 
 
The main portion of the respondents is young people. As shown in the graph 1, 50.96% of 
the respondents are at the age of 25 to 35. The respondents of the age between 36 to 45 represent 
30.77%, and the respondents of the age above 46 represent 16.35%. And as shown in the graph 
2, more than 60% of the respondents are female. 
 
 
Graph 3 
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As shown in the graph 3, 83.65% of the respondents are not born in Beijing, which might 
mean that they have less emotional and physical ties to the city considering the possibility for 
them to emigrate. 
 
    
Graph 4                                               Graph 5 
 
As the respondents are mainly young researchers, normally their job title are mainly below 
research associate, corresponding to 53.85% of the whole respondents, as shown in the graph 
4. And only 7.69% of them are working on the research field directly related to the 
environmental area (graph 5). 
 
    
Graph 6                                                      Graph 7 
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As we know, the requirement of the employment of the Institutes of Science and 
Development of CAS for the educational degree is above bachelor degree, so we are sure that 
100% of the respondents are above bachelor degree. 83.65% of them have Graduate degree, 
and 44.23% of the respondents are Doctors (graph 6). Among the respondents, 15.38% have 
their educational background directly related to the environmental area. 
As I explained in the previous chapter, it was also conducted semi-structured interviews 
with some representatives of the research sample. Here I would introduce the Institute for 
Sustainable Development Strategy of ISD/CAS. It mainly conduct research on Ecological 
Civilization and Sustainable Development Strategy, with a focus on the major issues of the 
construction of an ecological civilization system, developing a theory system of ecological 
civilization, sustainable development strategies and policies, energy and climate change, land 
and space planning, regional development policies, geopolitics and economics, geographic 
process simulation, etc. The researchers of this institute is chosen to be the interviewees of this 
present research, as they are both qualified experts on the theme of environmental policy and 
the local residents that experience the air pollution in their daily life. 
As an institute of interdisciplinary and intersected with the natural sciences and the social 
sciences, the educational background of the researchers is also quite distinctive. For example, 
their undergraduate majors are verified from philosophy, history, economics, law, music, to 
computer science, civil engineering, and many other natural sciences subjects, etc. But at the 
doctoral level, many people have turned to the study area of management or economics. 
Here below are the information of the 9 interviewees of the present research. 
AC5: Male, 45-55 years old, Professor, deputy director of the Institute for Sustainable 
Development Strategy. He began to study economic geography and urban and rural regional 
planning from his undergraduate studies. Now he is mainly engaged in environmental and 
sustainable development research for many years. His child has grown up already. 
BL: Male, under 35 years old, Research Associate. Mainly engaged in research of 
environmental economics and climate change economics. The current main research focuses 
on the Integrated Assessment Model for Climate Change Economics (IAM). He is originally 
from Hubei Province. There is a child in his family, less than two years old. 
CS: Male, 35-45 years old, Associate Professor. Mainly engaged in climate change 
economics research and regional innovation management research. He and his team mainly do 
 
5 The numbering letters is a combination of the letter of A-I equals to number 1-9 and the first letter of the surname of the 
interviewee. 
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policy simulation related to the sustainable development and climate change. They are mainly 
researching in methodology. He has been doing this research since the beginning of his Ph.D., 
starting in 2006 and it has been 12 years. His undergraduate major was urban areas and planning, 
doctoral studies were in the area of management science and engineering. He is originally from 
Hunan Province. He has two children in the family. 
DZ: Male, under 35 years old, Research Associate . Engaged in relevant policy and 
strategy research in the field of water resources. The current research includes three major 
blocks, the first is the evaluation of relevant policies, the second is the design of the basin 
ecological compensation mechanism, and the third is the improvement of the integrated river 
basin management system. He has been doing this research area since the beginning of the 
Ph.D., probably from 2008 until now, about ten years. The background of education is the study 
of water resources, and he is a Doctor of engineering. But now he is working on the policy 
study. He is originally from Tianjin. Single person now. 
EZ: Female, 35-45 years old, Associate Professor. Now she is engaged in green low-
carbon development strategy and policy research. The main research in energy and climate 
change is mainly on modeling. It is to use some economic models or composite models to do 
policy simulation, policy analysis, and policy evaluation. She did her Ph.D. in the area of 
Management Science and Engineering and she has been doing this research since the Ph.D. in 
2008. At the beginning, her research was mainly on carbon dioxide emissions and climate 
negotiations. In the next few years, from the beginning of 2011 and 2012, it was more focused 
on energy and modeling. She is a native Beijinger, and she has a one year old baby in the family. 
She and her family live in public rental housing offered by the ISD/CAS at a walking distance 
from the workplace. 
FG: Female, 35-45 years old, Associate Professor. She has been engaged in innovation 
policy research for a long time and has recently been engaged in energy transformation policy 
research. There is a six-years-old child in the family. Both parents of she and her husband are 
living in Beijing. 
GG: Male, under 35 years old, Research Associate. Has been doing climate change and 
low carbon research since 2009, at the beginning of the Master’s degree study. Now he is 
engaged to the study of evaluation of the effectiveness of low-carbon policies in various 
industries from the industry level, including to evaluate its potential for reducing emissions 
from the policy, explore how much reduction this policy can lead in the future, and what its 
abatement costs are. Doing this evaluation analysis and then compare the policies to see which 
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policies should be prioritized. There is a child in the family, less than two years old. He is 
originally from Liaoning Province, and his wife is originally from Heilongjiang province. They 
are living with the mother of the wife, living in public rental housing offered by the ISD/CAS 
at a walking distance from the workplace. 
HZ: Male, 35 years old, Associate Professor. His research is based on climate change, 
researching on emission reduction policies, and environmental economics, including 
predictions of future global warming. Because global warming is related to greenhouse gas 
emissions, and emissions are related to economic paths and trends. It is a simulation analysis 
of integrated assessments. Since about 2009, his doctoral thesis was done in this area. And his 
Ph.D. area belongs to Geography, which is also quite extensive. He is originally from Hebei 
province. He is married without children. He and his wife live in public rental housing offered 
by the ISD/CAS at a walking distance from the workplace. His wife works near this 
neighborhood too. 
IC: Male, 45 years old, Associate Professor. Undergraduate is studying thermal energy 
engineering in the Department of Energy Science and Engineering. In 1999, he participated in 
the third Sino-Japanese Environmental Science Conference, and then in 2003, he was awarded 
the scholarship of Japanese Ministry of Education, and went to study in Kyoto University. After 
returning from the Kyoto University with a Ph.D. in energy science in 2008, he is currently 
engaged in energy and environmental research, including energy economics, econometrics and 
energy finance, industrial organization and regulatory economics, and energy security strategy 
management. The main research topics include recycling vulcanization plant technology, power 
industry emission reduction (SO2, NOx, SOx), energy environment system design (CDM, JI), 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan of Low Carbon Development Strategy Research, Energy in various 
regions and industries Efficiency research, evaluation and energy saving and emission 
reduction target design, and so on. Mainly applied economic theory, environmental economic 
theory and policy, regulatory economics, etc. There are two children in his family. 
3.1. Risk perception of air pollution of local scientists in Beijing 
Risk perception can be a consistent predictor of the responses of individuals and 
communities in the event of an accident or disaster, and derives from a wide range of sources, 
with a variety of forms in the population (Stoffle et al., 1991), which influences individual 
decision and behavior (Siegrist et al., 2005 a). 
As Beck explained, when he talked about the contradictory consequences of global risks: 
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Threats do not exist as such any more than do catastrophes. […]Since it goes 
without saying that the ‘brutal reality of the threat’ remains a manufactured, 
interpreted threat […] it can also lead to splits and extreme polarization, and this 
for the very reason that this experience is refracted in the world’s cultural, 
religious, national, ethnic and economic antagonisms. 
When and to what extent this ‘reality experience’ unites or splits, however, is 
a function of the specific type of staging of global risks. Thus a suborn 
abstractness clings to the threats and anticipated effects of climate change (in 
contrast to the terrorist threat), for it involves a global risk that rests on scientific 
models and calculations and is difficult to prove or refute on the basis of everyday 
experience (Beck, 2009:71). 
Specifically, air pollution in Beijing is a phenomenon, it is not a catastrophe yet, it hasn’t 
caused any large-scale mass health events. So how much the threat does everyone feel about it 
differs from people to people. And as Beck concluded: 
Dangers do not exist ‘in themselves’, independently of our perceptions. They 
become a political issue only when everyone becomes aware of them; they are 
the products of social stagings which are strategically defined, covered up or 
dramatized with the aid of scientific materials (Beck, 2009:84). 
The research will first seek the risk perception of air pollution. How does air pollution 
influence their lives? How does air pollution correlate with their health and the health of their 
acquaintances? How serious do they concern with air pollution? Which perspective on the 
future of air pollution in Beijing? If it is necessary, how much of sacrifice of benefit can they 
do to improve the situation? And then I will conclude whether the risk of air pollution is 
perceived or not among local people in Beijing. 
 
Graph 8 
 
When asked “Do you think the air pollution in Beijing has affected your health?” Most of 
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the respondents gave positive answers. As shown in graph 8, More than half of the respondents 
said that they often feel respiratory discomfort and they think it is caused by air pollution. And 
some other people also feel respiratory discomfort, though they don’t think it is related to air 
pollution. Also, there are 21 people said that they occasionally or often feel discomfort in the 
cardio cerebrovascular system, and they think it is directly related to air pollution. Only 13 
people think their health situation is absolutely not affected by air pollution. 
 
Graph 9 
 
At the same time, when asked how much of the threats to the safety do they feel of air 
pollution, as shown in graph 9, more than half of the respondents said that the air pollution 
directly affects their health and threatens their lives. If there are children or elderly people in 
the family, the situation seems to be more serious. As 38 people expressed that the air pollution 
directly affects the health of their children and threatens their lives, and 42 people thought that 
air pollution directly affects the health of the elderly people in the family and threatens their 
lives. Even though some of the respondents didn’t think that the air pollution threatens the lives 
of themselves or the other family members, 91.35% of the respondents think the air pollution 
has direct effects to their health or the health of their family members. 
In this aspect, the interviewees maintain a similar opinion to the other respondents. For 
most of them, air pollution is threatening to their health and the health of their family members. 
DZ believes that “The incidence of lung disease and lung cancer should be higher, and it(air 
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pollution) also affects people’s mood. There must be some impact on newborns and on people’s 
respiratory system.” 
EZ informed that, according to the research of Prof. Zhang, of Beijing University, using 
the “Air Reaction Exposure Model” and combining the data of hospital visit, the result of 
research shows that air pollution has a big impact on health. And she said, “I personally feel 
that the impact on health is definitely exist. I feel uncomfortable when the smog is severe in 
winter. When it is smoggy, I will definitely feel uncomfortable and cough.” 
What’s more, all the interviewees that have children in their family, like IC, DZ, BL, EZ, 
etc. expressed their concern of the threat of air pollution to the health of their children. “The 
children are more vulnerable, because they are less resistant to the pollution.” Said DZ. 
And this is not just an imagination, it is happening. As BL said, “It must be a threat. I think 
it will definitely have an impact. For example, when two more serious hazes occurred recently, 
my children were sick. There may be other factors, but I think it still has some link to the 
pollution.” 
As a mother, FG is even more worried about the health problems of the children.  “In 
particular, I think it is (a big problem) for the growth of children, because they are in a stage of 
growth, their own resistance and physical fitness have not yet matured. On the one hand, the 
direct harm to them is definitely a direct impact. Now many children in Beijing have respiratory 
diseases. And I also heard some cases of eye diseases, the inflammation of the conjunctiva. If 
you go to the hospital and ask the doctor, they will tell you that many people come to see the 
disease, they think it is an inflammation of the conjunctiva, but in fact, it was caused by polluted 
air. It is indeed influential. This is the direct impact.  
“On the other hand, there are indirect impacts. For example, we registered football classes 
for our son. This is especially typical. The outdoor sports in Beijing are almost impossible to 
carry out. Like football, it is going to be held in an outdoor football field. The football class 
should be taken on Saturday and Sunday, twice a week. He (My son) started the class at the age 
of five, now it passed more than a year, it should be a total of more than 70 classes, but we have 
been to less than 30 classes so far. When it is winter, it will be smog. As the football class 
should be taken twice a week, but there may be a day of smog in these two days. And even 
sometime it is smog for the both two days. Then it is impossible to play. This kind of outdoor 
sport is greatly reduced. Even if you are indoors, you have to have a fresh air system in the 
room. If there is no fresh air system in the room, isn’t it the same as outdoor? As the air is 
polluted, if you did a lot of sports, it is even more harmful to your health. And doing sports is 
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that, you have to be sustainable. You can’t just practice hard for one day, maybe for eight hours, 
and then you don’t practice for the other day, it won’t work. That’s why, now in summer, when 
the weather is always good, we will try our best to make sure that our son doesn’t miss any of 
the football classes, because he needs a continuity. But even if the weather is good these months, 
and he will practice hard, when comes to November, the smog will come up, then he will not 
practice for three or four months. Isn’t that still the same? So it will indirectly affect the 
development of their physical fitness. I think this impact is actually very serious. I think this is 
also why so many parents, when the children have not yet gone to school, or their studies are 
not heavy yet, the parents would like to send their children to other cities, because (air pollution) 
is really harmful for children.” 
But other respondents hold different views. 
According to CS’s opinion, “At least I don’t intuitively feel the threat. Of course, not 
feeling doesn’t mean not existing, because health-harming is a long-term process. But you 
asked me if it poses a threat, and because I don’t feel the threat, so I can’t say there is a threat. 
Maybe one day, I can see that many people around me have serious symptoms, and I may 
change (my view). But I want to say that sometimes the threat of air pollution to the health can 
be felt. I would like to give you an example. The place where I was born and I grew up, there 
was an industrial and mining enterprise. Many of the people living there have various kinds of 
cancers. (When I was living there,) I didn’t feel it. I thought it was a common phenomenon. But 
later, when I came to Beijing and found that it was not. Because we found that the cancer in our 
place was significantly higher than the average that my classmates could perceive. So I later 
realized that this is obviously an example of a health deterioration caused by long-term air 
pollution. But now, talking about the extent of the smog in Beijing, it has not yet made me feel 
intuitive. Of course, everyone will say that ‘I am not feeling well, the air is a bit choking, and I 
feel scorpion’, but I still can’t talk about a negative impact on the health because of air pollution 
in Beijing for a long term. Sometimes we feel very serious, but there is no actual research or 
report to support it, and the data is not yet supported.” 
DZ, HZ and GG hold a similar opinion to CS. DZ believes that the problem of air pollution 
for now is not that serious. And the same as CS, GG also sees that “There are a lot of longevity 
people in Beijing, much more than in my hometown, my hometown is Liaoning, the air quality 
is particularly good, and the scenery is beautiful.” 
HZ believes that “It certainly has an impact on health, but it has not yet appeared in the 
short term, I feel, at least from the people around me. For example, in the first few years when 
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the pollution concentration was relatively heavy, everyone wore a mask and bought an air 
purifier. Later, they gradually adapted to it, and they didn’t pay much attention to it, but there 
was no big disease occurred to them. Of course, maybe that’s because there is no susceptible 
people like the elderly and children around me.” 
For them, though they show some concern about their children’s health, they don’t take 
too serious about it. “Only during the heavy or severe smog days, that I won’t let my child go 
out to play, but on the other days I just let him go out and play.” Said GG. 
Meanwhile, other than the health impacts, all of the interviewees believe that the air 
pollution didn’t cause any increased cost of living. FG explained, “The impact on individuals 
should be small. Nothing else, it is just to buy some air purifiers. But this may be okay, it is a 
one-time consumption, and there is not much cost. But for enterprises, and public facilities like 
hospitals, kindergartens, and schools, they now have to install a new-wind-system. This is 
definitely not originally planned in the investment budget of the infrastructure. But fortunately 
it doesn’t occupy a big percentage of the investment.” 
Faced with the air pollution, there are few methods for ordinary people to protect 
themselves and their family. The recommended ways are: avoid going out when the air 
pollution is heavy; use a mask when going out; and use air purifiers inside the room. 
 
Graph 10 
 
Being one of the most efficient ways to protect from air pollution, local residents are well 
informed that it is better to stay at home and avoid going out in heavy polluted weather. As 
shown in graph 10, 77.67% of the respondents would try to avoid going out in heavy polluted 
weather. “Having said that, but if you really have a business to do, you have to go out, no matter 
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how heavy the pollution is. In fact, we are consuming our health. It is difficult to avoid (going 
out and other ways of consuming our health). Even if you are a leader, you also have your 
affairs. (On this aspect,) You will not be exempted because of your higher status.” BL expresses 
the helplessness of ordinary residents in Beijing. 
 
Graph 11 
 
For Beijing’s families, air purifiers is kind of a life necessity. As shown in graph 11, only 
12.75% of the respondents don’t have air purifier at home. 41.17% of the respondents even 
have more than 2 air purifiers at home. But having purifiers at home doesn’t mean they will use 
it. “There is an air-purifier at home, but we rarely use it.” Said HZ. 
Similarly, “There is an air purifier in my home, which was bought in 2015, when the smog 
in Beijing was the most serious. It was used only in that winter and never been used again. I 
feel that it has no effect at all, and it blows a wind, and I feel that wind will blow the dust in the 
house.” Said GG.  
CS holds a similar opinion, “I occasionally open the air purifier. But I don’t think it is 
much useful. First, is the product itself reliable? Second, you live in the middle of this 
environment, you can’t get rid of it. There are 24 hours a day, you let the air purifier run for 4 
hours, how about the other 20 hours? And it (the machine) will pollute itself. For example, there 
is a filter element, and you need to change it from time to time, but you just can’t make sure to 
do it.” 
Besides, there are still some good reasons for not using the air-purifier. As DZ said, “The 
air-purifier has not been used for a long time. Because the air quality is getting better and better, 
there is no need to use it, no more scorpion. When I used to feel the scorpion when the pollution 
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was particularly serious, I closed the doors and windows and opened the air purifier. But I feel 
it’s unnecessary now.” 
 
Graph 12 
 
As shown in graph 12, surprisingly, 47.57% of the respondents confirm that they rarely 
wear a mask unless the pollution is particularly serious. The other half and little more of the 
respondents confirm that they wear masks according to the air condition. Among the 
respondents, there are 5.83% confirm that they wear a mask almost every day. 
Most of the interviewees think that the local residents in Beijing show a strong enough 
awareness of self-protection. As they observe, as long as the weather is not good, there must be 
a lot of people wearing masks on the street. “Especially the young people, who are about the 
same age of us (around 30), or a little younger, I found on the subway that a lot of people 
wearing that kind of mask (professional anti-smog mask), even when I feel the weather is not 
so bad.” Said GG. 
But HZ raises an interesting opinion, “I may say that the self-protection awareness of 
Beijing’s residents probably should be less than the southerners (in China)? I don’t know very 
well. I don’t have any geographical discrimination. It’s just that in terms of personality, the 
northerners don’t care so much. And I also think it is not necessary to be too careful.” 
134 
 
 
And for themselves, surprisingly, almost none of the interviewees is a fan of masks. 
Though some of the interviewees confirm that they do wear masks, but most of them don’t. As 
DZ said, “I will wear a mask when it (the air pollution) is serious. I don’t care much about it, 
because I live near to the workplace, a walking distance. I have a mask at home, and another 
mask here (at the office). When I feel it is too serious, then I will wear it (the mask).” 
Then he further expressed, “But I feel that the necessity of wearing a mask is getting less 
and less. And I think the air quality improvement will be faster and faster in the future. Actually 
I think this problem is already not very serious now. For example, today I feel that it (the air 
quality) is ok. Like this kind of weather, basically I don’t feel uncomfortable.” 
BL also confirmed that he doesn’t wear mask very often, as he always forgets about it. 
GG neither, “For me, no matter what the weather it is, I won’t wear mask. Because I have 
rhinitis, wearing a mask makes me difficult to breath. Neither does my child wear mask. My 
whole family are all the same, no one wears a mask.” Said GG. 
Similarly, HZ also rarely wears a mask. He explained, “I don’t think it works. Because 
although there is a filter layer, but the polluted air can come in from both sides. And I don’t 
spend much time outdoors, I only go to work, and I live near. Besides, the new masks have a 
foul smell, and when you use it for a long time, it gets dirty. Once our entity dispensed masks 
to everyone, the smell of the masks was so big. I felt that the damage caused by wearing the 
mask might be even greater (than the air pollution). Simply I don’t wear it, and just reduce 
outdoor activities.” 
CS never wears mask. “You see, I haven’t opened it (the package of the masks) yet. I think 
it’s useless.” Then he further explained, “Air pollution is that kind of thing, when you face it, 
you are very helpless. You can only try to manage it, reduce it, but before you successful 
manage it, you can do very little to protect yourself. To put it plainly, ‘you have a mace, I have 
a celestial cover’, I can only endure it. So what we are urgently doing now is not to protect from 
it, but to manage it. This is what we have to do. Spending a lot of effort to get the air-purifier 
and get all kinds of masks is useless. To a large extent, it is only psychological comfort. For 
example, you see, although I don’t wear mask, but I still let my children wear it, it is a 
contradiction. I find it useless, but everyone wears it, then letting my children wear it makes me 
feel better.” 
At the same time, they don’t care too much about the official data of the pollution status 
every day. Most of them confirm that they rarely read the official data of pollution status. “First 
of all, I still rely on my own feelings. Unless it seems bad weather, then I will go to read the 
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official data to make sure how serious the pollution is. Like today, it’s kind of foggy, then I 
might go to read the official data to check out whether it is fog or smog, and how much the 
pollution concentration is, etc.” Said FG. 
Only one exception, EZ will check the official data every day. Because she has a new-born 
baby, and she needs to make sure whether it is favorable to take her baby out for a sunbathe. 
In general, the interviewees agreed that the perception of risk of air pollution of the local 
residents is sufficient high. According to CS, even children in Beijing understand the smog 
warning level and can tell it’s red or yellow or orange. 
DZ explained that Beijingers should know more deeply than other parts of the country. 
First of all, they are close to the central government. Then they pay more attention to the 
national affairs. Another reason is that Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei is a serious area of smog. Beijing 
itself is particularly serious. And the Ministry of Environmental Protection is also located here, 
so it is sure that it will publicize most at his doorstep (Beijing). “So I feel that Beijingers’ 
perception is still the highest, among the whole country.” affirmed DZ. 
CS and GG even hold the opinion that the perception of risk of the local residents are 
exaggerated. One of the reasons, as explained by CS, is that the general public is easily misled 
by the media. “Because the only information resource that they can get in touch is the media, 
and the media always likes to exaggerate things, because of its news attributes, so it needs to 
cause this kind of ‘news effects’. Therefore, it doesn’t report objectively. It deliberately 
chooses some cases, data, or some emotional expressions to stimulate public attention to this 
issue. Its intention is to make the public to pay attention to this matter, but the final effect may 
be exaggerated, or on opposite, partially reduce the impact of this matter. I think it is too much 
exaggeration to the problem of smog now.” Said CS. 
Another reason, explained by GG, is that people’s understanding of the effects of 
governmental governance on air pollution is relatively lagging behind. He said, “In fact, this 
year, or from last year on, Beijing has improved a lot (on the situation of air pollution), as to 
my personal feeling. But when there is a smoggy day, the public will still blame the government 
and will say ‘the governance is still very poor’ or ‘Beijing, or the North of China, is not possible 
to live, you have to go to Shenzhen’ that kind of speech.” 
But some other interviewees hold the opposite opinion.  
FG believes that it is impossible to exaggerate, the perception of risk of air pollution of the 
local residents may be appropriate or even insufficient. She points out that “Beijing has more 
than 20 million permanent residents, and the difference is still quite large. Because it is a big 
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city, you can’t say the average value, because in this kind of big cities, the average value is 
actually not significant. I think, in the big city, like Beijing, in terms of stratification, one is a 
relatively high educational level, and it pays more attention to the quality of life. Their 
understanding, I think, will not be exaggerated, it will be very objective.  
“And on the other side, the older people, because he may not pay much attention to this 
issue like young people, so their perception may be insufficient. (Although the elderly are more 
vulnerable, but) they may already have various diseases, it is not easy to say what caused the 
disease. They are also concerned, but there are few elderly people wearing masks in winter. 
Instead, I found that the people who really wear masks are young people. Young people seem 
to care more. And children definitely are the most concerned by the family, so children will 
wear masks. For the older people, if you buy him an air purifier, he will accept it, but he won’t 
buy it himself. Another example, when the smog is heavy and you persuade him not going out 
to exercise. He may feel more uncomfortable if he doesn’t exercise, but he doesn’t think that 
the smog may have a greater harm on him. He thinks that exercise is more important. And you 
advise him to wear a mask, but he will say that wearing a mask is more uncomfortable. He will 
weigh and choose. Because the harm of air pollution is a long-term problem, and you can’t see 
the harm in the short term.” 
Of course, as EZ pointed out, among her colleagues, as their research is more or less related 
to the environmental issues, they know better, so their perceptions of risk of air pollution are 
more objective. 
But EZ further explained the current situation of people’s risk perception: “At the 
beginning, the most severe years of smog, in 2014 and 2015, when the smog was particularly 
serious, everyone would be very scared. But now, after three or four years, it still happens every 
year, and the extent is definitely being alleviated, so at this time everyone will not be that much 
scared. For example, when at the beginning, in 2013 or 2014, when it was very serious, I really 
knew some people around me that moved to the south (of China) considering the health and for 
the children, but in recent years, it should be less and less, basically not heard any more. 
“First, it really does get better and better every year, so I won’t worry that much. If it gets 
worse, I will definitely be worried. But in fact the air quality does improve, so I’m optimistic 
about the situation. Second, people are more adapted to it. I mean, when it comes the smog, I 
know how to deal with it, and how to prepare for it. I know to wear a mask, to take a shower 
and change clothes when come back from polluted outside, and try to maintain personal hygiene. 
I know all of this, so I won’t be panic.” 
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Meanwhile, the interviewees believe that, considering the risk perception of air pollution, 
people’s self-protection awareness is definitely enough, but only few people will spontaneously 
have the awareness to save energy and reduce emissions. As IC pointed out, “The understanding 
of the local residents is appropriate, but some people don’t take action, which is a cost problem.” 
We will discuss this issue in the following sections. 
3.2. Behaviors under environmental policies in Beijing 
3.2.1. Transportation 
As introduced in 1.2.1 of Chapter 1, recently vehicle emissions have become an increasing 
problem in urban areas, especially the megacities. According to statistics of Beijing Traffic 
Management Bureau, as of the end of 2015, the number of motor vehicles in Beijing was 5.619 
million, an increase of 28,000 from 2014, an increase of 0.5%. Compared with the end of 2000, 
the number of motor vehicles in the past 15 years has increased by 4.041 million. And according 
to the latest data, as of September 2018, the number of motor vehicles in Beijing was 6.035 
million and the number of drivers was 11.246 million. So how to manage the transportation 
problem in Beijing is closely related to the air pollution control. 
Also, as specifically introduced in 1.4.3 of the first chapter of the governmental measures 
on air pollution aimed at transportation, here we will have a look at local resident’s feedback 
and behaviors in this aspect. 
 
Graph 13 
 
As shown in graph 13, most of the respondents have private cars in their family, with a 
proportion of 67.31%. And 19.23% of the respondents have more than two private cars in their 
family. Among the people who own private cars, 57.14% bought their first car after 2011, the 
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year that the local government introduced the policy of limitation on purchase of private cars, 
more specifically, the need of application for the Personal Car Configuration Quota, or more 
commonly known as the “lottery of car license plate”. And 3 of them predictively bought their 
cars in the end of 2010, just before the policy was introduced. Among the people who own more 
than 2 cars in their family, 1/4 of them only have 2 people in their family, which means everyone 
in the family owns a car, and if the respondents who have 3 people in their family, normally the 
most common family of one couple and one child, are also counted, the percentage even greatly 
increased to 80%. 
 
Graph 14 
 
 
Graph 15 
 
As shown in graph 14, only 14.56% of the respondents own electric cars. And among the 
respondents that own electric cars, we can see that only 26.67% of them don’t own fuel car and 
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won’t consider buying one. The others, 40% still consider buying a fuel car, 6.67% are already 
participating in the License Plate Lottery of fuel cars. And the other 33.33% own fuel cars at 
the same time. 
As DZ informed, among people he knows, there are more and more people who would 
buy electric cars. But there are still many people hesitating, and even some of those who have 
bought electric cars are still dreaming to buy a fuel car, there must be some reason. 
BL is one of those who own electric car, and he is fully supportive to the new energy 
vehicles, as he confirmed that he doesn’t consider to buy another fuel car. In his opinion, 
promoting electric cars is a good trend as to promote social progress. He notices that many 
people are more conservative and are still waiting to see. He also accept that the technology of 
new energy vehicles is still not perfect. “For example, a fuel car can be refueled in a few seconds, 
and after refueling, it can run for hundreds of kilometers. But the electric car for charging, it 
takes one hour. But he is optimistic, seeing that now the technology is continuing developing, 
and now an electric car can run for more than 400 kilometers after a charge. But he still raised 
the problem of how many of the charging piles can be used. As he said: “The first is whether 
there always is a charging pile when you need, and then the second is what is the standard of 
the charging pile, what kind of payment method is used, for those questions there is no uniform 
now. Like me, I have four charging cards for different companies in my hand. For example, if 
you go to a place, you find that there is a charging pile, but you find that you don’t have a 
charging card for it. They are not as versatile as refueling. What’s more, some cars may have 
problems charging in some specific charging piles, because the standard of the car, the standard 
of the interface and the standard of the charging pile are different. Therefore, there are still 
many things to be resolved for promoting the electric cars in our country, and the problems of 
system engineering have not been well designed. New energy car is a trend in the future. Just 
like in the past people driving petrol car, everyone pays attention to its engines and cylinders, 
but in the future everyone will pay more attention to comfort. How many people drive for the 
kind of mechanical pleasure? Most of them are for the convenience of daily normal travel. Now 
people are still worried about risk and because of the herd mentality. If the technology is really 
developed in the future, such as charging very fast, only takes 10 seconds. Is it impossible? This 
kind of technology is available in American laboratories, using electromagnetic waves to charge, 
but they have not yet been marketed, but it shows that it is feasible. Therefore, taking the green 
development route is an irreversible trend, what is also consistent with the willingness of the 
people, who doesn’t want to live in a better environment?” 
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Photograph 1(left): private charging pile constructed at home 
Photograph 2(right): an electric car in charging 
Origen: author, in July 2018 
 
There are several fuel cars in FG’s family, and actually she is considering buying an 
electric car, but as the industry is not mature yet, her friends advised her to buy electric car in 
another 3 years. She explained: “Recently I want to change cars, I am also very entangled. I 
also consulted a lot of friends in the field of new energy vehicles. Our family is that I and my 
husband we have two cars, and my father and my father in law also have cars, they are all fuel 
cars. For the old men, they drive petrol car because they are used to it and it’s difficult for them 
to change. For me, like we have two cars, and I actually only drive to work every day, so I can 
actually exchange a new energy car. But now because the charging piles are still not so popular, 
then I must install my own charging pile, but as we live in an old community, and the parking 
space is very limited, so it can’t guarantee that you can be given a place to install your own 
charging pile. This is the most concern of mine. In addition, there is still a transition period of 
several years in the development of this industry. The suggestions given by these entrepreneurs 
in the field of new energy vehicles are that we can exchange new energy vehicles in 3 years. I 
still want to change for the new energy car, because I know the direction of the current policy. 
And as we have done research in this area, we also know that in foreign countries, fuel cars 
may be eliminated by 2030, that is, there will be no more petrol cars. China may not be so fast, 
but this is a trend, and a future maintenance cost for fuel cars will be higher and higher, all kinds 
of taxes, including fueling, will increase your maintenance costs. From the perspective of 
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personal economics, I feel that it is in the personal interest to replace to the new energy vehicle, 
and it is also consistent with national environmental protection. But at this stage now, at least I 
can’t install a charging pile in my home, so it’s difficult (to buy an electric car).” (FG) 
GG is another consumer of electric car, but he’s not very satisfied with it. He advised that 
the measures on transportation needs overall planning and to improve the appropriate policies 
and infrastructures. For example, the same as BL mentioned, we encourage the new energy 
vehicles, but then we should set up enough charging piles. “People who buy electric cars are 
very helpless. The failure rate of the electric cars is very high, and until now there is no good 
solution to handle with the battery. I drive the electric car myself. But I bought it because I had 
absolutely no other choices at the time. Compared with the fuel car of the same price, the driving 
experience is much worse.” Said GG. 
At the same time, different from BL and FG, GG believes that promoting electric cars is 
more like a “gamble”. He said: “From a long-term perspective, it is hard to say whether the 
electric cars is a real trend. But surely in the near future, it is a trend. Few days ago, I and my 
colleagues had a discussion on this issue, that is, how is the future low-carbon technology 
developed? What exactly will become a real route? In the case of transportation, actually 
electric vehicles is only one of the choices. Whether shall we choose fuel cell, hydrogen energy, 
or electricity for transportation is still not conclusive. It is only the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology of our country that has chosen this path, but whether this path can be 
developed or not is now a gamble. Now its infrastructure is not constructed so completely, it 
may still be weighing. If it is really spread, the cost is very high. Then the cost of changing a 
path is also particularly high. So there is no final conclusion yet.” 
 
Graph 16 
 
As shown in graph 16, we are happy to see that the number of people who choose to use 
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the car is positively related to the travel distance. But still, we found that there are 3 people 
would take cars even within 2 km. 
Among the interviewees, most of them are more willingly to take public transportation 
than cars. As AC said: “For me, a person who is engaged in sustainable development research, 
of course, I pay more attention to it. I usually travel by subway. I don’t like to drive. I also 
repeatedly emphasize to my students to raise their awareness. Since you choose this course, at 
least your awareness of environmental protection should be stronger than others. I can’t advise 
low carbon lifestyles to others, while I am driving a large displacement car every day. it is 
ridiculous.” 
The other interviewees have expressed similar opinions. Like HZ and IC, they own fuel 
cars, but normally they don’t drive. HZ says that normally he takes subway or bicycle as his 
main transportation, and as he lives very near to his office, so he can just walk every day. He 
only drives when going to the far suburbs where the subway line doesn’t reach, or when going 
to his home town in Hebei province. He also informed that he didn’t buy an electric car because 
at that time it hasn’t been developed well, and it could only run for 100 km, as his main purpose 
to buy a car is for going to his hometown, so as it couldn’t even support a round trip to his home, 
then it’s useless to him. 
EZ and DZ don’t own cars. As they both live near to the office, so they also don’t think 
it’s necessary to own a car. But the difference is that EZ and her husband have already given 
up the lottery of car license plate, while DZ is still running the lottery every month. DZ 
explained: “Because I have participated the lottery for many years, so the probability is 
relatively large now, so I don’t want to give up. (Because if you stopped, then when you really 
need to buy a car, you need to start over again, the probability will be refreshed, which is much 
less than the probability of those who participate the lottery for many years.) And I am not very 
anxious with the car, as I live so near. If I bought an electric car, I would just put it in the parking, 
that’s unnecessary. When I really need to buy a car, I also will consider buying an electric car. 
Now the problem is I don’t need it.” So for him, participating the lottery of license plate of fuel 
car is just preparing for the future, to give himself more choices when he does need a car in the 
future. At the same time, he thinks the lottery of car license plate is necessary and it’s a fair 
way: “It’s necessary, because so many people want to buy cars, and the resource is so scarce. 
And I feel it’s quite fair, no matter you are rich or poor, everyone is the same.” 
And DZ also justifies the local residents’ behaviors on buying private cars: “In fact, if you 
have different economic incomes, you will consider different issues. If I earned one million 
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yuan a year, why don’t I buy two cars? Why doesn’t everyone in my family have a car, it’s 
convenient, isn’t it? I can pay the environmental tax. I don’t think it is a problem to drive a few 
cars. The key is that I pay for the environmental governance, I can afford this price. Right?” 
When being asked “Do you think the environmental tax you pay in proportion to your 
environmental impact?” He answered: “That must be proportional. The more cars you have, the 
more taxes you pay. If it doesn’t make up for the environmental damage you caused, that is the 
failure of environmental protection department when doing the calculation. The tax is not 
calculated by the citizens themselves. The game rules are formulated by the government. For 
example, there are many people in the family, and people have this economic strength, but you 
don’t allow people to buy a car. Then he has to squeeze in bus or subway every day. That is 
unreasonable. Of course, traffic congestion is another problem.” In his opinion, government 
can’t rely on the improvement of citizens’ own environmental awareness, it depends on policy 
constraints. 
In contrast, GG is not fully agreed with his opinion. He also raised some other possibilities: 
“There are still many policies to be explored or to be implemented. For example, study from 
foreign countries, is it necessary to collect congestion charges? Or a high parking fee? This kind 
of policy is definitely good for energy saving and emission reduction, but it doesn’t match the 
income level of our country.” 
Another failure on the measures of transportation, that shows the contradiction between 
people’s willingness to drive private cars and governmental control on transportation is that, 
they restrict the private cars’ travel according to its plate number, but as a result, many people 
buy two cars instead. GG explained: “From the perspective of cities, the main measure for 
reducing emissions is to develop public transportation. Now people are forced to stop driving 
cars. But then you have to give me another choice. If I can easily go from home to work, from 
one place to another, of course I won’t drive a car. But now we still don’t have the conditions. 
For example, in Japan, you will meet a small subway station for a very short distance, and when 
you go in it can lead you to all directions. The public transportation sharing rate is very high, 
but Beijing doesn’t have this condition now. The public transportation in Beijing has already 
developed quite well, but compared to its population density, the density of the subway network 
should at least doubled.” 
Actually the government is paying their effort to this issue. As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
new subway lines are being constructed every year. And in Beijing, the subway line has reached 
to every suburb districts of the city, and still being constructed. 
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At the same time, it’s pushing forward the “intelligent bus” (as shown in Photograph 3), 
using the most advanced GPS/Beidou positioning technology, 3G/4G communication 
technology and GIS geographic information system technology, the public transportation 
intelligent dispatching system will be constructed to plan and dispatch lines and vehicles to 
realize intelligent scheduling and improve the utilization rate of public transportation vehicles. 
Through the construction of a complete video surveillance system to achieve monitoring and 
management of buses, bus stops and bus stations or terminals, which will be much more 
convenient for the passengers. 
 
Photograph 3: Intelligent bus in Beijing 
Origen: LENG Fuhai, colleague of author, in December 2017 
 
Moreover, the government also encourages the development of “Sharing bicycles”(as 
shown in Photograph 4), as a supplement of the traditional public transport such as bus and 
subway, to connect between bus stops or subway stations to people’s final destination, or to 
connect two close places. According to my own experience in Beijing, the advantages of sharing 
bicycles are obvious: first, there is a large number of delivery. It’s served in each subway station, 
and the number of served bicycles is positively related to the passenger flow of different subway 
stations. Second, it’s very cheap. It takes only one yuan (0.15 USD) per hour or per half hour, 
depending on different companies. Third, it’s convenient. People scan the QR code to unlock 
the bicycle, and once they finished using it, just lock the bicycle, and it will automatically finish 
the payment through the App. So people don’t need to return it to a fix place. However, there 
are certain problems: first, there are some user deliberately destroy the QR code, or hide the 
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bicycle to their own places, to take the “sharing bicycle” as their own possession. Second, 
during the peak hours in the morning and in the evening, sharing bicycles are always in short 
supply. Third, every day, it’s required to collect the scattered bicycles and send them to the 
transportation hub location, so the cost of human input cost is high. As a result, many of the 
sharing bicycles companies are facing the risk of collapse. 
 
Photograph 4: Locating the sharing bicycles at a subway station in the morning 
Origen: author, in July 2018 
 
 
Graph 17 
When considering the long-distance transportation, as we know, the aircraft’s carbon 
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emissions are amazingly large. So reducing the chances of taking flights can also be considered 
as a pro-environmental behavior. As shown in graph 17, most of the respondents have taken 
flights for 3-5 times in 2017, and it shows no obvious tendency between different groups of 
people. According to China Industry Information Network, in 2016, China’s flight times per 
capita are as low as 0.35 times/year. From this perspective, compared to the extremely low 
flight times per capita in the country, the researchers’ emission of transportation, especially of 
taking flights, is noteworthy high. 
3.2.2. Energy efficiency 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the efficiency of coal used for home-heating and 
the efficiency of petroleum used in cars, are the two main sources of pollutants coming from 
local residents in Beijing. So in this section, we will have a look about how’s the pro-
environmental behaviors of energy efficiency of the respondents and interviewees. In addition, 
it also takes into account the use of clean energy and energy-saving facilities at home. 
 
Graph 18 
 
Here we should notice that, actually it has already changed the heating resource from coal 
to natural-gas in Beijing in the winter of 20186. As explained in Chapter 2, the questionnaire 
was designed in the first half year of 2017, before the heating season of 2018, but it was taken 
in July 2018, after the heating season. As there is an option of “others” in the questionnaire, so 
I didn’t revise the recent questionnaire, and try to figure out how many people even realized 
 
6 The heating season in China is normally from November of the previous year to March of this year. Which means that 
here “the winter of 2018” is the period from November 2017 to March 2018. 
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that they have already changed the heating resource and will choose the option of “others” 
rather than the options of “coal”. 
As shown in Graph 18, 71.96% of the respondents chose “public coal-fired heating” as the 
main heating measure in their homes. Only 18.69% of the respondents mentioned that the main 
heating measures in their homes are “public gas-fired heating”. And other 9.33% of the 
respondents clearly indicates other main heating measures in their homes, as private coal-fired 
heating, private gas-fired heating, electric heating or solar heating. The result shows that most 
of the respondents didn’t really have an idea of the heating resource in their homes and didn’t 
notice that the local government have implemented the measure of transforming gas-fired 
heating from coal-fired heating in consideration of the air pollution in winter. 
 
Graph 19 
 
Further, not surprisingly, being asked “(If you choose coal-fired heating, please answer) 
Is your home heating coal a clean coal?” Only 3.57% of the respondents can clearly indicate 
that the heating coal in their home is clean coal or not. The others don’t have an idea. As they 
indicated, either they don’t know what is “clean coal”, or they don’t know whether it is clean 
coal or not in their home, or they don’t know either. The result shows that these people don’t 
care much about the energy efficiency of the heating resource, which is probably the main origin 
of air pollutant in winter in Beijing. And they don’t care much about the public measures of air 
pollution control. 
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Graph 20 
 
Surprisingly, among these respondents, when we pick out those who have Doctoral title, 
96.87% of them have chosen the answers of “I don’t know” when asked  “(If you choose coal-
fired heating, please answer) Is your home heating coal a clean coal?” Different from what I 
assumed, it seems that the educational level is not necessarily directly related to environmental 
cognition. 
 
Graph 21 
 
We are happily seeing that 87.5% of the respondents positively indicate that there are 
energy-saving facilities in their home. This can be seen as part of the achievement of the long-
term advocacy and promotion of energy efficiency in the whole society. For example, the tax 
incentives of small displacement cars, and the obligation to purchase the items from “Energy 
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saving and emission reduction list” when public entities buying office supplies, including 
computers and printers, etc., which we call it “government procurement”. 
But still, the interviewees think that in general, the awareness of energy saving and 
emission reduction of the residents in Beijing is not sufficient. As IC mentioned that it is normal 
to see people keep the windows open when using the air conditioner. “For example, when 
people use the paper towel in the public bathroom. Generally one person uses two pieces, 
sometimes two are not enough, they use more. And some people have to wash their hands before 
using the toilet, wipe two pieces, and wash hands again after using the toilet, two pieces more. 
I think it is completely unnecessary. For me, I can wipe both my face and my hands with one 
piece of paper. I mean, from our habit of living, it can be reduced in many places.” Said HZ. 
HZ is not alone, it seems that all of the interviewees, with their educational background or 
their research background directly related to environmental issues, have shown more awareness 
of energy efficiency than the others. Take DZ, EZ and GG for example, they said they would 
never forget to turn off the light, the air conditioner and other electric appliances when leaving 
a place. And take care of some small details in their daily life, like close the faucet after using, 
try to use the air conditioner as few as possible, or at least keep a higher degree as long as it’s 
comfortable . These kind of things seems very easy, but normally people just don’t care about 
it. 
EZ mentioned that her habits should thanks to her family education. She was told by her 
parents to be aware of saving resources and can’t waste from when she was a kid. 
FG is a very typical example, as she was not originally from the environmental area of her 
educational and research background. She just occasionally participated a research project of 
energy transformation. As she said, “I don’t think my consciousness is very strong, because I 
am not from this field, I just did this one (energy transformation) project. I found that it is truly 
related (between my consciousness and my research background). After that I have done this 
project, since then I must always remember to turn off the air conditioner every day when I 
leave my office. It may not be possible before. Or as the case of turning on the lights. I might 
have turned the lights on immediately when I came in the office. But if you go to the offices of 
the other interviewees, you will see that they are really ‘sustainable’. They are much better than 
us. For example, once they were visiting my office, and they said, ‘Oh, your office is cool, our 
office is very hot.’ I asked, ‘Why don’t you turn on the air conditioner?’ They answered, ‘Yes, 
we turned it on. But as we always turn it off after work, and turn it on after we come, so it will 
take time to cool down.” You see the difference, as most of us normally keep the air conditioner 
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running all day long, never turn it off, no matter whether there are people in the room or not. 
You can see that their awareness of energy efficiency is definitely different. There are 
differences between me and them, though we are still in the same group, not to mention the 
difference between different groups of people in the general public. And what’s more, as far as 
I am doing this energy project, I concern more about it, if I don’t do this project, it may be quite 
different. But I’m not sure how long can this consciousness keep in my mind.” 
Talking about the air conditioner, GG raised an interesting point. As he mentioned: “Of 
course I will turn off the air conditioner before leaving, that’s a must to do. Oh, you mean our 
office? There’s a bug. Because turning off the air conditioner in our office room is meaningless, 
because that is the central air conditioning, so the switch in each room is useless. So the problem 
is that the entity’s overall awareness of energy saving and emission reduction is relatively poor. 
(Laugh). And what’s more, we used to turn it off every day in the winter. Later, we were ordered 
to not turn off the air conditioner, because it may cause the tube to freeze, so the building 
manager don’t let us turn it off, especially in winter. You know, in the winter we don’t have 
public coal or gas fired heating, and it’s all relying on air conditioning, which is really not 
energy efficient. You see, when the building was designed, the energy efficiency wasn’t taken 
under consideration. And if you considered the energy efficiency, you also shouldn’t make the 
office space so big. Completely unnecessary. Look at how big are the Professors’ offices! Even 
the offices of us, as little Research Associates, are so large, there is absolutely no need to do 
that. The entire space is designed very unreasonable. This in itself is a performance of no energy 
efficiency.” According to him, the overall consideration of the facilities and policies of the 
whole society itself should be improved to be more environmental-friendly, and then it is 
possible to promote the residents to be more conscious of that. We will discuss more about this 
issue in the following chapter. 
FG also mentioned that now the home constructions and home decorations don’t take 
much consideration of the energy efficiency. She thinks “Maybe because China’s market has 
not yet reached that stage. The building materials have not yet reached the standards of 
environmental protection, of the limit of toxic emissions. There is no effort to consider energy 
efficiency.” But she mentioned that the current technology has allowed the most energy 
efficiency at home, the so-called “smart home”. And she thinks it’s much better realized in the 
South of China. She said: “You can see that in Guangdong and Shenzhen, and some else places 
in the South of China, the industry of ‘smart home’ is well developing. Of course the houses 
are relatively bigger there. Because in general the ‘smart home’ needs a relatively large area. 
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Our technology has already given the conditions, such as the smart refrigerators, the smart TV 
sets, automatic light adjustment, etc., they may have many benefits for energy saving. But it 
still need time to be accepted by the market, especially in the North of China.” 
3.2.3. Environmentally friendly purchases 
There’s a general awareness today that China and its massive industrial sector generate 
more carbon emissions than any other country, which is one of the reasons that parts of the 
nation have to endure some serious issues with smog and airborne pollutants. But according to 
the study of Diana Ivanova et al. (2015), if you want to know what’s really driving the impact 
on the planet, you need to look past the obvious primary factors taking a toll on the environment 
– like industry and agriculture – and instead realize whose needs those things are servicing. 
From that perspective, researchers say household consumers are by far the biggest drain on the 
planet, which makes for a very different picture to purely nation-focused analyses of 
environmental impact. In other words, before we start blaming whole countries for the state of 
the planet, we should probably be looking at our own habits and demands (Dockrill, 2016). 
By measuring “secondary impacts” – the environmental effects of producing the goods 
and products we buy every day – Diana Ivanova et al. believe that consumers are responsible 
for more than 60 percent of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions, and up to 80 percent of 
global water use. According to their research, when you look at the impacts of consumers based 
on where they live, the researchers found a pattern: the richer a country is, the more its 
inhabitants consume, and the greater each person’s impact on the planet. 
This result of research is also applicable equally within the country. Before we start 
blaming the factories and the production processes of their impact on air pollution, we should 
probably be looking at our own habits and demands, because it is we as customers that actively 
drive the production. 
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Graph 22 
 
When being asked “Will you report a highly-polluting company?”, as shown in graph 22, 
only 1.87% of the respondents say that they will and they have reported once or more. Most of 
them, respectively 43.93% and 28.97% of the respondents say that they will but they don’t 
know any highly-polluting company or they don’t know how and to whom to report it. Also, 
there are some people, 5.61% of the respondents think it is totally not their business, so they 
won’t report. But most people of those who won’t report, hold the opinion that because their 
report won’t make any difference. This idea of them coincidentally verified what Giddens 
(1990:146-147) observed, balanced against the deep anxieties which such circumstances must 
produce in virtually everyone is the psychological prop of the feeling that “there’s nothing that 
I as an individual can do.” 
1.87%
43.93%
28.97%
5.61%
19.63%
Will you report a highly-polluting company?
Yes, and I have reported once or more
Yes, but I didn’t know any highly-polluting company
Yes, but I don’t know how and to whom to report it
No, it is not my business
No, I don’t think it will make any difference
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Graph 23 
 
Another question also have shown the same psychological prop of the ordinary people and 
their careless about the impact of their behavior of purchase. As shown in graph 23, when being 
asked “Will you refuse to buy products produced by highly polluting companies?” Only 23.53% 
of the respondents firmly agree that they will absolutely resist buying products produced by 
highly polluting companies. The others give the answers of indifference. 66.67% of them say 
that they haven’t considered this issue before, and they can’t distinguish whether a commodity 
producer is a highly polluting company. 7.84% of the respondents say “Not necessarily, I will 
consider all aspects.” And 1.96% firmly disagree and think the cost-effectiveness is the most 
important. 
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Graph 24 
 
But still, as shown in graph 24, we are happy to see that most of the respondents, with a 
percentage of 77.67%, confirm that they are willing to buy eco-friendly or environmentally-
friendly products at higher prices than regular products. While the other 18.45% of them think 
they won’t. And 3.88% of them are not sure about this question. 
 
Graph 25 
 
Anyway, there is still a distance between “willing to do” and “truly take action”. As shown 
in graph 25, only 33.01% of the respondents say that they have purchased products from 
eco/environmental companies. Other 15.53% of the respondents say that they know some 
eco/environmental companies but never bought their products. And sadly, most of the 
respondents, with a percentage of 51.46%, even don’t know any eco/environmental companies. 
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Graph 26 
 
Taking into consideration the emissions from the transportation of products, and obviously, 
the farther the product is from the customer, the more emissions it will generate in the process 
of transportation, so I asked one more question: “Are you inclined to buy products made by 
local producers?” At this time, 66.99% of the respondents think it indifferent, saying that they 
never considered the producer location, and the cost-effectiveness is more important. Only 
17.48% of them say that they prefer local products except for those necessary but don’t have 
locally. And there are even 15.53% of them confirm that they always choose the imported 
products within their economic ability. 
Meanwhile, the interviewees have shown more consciousness of environmentally friendly 
purchases. For example, GG always avoids ordering takeaway or delivery food, because “I 
think that the package of takeaway or delivery food is a waste, the packaging is too good, and 
actually sometimes I think it is overpacked. The disposable food box, the disposable chopsticks 
and the plastic bag, sometimes even two plastic bags, they are really wasteful.” 
Now a days, China’s logistics industry is famous all over the world, as it’s so fast and 
cheap. It is very convenient to buy anything from anywhere in the country and even from abroad 
through the internet. And more and more Chinese people are used to the new form of purchasing. 
But at the same time, GG advised that we should return back the boxes of delivery to the 
logistics company if possible to reuse them. 
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3.2.4. Emigration 
Face a serious environmental risk, the last choice that local people can make is emigration, 
which seems much easier in the contemporary society. Because after all, the separation of time 
and space is one of the three dominant sources of the dynamism of modernity (Giddens, 1990). 
Just as Beck(2005) explained the dual locatedness for all when he raises the idea of 
“cosmopolitanism”: 
In term of both social and philosophical ideals, the cosmopolitan lives in a 
dual homeland and possesses dual loyalties: he is both a citizen of the cosmos – 
a world citizen – and a citizen of the polis – a citizen of city and state. For the 
Stoics, the cosmos was infused with the power of the ‘logos’ and was their 
homeland; everyone had a share in it, whether they were freemen or slaves, 
Hellenes or Orientals. Each person is both a citizen of the world and a citizen of 
the city; each has both roots and wings, is both equal and different, at home in a 
particular place and at home in the cosmos; in other words, everybody lives in 
the ‘cosmopolis’. This is essentially conceptualized as a political unit that crosses 
all boundaries of ethnic belonging, culture, religion and class in a kind of ‘as-if 
equality’ – in the sense, in fact, of a ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ (Cohen 1997; Beck 
2002a), that is, a locally rooted and proactive cosmopolitanism. […] The 
cosmopolitan identity does not betray national or local identity (as the national 
outlook pretends and accuses it of doing); on the contrary, it makes them possible. 
By cosmopolitan common sense I mean the taken-for-granted way (through it is 
anything but taken for granted) in which, both culturally and politically, people 
experience and live out apparently contradictory identities and loyalties, without 
this being experienced as contradictory either in a person’s own mind or in others’ 
expectations. This is why, for example, one speaks of the USA as a ‘nation of 
many nations’ of a ‘nation of many peoples’ in which (at least according to the 
prevailing model) it is natural to be both American and African, American and 
Irish, Spanish, German, Japanese, and so on (Beck, 2005:36). 
 
But the result of the present research in this aspect shows a distance of China from the 
imagination of the cosmopolitan world. China, traditionally, is not a country of migrations. It 
has its typical and unique culture, which flows in the blood of its people and hard to throw away. 
Being attached to one’s native land and unwilling to leave it (in Chinese: 安土重迁) has always 
been one of the characteristics of Chinese people, which has a firm relation to the traditions of 
thousands of years of farming civilization of China. 
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Graph 27 
 
As shown in graph 27, being asked “If air pollution in Beijing continues to be severe, do 
you consider moving out of Beijing?” Most of the people gave a negative answer, as 24 of these 
104 people never considered this issue and 25 of them definitely won’t move out, and there are 
27 people said they won’t move out themselves, but they would like their children to immigrate. 
Among the people who consider moving out of Beijing, 20 of them chose to move inside of 
China, and only 9 of them consider to immigrate abroad. Though the people who would like 
their children to move out are more likely to let their children immigrate abroad than move to 
other cities in China. 
 
Graph 28 
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Considering the educational background, it seems that there is no difference between 
people who have doctoral title and the others. As shown in graph 28, the result is similar to 
what shows in Graph 27. Most of the respondents who have doctoral title won’t move out of 
Beijing, or they never considered this issue. And among the others, those who would move to 
other cities in China and those who would like their children to immigrate abroad take more 
proportion. 
 
Graph 29 
 
Then I asked the respondents to describe their overseas background. As we can see from 
the graph 29, most of the respondents have no overseas background. And among the people 
who have some overseas background, mostly they have only had short overseas travelling 
experiences (1-6 months). This partly explained why most of the respondents won’t immigrate 
abroad, everyone can imagine how frightening it could be moving to an unfamiliar place where 
you don’t have any background and you have to start over everything. 
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Graph 30 
 
As shown in graph 30, among the people who consider to immigrate abroad or would like 
the children to immigrate, those who have long-term overseas living experience (more than 2 
years) and those who have relatives living abroad count big percentage, respectively 20% and 
16%, considering the total amount of these two groups of people are relatively very small, 
respectively 12.50% and 10.58%. 
In contrast, among the 10 people who chose “I will not, but would like my children to 
immigrate abroad”, 6 of them have no overseas background, 1 had short overseas travelling 
experience, 1 had short-term overseas living experience, 1 had long-term overseas living 
experience, and 1 have relatives living abroad. This result may show the interesting 
phenomenon of so-called “Pin their hopes on the next generation” of Chinese parents. 
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Graph 31 
 
When we look inside the people who have no overseas background, it is more obvious, as 
shown in graph 31, only 2.22% of them consider immigrating abroad, but 20% of them would 
like their children to immigrate abroad. And there are also a big percentage of respondents, 
22.22% chose to move to other cities in China or relocate to their hometown. 
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Graph 32 
 
In contrast, to the people who had long-term overseas living experiences (more than 2 
years) or have relatives living abroad, as shown in graph 32, 28.57% of them consider 
immigrating abroad, representing the largest percentage. Even more than those who never 
considered this issue or those who won’t move out of Beijing, which two parts account for the 
largest proportions in other groups of respondents. 
The result of questionnaire consistent with answers of the interviewees, as most of the 
interviewees believe that the air pollution in Beijing won’t lead to immigration of the residents, 
because until now, the migration in China is still mainly driven by economic factors. 
As BL explained: “I don’t think it (air pollution) will lead to immigration so far. Everyone 
knows that the air pollution is harmful, dangerous, and even fatal. However, we have not yet 
reached a well-off standard of living. Many people come to Beijing not because how good is 
the environment in Beijing, but because of its economic attraction. The Chinese people as a 
whole are attracted by economic income, and have not yet reached the level of pursuing the 
environment and pursuing quality of life. If we did reach the level, then the smog in Beijing 
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will soon be resolved as well. For example, for an ordinary person, is he paying more attention 
to the increase of two thousand yuan of his wage in a month, or is he more concerned about 
better air quality? Both are concerned, but if he can only choose one of them, he must choose 
the former. People still give priority to survival issues, then come to the quality of life.” 
“People won’t give up the economic environment because of the potential health effects 
of air pollution, or because of their individual feelings. We haven’t reach this level yet.” 
Generalized by EZ. 
Similar to the ideas of BL and EZ, CS supplemented: “ The first consideration of everyone 
is the problem of ‘eating’. The first is to ‘eat full’, the second is to ‘eat well’, and then to ‘eat 
better’. Pollution is a very minor issue. Because the gap between Beijing and other places is too 
big. Maybe in our real life, you may not have heard of anyone who has moved out of Beijing 
because of this incident of air pollution, but you may be informed of those cases in a news 
report. The media will deliberately choose two or three individual cases, saying that he moved 
to Yunnan Province, living very comfortable life. And then you feel that migration is a very 
common phenomenon. This is the exaggerated role of the news media. Migration does not 
depend on this matter. At least the level of air pollution in Beijing is not strong enough to allow 
people to change it through migration. Because we have a lot of other ways to change besides 
migration. Not yet that extent. Migration is very difficult.” 
And to HZ, besides that the resource attraction of Beijing is far more important than the 
defect of air pollution, the expectation of Beijing’s air quality is definitely good. As he said: 
“Because Beijing is the capital, and the international exchange center, certainly the government 
will not let its air quality be particularly bad. Therefore, its governance methods and governance 
effects are certainly the best in the country. So although the air quality is not good yet, the 
expectation is good, and it may be cured in three or five years, seeing from the strength of its 
governance. Of course if you want to resolve it from the technical level, or from the natural 
adjustment of the industrial structure itself, the time will certainly be long, but coupled with 
administrative means, it will definitely be effective soon.” 
But some interviewees pointed out that though the air pollution may not have big influence 
on immigration, it does have some negative impact on attracting people. In other words, maybe 
the people who have settled down in Beijing won’t move out because of the air pollution, but 
the air quality could be one of the factors that influence people’s choice of which city to settle 
down, then they may not choose Beijing as their destination because of the air pollution. 
As FG pointed out: “There is some influence, though the ratio may not necessarily be large 
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at the moment. I believe that this may not be a major driving force, but it must be one of the 
conditions. Like the loss of many of our researchers, of course, the largest reason is the problem 
of our science and technology system, in terms of research funding and resource allocation. 
And another reason is that the environment and climate are not good anyway. But the most 
important influence is shown when the talents are introduced, i.e. the role of this (air pollution) 
may be more obvious at this time, and the impact will be even greater. Especially some 
returnees, some people abroad, they are used to the natural environment in foreign countries, 
Beijing is densely populated, and the air is not good, so they may not choose to come to Beijing. 
I know that there are many cities in the south where they prefer to go, like Zhejiang province, 
Suzhou, Shenzhen, Yantai, Shandong province, etc. Because the population density and air 
quality there, including the policy of introducing talents there, is indeed better than Beijing.” 
GG also believe that for some students, especially those from South, when they graduate 
and need to think where to go next, a certain proportion of them will possibly take the air 
pollution under their consideration, though it may not be a core consideration. He gave an 
example of one of his friends from Fujian province. “I have a friend who got her master degree 
this year, we were from the same university in Beijing, and she went to Guangzhou. She is from 
Fujian province. When she first came to Beijing, she felt particularly uncomfortable, but not 
because of pollution. I think mainly because it is dry in Beijing, not because of how bad the air 
is. Of course, the air is bad, but it should be the second reason. She said at the time that this 
place (Beijing) could not be left. But after two years, she was a bit comfortable with it. Finally 
she left, but there are other reasons for leaving, because her family is in the south and her 
boyfriend is in the south, mainly because of these factors, and then she left Beijing and went to 
Guangzhou. Do you say that the weather in Beijing is one of the reasons for her left? I think it 
must be one reason, but it is not her main reason.” 
Finally, the problem is the weight of the air quality in mind of different people. As FG 
explained: “I think that air quality is a very important factor for us, but it will not let many 
people in Beijing leave because of this factor. For most people, he chose Beijing because of the 
opportunities to his career, the resources, better education for children, because of those reasons. 
Therefore, if he leaves, it must because of the factors of education, or the development prospects 
of his career. The air quality is definitely an important factor, but it is certainly not among the 
top three. I think this is related to the big environment and development stage of our country. 
Perhaps it may be different if the question is placed in a developed country, because this issue 
is very important to them. For example, there used to be a German scientist working here. When 
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she came, it was during the period of Olympics, the air was very good. She also worked here 
for a few years, but eventually she left. One of the reasons is that her work contract is expired. 
But the most important is that, she feels that everything else in Beijing is very good and can be 
adapted, including the working environment, but the most intolerable thing for her is air quality. 
So this is why, at the beginning her children went to school here in Beijing, but later she sent 
her children to Hong Kong with her husband, and finally she left too. It is for them that this (air 
quality) weight may be larger than us.” 
IC concluded that air pollution will certainly cause population movement, in other words, 
air pollution is one of the factors of population mobility, as migration is a multi-faceted 
consideration, and the environment is one of the factors. He believes that “if there is not a 
limitation of the Hukou, I am afraid that migration will be more.” 
Corresponding to their perspectives, to the interviewees themselves, it is also confirmed 
that none of them will consider immigrating out of Beijing because of the air pollution. 
As a Beijinger, EZ has a deep emotional link to the city, and she said: “I won’t consider it, 
because I am a Beijinger, my parents are in Beijing, and I grew up in Beijing since I was a child, 
so basically I wouldn’t move to another place if there’s not a special reason.” 
Different from EZ, BL actually has thought about this question. He said: “I have thought 
about this problem. But frankly, I don’t consider it at this age. Because I have also come into 
contact with some Chinese people living in foreign countries. In fact, the first generation of 
immigrants are under great pressure, including work problems and institutional problems. For 
example, two people of the same age, under normal circumstances, relying on their own efforts. 
The one living abroad looks much older than the other. It is a very hard process and nothing 
fits. What’s more, usually they don’t go out at my age, surely there are some that immigrate at 
my age, but most of them are going out during the studying stage. After a buffer period, they 
have adapted partly to the foreign environment. So considering my current conditions, I don’t 
have this idea right now. It is possible to leave Beijing, for example, to Guangzhou or Shanghai. 
I am from Hubei province, so returning to Hubei doesn’t rule out the possibility. But I have not 
considered it at present. Because after all, Beijing’s resource conditions are better and the 
development platform is better. Maybe the quality of life is not as good as in the other cities, 
and it may be a lot worse.” 
CS further explained: “Migration is never easy. It seems very simple for the academicians 
to immigrate. For example, if he wants to move, he can simply move to Fudan University. But 
the fact is that it’s not so simple. People in each location have strong local attributes. Of course 
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he can go, but he has to give up a lot of things. To give a simple example, the air pollution in 
Beijing is so serious, so if it is easy to move, then why don’t our leaders of government move 
to other cities? For example, they can work in Shanghai. President Xi said that the air pollution 
in Beijing is too serious, so this time the People’s Congress will be held in Shanghai. That’s 
impossible. At most, they are working indoors and put a few more air purifiers. From their point 
of view, it is known that migration is not that simple. Barefoot is the easiest to migrate. For you, 
it’s also not simple. If it’s simple, you will go directly to Brazil, and you will not still remain 
your work position in our entity. It’s even harder if you got married. First, you have to think, 
can you find the same job in Brazil? You still have to think, what to do with your parents, and 
your husband, it is not so easy to move away. After two years, when you have a child and you 
think about it again. It’s too much, and you can’t go anywhere. Migration is difficult. What kind 
of person is the most mobile? Tramp, beggars, they do not have any fixed assets, fixed income, 
they are the easiest to migrate. The big boss is the most difficult to migrate. He can have a lot 
of properties, but it’s not so easy for him to move freely. For example, recently it is said that 
Fan Bingbing7 would abandon Chinese nationality to evade taxes. But the reaction is that it is 
almost impossible, because she is being starred by thousands of eyes. So no matter how you 
migrate, active migration or passive migration, it is not so easy to go.”（CS） 
Always being optimistic, DZ again confirmed that he won’t immigrate to anywhere 
because he has confidence in the determination of government’s governance. He said: “I am 
from Tianjin. I remember that in the late 1990s, when I was in junior high school, the sandstorm 
was very serious. At that time, the sandstorm was blowing up and covering the sky. And I 
remember at that time, when I got home, and I washed my hair with a basin. You’ll find that 
you can’t wash out the sand completely just with one basin of water, and you need to wash at 
least twice. You can touch the sand in the water. But in just two or three years, it was well 
managed. As long as the government makes this determination, it will be fine. You see that 
there are very few sandstorms, at most once or twice a year, and it is not very serious and the 
time is short. The sandstorm is a different problem from smog. The problem of smog is more 
difficult to solve than that. To solve the sandstorm you only need to plant more trees, and to 
solve the smog you have to adjust the industrial structure, which is relatively slow and more 
complicated.” 
And to him, economic development is more important to people’s life expectancy than 
environment. “Because when the economy is more developed, correspondingly the medical 
 
7 Fan Bingbing, a Chinese actress. 
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conditions are better. I’ve read a report, saying that people in Hong Kong has the longest life 
expectancy. Why? One is because of a healthy lifestyle, people always have work to do, so they 
will not have bad habits, and there is a good medical condition. It’s not that you live in the 
mountains, so you have a long life. The most fundamental thing is to have a good medical 
condition, a good lifestyle, a good job.” 
Similar to DZ, HZ also never considered moving out of Beijing, other than the 
considerations of economy factors, he also gives the reason that he thinks the climate in Beijing 
is very good. “It has four distinct seasons, spring, summer, autumn and winter. In the south it’s 
wet all year round, which I can’t stand. I have been in Shanghai for five years. I didn’t like it. 
So I moved to Beijing. And now I’m all familiar with everything in Beijing, and I have my 
family and the circle of friends in Beijing. And Beijing’s air quality expectations is definitely 
good.” 
Talking about their consideration of their children. Most of the interviewees don’t have 
any plans yet. Just as IC said: “I will also consider letting my children immigrate in the future, 
but this (air pollution) is a reference variable, not an absolute variable.” 
FG has a more specific consideration about her son. She said: “Immigration is not 
necessary. He may have an experience of going abroad to study, or to work for a while, but it 
is not necessary to immigrate. Including me myself now, I can accept for working abroad for a 
while, but not necessarily immigrate. Because in fact, China’s development is getting better and 
better. Generally speaking, compared with other countries, it is still quite good, relatively stable, 
and the momentum is good. We also believe that the future will be better. I think it is good for 
people to live abroad for a while to broaden their horizons and experience more, but whether to 
immigrate, I feel that it is not so urgent and not necessary. There may be a lot of immigrants in 
the early years, in the past, there were a lot of technical immigrants, and now many of them are 
no longer immigrating.” 
3.2.5. Research behaviors of experts in the field of environmental policy 
3.2.5.1. Interaction with policy-making departments 
As informed by AC, the deputy director of the Institute for Sustainable Development 
Strategy of ISD/CAS, the main scientific research production of the institute is the yearly report 
of China Sustainable Development Strategy Report. Each year they will select a specific theme 
around sustainable development to conduct the report, such as green innovation, governance of 
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ecological civilization, urbanization, etc. And they also run a website named China Sustainable 
Development Research8 to where they upload the yearly report, and they have also built the 
China Sustainable Development Database. But AC frankly told me that now they don’t have 
sufficient ability to update the report to their website or to maintain the website, so people can 
only find the reports from 1999 to 2011. They didn’t update again after that. But actually they 
still publish the reports yearly until now. 
The researchers’ main production are academic papers. This shows no difference from 
other research institutes, though the original construction purpose of the whole entity was to set 
up a national think-tank. 
AC explained: “After all, we have been transformed from a research institute, and it is 
impossible for us to face the decision-making layer all at once. Because our researchers are all 
trained in the ‘ivory tower’, they are used to writing academic papers. Of course, a series of 
channels for upward reporting have also been opened, requiring them to write consulting reports, 
but most of them are still traditional researchers, and facing a process of transformation. 
Therefore, most of them still prefer to write academic papers. After all, this think-tank was 
established in 2016, traditionally we are just the so-called ‘national team of scientific research’, 
and it can’t be transferred in a sudden, there must be a process..” 
He supplemented: “Our projects are basically aimed at the market. Because after all, the 
national release projects can only support a part of the organization’s running. Facing the 
market means that the researchers goes to various departments to apply for the competitive 
projects, such as projects of the Natural Science Fund, of the Ministry of Science and 
Technology, of the Ministry of the Environment, of the local government and of the companies. 
We are still mainly kind of third-party assessments, after all, we are not government 
departments.” 
As some of the interviewees, such as BL, DZ, EZ, HZ, etc. confirmed, their main research 
production is still academic papers, and apart from it, they also conduct some research reports, 
consulting reports and short special reporting information. So their main audience is the peer. 
Other than that, some of them, like HG, GG and CS mentioned, they also develop software 
systems applied to policy analysis, for example, the Policy simulation system is one of their 
independent research and development results, with their own software copyright, and the 
database as well. And this part of the work is directly facing to the policy-making bodies. As 
CS explainer: “Our clients are mainly various departments of the country’s government, for 
 
8 Website of China Sustainable Development Research: http://www.china-sds.org/ 
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example, the department needs to do a simulation of the policy, we will do it for them. Our 
long-term cooperation units, such as the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Bureau of 
Statistics, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, and the General 
Administration of Market Supervision, we have all undertaken some specific projects.” 
But talking about the relationship with the decision-making layer, CS don’t think that their 
research is closely or directly related to them, “Because policy-making is layer by layer, we are 
mainly in the basic methodological and technical level. Then there are specific departments of 
policy recommendations. So we have a distance between them and we are not directly facing 
them. After all, our production is still the basic methodological thing, there is still a way to go 
to convert them into something they apply directly.” 
Similar to them, some of the interviewees, as FG, GG, BL and IC, have already well 
transformed their identity, as their main research production is not academic papers, but 
consulting reports and short special reporting information, which are mean to be directly sent 
to the policy-making bodies. As to FG, “Recently we have been doing many projects from the 
central government of the country, such as the projects released from various ministries and 
departments, all of which are policy consultations. Our production for the projects of policy 
consultations usually are consulting reports, as well as special reporting information. Special 
reporting information is actually closely integrated with the consulting report. It is always the 
summary or the essence of the core piece of the consulting report, or you can also target a 
problem that the country urgently needs to pay attention to, it’s usually about 3,000 words. For 
me, because everyone is different, my main production is consulting report, special reporting 
information as well, because generally, a consultation report will be accompanied by one or 
two special reporting information.” For them, the main audience of their research is the policy-
making bodies. 
More directly related to the government level, as EZ mentioned, her research group’s work 
is directly supporting the climate negotiations. “We provide plans for the government when 
they participate in climate negotiations. But it is not in the form of a policy advisory report. 
Because it’s always very urgent needs. Especially at the end of each year, in November and 
December, when the climate conference is held. It’s like that the negotiation team is in front, in 
the meeting place, and our team is behind to support them, ‘transporting shells to them’. For 
example, it’s natural that they would call us at mid-night, asking for data, and then we have to 
get that data immediately, this kind of work. But consulting reports are written less, because it 
will take a certain period to write it. So my productions are, one is the short-term and fast 
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support for the decision-making layer, and the other is to publish papers in academic journals.” 
All of the interviewees agree that, in the past, most of them were more concentrating on 
writing academic papers, but now with the positioning of the entity as a national think-tank, the 
main audience of their research should be the government decision-making level, and they are 
trying to transform themselves to adapt to this new identity.  
But it’s difficult to evaluate how much of their scientific research can be adopted by the 
state to be translated into national policies, or in other words, how big is the impact on decision 
making. 
AC explained: “Now we can just evaluate the impact of our research by counting on the 
provincial and ministerial leaders’ instructions to our report, but it is still hard to say whether it 
will be adopted. For example, our director Fan has been working on urban functional area 
planning. Their research result was adopted and implicated by the central government, which 
is a policy-related major impact. But things like this, you must have been studying for a long 
time and have practical experience, then you can say whether the research has been adopted or 
not. So now we are largely relying on leaders’ instructions (to evaluate the impact to policy-
making). But leaders’ instructions only means that your policy recommendations are accepted 
by the national decision-making department. However, the extent of this acceptance, and 
whether it will be adopted is hard to say. This is not traceable. So it is difficult to judge the 
impact of our research on policy making.” 
As a young researcher, BL is not satisfied with the current communication mechanism 
between them and the decision-making departments. He said: “In the past, our research results 
were more likely to be adopted by the state. But in recent years, I don’t know whether it is a 
channel problem or something, it has adopted less. It seems like young people’s research is not 
valued, not trusted, and the problems raised by young people are unreliable. The content of our 
reports is not well communicated with the superior. The leaders will not tell you what’s the 
problem of your report, so there is no opportunity for improvement. The official channels for 
reporting are not smooth, and the young-people’s research result and consulting reports are 
often not reported. So we are more willing to find other channels, to cooperate with others, at 
least there will be reporting channels, and there will be some people to guide you, so you have 
the opportunity to improve. Now the unit is in a transitional period, which is quite confusing. 
The channel is not smooth nor transparent. That’s also why we prefer to write papers, at least 
there are feedback on academic papers, which is something within my ability.” 
HZ also thinks that their working team has gotten leaders’ instructions once, but it was a 
170 
 
 
few years ago. “In recent years, it seems that the channels for reporting are not particularly 
smooth. Reports written now are not submitted. In our entity there is an office responsible for 
the submission, and later it set up a department specifically. But still… Or it may be because 
the topic of climate change has not been too hot recently.” Said HZ. 
“Our impact is very limited. We have the channels from the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 
and channels from the Ministry of Science and Technology that report to the state. We have 
colleagues, their reports have been adopted. But I didn’t get any instructions of the direct 
national leaders.” Informed FG. 
He explained: “There are many reasons. The first is that if the reported information is 
adopted or approved by the government leader, it must be his most concerned issue. It must be 
facing the needs of the special stage of the country. For example, ‘trade war’ may be a hot spot 
now. The reports and information about this issue must be easily approved by the leaders. 
Second is whether the suggestion is feasible. Because this kind of reporting information is 
different from research reports, or even consulting reports, it must be able to execute 
immediately, and be able to promote, it must be able to put forward practical recommendations. 
Third, it’s the channel. What channel do you pass through? There are some specific things that 
the central government may be assigned to various ministries. Then you will definitely get 
instructions from the leaders if you submit the information through the reports written by the 
ministries, because this matter was originally deployed by the leaders. If you think what may 
be important right now, and you report it, it may not be easy to get leaders’ attention. So it’s 
better from top down. Bottom-up reporting requires you to capture very accurately.” 
Indeed, more interaction with policy-making departments requires to research on issues 
that the country really cares about. For example, IC has reported to the State Council with seven 
policy recommendations, including the topics of transportation and smog, renewable energy, 
clean heating, natural gas market, and coordinated development and pollution control of 
Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region, etc.. Three of them were handed over to the national leaders and 
received instructions. The research topics of top-down deployment are naturally consistent with 
concern of the decision-making department. For example, some researchers who participated 
in the projects released from the policy-making departments think that their research has a 
certain influence on the policy. 
For example, DZ said: “There was a proposal for the ‘upstream reform pilot zone of the 
Yangtze River’, which was submitted to the Party’s Central Committee through party channels. 
The Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister of the Party’s Central Committee gave 
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instructions. The governor of Guizhou Province also gave instructions. And some other projects 
that have been done to the Ministry of Water Resources also have received proof of their 
application every year.” 
As GG and his working team supports the deputy director Wang of CASISD, who is a 
member of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, so their research results 
can always be adopted, or at least get feedback from the policy-making departments. GG said: 
“Every year in March, we will write 2 or 3 ‘people's representatives’ suggestions to the NPC. 
Wang’s suggestions which related to low carbon policies and planning are all provided by us. 
Then we have a close cooperation with the National Development and Reform Commission. 
We have done some research projects about low-carbon evaluation indicators and low-carbon 
policy assessments, which have been approved and adopted by the departments’ leaders. The 
projects were given by them. So it’s still based on top-down projects. We haven’t get 
instructions from national leaders. And there are instructions from provincial leaders, such as 
Chongqing Province and Guangdong Province. cooperate with their NDRC, and the policy 
recommendations are adopted by them.” 
EZ is also a member of the supporting team of deputy-director Wang, and she said: “Like 
our yearly report, ‘China Sustainable Development Strategy Report’. The theme is different 
every year. The topic is based on the hot spot of the year and has certain forward-looking. This 
report is presided over by deputy-director Wang. On the one hand, it is based on our scientific 
research. On the other hand, because Wang is a member of the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress, he may choose a topic from a higher strategic point of view, so 
these yearly reports also have certain influence.” 
What’s more, as she confirmed: “I think there should be quite a lot of these research results 
applied to decision-making. Like I said, the climate negotiations, from the beginning of 
Copenhagen, to the following Paris agreement, our country has always promised, starting with 
the ‘4045 goal’, that is, the carbon dioxide intensity is 40%-45% lower than in 2005, and later 
a promise of 60% reduction of emission by 2030 was made, and later it was promised to reach 
the peak of carbon dioxide by 2030, etc. These are not empty talk, and there are basis behind it. 
We are those who providing these basis, of course, certainly the basis are not only provided by 
us, there are many supporting teams. What we do is to run out a simulation result with our 
model system, using this data as the basis. So on the surface, it is only a number, like 60% or 
4045, in fact, there is logic and evidence behind it. It can cope with international pressure and 
allow the country to have a development space, which is basically considered. Now we still 
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support many policy-making departments with our simulation model system. Like the former 
Climate Change Division of the National Development and Reform Commission, which is 
transformed to the Climate Change Division of the Ministry of Environmental Protection this 
year. They don’t use our model directly, but they will use the results produced by our model, 
and then we should also tell them what kind of assumptions it is based on.” 
Another member of policy simulation system team, CS supplemented: “Our support for 
policy-making departments comes in many forms. We can develop a policy simulation or 
evaluation system for the specific needs of the policy-making department and teach them to use. 
At the same time, there are also cases that the policy-making department has specific questions 
to consult us, and we use our system platform to simulate the results for them, as to how they 
use this result is their business. And we also have direct policy recommendations, such as in 
the area of climate change research, and we also make a lot of policy recommendations every 
year. 
“Normally our policy recommendations on climate change are proposed through special 
reporting information of Ministry of Science and Technology, as well as from channels of the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences. For example, we are now conducting the fourth assessment of 
climate change, commissioned by the Ministry of Science and Technology. It’s very important, 
as it is equivalent to the IPCC report, which is international, and we are doing our own 
independent assessment. This assessment may be directly for decision-making.” 
He objectively evaluated: “I can’t say how big our influence is, because we are researchers, 
we must seek truth from facts. The decision-making process is not to listen to one person, and 
the area of climate change includes a big team across the country. Of course we are one of the 
centers in the team, but I can’t say how much personal influence I have. This is what the 
academic community is working together to get a consistent opinion and then report to the 
decision-making layer. So I can’t say that I directly influenced the decision, I dare not say it. 
But I dare say that many of the policies are consistent with what we suggested before. Because 
they will never say that they are grateful to the Chinese Academy of Sciences after the 
introduction of the policy, or they are grateful to XXX for providing good advice for their policy. 
They would never say that. But we feel that our suggestions have played a role for the policy-
making.”  
Finally, AC mentioned that the researchers are adapting their research behaviors during 
the interaction with policy-making bodies. He said: “Because the profession we are engaged in 
is constantly recognizing and constantly experiencing from the research. Like the risk of climate 
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change, there is no doubt that it is important for the country and the world, and that’s why they 
are engaged in research in this area. Of course, they are personally adapting themselves based 
on cognitive development, because climate change is also a cognitive process, and many things 
are still unclear. In particular, there is still debate in the academic community about climate 
change, and what is the cause of climate change. Different scholars have different perspectives 
and have an impact on his own behavior. For example, Ding Zhongli, they have been relatively 
opposed to ‘climate change’, because it is indeed unclear in different historical periods, it is 
difficult to explain with scientific explanation. From our perspective, it is mainly believed that 
climate change is caused by human activities, and how to deal with it is our central concern. 
Because it has already recognized in the central government of our country. Therefore, our 
researchers work is to help the government to resolve the problems, like under this development 
trend, how to achieve the country’s carbon emission goals, to achieve the country’s green 
transformation or low-carbon development. As the state has paid attention to it, everyone in the 
society would respond one by one. Whether to the ordinary people, the enterprises, or the 
scientific researchers, it has a great influence. For our researchers, we focus on national needs 
and issues, while conducting systematic research to provide systematic solutions and policy 
ideas. Because our entity is now a research-oriented think tank.” In his opinion, the aim is to 
form a benign interaction between the top and bottom, or more specific, between the researchers 
and the policy-making department, which is the core to the improvement of environmental 
policy. 
3.2.5.2. International cooperation 
As explained in Chapter 1, environmental problems is more seen as an international 
problem, especially the problem of air pollution and climate change, so in this section we will 
discuss the international cooperation of the experts in the field of environmental policy. 
According to the interviewees, in their field of research, participation of international 
meetings within a week is very frequent, on average almost everyone would participate once or 
twice a year. But short-term (few months to one-year) visits are less frequent, and intensive 
collaborative research is rare, and on average there will be only one or two cooperative papers 
in a few years. So in summary, as HZ said: “There is no particularly close cooperation with the 
foreign organizations or institutes, normally it’s just to have an exchange of ideas during the 
international meetings.” 
Mainly the collaborative research is conducted with international organizations, with the 
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foreign institutes is even rarer. According to AC, they have cooperated with United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), also have participated in EU framework cooperation, 
cooperated with American foundations and some other organizations. “Because it is open, 
everyone can apply. The application for cooperation projects is mainly based on the research 
team.” Said AC. 
FG supplemented: “In addition, the Ministry of Science and Technology also has special 
projects of international science and technology cooperation, but most advocate enterprises as 
the leader to apply, and they can call universities and research institutions to participate. But 
there are very few cases of this kind of international cooperation in our institution.” 
There are also other forms of collaborate research. For example, BL used to conduct 
collaborative research with Chinese people who work in foreign institutes. But it’s not very 
common. 
But still, actually they did have successfully conducted some intensive collaborate 
research with foreign institutes. 
For example, BL’s research team recently have intensive communication with 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) of Austria, as they are developing 
the Climate change model, and IIASA is one of the top institutions in the field. But it’s more of 
discussion and learning, rather than joint-development. 
FG’s research team has just completed a collaborative research about energy innovation 
with a university in Finland. But actually it’s parallel research, and it is not funded by third 
parties. The source of funds is the respective institutions. FG’s team is funded by CAS, and 
Finnish team is funded by their university. The result of research are research reports, which 
includes an English conclusive research report, and the respective sub-reports of the two 
countries. FG’s team will publish it in Chinese in China. The Finnish team will also publish in 
some of their Finnish related channels. Publications’ fee are also funded separately. The 
conclusive report is written together. FG’s team write about China. They write about Finland. 
And then they will write a summary together. 
GG’s research team was originally started from the SPF project of the UK “Prosperity 
Fund”. Their first collaborate research project was to take Chongqing as an example to develop 
low-carbon development plans from three sectors of energy, chemical industries and 
automobiles. They have already set a good international cooperation tradition. Then they 
subsequently supported the British Embassy, and later, in cooperation with the Norwegian 
Embassy, doing some consultations and research on adaptation to climate change. Then the 
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research team also cooperated with the US Energy Foundation from a project perspective. Now 
their cooperation network has reached Harvard University Kennedy School of Government, as 
well as the Southern California Government Association of the United States, and many other 
institutions, keeping a relatively close relationship, they have signed a Memorandum of 
Cooperation (MOU). 
GG raised an example of most intensive collaborate research: “Our low-carbon policy 
assessment model was originally developed in cooperation with an American agency. They do 
the US version and we do the Chinese version. This is a collaborative research and development, 
and it has been done for several years. They also participated in the guidance of the case study. 
But unfortunately, we didn’t cooperate in writing a paper, because their institution is not a 
research institution like us. They are the kind of consultation institution, they value more the 
influence on the local government. Their work has already had an impact in more than 30 states 
in the United States.” 
“Others are not as intensive as this one. Oh, another relatively intensive cooperation is 
with the Southern California Government Association. We sent a doctoral student staying there 
for more than a year to learn from them, and his doctoral thesis is related to that. Because their 
study is too huge, so he just learned a part of it. Now we keep cooperation in the form of 
meetings, we go to visit them, and then they come to us to communicate, hoping to have some 
sparks at the meetings. They will come again in a few days. This kind of mutual visit is 
relatively frequent.” He supplemented. 
Then he explained: “It is mainly because our supervisor, Director of our institute (Institute 
for Sustainable Development Strategy), and Deputy Director of ISD/CAS, Professor Wang, 
pays more attention to international cooperation, and he is in charge of the international 
exchanges and cooperation of ISD/CAS. His own international cooperation network is also 
relatively broad.” 
DZ informed another form of international cooperation: “We have participated in a project 
of the International Cooperation Committee on environment and development in China, which 
is a very high level of organization, with our Prime Minister or the Deputy Prime Minister to 
be the president. We participated in an environmental development project. The main result of 
that project was mainly came through discussion and exchange of ideas between experts, to 
reach a consensus, rather than through quantitative calculations, or modeling calculations, etc. 
At last, came out a result, and formed a report. But the research method is the conclusion of 
communication, because it is to promote the exchanges between China and foreign countries, 
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to learn from the Western experience, and to apply it to the practice of our country. This role 
for the decision-making level is still quite large.” 
After the communication with the interviewees, we found there are some problems and 
considerations that avoid the researchers from more intensive international cooperation. 
First, the practice of international cooperation always become a mere formality, and there 
is no effort to truly implement cooperative research, and it is difficult to produce some valuable 
results. 
As BL complained: “For example, I participated in an international project when I started 
working. There are all kinds of meetings, a lot. This project will hold a meeting once every 
three months, and I will have to write a summary report every time when held a meeting. And 
before the meeting, you have to contact the experts, send notice, reserve accommodation, 
prepare reception, etc. a lot of these transactional work. In fact, we should arrange a special 
person to do it, but we don’t have, so all arranged for me to do. At the same time, I had to 
prepare a report. Because I will need to talk at the meeting. As a result, I didn’t even have time 
to write a paper for the entire time. Then you still talk about international cooperation? In fact, 
you simply don’t have any room to talk about international cooperation. That is, you have no 
effort to talk about this matter.” 
He explained: “Of course, this may be the problem of our group itself. From my personal 
point of view, maybe I only represent a few people, not all of them. This should not be a 
common phenomenon.  
“We originally had a special secretary to do these things. Later, the leader might not be 
able to afford the secretary. It may not be necessary. But it is actually very important. This is 
actually very energy involved. In fact, in that year, for the project, various financial statements 
or those chores cost me more than half of my time and effort. 
“The key is that you do this, and it doesn’t actually help you with your research. The leader 
will in turn say that why don’t you publish enough pieces of paper. In fact, many things are 
actually done by young people like us. But many of these works don’t produce academic results. 
Then the leader says that you are not working hard enough. But can I work harder? Sure I can, 
for example, write a paper until mid-night. It’s not right to blame others completely. Many 
people are really hard working, working until 11 or 12 o’clock at night, they can also produce 
results.” 
He reluctantly concluded: “This is not necessarily who is right or wrong, but this is a 
development bottleneck we are facing. Young people are in the middle of the mezzanine. Not 
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that we don’t want to develop, but it’s very tiring. In fact, I hope that there is a relaxed and free 
environment, I will do some research that I am interested in, I can do it very well. But there are 
a lot of chores to disturb you, there is no such mood.” 
HZ is agreed with him, he said: “Mainly because the participation in the cooperation is not 
a big gain, and involves too much time and effort. I feel no difference from reading the research 
results of others online.” 
Second, after all, “Climate change” is a political issue and it is not easy to cooperate, that’s 
why there are many short-term meetings, but not many real cooperative R&D. 
As CS explained: “In the last two years, our specific projects have been carried out with 
relatively few international projects. Because this thing is not like the general science and 
technology policy or innovation policy, whose national boundaries are not so clear. ‘Climate 
change’ is a problem of strong competition among various countries. Of course, international 
cooperation is needed, but in many cases it is hard to talk deeply. If you are not careful, it is 
very likely that one thing you talked will become a tool for others to attack you. Therefore, we 
based our research in China, and with foreign countries we mainly communicate, but we have 
not intervened in specific projects. When considering the issue of international cooperation, we 
do have some conservative ideas because ‘climate change’ is too sensitive. Perhaps one of our 
decision-making mistakes is the loss of hundreds of billions of dollars. So we are maintaining 
an active international exchange, but more cautious for cooperation.” 
IC’s situation is special, as he said, he doesn’t participate in international cooperation, for 
fear of being suspected. Especially with Japan, as he has a background of long-term living and 
studying experience in Japan, considering that Sino-Japanese relations are tense, he fears to be 
ostracized inside and out. He also confirmed that he won’t take the initiative to apply for or 
accept foreign sponsorship, in other words, he won’t take foreign money, and he will only 
participate Chinese national arrangements for cooperation, however he hasn’t participated in 
any yet. 
But GG holds a different idea: “The political issue is mainly in the negotiation. In fact, 
many of the specific problems can also be cooperated... Unless there is such a trade war between 
China and the United States, you will put it on hold, otherwise, it’s not necessary. Just a few 
days ago, our Director Wang organized a forum and invited several people from Harvard 
University come over to participate. Under such a tense situation, they also talked deeply. They 
also decided that the two sides should conduct research on both sides under China’s ‘Belt and 
Road Initiative’. So I think it’s not that serious.” 
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But the third problem is more of a consensus between different interviewees, that is “The 
West has now less and less worth learning in the environmental field. We have learned a lot 
from them, but our problems are very complicated and special, so their experience may not be 
completely useful for us.” DZ concluded. 
He further explained: “The particularity of our problem is that, first, the speed of 
development is fast, second, the large population and the corresponding consumption of 
resources is large. Therefore, a problem in China may not be a problem in the West, such as 
water environment and water pollution problem, they have already solved it. However, this is 
still a big problem in China. Because the environmental problem is often combined with 
people’s livelihood, and then a small problem are often magnified several times. And the 
different problems are to be linked together. For example, in foreign countries, water problems 
may only be water problems. However, in China, water problems may be combined with food 
problems, social stability, etc., so this is a really difficult problem to solve. It is a problem of 
interconnectivity, the nexus problem.” 
Fourth, there are fewer opportunities to fund young people to participate in international 
cooperation.  
For example, DZ once applied for an international cooperation project but he didn’t 
succeed. And according to him, people like him rarely apply to domestic organizations for 
international cooperation funds, “mainly because of insufficient qualifications, generally you 
have to be Professor to apply.” 
According to AC and FG, some researchers have had overseas experiences. And exchange 
visits of researchers are frequent and in various forms. Internationalization strategies are also 
implemented in the institute and in CASISD. CASISD as well as all of the institutions of CAS, 
are funded by the China Scholarship Council (CSC) to support visiting scholars and visiting 
students. And there are also a variety of exchanges and visits, based on the research team’s own 
international cooperation, as well as participation of international meetings. There are also 
many projects to invite foreign researchers to come, visiting in short-term, longer-term or even 
to settle down. For example, a postdoctoral fellow from Cornell University of the United States 
was introduced to the institute through the “Little Hundred People” talent program last year. 
But the introduced foreign talents are very few, generally foreigners come in very short-term, 
for example, to make a report, or to participate a meeting. And there are also foreign researchers 
funded by their own state to visit us for a while. 
AC informed: “It is not necessary that there always are people visiting abroad every year. 
179 
 
 
This is a study-abroad program of CAS and CSC, depending on the researcher’s own 
application. For example, there is no one applied for it in 2018. Because some people have 
already visited, and it is hard to say why the other researchers who have not visited didn’t apply. 
Maybe because the quota is very limited.” 
BL took himself as an example, and gave an explanation: “Because the pressure on young 
people is now relatively large, the boss will send many tasks to complete. Some of the tasks are 
academic tasks or scientific tasks, these are good, because you get improvement through doing 
them, and some others are transactional work, which is very time-consuming. Another problem 
is the income, the pressure of survival is great, the house, the child, if these problems are not 
solved, you cannot go out with peace of mind. If I didn’t have child, I didn’t get married, I were 
alone, it doesn’t matter, and I will go out alone. But now that you have a family to take care of, 
you have to solve it. When we go out, our salary will be stopped. It only gives you 2,000 US 
dollars a month. You have to use this money to rent a house, eat, and spend your family’s 
expenses. It is definitely not enough. I am already married and have children, so I can’t go 
abroad. Actually I really want to go abroad. Especially now that the environment is relatively 
depressed, it is better to go out and change the environment to take a look. So there is such a 
demand, but many problems to be solved. The country has only raised this possibility, but it 
does not take into account many of the problems behind you.” 
The other interviewees also expressed that most of them haven’t had experience of 
studying abroad or being visit-researcher abroad. But most of them are frequently participating 
international conferences, an average of once or twice a year. 
EZ explained: “There are many exchanges and visits. Because ‘climate change’ itself is an 
international topic. If there was no international pressure, who cares about the climate will 
change or not. Haha… So there is a lot of international cooperation. On the one hand, our 
research results will be released in international conferences every year. The other is that we go 
to the UN’s Climate Change Conference every year. One is to support the negotiations, and the 
other is to participate in their side events. We also organize side events, which is to publicize 
our research results. Because this area is changing very fast, the trend is politically and policy-
oriented. So on the one hand, you have to keep up with hot topics, on the other hand, you need 
to be well-known in the international arena, so that you can have a voice for the case and the 
plan that you have proposed.” 
Other than the participation of international conferences to release their research results, 
EZ has gone abroad twice this year. One is in March, as ISD/CAS is co-constructing a research 
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center concentrated in the field of energy innovation with Vassar University in Finland. So 
there was an exchange with the Finnish group, including the current research situation of both 
sides, and future research directions. 
Then in May, there was another trip for EZ to Myanmar, to introduce Chinese experience 
on energy planning and economic development planning. Because Myanmar has been at war 
for a long time and now they urgently need this kind of help.  
But just as discussed above, the same as other interviewees, EZ expressed that normally it 
won’t be more than 3 times a year for her to go abroad, because “Going abroad is still very 
energy-intensive.” HZ also said: “I am less likely to participate in international conferences. 
Because in such a short period of time in the conferences, what valuable things can be 
communicated out? Besides, the procedures for going abroad are particularly troublesome.” 
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Chapter 4. Analysis of the pro-environmental behaviors of local 
scientists in Beijing 
4.1. The effectiveness of local environmental policies in Beijing and residents’ 
understanding 
According to the Chinese Environmental Status Bulletins, in 2008, sulfur dioxide 
emissions were 23.221 million tons, soot emissions were 9.016 million tons, and industrial dust 
emissions were 5.849 million tons, decreased by 5.9%, 8.6%, and 16.3% respectively over the 
previous year. In 2009, sulfur dioxide emissions were 22.144 million tons, soot emissions were 
8.472 million tons, and industrial dust emissions were 5.236 million tons, down 4.6%, 6.0%, 
and 11.7% respectively over the previous year. In 2010, sulfur dioxide emissions were 21.815 
million tons, soot emissions were 8.291 million tons, and industrial dust emissions were 4.487 
million tons, down 1.3%, 2.2%, and 14.3% respectively over the previous year. 
In 2011, under a stricter calculating standard, the total amount of sulfur dioxide emissions 
in the country was 22.179 million tons, down 2.21% from the previous year; the total amount 
of nitrogen oxides emissions was 24.043 million tons, up 5.73% over the previous year. In 2012, 
the total amount of sulfur dioxide emissions in the country was 21.176 million tons, down 4.52% 
from the previous year; the total discharge of nitrogen oxides was 23.378 million tons, down 
2.77% from the previous year. 
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Figure 11 National Air Pollutant Discharge 2008-2012 
Source: author (based on data in the Chinese Environmental Status Bulletins) 
 
From 2013, after a few days of severe smog pollution whether in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei 
region, which drew worldwide attention, the government determined to fight against the air 
pollution. 
 
Figure 12 Average concentration of pollutants in China 2013-2017 
Source: author (based on data in the Chinese Environmental Status Bulletins) 
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Figure 13 Annual Air Quality Statistics in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region 2013-2017 
Source: author (based on data in the Chinese Environmental Status Bulletins) 
 
 
Figure 14 Average concentration of air pollutants in Beijing 1998-2017 
Source: The Beijing Environmental Status Bulletin (2018), translated by author 
 
In 2013, the proportion of the number of days superior of the “air quality standard” in the 
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13 prefecture-level and above cities in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region ranged from 10.4% to 
79.2%, with an average of 37.5%, and there were 10 cities with the proportion less than 50%. 
Among the days that exceeded “air quality standard”, the proportion of severe and above-
mentioned polluted days was 20.7%. In the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, the number of days 
with PM2.5 as the primary pollutant accounted for 66.6%, followed by PM10 and O3, accounting 
for 25.2% and 7.6% respectively (MEP 2014). 
In 2013, the average concentration of PM2.5 in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region was 106 
μg/cubic. The average concentration of PM10 in the key areas was 181 μg/m3. According to the 
daily average pollutant concentration standards, the average concentration of PM2.5 and PM10 
in all cities exceeded the standard. The average concentration of SO2 was 69 μg/m3, and 6 cities 
exceeded the standard; the average concentration of NO2 was 51 μg/m3, and 10 cities exceeded 
the standard; CO has 7 cities exceeding the standard; O3 has an evaluation of 8 hours per day, 
and 5 cities exceeded the standard (MEP 2014). 
 
Figure 15 Annual Air Quality Statistics of Beijing 2012-2018 
Source: author (based on data in the Chinese Environmental Status Bulletins) 
 
As to Beijing, in 2013, the proportion of days superior of the “air quality standard” in 
Beijing reached 48.0%, and the proportion of heavily polluted days was 16.2% (MEP 2014). 
The main pollutants were PM2.5, PM10 and NO2. The average annual concentration of PM2.5 
was 89 μg/m3, exceeding 1.56 times to the standard; the average annual concentration of PM10 
was 108 μg/m3, exceeding 0.54 times; the average annual concentration of NO2 was 56 μg/m3, 
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exceeding the standard by 0.40 times; the average annual concentration of O3 exceeded the 
standard by 0.18 times; both SO2 and CO reached the standard. 
According to the observations of the China Meteorological Administration based on 
visibility, the average number of smog days in the country in 2013 was 35.9 days, an increase 
of 18.3 days over the previous year, and has been the most since 1961. The fog and haze in the 
central and eastern regions were frequent. The fog and haze days in the central and southern 
parts of North China to the northern part of the Southern China range from 50 to 100 days, and 
some areas exceeded 100 days. 
According to the air quality monitoring results of the MEP, in January and December of 
2013, two large-scale regional haze pollution occurred in the central and eastern regions of 
China. The two haze pollution processes were characterized by a wide range, long duration, 
serious effect, and rapid accumulation of pollutants. The primary pollutants in the pollution 
process were mainly PM2.5. Among them, the haze pollution process in January lasted for 17 
days, causing 677 days of heavy and serious pollution in 74 cities, including 477 days of heavy 
pollution and 200 days of serious pollution9. The heavily polluted areas are mainly Beijing-
Tianjin-Hebei region and surrounding areas, especially in southern Hebei. From December 1st 
to 9th, a serious haze pollution process occurred in the central and eastern regions, causing 271 
days of heavy and serious pollution in 74 cities, including 160 days of heavy pollution and 111 
days of serious pollution. The heavily polluted areas are mainly in the Yangtze River Delta 
region, Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region and surrounding areas, and parts of the northeastern 
region. 
 
Figure 16 Beijing’s 30-day average air pollution levels 2014-2017 
Source: U.S. Department of State Air Quality Monitoring Program, China Customs 
 
9 The Air Quality Index (AQI) in China is divided into six levels: first-level is excellent, second-level is good, third-level is mild 
pollution, fourth-level is moderate pollution, fifth-level is heavy pollution, and sixth-level is serious pollution. Among them, 
AQI reaches 201-300, which is heavy pollution, and AQI is more than 300, which is serious pollution. Serious pollution is the 
highest level 
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In 2014, the average annual concentration of PM2.5 in 13 prefecture-level and above cities 
in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region was 93 μg/m3, 12.3% decreased year-on-year. Only 
Zhangjiakou City reached the standard, and the other 12 cities exceeded the standard. The 
average annual concentration of PM10 was 158 μg/m3, 12.7% decreased year-on-year, and all 
the 13 cities exceeded the standard. The average annual concentration of SO2 was 52 μg/m3, 
24.6% decreased year-on-year, with 4 cities exceeding the standard; NO2 annual average 
concentration was 49 μg/m3, the year-on-year decline was 3.9%, and 10 cities exceeded the 
standard. The annual average daily concentration of the 95th percentile of CO was 3.5 mg/m3, 
14.6% decreased year-on-year, and 3 cities exceeded the standard. The annual average daily 
maximum 8-hr concentration of 90th percentile of O3 was 162 μg/m3, 4.5% increased year-on-
year, with 8 cities exceeding the standard. PM2.5 was the primary pollutant with the highest 
number of pollution days, followed by PM10 and O3. The average annual concentration of PM2.5 
in Beijing was 85.9 μg/m3, a year-on-year decrease of 4.0% (MEP 2015). 
In 2015, the proportion of the number of days superior of the “air quality standard” in the 
13 prefecture-level and above cities in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region ranged from 32.9% to 
82.3%, with an average of 52.4%, an increase of 9.6 percentage points over 2014 and an 
increase of 14.9 percentage points over 2013. The proportion of average exceeded-standard 
days was 47.6%, and the proportion of days with mild, moderate, heavy and serious pollution 
was 27.1%, 10.5%, 6.8% and 3.2% respectively. Among the exceeded days, the number of days 
with PM2.5 as the primary pollutant was the highest, accounting for 68.4%, followed by O3 and 
PM10, accounting for 17.2% and 14.0%, respectively (MEP 2016). 
The average concentration of PM2.5 was 77 μg/m3 (1.20 times higher than the national 
secondary standard), which was 17.2% lower than that of 2014. There were 12 cities exceeding 
the standard. The average concentration of PM10 was 132 μg/m3 (0.89 times higher than the 
national secondary standard), down 16.5% decreased from 2014, with all the 13 cities exceeding 
the standard. The average concentration of SO2 was 38 μg/m3 (reaching national secondary 
standard), 26.9% decreased from 2014, with all the 13 cities meeting up to the standard. The 
average concentration of NO2 was 46 μg/m3 (0.15 times higher than the national secondary 
standard), 6.1% decreased than 2014, with 11 cities exceeding the standard. The annual average 
daily concentration of the 95th percentile of CO was 3.7 mg/m3, 5.7% increased from 2014, 
and 4 cities exceeded the standard. The annual average daily maximum 8-hr concentration of 
90th percentile of O3 was 162 μg/m3, flat with 2014, with 7 cities exceeding the standard. 
Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region and surrounding areas (including Shanxi, Shandong, Inner 
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Mongolia, and Henan) are high-risk areas with high air pollution in the country. In 2015, there 
were 1710 days of heavy and serious pollution in 70 cities above the prefecture level in these 
areas, accounting for 44.1% of the national total. January-April and October-December are 
heavy and serious pollution occurrence seasons. In December, multiple large-scale heavy and 
serious pollution processes occurred continuously, and the number of heavy and serious 
pollution occurrences accounts for 36.8% of the whole year, which was significantly higher 
than other months (MEP 2016). 
In 2016, the proportion of excellent and good days in 13 cities in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei 
region ranged from 35.8% to 78.7%, with an average of 56.8%, an increase of 4.3% over 2015. 
The average proportion of exceeded-standard days was 43.2%, of which the mild pollution days 
accounted for 25.3%, the moderate pollution days accounted for 8.8%, the heavy pollution days 
accounted for 7.0%, and the serious pollution days accounted for 2.2%. The proportion of 
excellent and good days in 9 cities was between 50% and 80%, and in the other 4 cities, the 
proportion of excellent and good days was less than 50%. Among the exceeded days, the days 
with PM2.5, O3, PM10, NO2 and CO as the primary pollutants accounted for 63.1%, 26.3%, 
10.8%, 0.3% and 0.1% respectively of the total pollution days. SO2 never occurred as the 
primary pollutant during the year. In Beijing, the proportion of excellent and good days was 
54.1%, an increase of 3.1% over 2015. With 30 days of heavy pollution and 9 days of serious 
pollution, as a total, the heavy and serious pollution days decreased by 7 days compared with 
2015. Among the exceeded days, the number of days with PM2.5 as the primary pollutant was 
the highest, followed by O3 (MEP 2017). 
In 2017, the proportion of excellent and good days in 13 cities in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei 
region ranged from 38.9% to 79.7%, with an average of 56.0%, 0.8% decreased from 2016. 
The proportion of average exceeded-standard days was 44.0%, of which the mild pollution was 
25.9%, moderate pollution was 10.0%, heavy pollution was 6.1%, and serious pollution was 
2.0%. The proportion of excellent and good days in 8 cities was between 50% and 80%, and in 
the other 5 cities the proportion was less than 50%. Among the exceeded days, the days with 
PM2.5, O3, PM10 and NO2 as the primary pollutants accounted for 50.3%, 41.0%, 8.9% and 0.3% 
of the total days of pollution, respectively. No pollution with CO and SO2 as the primary 
pollutants occurred. The proportion of excellent and good days in Beijing was 61.9%, 7.8% up 
from 2016. Heavy pollution occurred for 19 days, and serious pollution for 5 days. And as a 
total, heavy and serious pollution days decreased by 15 days compared with 2016. In 2017, the 
average concentration of PM10 in 338 prefecture-level and above cities decreased by 22.7% 
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compared with 2013. The average concentration of PM2.5 in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze 
River Delta and the Pearl River Delta regions decreased by 39.6%, 34.3% and 27.7% 
respectively compared with 2013. The average concentration of PM2.5 in Beijing dropped from 
89.5 μg/m3 in 2013 to 58 μg/m3 (MEP 2018). 
As we can see through the data, the situation of air pollution in China, and more 
specifically in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region is getting much better during 2013-2017. 
Decades of hard work and mounting investments by the municipal government paid off with a 
dramatic reduction in air pollution. According to the latest report of UNEP(2019), in five years 
(2013-2017), annual average PM2.5 concentrations in Beijing fell from 89.5 to 58µg/m3, 
surpassing the 60 µg/m3 target set by the State Council. Moreover, the entire region of Beijing-
Hebei-Tianjin shared in this achievement, cutting fine particle pollution by 25% overall from 
the 2013 baseline. It was the single biggest step forward in more than a quarter century of steady 
progress. The war was officially launched by the city in 1998, air quality has kept improving 
trends in 20 years with hundreds of measures implemented in phases. The five years during 
2013 to 2017 was the period of most significant improvement. 
To answer the question about how do the residents in Beijing understand the government’s 
environmental governance measures on air pollution, first of all, we need to know how much 
do they know about the governmental measures about air pollution. 
To answer this question, we simply asked a question “Do you understand Beijing’s related 
policies for air pollution control?” 
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Graph 33 
 
Happily as we can see from graph 33, most of the respondents have some understanding 
about the policies for control of air pollution. 4.85% of the respondents are fully aware of the 
policies and will actively follow the updates. 45.63% of the respondents confirm that they have 
a certain understanding, and only care about the policies that involve their immediate interests. 
37.86% of the respondents say that they have a basic understanding, they do not follow with 
interest, but often receive relevant information. From this aspect we can tell that the public 
propaganda has a certain effect on the residents’ understanding of air pollution control. But still, 
there are 11.65% of the respondents do not have any understanding about this issue. 
Then the following question is, how do they think the effectiveness of the governmental 
control of air pollution? 
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Graph 34 
    
As shown in graph 34, most of the respondents positively think the current air pollution 
control in Beijing is effective, with a proportion of 58.65%. But still, there are 35.58% of the 
respondents think the current air pollution control in Beijing is general and the air quality has 
not improved significantly. And there are even 5.77% that gave a totally negative evaluation 
about the air pollution control in Beijing, saying that it is invalid and the air pollution continues 
to deteriorate. 
But for the interviewees, all of them agreed that the current air pollution control is effective. 
As AC confirmed, “Air pollution control has achieved great results since the 18th National 
Congress. For example, the goal of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei pollution control has been achieved. 
Great results have been achieved, and the country’s governance is also very strong.” For other 
interviewees, they all gave positive answers like “I think it is effective.”(BL, HZ, EZ, FG, GG), 
or “Very effective!”(CS, IC). As they point out, especially since last year, the air quality has 
improved a lot, there are many more days of blue sky, the serious smog incidents that happened 
in the past is much less in the recent two years. They confirmed that “It is sure that the situation 
is getting better”(CS), and “It is going in the right direction”(BL). 
As CS commented, “This is actually very difficult. Because things like climate change and 
environmental change may occur in a sudden, or we can say, the deterioration may be sudden, 
but improvement is a very difficult process. Generally, we measure our perception on a scale 
of ten, twenty, and thirty years. But what I find very impressed is that the air pollution control 
in Beijing can show the results in just a few years. Of course, there is still a lot to do, but we 
should confirm that it is not easy to see such obvious effects in such a short period of time.” 
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EZ explained: “Generally, statistics can usually be delayed. Like the Beijing-Tianjin-
Hebei area, everyone can feel the improvement intuitively, such as when the smog is heavy and 
when it is light. Overall, I think there are some effects. Such as ‘the ten articles on atmosphere’, 
and the change from coal to gas for heating in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei area, have a certain effect.” 
She also pointed out, “Of course, it is unlikely if you expect it to have a particularly large 
effect at once. We can shut down the factory and let it not discharge, but the economic loss is 
so great that the people can’t afford it. So the thing is that we have a solution, but the 
implementation of the solution is costly, so we have to consider carefully for how long time we 
can accept how much of the price. On the other hand, air pollution control may be a 
comprehensive systematic thing, that we can’t solve it by just one or two policies, and it is 
cross-regional. We can’t particularly strict the policies to Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei area. What 
about Shanxi? What about Inner Mongolia? What measures shall we take to those major coal 
provinces? And it is even more complicated when it comes to the ecology problem, for example, 
should the Three-North Shelterbelt still be built? What about the Qilian Mountain Ecological 
Barrier? And many more problems. So it is a particularly complicated matter. I personally feel 
that it still will take a certain amount of time to solve it. But for now, it (the current air pollution 
control) has some effect.” 
GG holds the similar opinion, he further explained, “I think Beijing’s own measures are 
very stringent. It actually moved some industrial companies away. But in fact, this problem in 
Beijing is not just a matter of Beijing itself, it is even not just Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei area, it is 
actually the whole North of China. Then you moved your own factory to Shandong or moved 
to Hebei, In fact, it doesn’t make much sense. It still produces pollution there. The air pollution 
control in Beijing should actually be linked to these areas and to establish a coordination 
mechanism, which is much more important. Now you look at the surrounding areas (of Beijing), 
the environmental governance there seems not so good. That is because it is also related to 
economic development and employment issues. Climate change is not just a matter of climate 
change. For example, the Ministry of Environmental Protection has to do supervision to see if 
the company has completed the emission reduction targets or does it meet the operating rate, 
something like that. According to what I know, at first, the factories would handle the 
supervision during the day time and resumed work at night. Later, the supervision was strict, 
and then the factories may began to have some fraudulent behavior. Later, they were forced to 
stop work, but how come? The company had to develop, and the orders had already gone out. 
What should they do? So, they were just completely shut down during the heating season, and 
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when the heating season is over, they started to be operating almost 24 hours a day, to meet the 
demand for orders, employment needs, economic development, they still have to produce. 
That’s why you see the pollution in Beijing was particularly serious after March 15th. They still 
have to produce, and the pollution is actually not reduced. Therefore, in order to truly achieve 
emission reduction and pollution control, it is necessary the successful economic 
transformation.” 
Just as FG concluded, the effectiveness of current air pollution control is very large, but 
the price is also great, and sometimes it has walked backtrack. 
 
Graph 35 
 
However, most of the local residents in Beijing are still optimistic about the future situation 
of air pollution. As shown in graph 35, more than half of the respondents think that in recent 
years (within 5 years), the air quality will get better and better. Though there are 34.62% of 
them think there will be no significant changes during the recent years. And even there are 3.85% 
of them think that the air pollution will continue to deteriorate. 
Similar to the respondents, the interviewees are also optimistic about the air pollution in 
recent years. “I am optimistic about air pollution. I think the healthy air quality can be achieved 
within about five years.” Said DZ. 
But to the scientists, to preview the future air pollution control, or more specifically to 
answer how long it will take to completely resolve the air pollution, is not that easy. As EZ 
explained, “To resolve the air pollution, similar to the climate change problem, we have to use 
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the appropriate cost that you can accept to achieve the desired effect. So let’s see how much the 
cost we can accept before we consider how long it will take. This is like the carbon dioxide 
peak that we have researched before. Generally it is said that there is no problem to reach the 
peak in 2030. But some experts say that we can reach the peak in 2025 and 2020. But reaching 
the peak in 2025 and in 2020 years, the economic loss and what it costs are definitely different. 
It is the same of air pollution. So, in fact, these two problems are done together, that is, there 
will be a synergy. So according to our research now, we will say, in 2030, When carbon dioxide 
reaches the peak, if this series of policies is adopted, then air pollution may have a turning point 
in about the same year. And if we pay a little more, we work harder, we make the carbon dioxide 
reaches the peak in 2025, then air pollution may be resolved in advance too.” 
As HZ previews: “I don’t know. It depends on the determination of the decision-making 
level. Of course, if we want to manage it well in the short term, the cost will definitely be very 
high. If we take sustainable measures to reduce emissions, such as through technological 
advancement and energy substitution, measures that are relatively small at cost, rather than such 
administrative control measures, may take two or three decades (to completely resolve the air 
pollution problem). Personal opinion.” 
Just as they pointed out, the achievement of China on air pollution control until now is 
directly related to the strong government management, which can be considered as the 
superiority of system of China. As ZHANG indicates (2012:92), “China has a relatively strong, 
disinterested and pro-development state, capable of setting out clear objectives for 
modernization and implementing development strategies and policies in the long-term interests 
of the country.” This is also justified when dealing with air pollution. 
When CS comments to the achievements on air pollution control in Beijing, he said: “The 
government has made great efforts and the superiority of the system is obvious. For example, 
(to the polluting factories) we can force them to stop production, which is very difficult to do 
in Western countries. Of course, we set aside the negative effects at first and not to consider it 
for now. I am not fully supportive of this kind of policies, but from the perspective of 
governance, I want to say that our ability to act is very prominent. For example, in addition to 
limiting production, last year, when air pollution was particularly serious, Hebei province even 
stopped heating! This kind of thing even can be done! Of course, this is too bad. The people in 
Hebei are suffering from cold. Even if I enjoy the good air, I can’t bear it. But from the 
perspective of air pollution control, the effect of our policies, of the administrative measures, 
has been exerted. The effects of technology and the effects of science have not yet appeared, 
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but we can manage it (air pollution) by our policies. Again, ethics, morality, we set these 
problems aside first. Of course, when we set up our evaluation function, we can’t just consider 
the cleanliness of the air. We may have to consider the acceptance of the residents, and we 
should not only consider the feelings of the Beijingers, we must consider the feelings of the 
people of the whole country. The evaluation function has to change, but that is another matter. 
For another example, what happened to our “APEC Blue”? Simply everyone stopped. The 
factory stopped producing, the private cars stopped running, all the chimneys outside stopped 
emission. And the responsible government officials would be asked to depose if they don’t stop. 
This is what we can do. So, we have been saying the superiority of the socialist system. What 
is the superiority of the socialist system? When I was at school and studied about it, I felt that 
it was empty talk, but in fact, this is the superiority of the socialist system. The changes we have 
made in these forty years may not be too much for you personally, but it is amazing when you 
bring it into the whole history to see.” 
DZ, HZ, EZ, FG all have mentioned the superiority of system of China, and the importance 
of the strong government leadership on air pollution control. “In the West, everything must be 
done in accordance with the laws of the market. The government cannot shut down enterprises 
and cannot restrict its development. In China there are a lot of administrative means, they are 
very tough, and the government can shut down the company directly. Of course there are 
problems by using administrative measures. There should be a balance between the 
environment and the development of the economy. On the one hand, we must improve the 
environment, on the other hand, we must achieve economic transformation. Of course this 
requires a certain process. Some enterprises have to be closed off. In the past, they were actually 
over-drafted. It is now a loan for the environment. In other words, it should not be developed 
before. Now that it has been developed for so many years, it is necessary to compensate the 
environment. It is also necessary to shut down. Therefore, air pollution control for now mainly 
benefits from the government.” Said DZ. 
According to HZ and IC, for now, the most effective measures to air pollution control are 
the administrative means with regard to the pollution sources and strengthening management 
from tree aspects. First, industry. Including the adjustment of industrial structure, moving these 
polluting enterprises out of Beijing, strict industrial control in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei area and 
shutting down the highly polluting factories. Second, governance of loose coal. Especially 
governance of heating measures, changing from coal-heating to gas-heating, and governance of 
industrial small furnace. And third, traffic. For example, the fuel quality improvement, control 
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of the yellow-labeled vehicle, restrict travel of cars, and in the surrounding area of Beijing, it is 
also restricted in winter, etc. Besides, the government also strengthens on legislation, not being 
specifically aimed at the atmosphere, and may be comprehensive treatment of waste water, 
waste gas and solid wastes. 
EZ supplements that basically the government has realized the scientific decision. “For 
example, the ‘Ten articles on Atmosphere” issued the year before, which seems to be very harsh, 
but the ten articles all have their aims, and it is not an empty saying, it has a certain scientific 
basis. So I think at least it is successful from the perspective of policy making.” Besides, in 
terms of policy effect, it is also successful. “From the monitoring data of Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, the air quality has truly improved from an average level since last 
year. The average of PM2.5 is also decreasing every day in the year. But it may be fluctuating 
due to some climatic reasons, but in general it is turning in the right direction. So basically it is 
a scientific and objective policy portfolio.” Said EZ. 
But as all of the interviewees agreed, depending on administrative measures to control the 
air pollution is not always good, especially when looking for a long term. “My point of view 
on the governance of this type of administrative regulation is that, the effect is immediate, but 
the cost is also very high.” Said HZ. 
DZ explained: “Actually the cost is mainly during the transformation of the economic 
development model. Such as, fuel standards should be raised, energy structures must be 
changed, some low-end companies in the value chain may be moved away, and then workers 
may be unemployed. These are the price to pay. 
“There is also the cost of environmental governance, like the factories being shut down. 
But these costs are totally reasonable. Because the former development method is wrong, some 
money you shouldn’t earn, but you have earned that money before, now you need to pay back. 
You solved people’s livelihood problem at that time. Now as people’s livelihood is guaranteed, 
and you have to compensate the environment. It is impossible to extort from the environment 
indefinitely. In a certain period of time, you pollute the environment to improve people’s 
livelihood, but to a certain extent, when the environmental carrying capacity has been destroyed, 
you have to turn back to compensate the environment. It used to compensate people’s livelihood, 
and now it is time to compensate the environment. No other ways. When the development stage 
is low, it is actually quite common to compensate people’s livelihood from the environment. 
For example, you destroy the environment, cut trees, discharge pollutants, to develop the 
economy. So you will have to improve the environment after you achieve the certain 
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development. Because now your development method doesn’t need to cut trees, or to discharge 
sewage, so now you have to deal with it.” 
But to EZ and FG, some of the cost from environmental governance is not reasonable, and 
could have been avoided before the administrative measures are taken, as they consider the 
social problems raised during the energy structure transformation. EZ gave an example when 
talking about the transformation from coal-heating to gas-heating in winter in the Beijing-
Tianjin-Hebei region, she said: “My family, and people like us who live in the city area, we are 
mostly supplied by concentrated-heating, so there are little impact to us. But in rural areas, there 
are greater impact to them, as they depend on scattered self-heating, all burning coal at first. 
Now they are not allowed to burn coal any more, but then the natural gas is not enough to supply, 
or it can be supplied but it is especially expensive. There are such problems.” 
FG also mentioned the similar problem. “Just like many cases of the surrounding areas (of 
Beijing), the transformation from coal to gas, or from coal to electricity, including shutting 
down many power plants. Perhaps because the local government is eager to reflect the country’s 
strategic needs. They quickly shut down some coal plants, small coal mines, but in fact, at the 
same time, the power supply is insufficient, resulting in many hospitals or schools without 
electricity, which will bring many social problems. So that’s why later on those small power 
plants went back to open up. And leading to the air pollution particularly serious this spring.” 
It is indeed a very difficult and very complicated project. The main problem is the systemic 
problem. As mentioned before, the current air pollution control is depending on administrative 
measures, or the compulsory measures, which are always palliative measures, and it will 
probably lead to a backtrack. The government needs to transform its model of public services. 
The relative policies and infrastructures should be laid out and configured in all aspects. 
The best example is that when there are big events, such as APEC or G20, as well as the 
Olympics, as long as we shut down these factories around Beijing, including some regular 
heating supplies are shut down, the air quality will be perfect immediately. This is beyond doubt. 
But once the factories open up again, the air pollution will come back as well. 
 As DZ pointed out: “The synergistic use of various means isn’t sufficient. Like we always 
say, both two hands should be exerting force, the one hand is the administrative means, the 
other hand is the market means. The market means are now also being used, but still not enough, 
and the development of the market subjects is not mature. Therefore, on the one hand, the 
pressure of environmental governance is relatively large, on the other hand, the speed of 
economic transformation is not as expected.” 
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“Because now there are many management departments all related to environmental 
governance, like the urban management and law enforcement departments, transportation 
departments, and environmental protection departments. How do they coordinate?” Questioned 
HZ. 
FG supplemented: “Not only the environmental policies, but many of our policies. In fact, 
this is still problem of how to make a balanced and systematic combination of policies. Because 
in our country, every functional department has his own jurisdiction, and it has a series of 
policies, and such policies will often be superimposed. There are many problems for the 
superimposed policies. First, this kind of superposition is not effective, maybe one policy is 
enough, because the policy is also costly. The second problem is that there are different 
standards of different policies. Another problem is that companies apply for a variety of policies, 
and then take a brand, but there is actually no big significance. One more problem is that each 
department has its own goal orientation, so they have different requirements, and that may be 
difficult for the company to meet at the same time. Therefore, when policies are introduced, 
especially when it comes to argumentation, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, must 
work with the Energy Bureau, as well as the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
to plan and jointly demonstrate. Otherwise, if the goals are inconsistent, they will not be able 
to achieve the goal. It is a coordinated joint governance.” 
She further explained: “The state’s environmental departments also must work with the 
local governments and the local environmental departments. For example, the country has the 
strategic orientation, that definitely we should change the energy structure. But actually it 
requires a process and time. But when it comes to the local government, sometimes it wants 
political achievements, or it must achieve a goal to fulfill the country’s requirements, so it 
brings some problems, such as the energy insufficiency after shutting down those small power 
plants. The performance appraisal of the local government in our country also needs to change.” 
“Like everyone says in the winter, is it appropriate to change from the coal-heating to the gas-
heating? Do we need to change so urgently? The policy direction is correct, but in the specific 
policy implementation, it may be anxious or thoughtless.” Supplemented EZ. 
AC also raised the same problem, but from another point of view, as he explained: “Our 
national governance is very strong, and a series of laws, regulations and policies have been 
introduced, and the speed of introduction is very fast, but the problem is how to implement it 
well, because the implementation is relatively poor. But actually, the most important of policy 
is the implementation. The systematic characteristics of our country is that, the central policy 
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and the locality have a series of problems in decentralization, like the decentralization is unclear. 
Because environmental pollution control is mainly in the local level, and the local level is 
restricted by financial resources, and it mainly focuses on economic development, which leads 
to a series of problems.” 
Similar to the energy structure transformation, the measures on transportation also needs 
overall planning and to improve the appropriate policies and infrastructures. For example, we 
encourage the new energy vehicles, but then we should set up enough charging piles. “People 
who buy electric cars are very helpless. The failure rate of the electric cars is very high, and 
until now there is no good solution to handle with the battery. I drive the electric car myself. 
But I bought it because I had absolutely no other choices at the time.” Said GG. “It must arrange 
and configure such policies in all aspects, and then it will be able to slowly transform.” 
Concluded FG. 
Another failure on the measures of transportation is that we restrict the private cars’ travel 
according to its plate number, but as a result, many people buy two cars instead. GG explained: 
“From the perspective of cities, the main measure for reducing emissions is to develop public 
transportation. Now people are forced to stop driving cars. But then you have to give me another 
choice. If I can easily go from home to work, from one place to another, of course I won’t drive 
a car. But now we still don’t have the conditions. For example, in Japan, you will meet a small 
subway station for a very short distance, and when you go in it can lead you to all directions. 
The public transportation sharing rate is very high, but Beijing doesn’t have this condition now. 
The public transportation in Beijing has already developed quite well, but compared to its 
population density, the density of the subway network should at least doubled.” 
He also raised some other possibilities: “There are still many policies to be explored or to 
be implemented. For example, study from foreign countries, is it necessary to collect congestion 
charges? Or a high parking fee? This kind of policy is definitely good for energy saving and 
emission reduction, but it doesn’t match the income level of our country.” 
The coordination between different regions is also very important, because there is a 
problem of diffusion between regions, so only successfully manage the air pollution in one 
region is not enough. “Like our Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, it is a key area, but now it may 
be more important to focus on the Midwest. Because the emission policy in the eastern region 
is getting tighter, so there are many heavy industry enterprises that are moving to the Midwest, 
so emissions will also follow the geographical shift. So we hope the next step will consider 
more in this regard.” Commented EZ. 
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CS criticized that the current air pollution control is emphasizing the effects, setting a 
single goal, and not considering multiple goals. “Morality is not being considered. Objectively 
speaking, the achievement on air pollution control thanks to the superiority of our system. But 
we must also consider the shortcomings of our system, such as sacrificing the interests of one 
group of people for the benefit of some other groups. But it is not only our system that has such 
defects, all systems have. Because the policy is always like this, it will always has to choose, to 
which group is facing, to which stage it is facing, it is impossible to cover it all. This is the 
scarcity said in Economics. For example, if you have countless money, then there is nothing to 
choose, you just spend it. But if you only have one dollar, to buy milk or buy bread, you have 
to choose. Now we have limited funds, limited time, varies goals, so we need to make choices, 
how to weigh the trade-offs, and how to make the final result of trade-offs optimal, this is what 
we have to consider when make our policies.” 
All of the interviewees believe that, as the environmental pollution is a long-term 
cumulative process, so it can’t be cured all at once, there will be a process and it needs more 
time. Moreover, China is currently at the stage of development, that industrialization has not 
yet been completed, and urbanization is still advancing rapidly. So they believe that the biggest 
resistance to restrict the air pollution control is its coordination with economic development. 
“On the one hand, the masses hope that the environment will be improved as soon as possible, 
and on the other hand, they hope that income will increase. That is a contradiction.” generalized 
DZ. 
As AC detailed introduced: “First, industrialization of China is now in the middle and late 
stages, and it can be basically completed by around 2020. Urbanization will basically be 
completed by 2030. Therefore, under such a development process, the pressure on the resources 
and environment is still very large. Second, environmental pollution is a long-term process. It 
has historical reasons. Which means that we still have old accounts to pay in our history. Third, 
although China has already become a middle-income country in the world, and its innovation 
capability is also improving, the ability of green innovation is still weak. Because of backward 
technology, it has led to so many environmental problems, high energy and low production. 
Fourth, because environmental pollution control is mainly in the local level, and the local level 
is restricted by financial resources, and it mainly focuses on economic development, which 
leads to a series of problems.” 
EZ, GG, BL and DZ all indicate that the matter of air pollution control is, finally speaking, 
a matter of industrial structure and energy structure, it is a problem of the stage of economic 
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development. 
As EZ explained: “In fact, it is closely related to the industrial structure and the energy 
structure. Why have we been coal-based energy structures for so many years, because it is the 
most abundant resource for our country, that is, the best and the cheapest, then coal is chosen 
to be the main fuel for the entire economic development. So over the years, it has formed a 
lock-in effect on energy. Then, with the lock-in effect of this energy, and other considerations 
of economic development, then we must have heavy industry, energy-intensive industries, 
heavy chemical industry as the pillar industry, this is inevitable. Therefore, there is another 
lock-in effect in the industry. Therefore, the combination of these two aspects, coupled with our 
economic volume is particularly large, it is very difficult to make it turn or change the road. So 
the biggest challenge and the most critical issue is how to transform the industrial structure and 
energy structure.” 
But obvious the transformation is quite difficult. BL, as an economist, gave an explanation: 
“If you want a good improvement of the environment, you will have to pay the economic price. 
After all, a country’s economic development must have its path dependence. As China, we rely 
on heavy industry for a long period, and you can’t just cut it off in a sudden. And saying about 
the development of strategic emerging industries, it also can’t be developed all at once. Why is 
the US trying everything to stop China from developing the strategic emerging industries? Do 
you think that China’s high-tech industries are now challenging the United States? I don’t think 
so. But the United States have already seen a sign, so it will cut you off from seedling. Because 
it would be too late for the US to deal with it, and it will cost much more, when the high-tech 
industries of China really became a challenge to the US. Said back to the environmental 
protection, if we want to achieve environmental protection, we must upgrade through industry, 
but how? We need to have technology as a source to promote the upgrade of industry. How to 
put forward the so-called supply-side reform? How to develop backward production capacity, 
develop clean industry, and high-end service industry? All of them are relying on technology 
to promote it? So we have to develop these strategic emerging industries. Our country has been 
developing, including the strategies as “Industry 4.0” and “Made in China 2025”. But the 
process of this transformation is very painful. After all, traditional heavy industry has fed so 
many people, and so many people still rely on these industries to feed. If you cut off the heavy 
industry, these people will lose their jobs. How do they live? It involves people’s livelihood 
issues. Maybe these people only earn two or three thousand yuan a month, but it is enough for 
him to support his family. You suddenly cut it off. What can he do? He was originally a worker 
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without land. The country’s strategic intent is good, but there are many such details when it is 
implemented. Including structural unemployment, the industry has transformed, and the human 
resources you need are higher-end. It is good for college students, but have you considered the 
common people, the low-educational people? We still have 280 million migrant workers. What 
should they do? How can China promote its urbanization? It is not by the people in the city 
raising their own children. The most important part of promoting urbanization is how to 
transform farmers into city people. If these people can’t even find a job, how to promote 
urbanization? But our country is aware of these problems, because it is slowly transforming, 
and these problems were shown up in the process of transformation. These problems are not 
irreconcilable, and they will be slowly resolved during the process, so as the air pollution 
control.” 
CS is more concerned about the problem of livelihood of people, as part of the balancing 
problem between economic development and environmental protection. He said: “If you look 
from the perspective of Beijing, there won’t be any problems for air pollution control. The funds 
are sufficient, and the people are very supportive. But if you put a broader view, it may not be 
the same. What about the people around Beijing? For example, a few days ago, I went to 
Qinhuangdao for investigation. I have been to Qinhuangdao many times. Every time I come 
back from Qinhuangdao, when I passed by Qian’an, the air will soon get worse. I saw the big 
chimneys in the far away discharging polluted air. And once you passed out of Qian’an, the air 
will suddenly be fine. Naturally, we thought, let’s stop those factories in Qian’an, which is easy. 
But what about the people in Qian’an? They also want to live, don’t they? They also have 
children going to school, and they also have parents to raise. What should they do? What do 
they eat? That is to say, when we consider the problem, we can’t only consider ourselves. The 
people in Beijing want to breathe fresh air, and the people in Qian’an also need to breathe fresh 
air! They also have this demand, but why they gave up this demand? Because they have more 
urgent goals, which is development. Therefore, for China, development is still the biggest 
problem. Population is the biggest problem, and economy is the biggest problem. Don’t look at 
GDP, that we are in the second place of the world, we feel rich. We are still very poor. As we 
live in Beijing, and if we don’t deeply look around, we don’t feel the actual difficulties in the 
other places. In fact, these are all typed. The developed countries have transferred the polluting 
industries to China, and China’s developed regions have transferred them to poverty-stricken 
areas. In the future, it will be transferred from poverty-stricken areas to rural areas. It’s always 
like that. 
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So basically the air pollution control depends on the development of technology. But 
technology development is not that reliable because it is difficult to predict. First it’s difficult 
to predict a certain time, and second, it is difficult to predict a certain technology. Sometimes it 
may take a long time. So, for the air pollution control, we rely on technology, but we can’t fully 
count on technology, because I don’t know when it can be solved, maybe tomorrow, maybe in 
50 years. Let’s imagine that one day in the future, the whole world is using clean energy, such 
as solar energy, nuclear energy, or if the artificial sun succeeded, of course, there is no pollution. 
But when can it be achieved? Therefore, what we can grasp in the near future is the policy. 
Although policy is not an optimal tool, it is a tool we can grasp. Of course, maybe another 
hundred years later, when we look back and find that we solved this problem, successfully 
control the air pollution, not by policy, but by technology, but for those of us now in 2018, we 
can only rely on policies.” 
So finally, are the residents in Beijing satisfied with the air pollution control in Beijing? 
 
Graph 36 
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According to the statistics of the questionnaire, we have happily seen that most of the 
respondents are satisfied with the air pollution control and are supporting the current 
environmental policies. As shown in the graph 36, 27.72% of the respondents think the 
measures are effective and they absolutely support them. 21.78% of them think the measures 
have a certain effect, but at the same time increase their life burden and cost, and overall they 
support them. But we should here pay attention that most of the respondents, 45.54% of them, 
hold the opinion that the measures have a certain effect, they basically support them, but they 
don’t support certain over-the-counter idle policies and will take initiatives to evade them. And 
there are 4.95% of the respondents think that the measures are not effective, most of them are 
inactive foolish policies, they don’t support them as a whole and will take initiatives to evade 
them. 
The interviewees, being part of the policies’ makers and the policies’ recipients at the same 
time, they have shown more satisfaction and tolerance to the current measures of air pollution 
control. 
For example, HZ and IC are basically satisfied with the current air pollution control. “I am 
satisfied both with the measures and the results of air pollution control. According to the 
analysis of China Data Analysis Committee (CDAC), the national investment on this issue has 
increased and the people’s health level has also improved.” 
But just as EZ expressed, “ I can’t say that I am very satisfied. The government is working 
hard in a good direction, and the direction of its effort is right. This is worthy of recognition, 
but it is still far from satisfactory.” To the interviewees, being satisfied and tolerant to the 
current air pollution control doesn’t mean that they think it is already perfect. As mentioned 
before, they think it still have a lot to improve. 
As GG emphasized again: “I think the effect is kind of good, but I’m not satisfied with its 
means. There are too many mandatory means for air pollution control, actually there is no need 
for that. It is still the problem of how to develop synergistically the economy and air pollution 
control. Now it has caused too much structural unemployment, which is bad.” 
FG’s idea is representative of all the interviewees, as she said: “I’m definitely not satisfied 
with the current status, in other words, the reality of the air quality is definitely not good yet. 
But I can understand it very well, because I am also doing policy research myself. I understand 
very well that it can only be like this for now, because it requires a process, and it cannot be 
done at once. Unless you leave Beijing, maybe it’s better off in other cities, but everything is 
worthwhile. So, first I can understand the current situation, and second, this (living in Beijing) 
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is my own choice. Because in fact, to be honest, at the national level, it is a rapid stage of 
transformation and development. The energy problem is the same. We have to reach the peak 
of carbon emissions in 2030. We have done research in this area. According to the results of 
the calculation, if you hope to reach this peak with one year earlier, GDP may fall by 1%. This 
is very big for China, it means that we have to lose a lot. Because the decline in GDP not only 
loses economic development, it brings a lot of problems in employment, so at the national level, 
this is very difficult. When we were doing this project, we talked with many energy experts. 
The first thing that they emphasize is that we must objectively judge that our energy 
transformation cannot be compared with the developed countries. When Chai Jing 10 
interviewed Ding Zhongli11, Ding said very clearly that carbon emissions and carbon trading 
markets are a political issue. It is not just an environmental or economic issue. The developed 
countries have experienced a high emissions or consumption of fossil energy before. They can’t 
just come to judge us after that they have developed already. Because the most fundamental 
problem here is that, after it established the carbon trading market, and let us buy carbon 
emission rights, which is actually depriving our development space. This is a political issue. 
Moreover, it is also impossible for China now. Now in China we consume more than 60% of 
the energy from coal, and even by 2030, the coal still accounts for 30%-40% of the energy 
sources, that is, for a long time our coal consumption still accounts for a large proportion. On 
the one hand, it’s because we have abundant of this resource. On the other hand, our 
development stage, industrial layout, and population density gave us no other choices. That is 
why, for example, we can’t compare it with Finland. Because it has no coal or oil in Finland, it 
is completely imported. So of course, it won’t use these kind of fossil energy. Then it won’t 
have the same problem of China. There are abundant forest resources, so that’s why its biomass 
can be developed so well. But in our country, our forest resources are also very rich, but when 
we calculate by per capita, we are already on the red line, and in our country, we do the biomass 
energy mainly with food grain, but then actually our food security is a problem, we can’t even 
guarantee the food needs of more than one billion people. And if food security can’t be solved, 
how can you take it to make energy? That is, we have not reached that stage yet, and the most 
stressing problem is not that yet. Different countries have different conditions.” 
In summary, we do admit that there are many aspects of thoughtless for the governmental 
decisions when considering the balance between environmental protection and economic 
 
10 Chai Jing is a Chinese journalist, former television host, author and environmental activist. 
11 Ding Zhongli is a Chinese geologist and politician. He is a Vice Chairman of the National People’s Congress, and a vice-
president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. 
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growth, and especially the livelihood issues. But on the other side, the effectiveness of 
governmental control on air pollution is obvious. The environmental problem doesn’t exist 
alone, it always involves complicated problems, which makes it very difficult to resolve. But 
we believe that with the determination of Chinese government, we should keep an optimistic 
eye on the environmental protection and the governance of air pollution, that it will be 
efficiently resolved in short time. Just as ZHANG (2012) describes: 
Is China’s rise real if its environmental degradation is so serious? Indeed, 
environmental protection is another challenge for China but one should not be 
excessively discouraged. In the history of its industrialization Europe 
experienced perhaps more pollution than China today. For instance, it was 
reported that in 1952 more than 4,000 people died of coal smoke pollution in 
London in a week. The Rhine River was once pronounced biologically dead as 
fish died and swimming became impossible. But Europe eventually brought the 
issue under control with its large-scale ecological protection programs and now 
leads the world in environmental protection. With a firm commitment to 
promoting environmental protection, China may well eventually catch up, as the 
strength of the China model lies in the fact that once consensus is reached and 
the goals are set out, the China model acts far more efficiently than the Western 
model, as shown in the way China is moving ahead in developing renewable 
energy: in the space of a few years, China is now leading the world in wind and 
solar energy and in the electric car industry (ZHANG 2012:9). 
4.2. The division of local scientists in relation to pro-environmental behavior 
under the environmental policies in Beijing 
According to Giddens (1990:146-147), the possibility of global calamity, whether by 
nuclear war or other means, prevents us from reassuring ourselves with the assumption that the 
life of the species inevitably surpasses that of the individual, but no one knows how remote that 
possibility is. Interestingly, as Giddens (1990:146-147) observed, balanced against the deep 
anxieties which such circumstances must produce in virtually everyone is the psychological 
prop of the feeling that “there’s nothing that I as an individual can do,” and that at any rate the 
risk must be very slight. Business-as-usual is a prime element in the stabilizing of trust and 
ontological security, and this no doubt applies in respect of high-consequence risks just as it 
does in other areas of trust relations. Yet obviously even high-consequence risks are not only 
remote contingencies, which can be ignored in daily life, albeit at some probable psychological 
cost. Some such risks, and many others which are potentially life-threatening for individuals or 
otherwise significantly affect them, intrude right into the core of day-to-day activities. This is 
true, for example, of any pollution damage which affects the health of adults or children. 
The interesting observation of Giddens, was proved by a related survey of Public Attitudes 
and Behaviors in relation to the Environment in the UK by DEFRA. In the result, it divided the 
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audience into seven groups in terms of their recognition of the risk of climate change and their 
willingness to react to it at the level of their daily lives: “Positive greens”; “Waste-watchers”; 
“Concerned consumers”; “Sideline supporters”; “Cautious participants”; “Stalled starters”; 
“Honestly disengaged”. 
The original intention of the present research was conducting a similar Chinese version of 
local scientists in Beijing. Though, because of the limit of time and labor force, it didn’t make 
a specific statistic division of the respondents to fit in the different groups, we may have an 
apparent impression of the different attitudes and behaviors of the respondents and the 
interviewees. And here we should be noticed that, as the original research of DEFRA was 
conducted to understand people’s attitudes and behavior on climate change, and the present 
research is conducted aiming at the problem of air pollution, so we have changed some of the 
description of the groups. 
We can see that almost all of the interviewees, meaning those who have their background 
of education or research from the area of the environment, have shown the strong characteristics 
of the “positive greens”, accepting that they should do as much as they can to limit their impact 
on the environment. For example, they will surely turn off all the electrical facilities when 
leaving a place. Try their best to use as less natural resources, such as water, paper and packages 
etc. as they can. And evite driving private cars, as well as support for the purchase of electric 
cars. 
Among the respondents of the present research, we can see few represents the “waste-
watchers” group, as “Thrift is part of their lives, presumably most often simply because of lack 
of resources”. This group of people are more likely to be the older people who have left or have 
been living their lives in bad economic condition for a long time or within a certain period of 
time. As the group of people I studied in the present research, as shown in the previous chapter, 
more than 80% of the respondents are in the age of 25-45, which means that they were born 
after the 1970s, historically after the big poverty years of China, and considering the average 
salary of the institution that they work, less possible for them to be living in bad economic 
condition right now. So as a result, they didn’t show obvious characteristics of the group of 
“waste-watchers”. 
The two clusters of the “concerned consumers”, those who “say they ‘already do more 
than a lot of people’ and are not willing at the moment to do much more”, and the “cautious 
participants”, those who “do little to help the environment, but would do more if others did” 
are not considered in the present research, as we didn’t ask the respondents about their attitudes 
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or evaluations to the others’ behaviors. But we do believe that the others’ behaviors have an 
effect on people’s environmental behaviors. As EZ said that her awareness on environment is 
deeply rooted in her childhood experience, when her parents were very conscious on protecting 
the environment. And FG also observed that the environmental behaviors usually differ from 
office to office, which means the people in one office are likely to show the same environmental 
behaviors, and as a result, one whole office of people will show more awareness on environment 
than another office of people. This is easy to understand, as many sociological and 
psychological theories, for example, the theory of “Observational learning” of Albert Bandura, 
have explained the social environmental influence on people’s behaviors. 
We can see from the previous chapter that most of the respondents fit in the following two 
clusters: the “sideline supporters”, those who accept that air pollution is a major problem, yet 
they are not contemplating any particular changes to their lifestyles; and the “stalled starters”, 
saying they don’t know much about air pollution, and, in any case, lack the means to take any 
steps to help with the issue. 
The “sideline supporters” say, for example, “I don’t think much about how much water or 
electricity I use, and I forget to turn things off”, yet do seem to feel minor pangs of guilt about 
their attitudes… These phenomena have exactly been observed among the sample of the present 
research. It seems that people don’t care much about the resources that they use, just as HZ 
described, people tend to use much more paper towel to wipe hands than they really need. And 
people seem don’t really care how their life influence the environment, more specifically, 
whether do they themselves cause the air pollution, for example, 71.96% of the respondents 
said that the main heating measure in their home is public coal-fired heating. But actually in 
2017 all Beijing area has transformed from coal-fired heating to gas-fired heating. They didn’t 
even notice it! Their carelessness was proved again when asking “(If you choose coal-fired 
heating, please answer) Is your home heating coal a clean coal?”. As 96.43% of them don’t 
know what is “clean coal” or whether it is clean coal in their home. 
It is the same when we look at peoples’ purchasing behaviors. As shown in 3.2.3, only 
1.87% of the respondents have reported a highly-polluting company once or more. The others 
just have a good attitude to pretend to report. And only 23.53% of the respondents will 
absolutely resist products produced by highly polluting companies. The others didn’t really 
considered the issue. 77.67% of the respondents say that they are willing to buy eco-friendly or 
environmentally-friendly products at higher prices than regular products, but only 33.01% of 
them actually purchased any products from an eco/environmental companies. 
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What’s more, even though as shown before, that the public transportation in Beijing is 
very convenient and cheap, as HZ described, people would think that “I feel more comfortable 
driving a car than crowding in public transportation, so I will drive, because anyway, air 
pollution is not caused by me alone.” The theory of “The Tragedy of the Commons” by Garret 
Hardin can explain this kind of behavior. 
The cluster labelled the “stalled starters”, according to the research of DEFRA, they are 
mostly from non-affluent backgrounds. Most can’t afford a car, but would like to buy one if they 
could. This could interestingly be noticed during the present research when observing local 
people’s tendency of buying private cars. But More than the influence of their economic 
conditions, the scarcity of the License Plate plays an important role for people’s behaviors. In 
other words, the more scarce one resource is, the stronger people’s willingness is to own it, 
even they don’t really need it. As shown in previous chapter, 3.2.1, among the people who own 
private cars, 57.14% bought their first car after 2011, the year that the local government 
introduced the policy of limitation on purchase of private cars, more specifically, the need of 
application for the Personal Car Configuration Quota, or more commonly known as the “lottery 
of car license plate”. And 3 of them predictively bought their cars in the end of 2010, just before 
the policy was introduced. And among the respondents that own electric cars, 40% still consider 
to buy a fuel car, 6.67% are already participating the License Plate Lottery of fuel cars, and the 
other 33.33% own fuel cars at the same time. 
Relatively, it also leads to a very interesting phenomenon in Beijing, that is almost 
everyone eligible, no matter whether they need or not, is participating the “lottery of car license 
plate”, which I would conclude as “I can choose not driving it, but I must own it!” The most 
representative is the interviewee DZ. When I asked him: “Are you participating the ‘lottery of 
car license plate’ of fuel cars?” He said yes. And I asked: “Won’t you consider to buy an electric 
car?” He said “Yes, I would like to buy an electric car.” Then I asked: “So why are you 
participating the ‘lottery of car license plate’ of fuel cars?” He answered: “Because I don’t really 
need a car right now.” I was completely confused, then I asked again: “So why are you 
participating the lottery?”. Then he explained: “Because I have already been participating the 
lottery for seven years, and I have gained a higher winning rate12, so I don’t want to quit. As 
long as I don’t need a car now, I will just let it run in the lottery. Who knows, someday if I win 
the lottery, I can choose what to do. Or if someday I really need a car, maybe I will buy an 
 
12 According to the rules of the “lottery of car license plate”, the system gives lottery applicants who have been applying for 
license plates for longer periods better odds of winning. 
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electric car13.” He’s right, we noticed that most of the people who urgently need a car, unless 
those very lucky ones or those specially determined ones, eventually end up buying electric 
cars. And to him, and to many of those who are participating in the lottery, they don’t really 
need a car, they just want to have the choice. 
At the same time, we do need to pay attention to the influence of people’s non-affluent 
backgrounds on their environmental behaviors. There is a famous joke in China, saying that 
once upon a time there was a tramp, when he was asked about his dream, he said “One day if I 
was rich, I will buy two bowls of soy milk, and I will drink one bowl and pour the other out.” 
The story itself is only an exaggerated joke, but we surely noticed that it is a reflection of 
Chinese social reality. To some people, “Energy conservation and emission reduction are 
sometimes considered to be ‘stingy’, and some people always take ‘waste’ as a way to show 
off their richness.” As HZ concluded. For example, one of the respondents is a young woman 
that struggled by herself for several years in Beijing. And without surprise, she immediately 
bought her own car after she married a rich man, and even though her husband already has a 
car and they live very near to her working place. It is true that, as she said, “It’s much more 
convenient that everyone in the family owns a car.” But obviously it is not that necessary. It 
shows no big difference from the phenomenon observed by Yan (2002) that a young villager 
would drive 300 meters away to buy some small goods. These can be explained by the 
“Psychological compensation”, that people need to completely fulfill from the wealth after a 
long time of poverty. And it is also deeply related to the Chinese traditional “Mianzi”(面子, 
face) culture, the spread of consumerism and the different way of emergence of individualism 
in China, of which we will have further discussion in the following section. 
According to DEFRA, the “honestly disengaged” are either skeptical about, or indifferent 
towards, climate changes. Different from climate change, which is still under discussion 
whether it is a fact or not, air pollution in Beijing is already a universally recognized reality, 
but the problem is, this group of people they don’t believe that their behaviors are one of the 
main reasons that cause the air pollution. So to the present research, the cluster of “honestly 
disengaged” are those feel indifferent towards air pollution. Significantly, this group of people 
rarely feel affected by air pollution. For example, there are 13 of the respondents think the air 
pollution in Beijing has absolutely not affected their health. And 2 of the respondents don’t 
think the air pollution in Beijing threatens the safety of themselves nor to their family members 
at all. At the same time, they show negative attitude towards the air pollution control, in other 
 
13 For buying an electric car, people don’t need to participate in a lottery, only need to apply and wait in the list. 
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words, they think it is not their business. For example, 5.61% of the respondents think it is 
totally not their business to report a highly-polluting company, and 19.63% of the respondents 
admit that they won’t report, because they think their report won’t make any difference. What’s 
more, 11.65% of the respondents do not understand Beijing’s related policies for air pollution 
control at all, and admit that they do not care about these policies. 
And surprisingly, if we extend the conditions of the group of “honestly disengaged”, we 
can see the tendency of people to fit in this group from their attitude to the governmental policies 
for air pollution control. As half of the respondents admit that they will take initiatives to evade 
some of the policies that brought inconvenience to their lives. As 45.54% of them said: “The 
measures have a certain effect. I basically support them, but I do not support certain over-the-
counter idle policies and will take initiatives to evade them.” And 4.95% of them said: “The 
measures are not effective. Most of them are inactive foolish policies. I don’t support them as 
a whole and will take initiatives to evade them.” One of the most common examples of people’s 
initiatives to evade the governmental policies of air pollution is also related to the private cars, 
that is, most of the people who have the economic conditions, their family would buy more than 
two cars, to evade the policy of “tail number limits of cars”. 
From the perspective of risk behaviors, there is another way to divide people’s 
environmental behaviors. As explained in the Introduction, based on the works of Burton, Kates 
and White (1993) and Park (1985), four different models of risk behavior can be identified: 
(a)The risk is not perceived; (b)The risk is perceived, but it is accepted passively; (c)Risk is 
reduced by a positive attitude;(d)Risk leads to change (migration) or to transformation of land-
use. As in their studies, the risk of air pollution is mainly considered in the “Model a”, that is 
“the risk is not perceived”. As they explained, in this case, the individuals are not aware of the 
threat as they judge its manifestation or its effects unlikely. Generally, no losses have yet 
occurred or, if they occurred, they were insignificant and their impacts were absorbed easily. 
Hence, risk does not become a concern and the community remains at the mercy of 
circumstances. As it is typical behavior in areas threatened by phenomena with slow and 
gradual evolution such as air pollution. 
But to the case of Beijing, especially as to the group of local scientists,  apparently  the 
risk of air pollution is perceived. As shown in the previous chapter, More than half of the 
respondents said that they often feel respiratory discomfort and they think it is caused by air 
pollution. And some other people also feel respiratory discomfort, though they don’t think it is 
related to air pollution. Also, there are 21 people said that they occasionally or often feel 
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discomfort in the cardio cerebrovascular system, and they think it is directly related to air 
pollution. Only 13 people think their health situation is absolutely not affected by air pollution. 
At the same time, when asked how much of the threats to the safety do they feel of air 
pollution, more than half of the respondents said that the air pollution directly affects their 
health and threatens their lives. If there are children or elderly people in the family, the situation 
seems to be more serious. As 38 people expressed that the air pollution directly affects the 
health of their children and threatens their lives, and 42 people thought that air pollution directly 
affects the health of the elderly people in the family and threatens their lives. Even though some 
of the respondents didn’t think that the air pollution threatens the lives of themselves or the 
other family members, 91.35% of the respondents think the air pollution has direct effects to 
their health or the health of their family members. 
Meanwhile, the “Model d: Risk leads to change (migration) or to transformation of land-
use” is also not that fit to the case of Beijing when analyzing the risk behaviors of the local 
scientists. As in this type of situation, the intolerance threshold has been reached and the risk 
implies the modification of land use, change of dwelling place, or a combination of both. 
Apparently the risk of air pollution in Beijing hasn’t reached the intolerance threshold of the 
local scientists. As shown in the previous chapter, being asked “If air pollution in Beijing 
continues to be severe, do you consider moving out of Beijing?” Most of the people gave a 
negative answer, as 24 of these 104 people never considered this issue and 25 of them definitely 
won’t move out, and there are 27 people said they won’t move out themselves, but they would 
like their children to immigrate. Among the people who consider moving out of Beijing, 20 of 
them chose to move inside of China, and only 9 of them consider to immigrate abroad. Though 
the people who would like their children to move out are more likely to let their children 
immigrate abroad than move to other cities in China. 
The result of questionnaire consistent with answers of the interviewees, as most of the 
interviewees believe that the air pollution in Beijing won’t lead to immigration of the residents, 
because until now, the migration in China is still mainly driven by economic factors. And 
people are relatively optimistic about the future situation of air pollution. As the previous 
chapter indicates, more than half of the respondents believe that the air quality will get better 
and better in recent years. What’s more, being attached to one’s native land and unwilling to 
leave it (in Chinese: 安土重迁) has always been one of the characteristics of Chinese people. 
All these factors lead to the reality that the risk of air pollution in Beijing hasn’t leads to 
migration, or the “Model d” of risk behavior. 
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As a result, the risk behaviors of the local scientists in Beijing, facing the risk of air 
pollution, are located mainly to the “Model b” and “Model c”, which are “the risk is perceived, 
but it is accepted passively” or “Risk is reduced by a positive attitude”. So the study is 
concentrated to these two models of risk behavior. As explained in the Introduction, to “Model 
b”, threats are recognized and tolerated, as they are considered a kind of “price” for housing. 
The threshold of consciousness has been reached as a result of experience with dangerous 
situations, so individuals know the risk, but passively accept its consequences, since they cannot 
find solutions to the problem, which is the most common in the poor communities. And to 
“Model c”, efforts are made to reduce losses, that is, to reduce vulnerability to the phenomenon, 
since the action threshold has already been reached. The residents became aware of the risk and 
importance of the losses, adopting more effective adjustments for prevention and control, which 
is a typical behavior of more developed regions, whose economic losses are high in accidents 
and the community has the necessary means to adjust. 
But this division of risk behaviors is not perfect enough, as it didn’t consider the possibility 
of taking behaviors to reduce and control the risk. Especially to the risk of air pollution, it has 
been proved (as the cases of London and California) to be an effective and necessary way. So 
we need to make up for this deficiency. 
As justified above, facing the risk of air pollution, the individuals have two strategies of 
measures to protect themselves, the mitigation behaviors and the adaptation behaviors. And 
here we define the mitigation behaviors as the behaviors that help to mitigate the air pollution, 
more specifically, the energy-saving and emission-reduction behaviors. And the adaptation 
behaviors are the behaviors that help them to reduce the damage of air pollution, more 
specifically, the self-protection behaviors, like wearing a mask or using air-purifiers. So here 
below I would also like to analyze the division of the respondents according to these two types 
of behaviors, which I will call it “mitigator-adaptor grouping”, as shown in Table 2. In this 
division, we separate the people into 2 series of 4 groups, which are: “positive mitigators”, 
“negative mitigators”, “positive non-mitigators” and “negative non-mitigators”; “positive 
adaptors”, “negative adaptors”, “positive non-adaptors” and “negative non-adaptors”. Simply, 
the “mitigators” are those who take mitigation behaviors and the “adaptors” are those who take 
adaptation behaviors. And “non-” means that they don’t take that kind of behavior. And 
“positive” means that they take their initiatives to take or not take the behaviors, “negative” 
means that their behaviors are passive and are influenced by the environment or by others. In 
this division, one can be described by one of the 8 groups, or by one of the 4 groups of the both 
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series. For example, one can be a “positive adaptor” or a “negative mitigator-positive adaptor”. 
Table 2 Mitigator-Adaptor grouping 
Mitigation behaviors Adaptation behaviors 
Whether 
take 
motivation grouping Whether 
take 
motivation grouping 
Yes By initiatives positive 
mitigators 
Yes By initiatives positive 
adaptors 
Influenced by 
conditions or 
by the others 
negative 
mitigators 
Influenced by 
conditions or 
by the others 
negative 
adaptors 
No By initiatives positive non-
mitigators 
No By initiatives positive non-
adaptors 
Influenced by 
conditions or 
by the others 
negative non-
mitigators 
Influenced by 
conditions or 
by the others 
negative non-
adaptors 
Origin: author. 
 
We find that the previous grouping by DEFRA are also correspondent to half of the 
“mitigator-adaptor” grouping, that it fits in the “mitigator” grouping. The group of “positive 
greens” are also “positive mitigators”, as they would like to do as much as they can to limit 
their impact on the environment. While the “waste-watchers” group can be seen as the “negative 
mitigators”, which means they are relevant to environmental goals not by their intention but 
simply because of lack of resources (unconscious, influenced by the social environment). The 
“concerned consumers” are “positive non-mitigators”, as they think they “already do more than 
a lot of people’” and are not willing at the moment to do much more. While the “sideline 
supporters” are considered to be “negative non-mitigators”, as yet they are not contemplating 
any particular changes to their lifestyles. And they don’t think much about the environmental 
influence of their behaviors (unconscious, following the habitat). The “cautious participants” 
are another kind of “negative mitigators”, as their behaviors are depending on the others, saying 
they “would do more (to help the environment) if others did…”. While the “stalled starters” are 
another kind of “negative non-mitigators”, as they believe that they can’t help with the 
mitigation because of lack of knowledge and lack of the means. Finally, the “honestly 
disengaged” are “positive non-mitigators”, as they intentionally feel indifferent towards air 
pollution. 
As we have analyzed the “mitigator grouping” before, by fitting the respondents in the 
DEFRA grouping, now we take a look at the “adaptor grouping”. Interestingly, we found from 
the previous chapter that, those who have their background of education or research from the 
area of environment, namely the “positive greens” or the “positive mitigators” are not necessary 
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the “positive adaptors” at the same time. Actually most of them are “negative adaptors” or 
“positive non-adaptors”. CS is a representative of this group. And he explained his “positive 
non-adaptor” motivation, simply because he think the adaptation behavior is useless facing to 
the risk of air pollution, as he said: “Air pollution is that kind of thing, when you face it, you 
are very helpless. You can only try to manage it, to reduce it, but before you successful manage 
it, you can do very little to protect yourself. […] The only thing that I can do is to endure it. So 
what we are urgently doing now is not to protect from it, but to manage it. This is what we have 
to do. Making a lot of effort to get the air-purifier or to get all kinds of masks is useless. To a 
large extent, it is only psychological comfort.” But also, he admitted that he can’t even resist 
the temptation of the psychological comfort himself, “For example, you see, although I don’t 
wear mask, but I still let my children wear it, it is a contradiction. I find it useless, but everyone 
wears it, then letting my children wear it makes me feel better.” Which makes him a “negative 
adaptor” in this aspect.  
CS is not alone in this group. As most of the interviewees expressed their doubts about the 
effectiveness of those adaptation behaviors and their tendency of being “positive non-adaptors” 
or “negative adaptors”. The difference is, just as CS explained, the capacity of resisting the 
temptation of the psychological comfort. For example, they all own air-purifiers in their homes, 
but they rarely use them, because they don’t think it really works, or even they doubt it may 
cause indoor air pollution. And of course they don’t keep in mind to regularly replace the filter 
elements of the air-purifier. They do have masks, but always forget to wear it, whether think it 
uncomfortable, or don’t believe it can really protect them from the PM2.5. When they wear a 
mask, it’s mostly because “everyone wears it” or “it (the air pollution) seems really serious, so 
wearing a mask psychologically makes me feel better.” 
Meanwhile, among the common respondents, we found the existence of “positive 
adaptors”. For example, typically, there are 5.83% of the respondents confirmed that “Unless 
the weather is particularly good, I wear a mask almost every day, because after all, it's no harm.” 
And 30.1% of the respondents will read the official air quality report every day and wear masks 
as recommended. What’s more, there are 10.78% of the respondents said they own more than 
3(included) air-purifiers in their homes. And 30.39% of the respondents have 2 air-purifiers at 
home. 
Emigration is another considerable “positive adaptation” behavior. Though according to 
the statistics of the questionnaire, there are not many people considering emigration from 
Beijing, half of the respondents said they would not move out of Beijing or they had never 
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considered this issue. Just as the interviewees explained, because the economic conditions, the 
educational conditions and career opportunities in Beijing are much better than in other cities 
(except for Shanghai, Guangzhou or Shenzhen), and it is very difficult to move from a familiar 
place to a totally unfamiliar one to start over again. But some of the interviewees noticed that 
there are some ways to balance. For example, FG informed that there are many friends of her 
that live in Beijing, but at the same time own a property, a house or an apartment, in Sanya, 
which is a beautiful seaside city of Hainan Province, in the south most of China. And the whole 
family will spend the winter there. Or, some others will leave their little children to their parents 
in their hometown, or leave them in a beautiful and clean city where they have property, and 
only pick them up to Beijing when they are old enough to go to school. These people are the 
most “positive adaptors”, as they are very able to choose their lives and to adapt to the air 
pollution, to make better conditions to themselves. 
Sadly we can imagine that, the people have the most economic conditions to be “positive 
non-mitigators”, even being able to evade policies of air pollution control, are those who have 
the most conditions to be the “positive adaptors”. Which means, they can make their lives so 
good and comfortable as they want that they don’t even need to care about the air pollution. 
They can “buy” “fresh air”, and “buy” the privilege to emit more, and leave the polluted 
environment to those who don’t have conditions to change their lives. What a tragedy of capital 
inequality! 
Try not to go out in heavy polluted weather is a widely accepted way to protect from air 
pollution. But still, there are 22.33% of the respondents said that they won’t try to avoid going 
out in heavy polluted weather. This surely should be seen as a “non-adaptation” behavior, but 
it’s difficult to say whether they are “positive non-adaptors” or “negative non-adaptors”, 
because as BL pointed out, “sometimes it’s not avoidable. You are forced to go out, as when 
you need to go to work, or you need to participate in a meeting.” And also, we should be aware 
of the fact that some people don’t know that staying indoors will protect them from air pollution. 
Both these two groups of people are “negative non-adaptors”. And those who are well informed 
of the self-protection manners and choose not to follow it are considered as “positive non-
adaptors”. 
4.3. The Search for Origins of Pro-Environmental Behaviors in Beijing 
As we can see from the results of the present research, the perception of air pollution of 
the local people doesn’t exactly correspond to the proper pro-environmental behaviors. As it is 
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closely related to the risk of climate change, the perception of the risk of air pollution also 
shows the similar unique characteristics to the perception of the risk of climate changes. As 
shown in detail in the previous section. First, the breadth of risk awareness. Second, the 
differences in risk perception subjects. In the perception of climate change risk, researchers 
usually classify subjects into masses of lay-people and experts based on whether the subject has 
relevant professional knowledge on climate change or not. They have differences in the 
perceptions of causes of climate change, results, and actions (Swim, Stern, et al., 2011). Third, 
the conflict between risk perception and action. This contradiction prevails, as people are 
concerned about climate change but have not taken corresponding measures (Gifford, 2011). 
Just as Beck (2009) described, the environmental risk is that kind of thing, that if you 
believe, it is there, otherwise it is not. And whether people believe it or not depending on the 
cost of solving the problem: 
For only those who have the climatic catastrophe ‘in their heads’ can ‘see’ 
that specific natural transformations ‘are’ concrete manifestations of the global 
climate risk. For those sectors of the global population that do not or cannot 
afford to share this belief, the climate catastrophe is a nothing, a non-thing, a 
hysteria or a new strategy of Western imperialism. And as with any religion, in 
the case of the global climate risk there are also heretics, agnostics, mystics, 
unbelievers, the ignorant and also radical secularists who don’t want to have 
anything to do with this kind of I’m-saving-the-world faith (Beck 2009:72). 
Just as we discovered in the previous chapter and the previous sections, local people’s 
awareness of the risk of air pollution is sufficient and adequate, but instead of correspondingly 
taking the mitigation behaviors, most of them prefer to only take the adaptation behaviors. And 
different from the masses of lay-people, the experts are more likely to take mitigation behaviors 
than adaptation behaviors, because they are fully aware of the fact that mitigation is the real 
solution of the problem, adaptation is not that useful, and can’t fundamentally solve the problem. 
AC indicated: “As an ordinary person, in the face of air pollution, first of all, we must 
realize that the problem of air pollution cannot be relied on the government only. Because first 
of all, we as human beings are also a source of pollution. If everyone travels by public 
transportation, saves the natural resources, and reduces pollutant emissions, uses less of luxury 
goods, doesn’t pursuit the luxury lifestyles, the problem (of air pollution) is well resolved. But 
just because of the low level of environmental awareness, this kind of problems arise. 
“Air pollution is fundamentally related to our production and consumption patterns and to 
ourselves. Imagine that you drive a large displacement car on the road, and you find the road is 
congested and the air pollution is heavy, then you blame the government for the ineffective 
governance, this is unfair. Besides, we should also take into account that the production of the 
companies is also to meet our needs. We should consider from the demand side to influence the 
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production.” 
The reasons lead to the difference between the masses of lay-people and the experts, and 
the distance from people’s awareness of the risk of air pollution to the pro-environmental 
behaviors are mainly located in the following 3 aspects. First, the influence of Chinese historical 
and cultural traditions and the current social stage of “compressed modernization”. Second, the 
lack of publicity and education to improve people’s awareness of energy conservation and 
environmental protection. Third, the current scientific research and expert groups could not 
create convincing links to the masses of lay-people between air pollution and personal 
behaviors, mainly because of the contradiction of techno-scientific development and the 
contradictory identity of experts. As Beck (2002) explained: 
Risk are not things. They are social constructions in which expert knowledge 
as well as cultural values and symbols play a key role. In order to unravel the 
power conflicts that lie behind conflicts over risk, it is necessary to raise the issue 
of ‘relations of definition’. I use the term ‘relations of definition’ in parallel to 
the term ‘relations of production’ used by Karl Marx. What is meant by it are the 
kinds of resources – and the access to them – needed for defining (away) risks in 
a socially binding way. 
A whole series of questions points to this substructure of risk-defining power: 
Who has what to prove? In other words, who bears the burden of proof in any 
given situation? What qualifies as causal evidence and as ‘proof’ under 
conditions of cognitive uncertainty? Which norms of accountability apply? Who 
is responsible? Who must carry the costs? As we begin to examine these cognitive 
power bases of the relations of definition, we gain a deeper insight into the 
connection between risk and power; we also get some indication of how changes 
in the power relations of definition – such as a redistribution of the burden of 
proof, or product liability regulations – can influence the political dynamic of 
risk conflicts. Transformation of the power relations of definition may not only 
improve the chances of opposition movements but may also make global 
companies take social responsibility for the unknown consequences they trigger 
(Beck 2002:106). 
Chinese culture has many aspects, and focusing on “face” (Mianzi，面子) is one of the 
most important ones. The famous Chinese writer and literary critic LU Xun has said that Mianzi 
is the program of the Chinese spirit. Another famous Chinese writer and linguist LIN Yutang 
has also said that Mianzi is the most powerful of the three goddesses (Mianzi 面子-face, Ming
命-fate and En 恩-grace) who rule the Chinese people. And it is the most delicate standard in 
Chinese social interaction. “Mianzi behavior” is to do something for others in order to create a 
certain image of oneself in the minds of others. Why does Chinese society pay attention to 
Mianzi? According to SONG (2013), because Mianzi culture itself is also a kind of orderly 
equilibrium, which is a balanced order endogenous under a specific social culture. First, the 
lack of the rule of law increases the randomness and unpredictability of the formal order of 
society, thus making the order itself a scarce product. In this case, the alternative order will 
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come into being, and Mianzi is an alternative order. People tend to judge a person’s immanence 
through one’s Mianzi information. If you “have face”(有面子 ), it means an increase in 
credibility, which means that there is a possibility of further strengthening the relationship. In 
reality, why do some people always value their own “face”? Because otherwise, it may generate 
large transaction costs. Second, the agricultural society is the economic and cultural root of the 
Mianzi phenomenon. Chinese farmers have a traditional habit of preferring to decorate the 
façade, which is a concrete reflection of the Mianzi awareness. Third, the secularity of Chinese 
culture also adds the weight of the constraints of Mianzi. Due to the lack of internal constraints, 
people must pay more attention to external constraints, such as constraints of Mianzi. Mianzi-
constraints make people pay more attention to formalism, and social activities and people’s 
behaviors become more and more epidermis. 
In interpersonal communication, Chinese people always judge the degree of acceptance of 
each other by whether giving themselves “face”, and then according to that to recognize and 
evaluate each other’s relationship. This traditional Chinese Mianzi culture has created the so-
called “Chinese-style waste” – which especially prominent in Chinese society, where gifts are 
over-packaged, an astonishing amount of luxury consumption, expensive gifts, and luxury 
office buildings, etc. What’s more, whether it is an official reception or a private banquet, it 
must have a lot of leftovers. 
According to statistics, every year Chinese throw away food worth 200 billion yuan 
(US$32 billion), enough to nourish 200 million people (Shanghai Morning Post, 2013). One-
third of urban household waste is garbage of packaging, and more than half of these packaging 
wastes are luxury packaging. China has become one of the most wasteful countries in the world 
for luxury packaging. And the country is ranked third in the world for luxury goods’ 
consumption. Appropriate pursuit of Mianzi is the maintenance of one’s own image, but when 
it exceeds a certain limit, it becomes the performance of vanity detached from objective reality, 
and even becomes the social psychological basis of falsification. Finally, the Mianzi behaviors 
become a comparison of generosity and richness, which has once formed a wasteful social 
atmosphere (XIE 2013). 
According to JIANG(2013), the pursuit of Mianzi in Chinese society is related to the 
Chinese culture of the sense of shame, which is different from the Western culture of the sense 
of sin. Chinese people are often taught how to conform to the “rules” in the process of 
socialization, how to give others a good impression. Chinese parents often mention “to give 
parents a face” or “don’t lose face” when educating their children. Which has prompted the 
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Chinese people to develop an awareness of “face” in the sense of shame. If the food was eaten 
clean when the guests are banqueting, the host will worry that the guests will think that they are 
stingy and not generous, so they must add more dishes to express their hospitality, and it is not 
important whether it is right or wrong to waste. 
In addition, according to XIE(2013), the social psychology of Chinese people’s pursuit of 
face has a very important link to the traditional “ritual” culture of Confucianism. Confucius 
said: “One can’t live in the society if he doesn’t know rituals. (不知礼，无以立也。)” and 
everyone should “Act according to rituals.(礼以行之)”. That is, everyone has a certain identity 
in society, and they must act in accordance with the rituals. If they do something that does not 
conform to their status, or they say something that does not meet their status, they will lose face. 
For interpersonal relationships, there are rules for the details of clothing and behavior. The idea 
of “礼多人不怪” (“Courtesy is never to blame” or “One can never be too courteous”) has a 
very important impact on the Chinese people’s interpersonal communication patterns. In order 
to avoid being ridiculed, and to avoid rudeness, one should try to meet the rules of ritual, at 
least to show “no violation on the surface”, that is, to pursue the formal ritual, which encourages 
the “comparison” of Mianzi behavior. Therefore, the superficial pursuit of the over packaged 
high-priced gift, and other “Chinese-style waste” phenomenon is a matter of course. “Ritual” 
is reflected through the “face”, and interpersonal communication has also formed a mindset of 
“face”, such as “give face”, “keep face”, “gain face”, “save face” and “lose face”, etc. Some 
have become unspoken rules and have been used socially. That’s why, in China, a dinner party 
is endowed with a lot of meaning, and the frugality instead becomes an extra cliché (XIE 2013). 
To XIE(2013), “Chinese-style waste” is a ritual waste, but also a social psychological 
problem. “Chinese-style waste” does not indicate the abundance and surplus of products, but 
the poverty of the spirit of the Chinese people. 
At the same time, along with the high speed of development of China, as it has rapidly 
concluded the three industrial revolutions within 30 years, the social problems accompanying 
the industrialization process are also rapidly emerging simultaneously. Chinese society is 
experiencing a “compressed modernization” (Deng, 2010). And as a result, the traditional 
Mianzi culture is combined with the “immature” individualization and the “immature” ideology 
of consumerism, and the improvement of people’s economic conditions, so the phenomenon of 
waste and people’s belief of “taking ‘waste’ as a way to show off their richness” is becoming a 
more unique and significant situation in the Chinese society. 
To summarize, individualization in China is characterized by the management 
of the party-state and the absence of cultural democracy, the absence of a welfare 
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state regime, and the absence of classic individualism and political liberalism. In 
this sense, the Chinese individualization process remains at the stage of 
emancipation politics of first modernity. Yet individuals in China also live in an 
environment where a fluid labor market, flexible employment, increasing risks, a 
culture of intimacy and self-expression, and a greater emphasis on individual 
responsibility and self-reliance have been created by the globalization of the 
market economy and an ideology of consumerism. The Chinese case 
simultaneously demonstrates pre-modern, modern, and late modern conditions, 
and the Chinese individual must deal with all of these conditions simultaneously 
(Yan 2010). 
Yan(2009) reviewed the change from under-consumption during the Maoist period to three 
waves of mass consumption in the post-Mao era, and to the formation of consumerism as the 
new and dominant ideology in the late 1990. Along with this change, the ethics of everyday life 
shifted from an emphasis on self-sacrifice and hard work for a greater goal, such as building 
the new socialist society, to a new focus on self-realization and pursuit of personal happiness 
in concrete and materialistic terms. In other words, what makes one’s life meaningful has 
changed from a collective ethics to an individual-centered ethics, similar to the shift from 
“being good” to “feeling good” observed in US society (see Bellah et al. 1996:75-81; 
Yan,2009:xxxv). 
As Yan (2002:173-178) explained, since the early 1980s, along with the socialist state 
loosening of control over ordinary people’s private lives, the values of the market economy and 
globalizing consumerism have become dominant forces in family life in particular and in social 
change in general. The spread of consumerism has led them to believe that money is meant to 
be spent, goods are meant to be consumed, and the quality of life is to be judged in terms of 
consumption satisfaction. This is not surprising, as China is rapidly becoming a consumer 
society and the state has been encouraging widespread consumerism. As Yan (2000) notes 
elsewhere, the graduated encouragement of mass consumption by the state played an important 
role in reducing social discontent and restoring political stability in post-1989 Chinese society. 
To expand the domestic market and speed up the sluggish Chinese economy in the late 1990s, 
the state went one step further to promote consumerism as an engine of economic growth, and 
the official media were filled with commentaries and reports that encouraged people to take 
personal loans – then a new social invention in China – for their consumer needs (Yan 2000). 
Consequently, The previous evil image of individualism was suddenly turned on its head during 
the post-Mao reform era of the 1980s, because it was rediscovered as a catalyst of 
modernization in the West, stimulating individual incentives and economic growth. Yet there 
has been no serious effort to explore what individualism actually is and how it works in Western 
culture and thus earlier misunderstandings continue to exist. Individualism is still understood 
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as a selfish and hedonistic ethic that places self-interest above the needs of the group, and one 
must pursue it at the expense of other people’s interests. 
As Yan(2002:224-228) notes, the phenomenon of tidal-wave consumption in the 1980s 
disappeared in the 1990s, in its place grew a much more differentiated consumer market. A 
direct result of this change is that people have become even more conscious of what 
consumption habits and lifestyle can do to one’s social status, in other words, differences in 
consumption capabilities and styles have become a major way of measuring people and of 
distinguishing them from one another both socially and spatially. For example, the explosive 
growth in the number of private cars in Beijing had created serious tension between those who 
own cars and those who don’t, as they all had to fight for space on the overcrowded streets. 
As Yan(2002:236) summarized, there have been three waves of mass consumption during 
the past two decades, and each of them has brought further political and social consequences. 
By the end of the 1990s, a consumer revolution had occurred in urban China, and consumerism 
had replaced communist doctrine to become the paramount cultural ideology of contemporary 
Chinese society. Along with the flow of material goods and cultural products, consumerism had 
changed consumers’ spending patterns, increased their awareness of individual rights, served 
as a new mechanism of social differentiation, linked consumers to the outside world, and played 
a role in promoting political stability in post-1989 China. Thus far, consumerism has overall 
played a more positive than negative role in China’s transition toward a free-market economy 
and a more open society. But it has also opened a Pandora’s box of new social perils, such as 
the fetishization of money, the commodification of personal relations, and the widespread 
phenomenon of corruption. 
As GG said, “Nowadays, the whole society is pursuing the so-called ‘success’, which 
narrowly means the ‘material success’. Everything is better to be ‘luxury’, and those ‘luxury’ 
things are always of high energy consumption and high emission.” 
His words remind me of one of my high school classmates. It was more than 10 years ago, 
when the school organized a visit to the largest car factory of Volkswagen in Shanghai. In the 
exhibition hall of the new cars, every new car was placed with a plate writing its basic 
information, including the design concept, production year, displacement, etc. When I was 
walking around, reading the information plate of a car, this classmate came to me and told me 
very proudly with a look of disdain, saying: “My cousin will never buy a car like this! Because 
the displacement is too small!” I didn’t know exactly what did she want to say at that moment. 
Of course now I know that she wanted to show off that her cousin is very rich. And besides, 
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very not environmentally friendly as well. And 10 years passed, now I still can see many friends 
or relatives of mine showing their newly bought racing car and other luxury products in the 
social media, though we all know that with the current traffic conditions in the big cities of 
China, with the serious traffic congestion, you can never make a racing car really run at a high 
speed. And imagine how ridiculous it is to see someone driving a Roadster in a polluted weather 
in Beijing, wearing a mask. 
So it is not surprising, when we see from the results of the present research, other than the 
experts, almost all of the local lay-people are fully aware of air pollution, but facing that, so 
many of them choose to be “positive adaptors” and “negative mitigators”, or even worse 
“positive non-mitigators”, if they have sufficient economic conditions. 
But as ZHANG(2014) optimistically predicted: A country that has been leading the world for 
thousands of years, and has been extremely poor for 200 years, and then quickly became rich in the past 
30 years, it is inevitable that “materialism” will rise for a while. But as time goes by, China’s cultural 
construction will also catch up. China’s cultural heritage has laid the foundation for this cultural 
construction and China’s own Renaissance. 
In this aspect, we believe that to improve people’s perception of air pollution and further 
improve people’s awareness of positive mitigation behaviors, it must focus on the publicity and 
education. 
As CS questioned: “Talking about the awareness of environment protection and energy 
conservation, is it improved because that everyone recognizes the seriousness of this matter or 
is it because of the overall improvement of the quality of citizens? This is hard to distinguish. I 
can only say that everyone’s awareness of self-protection has improved significantly, for 
example, everyone knows to wear a mask. But about the environmental awareness, I believe it 
is largely a reflection of the quality of education.” 
According to SONG(2013), the essence of “face”-consumption is an act of dishonesty, 
irrationality, and a lack of awe. To break the “face” culture, we need to build a humanistic spirit 
of integrity, rationality, and awe. Customs are a solid form of culture. To transform culture, it 
is important to transform customs. “In order to realize modernization, China must thoroughly 
renovate old customs. Otherwise, modernization is just a skin, modernization outside, and old customs 
inside, which makes it only a namely ‘modernization’.” 
In this process, we could make use of the guiding force of the mass media in the 
individualized society, as Beck(2002) stressed: 
The individualized society prepares the ground for new and multifaceted 
conflicts, ideologies and alliances, which go beyond the scope of all hitherto 
existing schematizations. These alliances are generally focused on single issues, 
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are by no means heterogeneous and are oriented toward specific situations and 
personalities. The resulting so-called structure is susceptible to the latest social 
fashions (in issues and conflicts) which, pushed by the mass media, rule the public 
consciousness just as the spring, autumn and winter fashion shows do. Fourth, 
permanent conflicts tend to arise along the lines of ascribed characteristics, 
which now as much as ever are undeniably connected with discrimination (Beck 
2002:40). 
Mass media certainly have the force to orient the common people toward the improvement 
of environmental awareness, especially as in China, under the specific political system, the 
government still play a very strong guiding role to public opinion. As we all can see the 
determination of Chinese government on environmental problems, we believe that it can play 
the guiding role, through the publicity of mass media, to improve the environmental awareness 
of people. Just as detailed explained in Chapter 1, Chinese government have been making a 
force on the publicity to improve people’ environmental awareness, promoting a thrifty lifestyle. 
Further, it will continue to change people’s outdated customs, and to make energy saving and 
emission reduction becomes a very “gain face”(有面子) behavior. 
Another focus is on education. As almost all of the experts interviewees expressed, they 
think their environmental awareness is stronger than ordinary people, which is also proved by 
the present research through their strong tendency of being “positive mitigators”, and they 
believe it is strictly related to their educational background. But here we don’t mean to make 
everyone be an expert in this area, we believe the improvement of education quality will lead 
to the improvement of citizens’ quality, which includes the high awareness of their 
responsibility to the environment. 
As CS explained: “I think that my environmental awareness is relatively strong. But I don’t 
think it is associated with the current situation of air pollution. More important is the 
improvement of the citizens’ quality of the entire generation. To raise awareness of 
environmental protection depends mainly on education. For example, the Japanese, and the 
Nordic people, they have a very strong awareness of environmental protection. Is that because 
of the serious pollution? Of course not. It’s because they are highly educated, so he developed 
a strong awareness of citizenship from an early age, which includes protecting the environment 
and saving energy. To give another example, the pollution in Bangladesh is very serious. It is 
much more serious than ours. Do they have strong environmental awareness? I’m afraid not, 
because the educational level is not good enough. So fundamentally it depends on education. I 
obviously felt it myself. Before I went to college, the whole environment in my hometown was 
like that, and everyone was like that (with no environmental awareness). It was normal to throw 
garbage everywhere. But when I came to Beijing, I found that no one was doing like that, then 
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eventually and naturally, my awareness has improved. So as to the children, I have educated 
my children since he was very little, that the garbage should be thrown into the trash-bin. Of 
course, all environmental issues are complementary, and not personal problems. For example, 
I want to throw the garbage into a trash-bin, and there must be a trash-bin. I can walk holding 
the garbage for 5 meters or 50 meters to throw it into a trash-bin. But if I need to walk with the 
garbage for 5000 meters until a trash-bin, then I’m sorry, I’m afraid I would only throw it on 
the ground. But the most fundamental thing is to rely on education. At least one is willing to 
hold this garbage and walk for 50 meters until the trash-bin.” 
The other interviewees also mentioned the importance of education on the improvement 
of people’s environmental awareness. As FG mentioned, it seems the younger people are more 
aware of this issue than older people, even the children in kinder-garden seem to be the best. 
She mentioned that now in the kinder-garden and in primary schools, children are taught a lot 
of knowledge about environmental problems, including the garbage sorting and recycling, air 
pollution, etc. So the younger people show more environmental awareness, which is deeply 
associated with the education, as for the older people, when they were at the school stage, the 
environmental problems were not an educational focus and they were not taught many about 
this issue, and along with getting old, all has become accustomed and they are unwilling to 
change anymore. That’s why it’s important to integrate environmental issues into the education 
system at a young age. But similar to CS, FG also mentioned the importance of the 
establishment of supporting industry chain. For example, people are taught to do garbage 
sorting, but when the package is complex and very difficult to distinguish its material, it makes 
impossible for people to practice it. 
To improve the education isn’t limited to the school education, family education and the 
whole social environment is also very important. As expressed in the previous section, we do 
believe that the others’ behaviors have an effect on people’s environmental behaviors. As EZ 
said that her awareness on environment is deeply rooted in her childhood experience, when her 
parents were very conscious of protecting the environment. And FG also observed that the 
environmental behaviors usually differ from office to office, which means the people in one 
office are likely to show the same environmental behaviors, and as a result, one whole office of 
people will show more awareness on environment than another office of people. 
The famous Russian educator Vasyl Sukhomlynsky said: “A child is a mirror of the moral 
life of their parents (Sukhomlynsky 2016:29).” And parents are the first teachers of the children. 
The family’s customs and habits and parents’ behaviors have a great possibility to pass on to 
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the children. 
On the other hand, one person’s behaviors also have an impact on the whole family. In this 
aspect, education also has great potential to improve the environmental awareness of the society. 
For example, if a child is taught to be more concerned about energy conservation, when he sees 
something deviated from the concept, he will point it out and tell the other family members to 
change. As a result, it will improve the environmental awareness of the whole family, further 
to make more people becoming “positive mitigators”. 
At the same time, AC and HZ both put forward that the improvement of people’s 
environmental awareness is largely influenced by various aspects, not only the education, but 
also the constraints of the policy system. The improvement of environmental awareness is a 
process of continuous interaction. The environmental awareness will not be simply improved 
by learning from school or by publicity, there must be some constraints as well. Especially for 
those people whose habits have been solidified, we can only rely on economic and 
administrative means, by improving the cost of their emissions, to correct their behaviors. For 
example, to collect the congestion fee or pollution fee to increase the cost of driving, eventually 
people will reduce or give up driving. “Of course, in the process of implementing the policies, 
some people will refuse or evade it, or even protest to the government, but with the constantly 
improvement of the policies, and people’s constant adaptation to the policies, eventually 
people’s environmental awareness will be improved as well.” Said AC. 
Some other interviewees also mentioned that one of the main reasons that the local people 
don’t take mitigation behaviors is that they are not well informed and convinced what exactly 
is the origin of the air pollution. As EZ, CS and HZ said: “Yes, we are promoting energy 
conservation and emission reduction, and smog is particularly serious, but the most lacking 
point in the publicity is that we have not linked smog to our behaviors. For example, if you 
could clearly tell the residents that 30% of the smog came from private cars, then everyone will 
know that we should try to reduce the driving. But until now, the recent researches haven’t 
gotten a certain convincing conclusion. Especially when the media give us some questionable 
conclusions, then in fact they are playing a negative role. For example, I remember that once 
earlier the media have said ‘According to some research, the restaurant industry is the main 
cause of smog’, the people would think ‘Are you kidding me? Isn’t this a nonsense?’ And there 
are also researches said that the transformation from coal-burned heating to gas-burned heating 
may be the biggest source of pollution for PM2.5, because natural gas combustion mainly 
produces water vapor, and water vapor is easier to combine with other substances in the air, 
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suspended in the air, forming PM2.5. So I think making a linkage between air pollution and 
people’s behaviors is very important. Because the people do feel the smog, but they don’t know 
where the smog came from, and they have various behaviors and activities every day. So our 
media and scientific research should build a particularly clear logical chain here, rather than 
just saying the empty slogans as ‘We should save energy! We should reduce emissions!’” 
People’s environmental awareness and perception of the risk of air pollution is influenced 
by the fact that people’s lack of trust toward expert system. This is exactly a reflection of the 
contradictory identity of experts along with the contradiction of techno-scientific development 
in the process of scientization. 
On one hand, experts are no longer being completely trusted as before, experts went down 
the altar and began to be doubted by the lay people. Firstly, because people’s attitudes of trust, 
or lack of trust, toward specific abstract systems (such as expert system) are strongly influenced 
by experiences at access points and updates of knowledge via the communications media and 
other sources (Giddens 1990:88-92). Secondly, because the scientific skepticism reaches to the 
lay people along with the complete scientization of reflexive modernity. According to Beck 
(1992:155-168), the dynamism of primary scientization is the contrast of tradition and 
modernity, of lay people and experts. The second phase is based on a complete scientization, 
which also extends scientific skepticism to the inherent foundations and external consequences 
of science itself. In that way both its claim to truth and its claim to enlightenment are 
demystified. People are freed from the “patronizing” cognitive dictates of the experts (Illich 
1979). More and more people are able to play the role of assessors of science. On the other hand, 
nobody can any longer claim to be an expert in conditions of modernity. In other words, all of 
us are lay persons in respect of the vast majority of expert systems (Giddens 1990:146). 
What’s more, the scientization not only brought the crisis of trust towards the experts, 
which further influences people’s perception and environmental behaviors towards air pollution, 
in fact it is also strictly related to the risk of air pollution itself. 
All of the characteristics of modernity, such as globalization, individualization, the 
urbanization and the rapid expansion of big cities, are all related with the development of 
science and technology. As Giddens (1990:153) justified, one of the most important reasons for 
the persisting unintended consequences of modern society is the circularity of social knowledge, 
which affects in the first instance the social world. In conditions of modernity, the social world 
can never form a stable environment in terms of the input of new knowledge about its character 
and functioning. New knowledge (concepts, theories, findings) does not simply render the 
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social world more transparent, but alters its nature, spinning it off in novel directions. The 
impact of this phenomenon is fundamental to the juggernaut-like quality of modernity and 
affects socialized nature as well as social institutions themselves. For although knowledge about 
the natural world does not affect the world in a direct way, the circularity of social knowledge 
incorporates elements of nature via the technological components of abstract systems. In other 
words, science and technology was the power source of the modernization. And it is continue 
being the origin of the second modernization, or the reflexive modernization, of which different 
conditions and processes, different media and agents are characteristic than were typical of error 
management processes in the phase of primary scientization (Beck 1992:158). 
The historically novel quality of today’s risks derives from internal decision. 
They depend on a simultaneously scientific and social construction. Science is 
one of the causes, the medium of definition and the source of solutions of risks, 
and by virtue of that very fact it opens new markets of scientization for itself. In 
the reciprocal interplay between risks it has helped to cause and define, and the 
public critique of those same risks, techno-scientific development becomes 
contradictory (Beck 1992:155) 
Here, the contradiction of techno-scientific development can be understood in two levels: 
first, it is contradictory because itself is at the same time the cause, the definition and the 
solution of risks; second, it is contradictory and has its limits as the cause, the definition and 
the solution of risks. 
 As to the problem of air pollution, with no doubt it is a result of industrialization, 
considering the directly industrial emissions and the emissions during the use of industrial 
products, fuel vehicles for example. And the industrialization itself is a result of development 
of science and technology. In this aspect, science and technology is the cause of the risk of air 
pollution. But at the same time, it could be the solution of air pollution as well. 
All of the interviewees believe that it is fundamentally relying on the development of 
science and technology to solve environmental problems. As they believe, “Technology will 
definitely promote the improvement of the environment. (HZ)” And “The environmental risks 
brought about by technology are controllable. (IC)”. 
Just as HZ explained: “Along with the improvement of technology, human’s ability to 
transform nature has certainly improved. And in the past, the development of technology didn’t 
consider much about the natural environment, so it did some harm to nature. But now that 
people are aware of the importance of environmental quality, so the development of technology 
in the future will definitely consider green technology and low-carbon technology. Ultimately, 
the environment must be improved by technology.” 
Talking about the air pollution control, he further explained the fundamental role of 
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scientific and technological development, as he said: “At present, natural science research on 
air pollution is not sufficient, compared with the research on greenhouse gases, it is still less 
mature. When natural scientists clearly figure out what exactly is the composition of PM2.5, and 
what is the source of emissions, then follow-up of that, our social scientists can do our work, to 
research on how to optimize the structure of industry, how to make the policies of emission 
reduction, how to evaluate the effect of emission reduction, etc.” 
As to CS, “Basically, human problems are solved by science.” He gave an example: “It 
was around 17th and 18th centuries, in Western countries, to a large extent, they had been 
burning whale oil, which is made by the fat of whales, for energy, such as kerosene. Therefore, 
whaling in the Atlantic Ocean was very popular. At that time, everyone was worried that what 
if whales were extinct one day? The problem was indeed discovered at the time, that the number 
of whales dropped sharply. Then what? It was solved by the successful large-scale exploitation 
of oil. Then the number of whales went up immediately. So fundamentally it must depends on 
science and technology. For another example, we are now mining oil quickly, and to solve that 
is still fundamentally depending on developing new clean energy. You see, as soon as oil shale 
was developed in the United States, oil prices immediately fell down. But this is short-term. In 
the long term, it depends on clean energy, like nuclear energy, solar energy or others. But 
science is always an unpredictable thing. So we can only give a trend, but it is difficult to give 
a concrete prediction. We can’t predict exactly which technology will finally solve the problem, 
nor can we predict when this technology will be successfully developed. So we have to rely on 
science, but we cannot rely entirely on science.” 
As he said, to fundamentally solve environmental problems, we have to rely on the 
development of science and technology, but we can’t rely entirely on science and technology. 
At the same time, and for the present stage of development of the country, the policies-choices 
is still playing a very important role. 
“Of course, the problem of the environment is also a problem of development. If we want 
to solve the environmental problem, it is very simple, just let everyone stop discharging. But 
we can’t, because our development still has to keep up. So we have to weigh and choose 
between development and environmental governance. It is fundamentally a trade-off to find a 
solution that everyone can accept. So right now, as long as we haven’t found the fundamental 
solution through the development of science and technology, to realize the sustainable 
development, we should still rely on the policies to make this balance between environment 
and development. Maybe decades after, when we fundamentally solved the environmental 
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problem and we look back, we would say that it was finally solved by a certain technology, but 
right now, in the year of 2018, we are still counting on policies, because it’s the only thing we 
can grasp at the moment.” 
On the other side, policies also play an important role of orientation during the 
development of technology and the process of environmental management. BL as an economist, 
he explained: “In fact, what do you think is the hottest aspect of technology today? It is 
environmental engineering, especially in the interdisciplinary field of environment and energy, 
including the topics like the management of mercury pollution and the management of volatile 
organic compounds (VOCs). To put it bigger, this involves a change in the pattern of 
international trade. Because, I believe the global sustainable development and green 
development are a big irreversible trend. Since you have to follow this path, you must have the 
support of relevant technology. And who is in control of these technologies? The EU and the 
United States. Our country is among the countries that are catching up with them. We have a 
lot of technologies of those kind, but few of them have reached the top level. Why is the EU 
pushing up the problem of climate change so urgently? So that its related technology can be 
sold. The perspective chosen by them is that they stand at the commanding heights of morality, 
but in fact it is hidden behind its actual interests. Of course, there are some areas very vulnerable 
to climate change, where are very easy to be flooded by seawater, and there are also many 
animals at risk of extinction. It is right to concern about climate change, but we should also 
carefully consider our agenda to push up this problems. Because if we push this agenda all the 
way up, our country will be forced to achieve a certain goal of carbon reduction. This pressure 
is great, then we must be forced to eliminate the steel industry and the cement industry. But 
then, how to solve the problem of people’s livelihood in our country? Environmental protection 
is good, but how do you solve the problems of people’s livelihood while protecting the 
environment? This is not easy to achieve.” 
In summary, due to cultural and social reasons, the environmental awareness of ordinary 
local people in Beijing is insufficient and people’s risk perception of air pollution and 
corresponding behaviors are still not very appropriate. For example, facing air pollution, most 
of the local people have chosen to take “positive adaptation” behaviors as well as “negative 
mitigation” or even “positive non-mitigation” behaviors. In this regard, it is necessary to 
strengthen publicity and education to improve people’s environmental awareness. On the other 
hand, it also requires policy constraints and guidance to people’s pro-environmental behaviors. 
At the same time, the problem of air pollution itself, as the consequences of scientization and 
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industrialization, it ultimately need to be fundamentally resolved by the development of science 
and technology. However, due to the unpredictability of development of science and technology, 
in this process, policies need to play an important role in achieving a balance between 
development and the environment. 
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Final Comments 
Due to the rapid development of science and technology and the expansion of globalization, 
human society began to enter a “risk society” era (Beck, 1992; 2009). 
Risk is not just a matter of individual action. There are “environments of risk” that 
collectively affect large masses of individuals – in some instances, potentially everyone on the 
face of the earth, as in the case of the risk of ecological disaster or nuclear war. 
The specific risk profile of modernity may be outlined in the following way: globalization 
of risk in the sense of intensity; globalization of risk in the sense of the expanding number of 
contingent events which affect everyone or at least large numbers of people on the planet; risk 
stemming from the built environment, or socialized nature: the infusion of human knowledge 
into the material environment; the development of institutionalized risk environments affecting 
the life chances of millions; awareness of risk as risk; the well-distributed awareness of risk; 
awareness of the limitations of expertise: no expert system can be wholly expert in terms of the 
consequences of the adoption of expert principles (Giddens, 1990:124-125). 
According to Giddens (1990:146-147), the possibility of global calamity, whether by 
nuclear war or other means, prevents us from reassuring ourselves with the assumption that the 
life of the species inevitably surpasses that of the individual, but no one knows how remote that 
possibility is. Interestingly, as Giddens (1990:146-147) observed, balanced against the deep 
anxieties which such circumstances must produce in virtually everyone, is the psychological 
prop of the feeling that “there’s nothing that I as an individual can do,” and that at any rate the 
risk must be very slight. Business-as-usual is a prime element in the stabilizing of trust and 
ontological security, and this no doubt applies in respect of high-consequence risks just as it 
does in other areas of trust relations. 
Climate change can be considered a component of a new set of contemporary 
environmental risks produced by the scientific and technological development process, which 
is qualitatively different from the typical risks of pre-industrial and industrial societies (Beck 
1992, 1995, 2010a). These new postindustrial risks would be characterized thus by their global 
scope, by the incomplete understanding of their causes and consequences, by being 
immeasurable and impossible to be compensated, and most often invisible (i.e., phenomena that 
require expertise in relation to their recognition and their measurement). Therefore, they would 
be uncontrollable and difficult to have responsibilities assigned, often irreversible (Ferreira; 
Barbi, 2016). 
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According to the debates around the risk theory presented by Beck (1992, 2009), the risks 
given by climate change are characterized by escaping from the sense perception, that is, they 
are phenomena located in the abstract of physical equations and chemical formulas, remaining 
thus invisible to the daily perceptions. They can be changed, expanded, dramatized or 
minimized within the knowledge and thus are open to definition and social construction. 
Moreover, these risks are closely related to the future and to the misfortunes evaluated in 
probabilistic projections regarding different future possibilities. 
In the risk society, the technical and industrial development causes are unpredictable, 
invisible and incalculable risks that require self-reflection and self-confrontation of society with 
respect to the base of social cohesion and the examination of the grounds of their rationality. 
The boundaries between nature and culture are pulverized against a historical setting permeated 
by multiple porosities between natural and artificial, between nature and culture. The risk that 
characterizes contemporary industrial society is closely involved with future projections, with 
the misfortunes actively assessed in relation to the possibilities and the probable situations with 
which our society has only limited experience (Beck 1992, 2000b, 2009; Giddens 2005, 2009). 
These characteristics are closely related to the risks of climate change and are influenced by the 
increasing globalization (Young et al., 2006), which is one of the fundamental consequences of 
modernity (Giddens, 1990). 
Going through a “compressed modernization”, China is currently experiencing the 
predicament of a synchronic coercion from the first and the second modernity, to which risk 
society might possibly provide a solution of “alternative social imaginary” (Deng, 2010). 
Due to its synchronicity of first and second modernity, China’s risk problems have shown 
greater complexity than in the West. The paradox of risk conflict is that in China, risk can 
promote rationalization and institutional transformation. However, risk also eliminates the basis 
of industrialization and first modernization. China is moving toward an industrialized, risk-
based society that is in the process of transforming itself into a modern state that has been 
traditionalized by reflexive modernity (Deng, 2006). The “compressed modernization” of 
Chinese society strengthens the production of risks without leaving time for the systematic 
anticipation and management of risks. 
Climate change and air pollution are strongly linked in China as the major GHGs and 
major air pollutants come from the same source, i.e. fossil fuels (Jiang et al., 2013; see also 
Barbi 2016). This is firmly related to the coal-based energy structure and the industry-based 
economic growth model of China during a long history. And the governmental resolutions to 
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the problem of air pollution and the response to climate change are aiming at the same purpose 
- transformation of energy structure and optimize the economic growth model. What’s more, 
the perception of the risk of air pollution also shows the similar unique characteristics to the 
perception of the risk of climate changes, such as the breadth of risk awareness, the differences 
in risk perception subjects and the conflict between risk perception and action. So as to the 
present research, to the case of Beijing, China, it is hard to extract “air pollution” from the topic 
of “climate change”.  
Recently, China, especially its famous capital and international big city Beijing, has been 
marked with a new label of “air pollution”. In fact, this is not a new problem. But the problem 
of air pollution is getting worse in recent years. We can see this problem from two points of 
view: Firstly, the air pollution is truly getting worse. Besides the geographic conditions and the 
energy matrix based on coal burning, with the high speed of industrial development and the 
following improvement of people’s living standards, there are much more energy consume and 
emissions during the production and the daily life than earlier. A good example is the rapidly 
increasing quantity of the ownership of private cars in the big cities as Beijing. Secondly, the 
problem of air pollution is getting much more attention. Once again, because of the industrial 
development and the following improvement of people’s living standards, the higher request of 
living conditions and the high speed spreading of information, people are getting aware of the 
problem and feel it threaten to their lives. At the same time, as China is getting more and more 
influential and having more and more attention of the world, along with its achievements, the 
problems are also exposed to the world. From the cosmopolitan vision (Beck 2004), in respect 
of the balance of security and danger which modernity introduces into our lives, there are no 
longer “others” – no one can be completely outside (Giddens 1990:149). In addition, air 
pollution and climate change are strongly linked in China as the major GHGs and major air 
pollutants come from the same source, i.e. fossil fuels (Jiang et al., 2013; see also Barbi 2016). 
Then, a local problem is no longer a local problem, everyone is feeling part of it. As a result, 
the problem of air pollution in Beijing is becoming an important international problem of which 
is talking by the entire world. 
Just as Beck (2002:167) observed, two epochal processes, individualization and 
globalization, are changing the foundations of living together in all spheres of social action. 
Both only superficially appear to be threats; they force but they also permit society to prepare 
and reshape itself for a second modernity. It is essential to recognize that cultural 
individualization and globalization create precisely that historical orientation and those 
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preconditions for an adaptation of institutions to a coming second modernity that are obstructed 
by the institutions (or those controlling them). The problem is that there are obstacles in 
perception. To cross the obstacles of perception, Beck gave rise to a methodologically 
cosmopolitan vision (Beck, 2006). 
The local air pollution in Beijing is becoming a global problem, both for its hazard and for 
its influence, and global risks have the power to mix a variety of irresponsible organized 
mechanisms and open these mechanisms for global (political) action. In order to answer the 
difficult problem, China needs to work closely with other countries. Which means, the 
cosmopolitan vision could be taken as a method to analyze and to resolve the problem. In my 
research, cosmopolitan vision is used when it comes to the analysis of the consequences of air 
pollution, the public environmental policies and most importantly, the local people’s reactions. 
Together with the globalization, individualization is another epochal process we are 
experiencing. Faced with the uncertainty of the globalized world, individuals have to make their 
own decisions. This new form of individualization is the result of the failure of experts in the 
management of risks (Beck 2009:54). People are thrown back upon themselves: disembedding 
without embedding is the ironic-tragic formula for this dimension of individualization in world 
risk society. The technological and social revolutions, which either still lie ahead or are already 
in full swing, will unleash a profound individualization of lifestyles (Beck 2005:39). 
When it comes to the problem of air pollution, one of the obstacles that we meet combined 
with the individualization is the absence of legal norms or, more precisely, the limits of the 
validity of legal norms. Because pollution always has multi-polluters, which makes it 
impossible to prove guilt, since this requires a proof of individual responsibility. At the same 
time, by the other side, there is no good way to protect the individuals from the pollution. 
As Yan (2009) indicated, Chinese society is undergoing an individualization 
transformation. Detraditionalization, disembedment, the creation of a life of one’s own by 
DIY(Do-it-yourself) biographic work, and the irresistible pressure to be more independent and 
individualistic are all indicators of individualization in Western Europe that have also occurred 
to Chinese individuals. Identity politics and institutional changes play a key role in promoting 
the process of individualization in both cases. Finally, the impact of globalization on 
individualization is equally important in Western Europe and China, albeit in different ways. 
One of the most important problems that come along with the individualization closely 
related to the environmental behavior of the individuals is the conflict of values in the Second 
Modernity. The much demonized decline of values actually produces the orientations and 
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prerequisites which will put the society in a position to master the future (Beck 2002:161). The 
old pattern of “more income, more consumption, more career, more conspicuous consumption” 
is breaking up and being replaced by a new weighting of priorities, which may often be difficult 
to decipher, but in which immaterial factors of the quality of life play an outstanding part. 
Beck drew a promising blueprint to our future, to the environmental problems, especially 
to the air pollution problem in the big cities, where the industrializing process is deteriorating 
the problem. This may be true in industrialized societies, but the situation may not be that 
optimistic in the developing countries. As mentioned before, the Chinese case of 
individualization simultaneously demonstrates pre-modern, modern and postmodern conditions, 
China is still on its way. 
Just as mentioned above, all of the characteristics of modernity, such as globalization, 
individualization, the urbanization and the rapid expansion of big cities, are all related with the 
development of science and technology. 
Science and technology was the power source of the modernization. And it is continue 
being the origin of the second modernization, or the reflexive modernization, of which different 
conditions and processes, different media and agents are characteristic than were typical of error 
management processes in the phase of primary scientization (Beck 1992:158). 
Here, the contradiction of techno-scientific development can be understood in two levels: 
first, it is contradictory because itself is at the same time the cause, the definition and the 
solution of risks; second, it is contradictory and has its limits as the cause, the definition and 
the solution of risks. 
Along with the contradiction of techno-scientific development in the process of 
scientization, the identity of experts is also becoming contradictory. On one hand, experts are 
no longer being completely trusted as before, experts went down the altar and began to be 
doubted by the lay people. On the other hand, nobody can any longer claim to be an expert in 
conditions of modernity. 
At the same time, social vulnerability has become a key aspect of social inequality in the 
world’s risk society: social processes and conditions allow people to tackle inequalities 
unevenly. 
But as well as the climate change increases the inequality between the poor and the rich, 
the center and the edge, it also eliminates it. The greater the threat, the less likely the richer and 
the more powerful people to escape from it. Climate change is hierarchical and democratic 
(Beck 2009, 2011). From this point of view, experts as part of “we” of the decision-maker, no 
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matter how much information do they have more than the lay people, and no matter how many 
benefits do they get from the decisions, when the risks are big enough, no one will escape from 
it. 
For these reasons above, a research of the risk perception of the individuals with the social 
identity of “experts” and their environmental behaviors in the face of air pollution will gain 
importance not only for the social analysis of the consequences of modernity in the Chinese 
society in the case of environmental risks, but also to preview the tendency of public politics 
and its results on the environmental problems. But just as justified above, in condition of 
modernity, the identity of “experts” is becoming contradictory and vague, so I would rather 
name them as “scientists” than “experts”. 
1.The risk of air pollution in Beijing and the governmental responses 
As a global actor, China can be considered as a key country in the international climate 
policy (Basso and Viola 2014; Ferreira and Barbi 2014; Moreira 2015). Moreover, it is also the 
largest GHG emitter in the world since 2007, when it overtook the USA (Moreira 2015). 
What is more noteworthy is the current stage of development in China. Undoubtedly, 
China’s economic leap is accompanied by the increasing degree of industrialization and the 
rapid development of technology. The industrialization and the development of technology 
deepens the degree of risk and expands its scope under the risk logic of the second modernity. 
China is now in a period of vigorous development. It is still a large developing country, 
and there are still vast underdeveloped rural areas and a large number of people in poverty. As 
the government insists, for China, “Development is still the first priority”, and the overall view 
of this country is still experiencing the first modernity. However, we also should be aware of 
that, with the rapid industrialization process, and under the context of globalization, some of 
the well-developed international metropolises in China, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen, etc. have inevitably entered the stage of second modernity. “Unexpected side-effects” 
like air pollution have becoming main concerns of people who live in it. 
Currently in China, pollution of water and air is one of the most alarming. According to 
UNEP (United Nations Environment Program), Beijing is among the twenty most polluted 
cities on the planet (UNEP, 2007). Air pollution is one of the most alarming risks in Beijing. 
The air quality of this megacity is a result of three factors: the geography of the city - it is 
surrounded by mountains that do not allow the pollutants to disperse; population growth; and 
economic expansion (UNEP, 2007). 
Chinese economic growth has been powered by a coal-dominated surging fossil fuel 
237 
 
 
consumption, resulting in the highest emission levels for such as CO2, SO2, NOx and primary 
PM in the world. Regional uneven development concentrates most of the population, economic 
activities, and emissions in eastern and central China, resulting in an overall severe air pollution 
situation in these regions, with its city clusters being most heavily affected (Jin et al. 2016). 
The air pollution in China has been estimated by the Global Burden of Disease (GBD) 
Study  to lead to 1.2 million premature deaths from one year’s (2010) exposure in China, and 
in multiple studies, to cause annual economic losses equivalent to between 1% and 7% of 
China’s GDP, partially or even totally offsetting China’s current annual GDP growth. 
As to Beijing, being a pioneer in developing countries, it is objectively required that 
Beijing must aim at the high-end form of international cities and continuously improve the level 
of urban internationalization. However, environmental pollution has become a gap for Beijing 
to attract multinational corporations, international organizations and high-end talents around 
the world. Seriously hindered the pace of construction of the world’s cities. Beijing’s pollution 
not only brings huge economic losses, but also poses a huge threat to the health of the citizens. 
Air pollution has an intense relationship with respiratory diseases and cardiovascular diseases. 
China’s air pollution is so extreme in 2015, independent research group Berkeley Earth 
estimated it contributed to 1.6 million deaths per year in the country. In 2012, the number of 
people who died at relatively young age in Beijing due to PM2.5 reached to 2,589, and the 
economic loss reached to 2.06 billion (Pan, 2012). 
In China, the major air pollution problems have been mainly attributable to coal burning 
and industry processes during the early stage of economic development. Recently vehicle 
emissions have become an increasing problem in urban areas, especially the megacities. 
Four decades of extremely fast economic growth turned China into the world’s biggest 
carbon emitter. But now the government is trying to change that without damaging the economy 
(Jeff Kearns et al. 2018).  
In terms of responses to climate change, specifically to air pollution in the case of China, 
it has been argued that governments are important protagonists that play a fundamental role in 
defining standards, institutions and appropriate ways of governance to address these risks at 
different levels and scales (Giddens 2005, 2009; Alber and Kern 2008; Bulkeley and Newell 
2010; Ferreira et al. 2016). China strives to balance the relationship between economic 
development and the protection of resources and the environment. 
Risks can be changed by modifying the activity or initial scenario or by minimizing their 
impacts (Renn, 2008). In the case of air pollution, societies can reduce pollutant emissions 
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(mitigation), thereby reducing the pace and magnitude of pollution, and adapt to their impacts. 
These responses can, and should, be complementary. The political responses to air pollution 
are defined as any action taken by any governmental actor in the different levels and sectors of 
action to face climate change, being directed to both mitigation of the problem and adaptation 
to the impacts brought about by this pollution. 
Since the late 1970s, when legislation and institutions to protect the environment have 
been created, China has adopted a series of policies and programs aimed at mitigating climate 
change, or to be more specific, mitigating air pollution, either within the civil society and the 
government sphere. The measures stood out for its diversity and coverage (MacBean 2007; 
Oliveira 2011; Ferreira and Barbi 2013; Ferreira et al. 2016). 
And from 2007, when the first National Climate Change Program was launched, Chinese 
environmental governance was marked by the establishment of structures, including 
government agencies, by building accountability systems for reducing carbon intensity, 
conducting climate change studies, by promoting specific legislation, in order to strengthen 
governance of systems and mechanisms in connection with the problem (Barbi & Ferreira 2016). 
First of all, a series of legislations and plans were carried out. For example, the National 
Environmental and Health Action Plan (2007-2015), which marks the beginning of the 
integration of environmental and health concepts into the economic and social development. In 
2012, China’s first comprehensive air pollution prevention and control plan, the “Twelfth Five-
Year Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and Control in Key Areas” was approved, which 
indicates that China’s air pollution prevention and control work is gradually changed the 
guidance from the total amount control of pollutants to the goal of improving environmental 
quality. In the same year, August of 2012, the State Council officially issued the “Twelfth Five-
Year Plan for Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction”. And the most important, in 2013, 
the State Council issued the “Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan” (referred to as 
“Ten Articles of Atmosphere”), which proposed 35 comprehensive measures in 10 aspects on 
air pollution. What’s more, after the revision of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law 
(Revised Draft) in 2009 and the new “Environmental Protection Law” in 2013, in 2015, the 
Law on the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution was revised and approved. 
Also, the government set up more strict standard and clearer supervision measures on air 
pollution control. “Environmental Air Quality Standards” (GB3095-2012) and its supporting 
standard “Air Quality Index (AQI) Technical Regulations (Trial)” (HJ633-2012) were issued 
in 2012. The government also further strengthened the control requirements for air pollutants 
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in key industries and fields, and promulgated series of steel and coking industrial pollutants 
emission standards. 
In 2014, the “Environmental Quality Forecast and Warning Center” was established, and 
the “Monitoring and Early Warning Program for Heavy Pollution Weather in Beijing-Tianjin-
Hebei and Surrounding Areas (Trial)” was issued, and the “Detailed Implementation Rules for 
Monitoring and Early Warning of Heavy Pollution Weather in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei and 
Surrounding Areas (Trial)” was prepared. From October 1, 2013, the daily environmental air 
quality forecast for the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region was carried out. In 2014, the air quality 
forecast and warning platform for the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze River Delta and Pearl 
River Delta regions was basically completed. Further, in 2016, the MEP actively promoted the 
construction of big data projects of the ecological environment, and made positive progress in 
the integration and application of data resources. 
At the same time, the Chinese government focuses on special seasons with frequent heavy 
pollution, with close monitoring and is well-prepared to take emergency measures. And during 
the major events, the government also took urgent temporary measures to ensure air quality. 
Chinese government also strengthened the environmental supervision and law 
enforcement, with strict emission reduction responsibility assessment. From 2014, the 
environmental protection department began to use high-tech means such as satellite and drone 
to adopt cooperative-law-enforcement, comprehensive-law-enforcement, and regional-law-
enforcement. MEP can conduct comprehensive environmental supervision and publicly 
interview and question the main leaders of the cities. 
In 2016, the environmental protection tax law, the environmental impact assessment law, 
the marine environmental protection law and other legal amendments were revised. It was also 
revised the “Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate 
on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Laws in Handling Environmental Pollution 
Criminal Cases”. 
As mentioned before, Chinese economic growth has been powered by a coal-dominated 
surging fossil fuel consumption, so logically the first concentration of Chinese government on 
control of air pollution is aimed at energy. And the first effort of Chinese government to achieve 
the goal in control of air pollution is actively promoting the clean and efficient use of coal. The 
reduction of coal consumption in national scale has always been a central consideration of 
Chinese government. The government keep strengthening the clean energy security in key areas, 
strictly controlling the new coal-consuming projects in key air pollution prevention and control 
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areas such as Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta, and put 
forward the replacement of high-quality coal in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region. Besides the 
strict requirement and high standard of emission to the coal-fired industries, the government 
also took measure to promote the intensive large-scale energy bases to replace the small units, 
to improve the efficiency of coal-burning. 
It is also noticed that one of the most important and urgent task for China’s war on energy 
conservation and emission reduction is actively and steadily resolving the excess capacity of 
industry. 
At the same time, transformation of energy structure is also important and even more 
essential. The government actively develop natural gas distributed energy, and promote the 
application of natural gas in vehicles and ships. And China is spending more than twice as much 
as the U.S. on clean-energy investment. Two-thirds of solar panels are produced in China. 
In the transportation sector, China already has one of the largest fleets in the world of bus 
powered by compressed-natural-gas (Jeff Kearns et al. 2018). The country also invests in the 
development of electric cars, in the set of projects called Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), which tries to create leading groups in the sector and the establishment of research 
institutions on the subject. The new-energy automobile industry is one of the strategic emerging 
industries that China has focused on, and it has also been included in one of the ten key 
development areas in the “Made in China 2025” strategy. 
In order to implement the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and 
Control of Air Pollution, to control the emission of motor vehicles, the emission standard for 
vehicles and standards for oil products are strictly prescribed. At the same time, the government 
keep strengthening the supervision of environmental protection compliance for new vehicles 
production. And car management system is constantly improving. The government also actively 
accelerated the elimination of the yellow-labeled vehicles. At the same time, the government 
have been making a big effort to develop the public transportation. 
Chinese government has realized that the control of air pollution must be conducted in a 
regionally collaborative way. In 2010, the General Office of the State Council forwarded the 
“Guiding Opinions on Promoting Air Pollution Joint Prevention and Joint Control Work to 
Improve Regional Air Quality” to the MEP and other eight departments, and clarified the 
guiding ideology and work objectives of air pollution prevention and control in China in the 
recent coming years. It is China’s first comprehensive policy on air pollution prevention and 
control. As well, in 2016, the joint supervision mechanism for environmental information 
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disclosure of listed companies was established. 
Most importantly, Chinese government doesn’t hesitate to invest in air pollution control. 
According to MEP, from 2013, the central government set up a special fund for air pollution 
prevention and control. In the same year, it allocated 5 billion yuan14 to support the air pollution 
control programs in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei and surrounding areas. Also in 2013, it launched and 
implemented the Clean Air Research Program. In 2014, the central government successively 
arranged a special fund of 10 billion yuan15 to support the prevention and control of air pollution 
in various places. In 2017, the central government’s special funds for prevention and control of 
atmospheric, water and soil pollution reached 49.7 billion yuan16. 
On the other hand, in recent years, the government has increasingly noticed the importance 
of raising people’s awareness of environmental protection, awareness of energy conservation 
and emission reduction, and environmental participation through publicity and education. In 
2015, the government launched a publicity campaign with the theme of “Practicing Green 
Living” to accelerate the “green” lifestyles. 
In 1998, Beijing began an intensified air pollution control programme, and over the last 
20 years the city has implemented a series of measures including energy infrastructure 
optimization, coal-fired pollution control and vehicle emission controls. The government’s 
efforts turn into significant results. Heavy air pollution days in key cities are down 50 percent 
in five years. Five years ago, Beijing’s “airpocalypse” unleashed criticism of the government 
so searing that even Chinese state media joined in. In the five years from 2013 to 2017, fine 
particulate pollution (PM2.5) in Beijing fell by 35% and by 25% in surrounding regions (UNEP 
2019). In 2017, the capital’s average daily concentration of PM2.5 particles was almost a third 
lower than in 2015, compared with declines of about a tenth for some other major cities. 
2.The risk perception of air pollution and pro-environmental behavior in relation to 
local environmental policies of the scientists in Beijing 
a. The risk perception of air pollution 
Air pollution in Beijing is a phenomenon, it is not a catastrophe yet, it hasn’t caused any 
large-scale mass health events. So how much the threat does everyone feel about it differs from 
people to people. 
From the data collected from the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) in 2006, the 
results show that, in general, Chinese residents have a very strong risk perception to the 
 
14 According to FED, in 2013, 1 USD = 6.1 yuan (RMB). 
15 According to FED, in 2014, 1USD=6.2yuan(RMB). 
16 According to FED, in 2017, 1USD=6.7yuan(RMB). 
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problems challenged to Chinese development, especially for the energy and environment 
problems. Besides, residents’ risk perception is mainly determined by individual cognitive 
ability, media-contacts, urban and rural segmentation, and social status. Specifically, those who 
have higher education, more frequently media contacts, and higher social status, will have 
stronger risk perception. The urban residents have stronger risk perception than the rural 
residents. 
As to the present research, how is the local scientists’ risk perception of air pollution in 
Beijing? As the result shows, most of the respondents of the questionnaire believe that air 
pollution is threatening to their health and the health of their family members. 
What’s more, all the interviewees that have children in their family expressed their concern 
of the threat of air pollution to the health of their children, because the children are more 
vulnerable, as they are less resistant to the pollution. 
Meanwhile, other than the health impacts, all of the interviewees believe that the air 
pollution didn’t cause any increased cost of living. 
Coincidentally to the research of CGSS, in general, the interviewees agreed that the risk 
perception of air pollution of the local residents is sufficient high, and they have shown a strong 
enough awareness of self-protection. 
Some interviewees even hold the opinion that the risk perception of the local residents are 
exaggerated. One of the reasons is that the general public is easily misled by the media. Another 
reason is that people’s understanding of the effects of governmental governance on air pollution 
is relatively lagging behind. 
b. The understanding of the local environmental policies 
Just as justified in previous chapters, the situation of air pollution in China, and more 
specifically in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region is getting much better during 2013-2017. But 
the understanding of the environmental policies and people’s attitude and satisfaction towards 
the current policies and the current situation of air quality differs from people to people. 
Most of the respondents have some understanding about the policies for control of air 
pollution. 4.85% of the respondents are fully aware of the policies and will actively follow the 
updates. 45.63% of the respondents confirm that they have a certain understanding, and only 
care about the policies that involve their immediate interests. 37.86% of the respondents say 
that they have a basic understanding, they do not follow by interest, but often receive relevant 
information. From this aspect we can tell that the public propaganda has a certain effect on the 
residents’ understanding of air pollution control. But still, there are 11.65% of the respondents 
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do not have any understanding about this issue. 
As to the problem of satisfaction toward the environmental policies, most of the local 
scientists are satisfied with the air pollution control and are supporting the current 
environmental policies. 
Most of the respondents positively think the current air pollution control in Beijing is 
effective, with a proportion of 58.65%. But still, there are 35.58% of the respondents think the 
current air pollution control in Beijing is just general and the air quality has not improved 
significantly. And there are even 5.77% that gave a totally negative evaluation about the air 
pollution control in Beijing, saying that it is invalid and the air pollution continues to deteriorate. 
The interviewees, which needs to be emphasized again that they are experts in the area of 
environment policies, being part of the policies’ makers and the policies’ recipients at the same 
time, they have shown more satisfaction and tolerance to the current measures of air pollution 
control. For the interviewees, all of them agreed that the current air pollution control is effective. 
But they also pointed out that although the effectiveness of current air pollution control is 
significant and obvious, the price is also very high, and sometimes it has walked backtrack. 
Most of the local scientists in Beijing are still optimistic about the future situation of air 
pollution. But to the environmental scientists, to preview the future air pollution control, or 
more specifically to answer how long it will take to completely resolve the air pollution, is not 
that easy. 
The environmental scientists agreed that, the achievement of China on air pollution control 
until now is directly related to the strong government management, which can be considered as 
the superiority of system of China, in other words, the importance of the strong government 
leadership on air pollution control. 
To be more detailed, the most effective measures to air pollution control are the 
administrative means with regard to the pollution sources and strengthening management from 
tree aspects. First, industry. Including the adjustment of industrial structure, moving these 
polluting enterprises out of Beijing, strict industrial control in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei area and 
shutting down the highly polluting factories. Second, governance to reduce coal-burn. 
Especially governance of heating measures, changing from coal-heating to gas-heating, and 
governance of industrial small furnace. And third, transportation. For example, the fuel quality 
improvement, control of the yellow-labeled vehicle, restrict travel of cars, and in the 
surrounding area of Beijing, it is also restricted in winter, etc. Besides, the government also 
strengthens on legislation, not being specifically aimed at the atmosphere, and may be 
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comprehensive treatment of waste water, waste gas and solid wastes. 
So, basically the government has realized the scientific decision. Besides, in terms of 
policy effect, it is also successful. As justified various times before, according to the daily air 
quality monitoring data, there are fewer polluted days and much fewer heavy polluted days. 
But as the environmental scientists argued, depending on administrative measures to 
control the air pollution is not always good, especially when looking for a long term. 
As they pointed out, air pollution control is indeed a very difficult and complicated project. 
The main problem is the systemic problem. As mentioned before, the current air pollution 
control is depending on administrative measures, or the compulsory measures, which are always 
palliative measures, and it will probably lead to a backtrack. The government needs to transform 
its model of public services. The relative policies and infrastructures should be laid out and 
configured in all aspects. 
For example, as President Xi pushes a greener approach, officials at every level of 
government are working to put his words into action. The government has set up a special police 
force, and polluting factories have been closed. Officials obediently banned coal, sending 
natural gas sales surging, before backtracking after supply shortfalls left many areas in the cold. 
Similar to the energy structure transformation, the measures on transportation also needs 
overall planning and to improve the appropriate policies and infrastructures. 
The coordination between different regions is also very important, because there is a 
problem of diffusion between regions, so only successfully manage the air pollution in one 
region is not enough. Though the government has realized the problem and has made an effort 
to it, it could be better, as we still can see many high-polluting companies in the neighboring 
provinces of Beijing. 
As the interviewees summarized, the current air pollution control is emphasizing the 
effects, setting a single goal, and not considering multiple goals. And sometimes, sadly to say, 
even morality is not being considered. For example, simply shutting down the polluting 
companies will cause the unemployment of many people, who urgently need this job to raise 
his family. 
As the environmental pollution is a long-term cumulative process, it can’t be cured all at 
once, there will be a process and it needs more time. Moreover, China is currently at the stage 
of development, that industrialization has not yet been completed, and urbanization is still 
advancing rapidly. So they believe that the biggest resistance to restrict the air pollution control 
is its coordination with economic development. On the one hand, the masses hope that the 
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environment will be improved as soon as possible, and on the other hand, they hope that income 
will increase. That is a contradiction. 
Some interviewees also raised an opinion that, basically the air pollution control depends 
on the development of technology, which can fundamentally resolve the energy problem and 
the industry structure. But technology development is not reliable because it is difficult to 
predict. Firstly it’s difficult to predict a certain time, and secondly, it is difficult to predict a 
certain technology. So before the technology completely resolve the problem of air pollution, 
for now, we still need to rely on policies. 
In summary, we do admit that there are many aspects of thoughtless for the governmental 
decisions when considering the balance between environmental protection and economic 
growth, and especially the livelihood issues. But on the other side, the effectiveness of 
governmental control on air pollution is obvious. The environmental problem doesn’t exist 
alone, it always involves complicated problems, which makes it very difficult to resolve. But 
we believe that with the determination of Chinese government, we should keep an optimistic 
eye on the environmental protection and the governance of air pollution, that it will be 
efficiently resolved in short time. 
c. The pro-environmental behaviors 
Meanwhile, we believe that, considering the risk perception of air pollution, people’s self-
protection awareness is definitely enough, but only few people will spontaneously have the 
awareness to save energy and reduce emissions. As IC pointed out, “The understanding of the 
local residents is appropriate, but some people don’t take action, which is a cost problem.” 
The efficiency of coal used for home-heating and the efficiency of petroleum used in cars, 
are the two main sources of pollutants coming from local residents in Beijing. 
From the perspective of energy efficiency, as the result of the questionnaire shows, most 
of the respondents didn’t really have an idea of the heating resource in their homes and didn’t 
notice that the local government have implemented the measure of transforming gas-fired 
heating from coal-fired heating in consideration of the air pollution in winter. These people 
don’t care much about the energy efficiency of the heating resource, which is probably the main 
origin of air pollutant in winter of Beijing. And they don’t care much about the public measures 
of air pollution control. 
We are happily seeing that 87.5% of the respondents positively indicate that there are 
energy-saving facilities in their home. This can be seen as part of the achievement of the long-
term advocacy and promotion of energy efficiency in the whole society. 
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But still, in general, the awareness of energy saving and emission reduction of the residents 
in Beijing is not sufficient. For example, the home constructions and home decorations don’t 
take much consideration of the energy efficiency. 
And considering the transportation, as introduced before, recently vehicle emissions have 
become an increasing problem in urban areas, especially the megacities. And lots of 
governmental measures are aiming at transportation. But the feedback of local scientists is not 
very satisfactory. 
Nearly 70% of the respondents have private cars in their family, and almost 20% of the 
respondents have more than two private cars in their family. And we can see people’s passion 
on participating the “lottery of car license plate”, as almost everyone who are eligible to 
participate the lottery are participating, no matter whether it is necessary. It seems that 
government’s purchase restriction order stimulates people’s desire to buy private cars. 
Another failure on the measures of transportation, that shows the contradiction between 
people’s willingness to drive private cars and governmental control on transportation is that, 
they restrict the private cars’ travel according to its plate tail number, but as a result, many 
people buy two cars instead. 
It is said that the main measure for reducing emissions of transportation is to develop 
public transportation. Actually the government of Beijing is paying their effort to this issue, the 
subway lines are dense and fast. “Intelligent bus” is put into use. “Sharing bicycles” are 
encouraged as a supplement of the traditional public transportation, and it is very cheap. The 
public transportation in Beijing has already developed quite well, but it still doesn’t offer a good 
enough condition to the local residents. For example, compared to its population density, the 
density of the subway network should at least doubled. 
Besides, although the government actively encourages everyone to buy electric cars, there 
are only 15% of the respondents own electric cars. There are many people hesitating, and even 
many of those who have bought electric cars are still dreaming to buy a fuel car. The main 
reason is that, we do admit that it is a good trend to promoting new energy cars, but recently 
the technology of new energy vehicles is still not perfect, and the supporting facilities are not 
complete. 
When considering the long-distance transportation, the aircraft’s carbon emissions are 
amazingly large. According to China Industry Information Network, in 2016, China’s flight 
times per capita are as low as 0.35 times/year, but the result of the present research shows, in 
2017, most of the scientists have taken flights for 3-5 times. From this perspective, compared 
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to the extremely low flight times per capita in the country, the scientists’ emission of 
transportation, especially of taking flights, is noteworthy high. 
Now a days, China’s logistics industry is famous all over the world, as it’s so fast and 
cheap. It is very convenient to buy anything from anywhere in the country and even from abroad 
through the internet. And more and more Chinese people are used to the new form of purchasing. 
But at the same time, people don’t consider much about the emissions from transportation and 
logistics, especially for those who prefer buying imported products. At the same time, the 
packages of delivery is also a huge waste. 
Different from what I assumed, it seems that the educational level is not necessarily 
directly related to environmental cognition. Of course, as I explained, the group of people of 
this research is the local scientists, which means all of them have completed undergraduate 
education, and most of them have Graduate degree. But here I mean, that there is no significant 
difference between people who have doctoral title and the others when considering the 
environmental cognition. 
But with no doubt, all of the interviewees, with their educational background or their 
research background directly related to environmental issues, have shown more awareness of 
energy efficiency than the others. For example, they are more willingly to take public 
transportation than private cars and prefer eating at home or at restaurant to ordering takeaway 
food. 
Government can’t rely on the improvement of citizen’s own environmental awareness, it 
depends on policy constraints. As well, the overall consideration of the facilities and policies 
of the whole society itself should be improved to be more environmentally-friendly, and then it 
is possible to promote the residents to be more conscious of that. 
Face to a serious environmental risk, the last choice that local people can make is 
emigration, which seems much easier in the contemporary society. But the result of the present 
research in this aspect shows a distance of China from the imagination of the cosmopolitan 
world. In this aspect, considering the educational background, it seems that there is no 
difference between people who have doctoral title and the others. 
We believe that the air pollution in Beijing won’t lead to immigration of the residents, 
because until now, the migration in China is still mainly driven by economic factors. And most 
of the people are optimistic about the future situation of air pollution control in Beijing. 
But we should admit that air pollution is one of the factors of population mobility, as 
migration depends on multiple considerations, and the environment is one of the factors. 
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Though the air pollution may not have big influence on immigration, it does have some negative 
impact on attracting human resources. 
To the experts in the field of environmental policy, their research behaviors are also very 
important to the governmental measures and eventually have an impact on the environment. So 
the interaction between scientists and policy-making departments is an important consideration 
in this study. 
According to the interviewees, their main production are academic papers, and the main 
audience is the peer, though the original construction purpose of the institution was to set up a 
national think-tank, and a series of channels for upward reporting have been opened. As the 
institution was transformed from a national research institute, the researchers are still used to 
write academic papers other than consulting reports, it needs a process of transformation. 
But they have already gotten some successful experiences for playing the role of “national 
think-tank” and been ready for the new identity. Apart from the academic papers, the scientists 
also conduct research reports, consulting reports and short special reporting information, and 
some of them also develop software systems applied to policy analysis, others even directly 
supporting the climate negotiations. Many of them have long-term cooperation with 
governmental departments. Although most of the interviewees modestly think that their 
research doesn’t have close or direct impact on decision-making layer, as to them, policy-
making is layer by layer, and they are mainly in the basic methodological and technical level, 
then there are specific departments of policy recommendations. 
At the same time, it is also not easy to evaluate the impact of their research on decision 
making of the governments. Some of the interviewees even show dissatisfaction with the 
current communication mechanism between them and the decision-making departments, 
because the content of their reports is not well communicated with the superior. Firstly, the 
decision-making level won’t tell the scientists about the problem of their report, so there is no 
opportunity for improvement. Secondly, the reporting channel is not smooth nor transparent. 
That’s also why many young scientists still prefer to write academic papers, at least there are 
feedback to them. 
The decision-making process does not listen to one person, and the area of climate change 
includes a big team. To the interviewees, they are one of the centers in the team, but it’s 
impossible to say how much influence they have. It is what the academic community is working 
together to get a consistent opinion and then report to the decision-making layer. So they can’t 
say that they directly influenced the decision, but they would say that many of the policies are 
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consistent with what they suggested before, so they believe that their suggestions have played 
a role for the policy-making. 
Also, the scientists are adapting their research behaviors during the interaction with policy-
making bodies. Because, to give suggestions to the policy-making departments, firstly it must 
be the most concerned issue, secondly the suggestion must be feasible. As the central 
government is concerned about the problem of climate changes, the scientists’ work is to help 
the government to solve the problems, such as how to achieve the country’s carbon emission 
goals, to achieve the country’s green transformation or low-carbon development. Once the state 
has paid attention to it, everyone in the society has to respond to it. For the scientists, they focus 
on national needs and issues, while conducting systematic research to provide systematic 
solutions and policy ideas, so the government’s intention has a great influence on their research. 
So, the aim is to form a benign interaction between the top and bottom, or more specific, 
between the scientists and the policy-making departments, which is the core to the improvement 
of environmental policy. 
Environmental problems is more seen as an international problem, especially the problem 
of air pollution and climate change, so in this perspective, the international cooperation of the 
scientists is also a very important issue to be considered in this research. 
In general, as the interviewees informed, participation of international meetings within a 
week is very frequent, on average almost everyone would participate once or twice a year. But 
short-term (few months to one-year) visits are less frequent, and intensive collaborative 
research is rare, and on average there will be only one or two cooperative papers in a few years. 
Most of them haven’t had experience of studying abroad or being visit-researcher abroad. So 
in summary, for this group of experts, there is no particularly close cooperation with the foreign 
organizations or institutions, normally it’s just to have an exchange of ideas during the 
international meetings. 
Mainly the collaborative research is conducted with international organizations, with the 
foreign institutes is even rarer. There are also other forms of collaborate research, such as 
collaborative research with Chinese people who work in foreign institutes. 
The Ministry of Science and Technology also has special projects of international science 
and technology cooperation, but most advocate enterprises as the leader to apply, and they can 
call universities and research institutions to participate. But there are very few cases of this kind 
of international cooperation in our institution. 
According to the interviewees, they did have successfully conducted some intensive 
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collaborate research with foreign institutes. There are many exchanges and visits. Because 
“climate change” itself is an international topic. On the one hand, they have to keep up with hot 
topics, on the other hand, they need to be well-known in the international arena, so that they 
can have a voice for the case and the plan that they proposed. But there are some problems and 
considerations that avoid the researchers from more intensive international cooperation. 
First, the practice of international cooperation always becomes a mere formality, and there 
is no effort to truly implement cooperative research, and it is difficult to produce any valuable 
results. The participation in the international cooperation is not a big gain, and involves too 
much time and effort. 
Second, after all, “Climate change” is a political issue and it is not easy to cooperate, that’s 
why there are many short-term meetings, but not many real cooperative R&D. “Climate change” 
is a problem of strong competition among various countries. Of course, international 
cooperation is needed, but in many cases it is hard to talk deeply. If not being careful, it is very 
likely that one thing you talked will become a tool for others to attack you. Therefore, they base 
their research in China, and with foreign countries they mainly maintain some communications, 
and not intervene in specific projects. When considering the issue of international cooperation, 
they do have some conservative ideas because “climate change” is too sensitive. Perhaps one 
of the decision-making mistakes is a loss of hundreds of billions of dollars. So they are 
maintaining an active international exchange, but more cautious for cooperation. But still, they 
do admit that the political issue is mainly in the negotiation, and many of the specific problems 
can also be cooperated. 
The third reason is that now the West has less and less worthy learning in the 
environmental field. We have learned a lot from them, but our problems are very complicated 
and special, so their experience may not be completely useful for us. 
Fourth, there are fewer opportunities to fund young people to participate in international 
cooperation. 
3.The division of local scientists in relation to pro-environmental behavior and the 
reasons 
According to the survey of Public Attitudes and Behaviors in relation to Environment in 
the UK by DEFRA, it divided the audience into seven groups in terms of their recognition of 
the risk of climate change and their willingness to react to it at the level of their daily lives: 
“Positive greens”; “Waste-watchers”; “Concerned consumers”; “Sideline supporters”; 
“Cautious participants”; “Stalled starters”; “Honestly disengaged”. As introduced previous, 
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firstly we would like to fit the local scientists of Beijing into these groups of division. 
Almost all of the interviewees, meaning those who have their background of education or 
research from the area of the environment, have shown the strong characteristics of the “positive 
greens”, accepting that they should do as much as they can to limit their impact on the 
environment. For example, they will surely turn off all the electrical facilities when leaving a 
place. They try their best to use as less natural resources, such as water, paper and packages etc. 
as they can. And they evite driving private cars, as well as support for the purchase of electric 
cars. 
Meanwhile, most of the respondents fit in the following two clusters: the “sideline 
supporters”, those who accept that air pollution is a major problem, yet they are not 
contemplating any particular changes to their lifestyles; and the “stalled starters”, saying they 
don’t know much about air pollution, and, in any case, lack the means to take any steps to help 
with the issue. 
Here we do need to pay attention to the influence of people’s non-affluent backgrounds on 
their environmental behaviors. To Giddens (2009:100-110), the group labelled the “stalled 
starters”, they are mostly from non-affluent backgrounds, for example, most can’t afford a car, 
but would like to buy one if they could. This is particularly coincide with the Chinese reality, 
as it has been extremely poor for 200 years, and then quickly became rich in the past 30 years, 
it is inevitable that “materialism” will rise for a while (Zhang 2004). As a result, for many it’s 
a common and interesting phenomenon that energy conservation and emission reduction are 
sometimes considered to be “stingy”, and some people always take “waste” as a way to show 
off their richness. These can be explained by the “Psychological compensation”, that people 
need to completely fulfill from the wealth after a long time of poverty. And it is also deeply 
related to the Chinese traditional “Mianzi”(面子, face) culture, the spread of consumerism and 
the different way of emergence of individualism in China. 
The cluster of “honestly disengaged” are those feel indifferent towards air pollution. And 
surprisingly, if we extend the conditions of the group of “honestly disengaged”, we can see the 
tendency of people to fit in this group from their attitude to the governmental policies for air 
pollution control. As half of the respondents admit that they will take initiatives to evade some 
of the policies that brought inconvenience to their lives. 
Of course, the division of DEFRA is not the only way to divide people’s environmental 
behaviors. Based on the works of Burton, Kates and White (1993) and Park (1985), four 
different models of risk behavior can be identified: (a)The risk is not perceived; (b)The risk is 
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perceived, but it is accepted passively; (c)Risk is reduced by a positive attitude;(d)Risk leads to 
change (migration) or to transformation of land-use. As in their studies, the risk of air pollution 
is mainly considered in the “Model a”, that is “the risk is not perceived”. As they explained, in 
this case, the individuals are not aware of the threat as they judge its manifestation or its effects 
unlikely. Generally, no losses have yet occurred or, if they occurred, they were insignificant 
and their impacts were absorbed easily. Hence, risk does not become a concern and the 
community remains at the mercy of circumstances. As it is typical behavior in areas threatened 
by phenomena with slow and gradual evolution such as air pollution. 
But to the case of Beijing, especially as to the group of local scientists, as justified 
previously, apparently  the risk of air pollution is perceived. 
Meanwhile, the “Model d: Risk leads to change (migration) or to transformation of land-
use” is also not that fit to the case of Beijing when analyzing the risk behaviors of the local 
scientists. As in this type of situation, the intolerance threshold has been reached and the risk 
implies the modification of land use, change of dwelling place, or a combination of both. 
Apparently the risk of air pollution in Beijing hasn’t reached the intolerance threshold of the 
local scientists. 
The risk behaviors of the local scientists in Beijing, facing to the risk of air pollution, are 
located mainly to the “Model b” and “Model c”, which are “the risk is perceived, but it is 
accepted passively” or “Risk is reduced by a positive attitude”. To “Model b”, threats are 
recognized and tolerated, as they are considered a kind of “price” for housing. The threshold of 
consciousness has been reached as a result of experience with dangerous situations, so 
individuals know the risk, but passively accept its consequences, since they cannot find 
solutions to the problem, which is the most common in the poor communities. And to “Model 
c”, efforts are made to reduce losses, that is, to reduce vulnerability to the phenomenon, since 
the action threshold has already been reached. The residents became aware of the risk and 
importance of the losses, adopting more effective adjustments for prevention and control, which 
is a typical behavior of more developed regions, whose economic losses are high in accidents 
and the community has the necessary means to adjust. 
But this division of risk behaviors is not perfect enough, as it didn’t consider the possibility 
of taking behaviors to reduce and control the risk. Especially to the risk of air pollution, it has 
been proved (as the cases of London and California) to be an effective and necessary way. So 
we need to make up for this deficiency. 
Facing to the risk of air pollution, the individuals have two strategies of measures to protect 
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themselves, the mitigation behaviors and the adaptation behaviors. And here we define the 
mitigation behaviors as the behaviors that help to mitigate the air pollution, more specifically, 
the energy-saving and emission-reduction behaviors. And the adaptation behaviors are the 
behaviors that help them to reduce the damage of air pollution, more specifically, the self-
protection behaviors, like wearing a mask or using air-purifiers. 
Then we can divide the local scientists according to the “mitigator-adaptor grouping”. In 
this division, we separate the people into 2 series of 4 groups, which are: “positive mitigators”, 
“negative mitigators”, “positive non-mitigators” and “negative non-mitigators”; “positive 
adaptors”, “negative adaptors”, “positive non-adaptors” and “negative non-adaptors”. Simply, 
the “mitigators” are those who take mitigation behaviors and the “adaptors” are those who take 
adaptation behaviors. And “non-” means that they don’t take that kind of behavior. And 
“positive” means that they take their initiatives to take or not take the behaviors, “negative” 
means that their behaviors are passive and are influenced by the environment or by others. In 
this division, one can be described by one of the 8 groups, or by one of the 4 groups of the both 
series (See Table 2). For example, one can be a “positive adaptor” or a “negative mitigator-
positive adaptor”. 
The previous grouping by DEFRA are also correspondent to half of the “mitigator-adaptor” 
grouping, that it fits in the “mitigator” grouping. The group of “positive greens” are also 
“positive mitigators”, as they would like to do as much as they can to limit their impact on the 
environment. While the “waste-watchers” group can be seen as the “negative mitigators”, which 
means they are relevant to environmental goals not by their intention but simply because of lack 
of resources (unconscious, influenced by the social environment). The “concerned consumers” 
are “positive non-mitigators”, as they think they “already do more than a lot of people’” and 
are not willing at the moment to do much more. While the “sideline supporters” are considered 
to be “negative non-mitigators”, as yet they are not contemplating any particular changes to 
their lifestyles. And they don’t think much about the environmental influence of their behaviors 
(unconscious, following the habitat). The “cautious participants” are another kind of “negative 
mitigators”, as their behaviors are depending on the others, saying they “would do more (to 
help the environment) if others did…”. While the “stalled starters” are another kind of “negative 
non-mitigators”, as they believe that they can’t help with the mitigation because of lack of 
knowledge and lack of the means. Finally, the “honestly disengaged” are “positive non-
mitigators”, as they intentionally feel indifferent towards air pollution. 
Those who have their background of education or research from the area of environment, 
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namely the “positive greens” or the “positive mitigators” are not necessary the “positive 
adaptors” at the same time. Actually most of them are “negative adaptors” or “positive non-
adaptors”. 
Most of the interviewees expressed their doubts about the effectiveness of those adaptation 
behaviors and their tendency of being “positive non-adaptors” or “negative adaptors”. The 
difference is just the capacity of resisting the temptation of the psychological comfort. 
Meanwhile, among the common respondents, we found the existence of “positive 
adaptors”, those who are used to wear masks and often use air-purifiers. 
Emigration is another considerable “positive adaptation” behavior. Though according to 
the statistics of the questionnaire, there are not many people considering emigration from 
Beijing, considering the economic conditions, the educational conditions and career 
opportunities. But some of the interviewees noticed that there are some ways to balance. For 
example, some people own property in other environmentally better cities and temporarily live 
there when not busy. These people are the most “positive adaptors”, as they are very able to 
choose their lives and to adapt to the air pollution, to make better conditions to themselves. 
Sadly we can imagine that, the people have the most economic conditions to be “positive 
non-mitigators”, even being able to evade policies of air pollution control, are those who have 
the most conditions to be the “positive adaptors”. Which means, they can make their lives so 
good and comfortable as they want that they don’t even need to care about the air pollution. 
They can “buy” “fresh air”, and “buy” the privilege to emit more, and leave the polluted 
environment to those who don’t have conditions to change their lives. What a tragedy of capital 
inequality! But don’t be too happy yet. Remember that, as well as the climate change increases 
the inequality between the poor and the rich, the center and the edge, it also eliminates it. The 
greater the threat, the less likely the richer and the more powerful people to escape from it. 
Climate change is hierarchical and democratic (Beck 2009, 2011). 
The perception of air pollution of the local people doesn’t exactly correspond to the proper 
pro-environmental behaviors. As it is closely related to the risk of climate change, the 
perception of the risk of air pollution also shows the similar unique characteristics to the 
perception of the risk of climate changes. First, the breadth of risk awareness. Second, the 
differences in risk perception subjects. In the perception of climate change risk, researchers 
usually classify subjects into masses of lay-people and experts based on whether the subject has 
relevant professional knowledge on climate change or not. They have differences in the 
perceptions of causes of climate change, results, and actions (Swim, Stern, et al., 2011). Third, 
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the conflict between risk perception and action. This contradiction prevails, as people are 
concerned about climate change but have not taken corresponding measures (Gifford, 2011). 
In summary, local people’s awareness of the risk of air pollution is sufficient and adequate, 
but instead of correspondingly taking the mitigation behaviors, most of them prefer to only take 
the adaptation behaviors. And different from the masses of lay-people, the experts are more 
likely to take mitigation behaviors than adaptation behaviors, because they are fully aware of 
the fact that mitigation is the real solution of the problem, adaptation is not that useful, and can’t 
fundamentally solve the problem. 
The reasons lead to the difference between the masses of lay-people and the experts, and 
the distance from people’s awareness of the risk of air pollution to the pro-environmental 
behaviors are mainly located in the following 3 aspects. First, the influence of Chinese historical 
and cultural traditions and the current social stage of “compressed modernization”. Second, the 
lack of publicity and education to improve people’s awareness of energy conservation and 
environmental protection. Third, the current scientific research and expert groups could not 
create convincing links to the masses of lay-people between air pollution and personal 
behaviors, mainly because of the contradiction of techno-scientific development and the 
contradictory identity of experts. 
Chinese culture has many aspects, and focusing on “face” (Mianzi，面子) is one of the 
most important ones. “Mianzi behavior” is to do something in order to create a certain image 
of oneself in the minds of others. In interpersonal communication, Chinese people always judge 
the degree of acceptance of each other by whether giving themselves “face”, and then according 
to that to recognize and evaluate each other’s relationship. The social psychology of Chinese 
people’s pursuit of face has a very important link to the traditional “ritual” culture of 
Confucianism. As a result, this traditional Chinese Mianzi culture has created the so-called 
“Chinese-style waste” – which especially prominent in Chinese society, where gifts are over-
packaged, an astonishing amount of luxury consumption, expensive gifts, and luxury office 
buildings, etc. 
At the same time, along with the high speed of development of China, as it has rapidly 
concluded the three industrial revolutions within 30 years, the social problems accompanying 
the industrialization process are also rapidly emerging simultaneously. Chinese society is 
experiencing a “compressed modernization” (Deng, 2010). And as a result, the traditional 
Mianzi culture is combined with the “immature” individualization and the “immature” ideology 
of consumerism, and the improvement of people’s economic conditions, so the phenomenon of 
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waste and people’s belief of “taking ‘waste’ as a way to show off their richness” is becoming a 
more unique and significant situation in the Chinese society. 
So it is not surprising, when we see from the results of the present research, other than the 
experts, almost all of the local lay-people are fully aware of air pollution, but facing that, so 
many of them choose to be “positive adaptors” and “negative mitigators”, or even worse 
“positive non-mitigators”, if they have sufficient economic conditions. 
We believe that, to improve people’s perception of air pollution and further improve 
people’s awareness of positive mitigation behaviors, it must focus on the publicity and 
education. 
The essence of “face-consumption” is an act of dishonesty, irrationality, and a lack of awe. 
To break the “face” culture, we need to build a humanistic spirit of integrity, rationality, and 
awe. Customs are a solid form of culture. To transform culture, it is important to transform 
customs. In this process, we could make use of the guiding force of the mass media in the 
individualized society. 
Mass media certainly have the force to orient the common people toward the improvement 
of environmental awareness, especially as in China, under the specific political system, the 
government still play a very strong guiding role to public opinion. the determination of Chinese 
government on environmental problems, we believe that it can play the guiding role, through 
the publicity of mass media, to improve the environmental awareness of people. Chinese 
government have been making a force on the publicity to improve people’ environmental 
awareness, promoting a thrifty lifestyle. 
The improvement of education quality will lead to the improvement of citizens’ quality, 
which includes the high awareness of their responsibility to the environment. To improve the 
education isn’t limited to the school education, family education and the whole social 
environment is also very important. On the other hand, one person’s behaviors also have an 
impact on the whole family. In this aspect, education also has great potential to improve the 
environmental awareness of the whole society. 
Of course, all environmental issues are complementary, and not personal problems. The 
improvement of people’s environmental awareness is largely influenced by various aspects, not 
only the education, but also the constraints of the policy system. The improvement of 
environmental awareness is a process of continuous interaction. The environmental awareness 
will not be simply improved by learning from school or by publicity, there must be some 
constraints as well. Especially for those people whose habits have been solidified, we can only 
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rely on economic and administrative means, by improving the cost of their emissions, to correct 
their behaviors. 
Besides, another main reason that the local people don’t take mitigation behaviors is that 
they are not well informed and convinced what exactly is the origin of the air pollution. 
People’s environmental awareness and perception of the risk of air pollution is influenced 
by the fact that people’s lack of trust toward expert system. This is exactly a reflection of the 
contradictory identity of experts along with the contradiction of techno-scientific development 
in the process of scientization. 
The scientization not only brought the crisis of trust towards the experts, which further 
influences people’s perception and environmental behaviors towards air pollution, in fact it is 
also strictly related to the risk of air pollution itself. 
All of the characteristics of modernity, such as globalization, individualization, the 
urbanization and the rapid expansion of big cities, are all related with the development of 
science and technology. 
To the problem of air pollution, with no doubt it is a result of industrialization, considering 
the directly industrial emissions and the emissions during the use of industrial products, fuel 
vehicles for example. And the industrialization itself is a result of development of science and 
technology. In this aspect, science and technology is the cause of the risk of air pollution. But 
at the same time, it could be the solution of air pollution as well. 
But science is always unpredictable. We can only give a trend, but it is difficult to give a 
concrete prediction. We can’t predict exactly which technology will finally solve the problem, 
nor can we predict when this technology will be successfully developed. So we have to rely on 
science and technology, but we cannot entirely rely on science and technology. At the same 
time, and for the present stage of development of the country, the policies-choices is still 
playing a very important role. 
As long as we haven’t found the fundamental solution through the development of science 
and technology, to realize the sustainable development, we should still rely on the policies to 
make this balance between environment and development. At the same time, policies also play 
an important role of orientation during the development of technology and the process of 
environmental management. 
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Attachments: 
一、调查问卷 
本问卷不记名，请如实填写。 
 
以下涉及以“家庭”为单位的问题，“家庭成员”均包括本人及所有共同居住的直系亲属。
例如：已婚者“家庭成员”应包括本人、配偶、未婚子女（若子女已婚但仍共同居住也
应计入）、共同居住的父母；离异、丧偶者“家庭成员”应包括本人、子女（若子女归
本人抚养）及共同居住的父母；离异重组家庭其成员应包括本人、现任配偶、共同居
住的子女和继子女以及共同居住的父母；未婚者“家庭成员”应包括本人和共同居住的
父母、未婚兄弟姐妹。 
 
基本信息： 
年龄：_______  性别：____ 籍贯：________ 家庭人口总数：_____人 
受教育程度：__________ 职称：_____________ 
最高学历研究领域：______________________________________ 
现工作从事领域：________________________________________ 
 
1. 你的家庭共拥有几辆私家车？  
0 辆   1 辆   2 辆   3 辆   3 辆以上 
2. 你家的第一辆私家车是何时购买的？（上题选“0 辆”者无需回答） 
_______年_______月 
3. 你的家庭是否拥有电动汽车？ 
是     否 
4. （若上一题答案为“是”，请回答）除了电动汽车外，你家是否还拥有或准备购买燃
油汽车？ 
拥有燃油汽车 
目前没有，但正准备购买燃油汽车（已经在参加燃油小客车指标摇号） 
目前没有，但仍期望在未来购买燃油汽车 
目前没有，且不考虑购买燃油汽车 
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5. 多远的距离你倾向于使用私家车或出租车出行？（可多选） 
0-2km     2-5km     5-10km     10km 以上 
6. 2017 年你搭乘了多少次飞机？（往返算 2 次，联程转机算 1 次） 
0 次   1-2 次   3-5 次   5-10 次   10 次以上 
7. 你家的主要采暖措施是什么？（可多选） 
公共燃煤取暖 
私家燃煤取暖 
电取暖 
太阳能取暖 
其他，请说明___________________ 
8. （上题若为燃煤取暖，请回答）你家取暖用煤是否为洗精煤？ 
是 
不是 
我不知道什么是洗精煤 
我不知道我家取暖用煤是否为洗精煤 
9. 你家是否拥有节能设施？（如节能灯、节能热水器，等等） 
是       否        不知道 
10. 你会举报高污染企业吗？（可多选） 
会，且曾经举报过 
会，但是没有发现过高污染企业 
会，但是不知道举报渠道 
不会，跟我没什么关系 
不会，举报了也没用 
11. 你是否会拒绝购买高污染企业生产的产品？ 
是，坚决抵制 
没考虑过这个问题，且我无法区分商品生产者是否为高污染企业 
不一定，我会综合考虑各方面因素 
否，性价比高最重要 
12. 你是否愿意以高出普通产品的价格来购买环保型或生态型产品？ 
是       否 
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13. 你是否倾向于购买本地生产者生产的产品？ 
是，除了本地买不到的必需品，我都会选择本地生产的产品 
否，能力范围内我更喜欢购买进口商品 
无所谓，从不关心产地，性价比高最重要 
14. 你是否知道某些生态/环保企业并购买过他们的产品吗？ 
我不知道任何生态/环保企业 
我知道一些生态/环保企业，但从来没买过他们的产品 
我知道一些生态/环保企业，且购买过他们的产品 
15. 你认为北京的空气污染影响了你的健康吗？（可多选） 
完全没有 
经常感到呼吸系统不适，但我认为大部分情况和空气污染无关 
经常感到呼吸系统不适，且我认为是空气污染导致的 
偶尔或经常感到心脑血管系统不适，但我认为和空气污染无关 
偶尔或经常感到心脑血管系统不适，且我认为与空气污染有直接关系 
16. 你认为北京的空气污染威胁到你或你家人的生命安全了吗？（可多选） 
完全不会 
空气污染影响了我的健康状况，但我认为不会影响我的寿命 
空气污染直接影响了我的健康，且会威胁我的寿命 
空气污染影响了家中老人的健康，但我认为不会影响老人的寿命 
空气污染直接影响了家中老人的健康，且会威胁老人的寿命 
空气污染影响了家中孩子的健康状况，但我认为不会影响孩子的寿命 
空气污染直接影响了家中孩子的健康，且会威胁孩子的寿命 
17. 你认为北京的空气污染状况在近几年（5 年内）会如何变化？ 
空气污染会持续恶化 
空气质量会越来越好 
不会有什么明显变化 
18. 你家共有几台空气净化器？（若拥有多处住房，请合并计算） 
0   1   2   3   3 台以上 
19. 你出门经常戴口罩吗？ 
除非天气特别好的时候，我几乎每天出门都戴口罩，毕竟也没什么坏处 
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我会关注官方空气质量报告，根据建议佩戴口罩 
我每天目测空气情况，如果觉得污染严重就戴口罩 
我很少戴口罩，除非污染特别严重的时候 
20. 在污染严重的天气你会尽量避免出门吗？ 
会，能不出门就不出门 
不会，该干嘛还干嘛 
21. 如果北京的空气污染持续严重，你是否考虑迁出北京？ 
不会 
会，考虑迁回我的老家 
会，考虑迁往国内其他城市 
会，考虑移民国外 
我不会，但愿意我的子女迁居国内其他城市 
我不会，但愿意我的子女移民国外 
没有考虑过这个问题 
22. 请描述你的海外背景（可多选）： 
本人曾有短期海外旅居经历（1-6 个月） 
本人曾有短期海外生活经历（6-12 个月） 
本人曾有中期海外生活经历（1-2 年） 
本人曾有长期海外生活经历（2 年以上） 
本人有亲属在海外定居（在该国有固定工作、或有永久居留权、或有国籍，符合任
何一条均可） 
本人无任何海外背景 
其他，请说明_________________________________________ 
23. 你认为目前北京的空气污染治理有效吗？ 
有效，空气污染情况有所改善 
无效，空气污染情况持续恶化 
一般，空气污染情况没有明显改善 
24. 你对北京空气污染治理的相关政策有所了解吗？ 
完全不了解，不关心这方面政策 
有一定了解，只关心涉及到我切身利益的政策 
266 
 
 
基本了解，不主动关注，但会经常接收到相关信息 
十分了解，会主动关注这方面政策 
25. 你对北京空气污染治理的政策措施持何种态度？  
政策措施行之有效，我绝对支持 
政策措施有一定效果，但同时增加了我的生活负担和成本，总体支持 
政策措施有一定效果，我基本支持，但不支持某些一刀切的惰政，会主动规避 
政策措施效果不大，多属愚政惰政，我总体不支持，会主动规避 
 
 
I. Questionnaire 
This questionnaire is anonymous, please fill it honestly. 
 
The following questions which deal with the issue of “family” as the unit, “Family members” 
(or “Total household population”) include yourself and all immediate family members living 
together. I.e., the “family members” of married persons should include themselves, their 
spouses, cohabiting unmarried children (if the children are married but still living together 
should also be counted), and cohabiting parents; the “family members” of whom are divorced 
or widowed should include themselves and their children (if the children are the dependents) 
and cohabiting parents; the members of the divorced reconstituted family shall include the 
individual, the current spouse, cohabiting children and step-children, and cohabiting parents; 
the unmarried persons’ “family members” should include both themselves and cohabiting 
parents, brothers and sisters. 
 
Basic information: 
Age: _______   Gender: ____   Origin (birthplace): ________  
Total household population: _____ 
Education level: __________   Job title: _____________ 
Research area of your highest education: ___________________________  
Recent working area: ______________________________________  
 
1. How many private cars do you have in your family? 
0   1   2   3   more than 3 
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2. When did you buy the first private car in your family? （no need to answer this question if 
you choose 0 in the last question） 
______________(month/year) 
3. Do you have electric car(s) in your family? 
Yes     No 
4. （If you choose “yes” in the last question, please answer）Does your family own or plan 
to buy fuel car(s)? 
Already own fuel car(s) 
Do not own fuel car, but plan to buy one recently (already participating the License Plate 
Lottery of fuel cars)  
Do not own fuel car, but consider buying one in the future 
Do not own fuel car, and won’t consider buying one 
5. How far away do you tend to use a private car or taxi to travel? (Multiple choice) 
0-2km     2-5km     5-10km     more than 10km  
6. How many flights did you take in 2017? (Returns count for 2 times, Interline Turns count 
for 1 time) 
0   1-2   3-5   5-10   more than 10 
7. What is the main heating measure in your home? (Multiple choice if necessary) 
Public coal-fired heating 
Private coal-fired heating 
Electric heating 
Solar heating 
Others, please specify ___________________ 
8. （If you choose coal-fired heating, please answer）Is your home heating coal a clean coal? 
Yes 
No 
I do not know what is “clean coal” 
I do not know whether it is clean coal or not 
9. Does your home have energy-saving facilities? (eg. energy-saving lamps, energy-saving 
water heaters, etc.) 
Yes       No        I don’t know 
10. Will you report a highly-polluting company? (Multiple choice) 
Yes, and I have reported once or more 
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Yes, but I didn’t know any highly-polluting company 
Yes, but I don’t know how and to whom to report it 
No, it is not my business 
No, I don’t think it will make any difference 
11. Will you refuse to buy products produced by highly polluting companies? 
Yes, resolutely resist 
I did not consider this issue, and I cannot distinguish whether a commodity producer is a 
highly polluting company. 
Not necessarily, I will consider all aspects 
No, cost-effectiveness is the most important 
12. Are you willing to buy eco-friendly or environmentally-friendly products at higher prices 
than regular products? 
Yes       No 
13. Are you inclined to buy products made by local producers? 
Yes, I prefer local products except for those necessary but don’t have locally. 
No, I always choose the imported products within my capability. 
Indifferent, I never considered the producer location, cost-effectiveness is more important. 
14. Do you know any eco/environmental companies and have purchased their products? 
I don’t know any eco/environmental companies 
I know some eco/environmental companies, but never bought their products 
I know some eco/environmental companies and purchased their products 
15. Do you think the air pollution in Beijing has affected your health? (Multiple choice) 
Absolutely not 
I often feel respiratory discomfort, but I think mostly are not related to air pollution 
I often feel respiratory discomfort and I think it is caused by air pollution. 
Occasionally or often feel discomfort in the cardio-cerebrovascular system, but I think it 
has nothing to do with air pollution 
Occasionally or often feels discomfort in the cardio-cerebrovascular system, and I think it 
is directly related to air pollution. 
16. Do you think the air pollution in Beijing threatens the safety of you or your family? 
(Multiple choice) 
Not at all 
Air pollution affects my health, but I don’t think it will affect my life expectancy 
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Air pollution directly affects my health and threatens my life 
Air pollution affects the health of the elderly at home, but I do not think it will threaten the 
lives of the elderly. 
Air pollution directly affects the health of the elderly at home and threatens the lives of the 
elderly 
Air pollution affects the health of children at home, but I don’t think it will threaten their 
lives 
Air pollution directly affects the health of children at home and threatens their lives 
17. How do you think the air pollution situation in Beijing will change in recent years (within 
five years)? 
Air pollution will continue to deteriorate 
Air quality will get better and better 
There will be no significant changes 
18. How many air-purifiers are there in your home? (If you have more than one house or 
apartment, please combine the calculations) 
0   1   2   3   more than 3 
19. Do you always wear a mask when you go out? 
(A)Unless the weather is particularly good, I wear a mask almost every day, because after 
all, it’s no harm. 
(B)I will read the official air quality report everyday and wear masks as recommended. 
(C)I observe the air condition by myself everyday and wear a mask if I feel serious 
pollution 
(D)I rarely wear a mask unless the pollution is particularly serious 
20. Will you try to avoid going out in heavy polluted weather? 
Yes           No 
21. If air pollution in Beijing continues to be severe, do you consider moving out of Beijing? 
(Multiple choice if necessary) 
No 
Yes, I consider relocating to my hometown 
Yes, I consider moving to other cities in China 
Yes, I consider immigrating abroad 
I will not, but would like my children to move to other cities in China 
I will not, but would like my children to immigrate abroad 
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I never considered this issue 
22. Please describe your overseas background (multiple choices): 
I had short overseas travelling experiences (1-6 months) 
I had short-term overseas living experience (6-12 months) 
I had medium-term overseas living experience (1-2 years) 
I had long-term overseas living experience (more than 2 years) 
I have relatives living abroad (have fixed job in this country, or permanent residency, or 
nationality, any one of them may be eligible) 
I have no overseas background 
Others, please specify _____________________________________ 
23. Do you think the current air pollution control in Beijing is effective? 
Effective, air quality has improved 
Invalid, air pollution continues to deteriorate 
General, air quality has not improved significantly 
24. Do you understand Beijing’s related policies for air pollution control? 
Do not understand at all, do not care about these policies 
Have a certain understanding and only care about the policies that involve my immediate 
interests 
Basic understanding, do not follow with interest, but often receive relevant information. 
I am fully aware of these policies and will actively follow the updates 
25. What is your attitude towards the policy measures for air pollution control in Beijing? 
(A) The policy measures are effective and I absolutely support 
(B) Policy measures have a certain effect, but at the same time increase my life burden and 
cost. And overall I support them. 
(C) The policy measures have a certain effect. I basically support it, but I do not support 
certain over-the-counter idle government policies and will take the initiative to evade it. 
(D) The policy measures are not effective. Most of them are inactive foolish government 
policies. I don’t support them as a whole and will take the initiative to evade them. 
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二、深度访谈提纲 
（一）向受访者简要介绍 
向受访者解释研究目的和受访者意见的重要性，并确保对所收集信息保密； 
向受访者告知录制访谈音频的重要性和需求，获得受访者的许可并确保对所收集信息
保密。 
（二）基本信息 
编号：____ 姓名：___________ 年龄：_____ 性别：___ 籍贯：________  
家庭人口总数和构成：_____人，________________________________ 
受教育程度：__________ 职称：_____________ 
最高学历研究领域：_________________________________________ 
现工作从事领域：__________________________________________ 
访谈日期：__________时间：_____________________ 
（三）问题 
1.专家角度 
您从事这方面的研究多久了？ 
您在空气污染治理方面的研究成果主要在哪些方面？ 
您的研究成果的受众群体是谁（学术期刊发表同行交流、智库报告呈交决策机构、公
开出版面向普通大众）？ 
您的研究成果被决策机构采纳的情况如何？ 
从您的研究角度来看，北京的空气污染治理有效吗？ 
空气污染治理举措中存在哪些问题、缺陷、不合理之处？有哪些成功之处？ 
北京空气污染治理的阻力来自哪些方面？ 
在您看来，北京的空气污染状况是如何造成的？受自然地理条件影响更大还是人为因
素影响更大？谁是最大的污染源？ 
您预测北京的空气污染情况会越来越好吗？大概多久能够恢复到宜居、健康的空气环
境？ 
北京的空气污染对居民健康状况的影响有多大？受空气污染威胁最严重的、最无力保
护自己的是哪些人？ 
您认为北京居民对空气污染的认识状况如何？不足、恰当、夸大？具体表现有哪些？ 
您认为北京居民的环保意识如何？具体表现？ 
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北京居民如何有效的自我保护？您认为北京居民的自我防护意识如何？具体表现？ 
空气污染会影响北京的人口流动吗？ 
空气污染治理领域的国际合作情况如何？您本人参加的国际合作研究和国际会议多吗？
有哪些？ 
2.个人角度 
您个人生活在北京，认为生命健康或物质财富受到了空气污染的威胁吗？主要表现有
哪些？ 
您对北京的空气污染治理措施和结果满意吗？为什么？ 
您和家人会比较注重节能环保吗？比如在交通、采暖、消费等方面。为什么？有效吗？ 
您和家人平时生活中会关注空气质量并且主动采取自我保护措施吗？比如空气净化器、
口罩、减少出行等等。为什么？有效吗？ 
您和家人有没有考虑过“逃离北京”？为什么？去哪里？ 
 
II.Questions for Detailed Individual Interview 
(I)Presentation: 
-Presentation of the interviewer: Explain the objectives of the study and the importance of the 
participant's opinions. Guarantee of confidentiality of information collected. 
-Recording: Inform the participant about the importance and need of recording the audios, and 
request authorization for them, ensuring the confidentiality of the information to be collected. 
(II)Basic information: 
Name:________  Age:_______  Gender:____ Origin (birthplace):________  
Total population and composition of the family:_____ 
Education level:__________  Job title:_____________ 
Research area of your highest education:____________________________________ 
Recent working area:____________________________________________________ 
Date of interview: ____/____/_____ Start time:________ End time: _________ 
(III)Questions 
1. Expert perspective 
How long have you been doing research in this field? 
What are your major achievements in the research of air pollution control? 
Who is the audience for your research results (academic journals published for peer-to-peer 
exchanges, think-tank reports submitted to decision-making agencies, or publications opened 
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to the general public)? 
How has your research been adopted by the decision-making agencies? 
From your research perspective, are the measures of air pollution control in Beijing effective? 
What are the problems, deficiencies, and irrationalities in the air pollution control measures? 
And in which aspects are successful? 
What are the obstacles to Beijing’s air pollution control? 
In your opinion, what is the main origin of air pollution in Beijing? Is it more affected by natural 
geographical conditions or is it more influenced by human behaviors? What is the biggest 
source of pollution? 
Do you predict that the air pollution situation in Beijing will become better and better? How 
long will it take to return to a livable, healthy air environment? 
How does Beijing’s air pollution affect the health of residents? Who are the most vulnerable to 
the threat of air pollution? 
How do you think Beijing’s residents know about air pollution? Insufficient, appropriate, or 
exaggerated? What are the specific performance? 
What do you think of the environmental awareness of Beijing’s residents? And the specific 
performance? 
How can Beijing’s residents effectively protect themselves? What do you think of the self-
defense awareness of Beijing’s residents? And the specific performance? 
Does air pollution affect the population flow in Beijing? 
How is the international cooperation in the field of air pollution treatment? Do you participate 
in international cooperative research and international conferences? Please give any examples? 
2. Individual perspective 
According to your experience of living in Beijing, do you personally believe that your life 
quality, health or material wealth is threatened by air pollution? What are the main 
performances? 
Are you satisfied with the air pollution control measures and results in Beijing? Why? 
Are you and your family more concerned about energy saving and environmental protection? 
For example, in transportation, heating, and consumption. Why? Is it effective? 
Do you and your family focus on air quality in your daily life and take the initiative to take self-
protection measures? Such as air purifiers, masks, reduce travel and so on. Why? Is it effective? 
Have you and your family ever considered “escape from Beijing”? Why? If yes, where to go? 
 
